Foreign Relations of the GCC Countries

Shifting Global and Regional Dynamics

Eman Ragab, Silvia Colombo

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351330077
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the foreign policies of the GCC countries six years after the Arab uprisings, in terms of drivers, narratives, actions and outcomes, paying particular attention to Middle Eastern countries, Iran and Western international powers. The assessment focuses on current affairs, but also contributes to establishing a productive link between empirical studies and the existing theoretical frameworks that help explain the increasing foreign policy activism of the GCC countries. All in all, the articles collected in this book shed light on and provide a more solid and fine-grained understanding of how regional powers like Saudi Arabia, as well as the other smaller GCC countries, act and pursue their interests in an environment full of uncertainty, in the context of changing regional and global dynamics and power distribution.

The book brings together the articles published in a Special Issue of the International Spectator.

Between Accommodation and Opportunism: Explaining the Growing Influence of Small Gulf States in the Middle East

Máté Szalai

ABSTRACT

Smaller members of the Gulf Cooperation Council defied theoretical and practical expectations as they were able to enlarge their international influence during the years of the Arab Spring. They adopted markedly different foreign policy strategies, which can be seen as stances lying between accommodation and opportunism, depending on the extent to which they respected the security concerns of their geopolitical patron, Saudi Arabia. The mainstream schools of IR theory – neorealism, neoliberalism and constructivism – offer different explanations for these phenomena. Although none of the three schools can provide a completely exhaustive explanation, neoliberalism seems to offer the most comprehensive framework for analysis.

During the ‘Arab Spring’,¹ two interrelated processes took place along the shores of the Persian Gulf, both interesting from theoretical and practical points of view. First, the small states of the region – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), namely all the members of the GCC except Saudi Arabia – defied expectations and surprised regional powers by exercising unprecedented influence far beyond their borders. Second, they implemented markedly different foreign policies vis-á-vis each other and the two closest ‘giants’, Saudi Arabia and Iran. Neither development is easily explained by conventional international relations (IR) theory and small state studies,² which expect relatively small entities to implement similar and minimalist foreign policies.

In the following pages, we seek to explain these two phenomena from a theoretical perspective. After a short description of the main foreign policy strategies adopted by the small Gulf states, we try to discover the reasons behind 1) their enhanced role and 2) the discrepancies in their behaviour. We will use three different traditions of small state theory,³ namely structural realism (focusing on the regional balances of power and geopolitics), neoliberal institutionalism (emphasizing the role of domestic and international institutions, as well as complex interdependencies) and social constructivism (stressing the importance of identity and norms).

The comparison of the applicability of IR theories is relevant for many reasons. First, the majority of articles focus either on an empirical description⁴ or simply use a ‘mixture’ of theories, thus disregarding the boundaries of the different methodologies.⁵ Despite their success in interpreting individual cases, these attempts fail to provide a thorough analysis of why and how. Second, in practice, distinguishing between theoretical schools means differentiating between diverse types of causes (systemic, domestic, institutional, etc.), which helps identify whether these processes are pre-determined or rather are the result of voluntary decisions. Third (and consequently), the use of different models can shape our expectations about the durability of the phenomena, whether they are long-lasting or temporary. The conclusions at the end of the article provide a reflection on these questions.

Between accommodation and opportunism – the strategy of small Gulf states

After 2011, all the small Gulf states enhanced their international activities and tried to realise their interests in the region. Generally, the aims of the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) were similar – preventing the spread of anti-establishment movements at home while trying to capitalise politically on the unfolding events.⁶ To achieve these goals, the six states used a wide range of tools including soft power (especially through the media), financial support and direct military intervention.

Nonetheless, the actions taken by the different regimes were alike in terms of coordination and self-determination. Traditionally, the small Gulf states had followed the lead of Saudi Arabia and, despite their existing bilateral tensions, had not gone directly against the interests of Riyadh. This notion changed significantly during the last years of the Arab Spring as the neighbours’ perception of Saudi dominance varied significantly: some tolerated it, some questioned it and seemingly only Bahrain supported it.⁷

The attitudes of the small Gulf states towards Saudi Arabia are of strategic importance from both an empirical and a theoretical perspective: alliance-making in the international arena is considered the most important decision of a small state as it can guarantee security. Therefore, disavowing the Saudi lead reflects strategic shifts under the surface. Naturally, the choice is not a binary one, it is more realistic to picture foreign policy strategies on a scale between accommodation (total acceptance of Saudi leadership) and opportunism (going ‘rogue’ – challenging or neglecting Saudi security interests).⁸

On the left side of the line are those states which continued to respect the general strategic framework of Saudi foreign and security policy. Although they increased their activity in the last years, they remained in line with Saudi Arabia (especially with respect to Iran and Yemen).⁹ Thus Bahrain, Kuwait and the UAE (from left to right) can be classified as accommodative states with different levels of involvement. Among them, the Emirates played the biggest role regionally, contributing independently to the Libyan intervention and the fight against the Islamic State. Nonetheless, all of these actions were in line with and did not harm Saudi interests.

Table 1. The foreign policy of small Gulf states portrayed on a scale between accommodation and opportunism.

On the other side of the scale, the two remaining states (namely Qatar and Oman, “the opportunists”) used their enhanced leverage to widen their autonomy vis-á-vis Saudi Arabia and at times put Saudi policies in danger. Throughout the region, Qatar funded and supported the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), Saudi Arabia’s fiercest ideological competitor.¹⁰ Alongside Abu Dhabi, Doha also intervened in Libya, albeit with different aims and supporting MB-related groups in the country.¹¹ In Egypt, Qatar sided with the Islamist President Mohammad Morsi against the Saudi-backed military, turning the situation in the North African country into a proxy cold war.¹² In Syria, Doha followed a similar path, supporting its own networks (such as Ahrar as-Sham) with the ultimate aim of setting up a friendly Brotherhood-led government. Therefore, since Saudi goals involve combatting Iranian and the Brotherhood’s influence, the two Gulf countries confronted each other many times.¹³ Qatar was also less enthusiastic about supporting Saudi initiatives on the Arabian Peninsula.

Oman, as the other opportunist state, defied Riyadh’s foreign policy several times. Muscat upheld relations with the Assad government in Damascus and also communicated with Moscow.¹⁴ It mediated between the Western governments and Iran, most notably on the nuclear question,¹⁵ and was the only GCC country that did not support the Saudi-led intervention in Yemen,¹⁶ maintaining ties with the Houthi rebels of Yemen, some of whom still reside in the Omani capital.¹⁷

Altogether, the opportunist stance resulted in an intensive diplomatic and political debate between Saudi Arabia and Qatar during 2014.¹⁸ Although the problem was seemingly solved by the end of the year, reportedly following a Saudi threat to isolate the tiny country,¹⁹ it is rather questionable whether Doha renounced its ambitions. In parallel, Omani-Saudi relations seem stable but could easily deteriorate in the coming years.

The choice between accommodation and opportunism is not self-explanatory. There is no single factor that explains the behaviour of the five small GCC countries. In the following, we seek to explain both the growing influence and the differences between the behaviours adopted by the Gulf states from three different theoretical perspectives.

Theoretical explanations of small state behaviour in the Gulf

Balance of power, geopolitics and capabilities – the neorealist narrative

Although there have been theoretical advances, neorealism remains the most frequently used IR theory, in terms not just of general world politics but also of Middle Eastern affairs. In dealing with the region, the majority of researchers focus on the role of geopolitics, the balance of power and the “traditional concern for power and regime survival”.²⁰ Scholars of the Middle East define “complex realism” as a descriptive framework of foreign policy, according to which survival and the balancing effort between material and ideological challenges are the two primary drivers of state behaviour in the region.

In this framework, since small Middle Eastern states have relatively limited resources and usually lack the capacities needed to defend themselves and alter their environment, “self-reliance in defence and security matters is a difficult, if not unachievable”²¹ goal. Therefore, they mu...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Editorial Note: Foreign Relations of the GCC Countries amid Shifting Global and Regional Dynamics
• 1 Between Accommodation and Opportunism: Explaining the Growing Influence of Small Gulf States in the Middle East
• 2 Status and Foreign Policy Change in Small States: Qatar’s Emergence in Perspective
• 3 Beyond Money and Diplomacy: Regional Policies of Saudi Arabia and UAE after the Arab Spring
• 4 Foreign Policy Activism in Saudi Arabia and Oman. Diverging Narratives and Stances towards the Syrian and Yemeni Conflicts
• 5 The Evolution of Saudi Foreign Policy and the Role of Decision-making Processes and Actors
• 6 Iran, the GCC and the Implications of the Nuclear Deal: Rivalry versus Engagement
• 7 US-Arab Gulf Relations amidst Regional and Global Changes
• 8 Russia as a Gravity Pole of the GCC’s New Foreign Policy Pragmatism
• Index