Crisis Elections, New Contenders and Government Formation

Breaking the Mould in Southern Europe

Anna Bosco, Susannah Verney

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367892548
• eBook ISBN: 9781351332347
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The parliamentary elections of 2015–16 in Greece, Spain and Portugal had extraordinary consequences, bringing repeat elections, unprecedented processes of government formation and uncharted government outcomes. Greece formed a coalition of radical left and radical right and Portugal its first government supported by the communist party while Spain took ten months to get a government. These developments are especially astonishing in three states which in previous decades were a byword for democratic stability. After the transitions following the fall of their dictatorships in the 1970s, Greece, Spain and Portugal established bipolar electoral competition and predictable patterns of government formation. But more recently, all three countries have been in the frontline of the economic crisis and austerity implementation, triggering electoral realignments and turning the radical left into a major player. This volume offers essential understanding of the political destabilisation of Southern Europe. It includes detailed analyses of all five 'crisis elections' and of Greece's bailout referendum. It also provides studies of the five 'new contender' parties (SYRIZA, Podemos, Ciudadanos, the Bloco Esquerda and the Portuguese Communist Party) which played a key role in government formation for the first time. The chapters originally published as a special issue in South European Society and Politics.

From Electoral Epidemic to Government Epidemic: The Next Level of the Crisis in Southern Europe

Anna Bosco

and Susannah Verney

ABSTRACT
With the elections of 2015–16 in Greece, Spain and Portugal, the political fallout from the economic crisis in Southern Europe reached a new level. An overview of the new electoral arenas and party systems is followed by an investigation of the paths to government formation. Unprecedented events during (multiple) processes of government formation, uncharted outcomes in government types and governing party identities, and the necessity to repeat elections are three features defining a new syndrome that first appeared in Greece but has now spread to Iberia. In Southern Europe the road to incumbency has become arduous and the risk of government instability high.

Inconclusive elections that had to be repeated; the breakdown of established patterns of political representation; a winning party that refused a mandate to form a government; a winning coalition rejected by a no confidence vote; a government coalition of the radical left and nationalist right; a left–left cabinet agreement; and a case of parties repeatedly failing to form any coalition government. These are just some of the unprecedented events that have recently marked the perilous path from elections to government installation in Southern Europe.

In the first phase of the economic crisis (2010–11), Southern Europe faced the outbreak of an ‘electoral epidemic’ whose hallmarks were declining voter turnout, severe incumbent punishment without special benefit for the official opposition, and the emergence of new contenders (Bosco & Verney 2012). A second phase in 2012–13 consolidated ‘protest elections and challenger parties’ as the prevalent characteristics of the new electoral scene (Verney & Bosco 2015). In the following years, the electoral epidemic has spread further. With the last wave of general elections in Greece, Portugal and Spain (2015–16), the political cost of the crisis, which had initially affected the national party systems, seems to have passed to the government level, shaking the process of government formation, changing the identity of incumbents and, ultimately, undermining the stability of the executives.

A decade into the economic disruption that started in 2008 (Frieden & Walter forthcoming; Pontusson & Raess 2012), a vast research repertoire has shown how the Great Recession has affected democratic life in Southern Europe. A number of works have revealed how the structural reforms and austerity policies implemented in response to the crisis (spending cuts, tax increases, welfare trimming and the freezing of public sector employment) together with their main consequences (an upsurge in unemployment, consumer demand compression and social inequalities) have had an impact on the circuit of democratic representation.

The changes in voters’ preferences, the increase in electoral volatility and the decline in electoral turnout; the spread of new and old forms of protest; the decay of mainstream parties and the appearance of powerful anti-establishment challengers; the growth of distrust in political institutions and the dwindling capacity of parties to channel and represent the positions of their voters are among the dimensions affected by the crisis and discussed in the literature (see, among others, Freire & Lisi 2016; Hernández & Kriesi 2016; Magalhães 2014; Moury & De Giorgi 2015; Torcal 2014). In fact, the impact of the crisis on South European democracies has been so great that we cannot but agree with the conclusion that the Great Recession has ended up affecting the quality of democracy at large: ‘worsening of the economy mainly affects the rule of law, electoral accountability, participation, equality and responsiveness’ (Morlino & Quaranta 2016, p. 626).

This volume aims to update our understanding of the South European electoral epidemic through scrutiny of the most recent national parliamentary elections and the most successful challenger parties. It also seeks to highlight the way in which the electoral malaise is being transferred to the government level, with presently unforeseeable consequences for the long-term stability of South European democracy. These goals are reflected in the structure of this introductory article, which pursues a causal progression, examining first the new electoral landscape, then the reshaped party systems to which this has given rise and, finally, the latter’s consequences for government formation and longevity.

What makes this story even more striking is that it is playing out in a region that, in the decades since the fall of the authoritarian regimes in the 1970s, has been widely regarded as a democratic success story and a byword for democratic stability and predictability. It is also worth noting that the 2015–16 elections were held at a time when it seemed the worst of the economic crisis might be over. Portugal had exited its European Union/International Monetary Fund (EU/IMF) sovereign bailout in May 2014, just a few months after Spain exited its bank bailout. In 2014, after several years of recession, all three economies saw a switch to positive growth (of 0.8 per cent of gross domestic product [GDP] in Greece, 0.9 per cent in Portugal and 1.4 per cent in Spain). This was accompanied by a marginal drop in the unemployment rate (by 1.0 per cent of the economically active population in Greece, 1.6 per cent in Spain and 2.3 per cent in Portugal) (European Commission 2015). Yet this muted brightening of the economic prospects did not ameliorate the political discontent generated during the crisis years. Instead, the political crisis continued to deepen.

The advance of the electoral epidemic

Each of the five South European national parliamentary elections that took place in 2015–16 is covered in detail in an article in this volume (Tsirbas 2016 on the Greek contest of January 2015; Tsatsanis & Teperoglou 2016 on Greece in September 2015; De Giorgi & Santana-Pereira 2016 on Portugal in October 2015; Orriols & Cordero 2016 on Spain in December 2016; and Simón 2016 on Spain in June 2016). The aim of this section is not to repeat the details of the individual contests that feature in these articles. Rather, it aspires to offer a comparative overview of the new electoral landscape that has emerged in Greece, Portugal and Spain. To do so, it is necessary also to take into account the four other national parliamentary elections held during the crisis period (Spain and Portugal in 2011, Greece in May and June 2012). Doing so will help us to contextualise the most recent electoral wave in the sequence of crisis elections.

If we look at the electoral panorama of Greece, Spain and Portugal from a late 2016 viewpoint, the first feature to be emphasised is the variation in the number of elections. Five elections took place between 2009 and 2015 in Greece, four between 2008 and 2016 in Spain and three between 2009 and 2015 in Portugal. Since the beginning of the crisis, none of the three countries has avoided early elections. But in Greece and Spain some elections were very close to one another – an indicator of crisis according to Morlino (1998, p. 85) – while Portugal only recorded one snap poll in 2011.

According to the classic formulation by Hirschman (1970), voters have a choice between ‘exit’, ‘voice’ and ‘loyalty’. If we examine the figures on abstention in Table 1, it is clear that in Greece there has been a significant increase in voters opting for ‘exit’. The proportion of those not going to the polls has increased steadily at every Greek election since the start of the crisis. Over the six years between the elections of October 2009 and September 2015, the total increase in abstainers reached 14.7 per cent of the total electorate. Particularly striking is the jump of 7.7 per cent between January and September 2015. If we consider that in this last election 2.4 per cent of those voting chose to cast blank or invalid ballots, this means that less than 54 per cent of voters were prepared to indicate a preference for one of the political parties. If the level of electoral participation is regarded as an important gauge of support for a democratic political system, Greece is currently only narrowly above the 50 per cent mark of systemic legitimacy. While there has also been some rise in ‘exit’ in Spain, the total increase (7.3 per cent) between 2008 and 2016 was half that which occurred in Greece. Moreover, two-thirds of the Spanish electorate, a large majority, continue to go to the polls. In Portugal, there is a perennial problem with the electoral registers, which means that the apparent totals for abstention are not generally regarded as accurate. Nevertheless, what the Portuguese data do suggest is that any increase in abstention during the crisis period has been rather limited.

A similar picture, with dramatic or fairly extensive change in Greece and Spain but without significant change in Portugal, emerges when we look at the ‘loyal’ voters: those who not only kept on participating in the long sequence of elections but also kept on voting for the mainstream option, i.e. for the two traditional parties of government. ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• 1. From Electoral Epidemic to Government Epidemic: The Next Level of the Crisis in Southern Europe
• 2. The January 2015 Parliamentary Election in Greece: Government Change, Partial Punishment and Hesitant Stabilisation
• 3. Realignment under Stress: The July 2015 Referendum and the September Parliamentary Election in Greece
• 4. The 2015 Portuguese Legislative Election: Widening the Coalitional Space and Bringing the Extreme Left in
• 5. The Breakdown of the Spanish Two-Party System: The Upsurge of Podemos and Ciudadanos in the 2015 General Election
• 6. The Challenges of the New Spanish Multipartism: Government Formation Failure and the 2016 General Election
• 7. SYRIZA’s Electoral Rise in Greece: Protest, Trust and the Art of Political Manipulation
• 8. U-Turn: The Portuguese Radical Left from Marginality to Government Support
• 9. Fast and Furious: Podemos’ Quest for Power in Multi-level Spain
• 10. Going National: Ciudadanos from Catalonia to Spain
• Index