Behind Time

Incoherence of Time and McTaggart's Atemporal Replacement

Gerald Rochelle

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138610200
• eBook ISBN: 9780429864476
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

First published in 1998, this volume responded to and evaluated criticisms of McTaggart's atemporal philosophy of time. Established philosophical positions on time had positioned themselves in relation to either the A Series (past, present and future) or the B Series (earlier and later). McTaggart considered both series untenable and proposed his own, atemporal C Series. Beginning with an overview of McTaggart's position, Gerald Rochelle attempts to reinforce the seriousness of, and think beyond, McTaggart's attempt to describe a world without time through an assessment of McTaggart's criticisms and his suggested alternative. Rochelle argues that McTaggart's atemporal world constitutes a strong foundation for a new theory on time which breaks away from the existing philosophical models of temporality.

1 Introduction

Time is puzzling. This work is an attempt to solve part of the puzzle by looking at McTaggart’s argument against its reality and his vision of a replacement atemporal world. My opinion is that fully to understand McTaggart’s view about time we need to go beyond an analysis of his denial that it is real. Many philosophers have become so involved in his argument against the reality of time that they fail to notice that it makes little difference whether the argument is right or wrong. If it is right then time must be something other than what it appears to be. If it is wrong then the difficulty in showing that it is wrong makes any assertion about the consequent version of time incompatible with time as we know it. After all, if the reality of time was self evident there would be no need to get involved in finding a defence to any argument against it.

McTaggart takes an idealist view that reduces all that is real to spirit; that any expression of reality is dependent on or a manifestation of consciousness. This is an interesting perception of the world which allies to the contemporary scientific world-view which holds a scepticism of apparent materiality. Whereas McTaggart’s denunciation of time is well known his replacement for time, the C series, is not. McTaggart’s system of atemporality forms part of a coherent metaphysical scheme that should be taken seriously. The system helps us to interpret some riddles that time presents to us. It also explains how we can form part of an ideal world that is not out of place in modern times.

Broadly, McTaggart’s argument against time has two parts. Part one involves three steps. Step 1. Time involves change. Step 2. Change can only occur if there is a series of relations past, present and future, the A series. Step 3. The A series involves a contradiction that leads to a vicious infinite regress therefore there can be no time. Part two argues that the relation earlier and later, the B series, must be temporal, but that there can be no B series without an A series. As the A series is self-contradictory there can be no B series. This leads to two problems. Problem 1. Our view of things changing in the A series is wrong. Problem 2. Our experience of time in the B series is also wrong. These are problems because nothing seems more certain than our experience that things are changing in time.

Many philosophers accept that time requires change but conclude that there is no need to get involved with the A series because this is not essential for time. They think that for time to exist we need only the ‘movement’ from earlier to later (the B series) and as this relation is undeniably in place the argument that the A series is self-contradictory is irrelevant. This is the dominant B-theorist view which invites us to accept a temporal world that scarcely seems like time as we experience it. Some move closer to our everyday conception of time and accept the reality of the A series but hold that McTaggart’s argument for its contradictory nature is spurious. This is the slightly less popular A-theorist view which has less philosophical appeal but is more in keeping with common sense. I think both these views (taken in a general sense) are misleading. On the first account we are left to deal with a form of time which does not seem to fit with our everyday experience and on the second we are left wondering that if time in the A series is not puzzling then why are we so puzzled about it.

I think we have three alternatives. 1. Accept the argument and look at a world without time. 2. Deny the argument and take one of two routes, a. Accept the reality of time and face unremitting A series problems, answers to which lead to a view of time that scarcely resembles how we think of it. b. Adopt an interpretation of time in the B series that scarcely resembles how we experience it. In either case still we are looking at a world without time. 3. Keep arguing about the argument. After ninety years this has proved inconclusive. If eventually there is a finding still we will be faced with either option ‘1’ or ‘2’ and as the outcome of each is substantially the same, we are not disadvantaged by considering a world without time.

My view is that McTaggart is correct in both the basis for his argument and his conclusion that time is unreal. No B-theorist argument gives an acceptable account of change. A-theorist arguments against the contradictory nature of the A series are very wire drawn and, though accepting the reality of time, dissolve the A series into something unlike how we think of the passage from future to present to past.

The nature of time in our experience is so uncertain that it makes either conclusion a possibility. However, making a broadly interpretable quality like time fit our purposes does not bring us any closer to its true nature. If we accept that time is very confusing, indeed so confusing as to raise a high level of suspicion about its reality (or at least it’s coherence) in our minds, then we have good reason to look for a replacement. It is indeed strange that though A and B-theorists are prepared to create elaborate versions of time in order to defend it against McTaggart’s denial, they are reluctant to look at anything atemporal that replaces it, even though such a replacement may be more ‘time-like’ than some of their own temporal variants. McTaggart offers a replacement by providing an atemporal scheme which can be substituted for what we think is time. This replacement system answers many of our confusions about temporality as well as pointing us towards answers about other confusions that appearance in general presents us with.

Here, I try to show that McTaggart’s atemporal vision of reality, which gets little philosophical attention, is a serious attempt to describe a coherent world without time. To reinforce the need for us to consider this I have concentrated on showing that no matter how we look at time it is never acceptably coherent. I suggest that the answer to the puzzling nature of time is not to be found in its variable and confusing components but in the atemporal C-world that McTaggart describes.

Like McTaggart, I hold an idealist view, though perhaps a more ‘absolutist’ one than can be ascribed to McTaggart. I believe spiritual selfhood is the expression of the universe’s ability to know itself. I think that consciousness is a special universal circumstance that has priority over the apparently objective world. It seems to me sensible that the conscious world can at least entertain this (whether it is right or wrong about what is true) whereas it seems absurd that the apparently objective world can be anything other than an object of consciousness. If, as I believe, this is so, then all apparently material aspects of the universe are subordinate to consciousness.

It is important that we know something of McTaggart before we begin. He is a complex philosopher whose devotion to metaphysical enquiry led him to relentless scrutiny of what could be the nature of reality.¹ In Chapter 2 I provide some initial information on McTaggart, his terms and his system. In § 2.1 I provide a brief synopsis of his important publications. In § 2.2 I give an explanation of some of his important terms. In § 2.3, as well as an outline of his whole system, I give a summary of the main features of his fuller philosophy, without which it is not possible to appreciate his atemporal system. In § 2.4 I conclude that McTaggart’s argument against time is part of his fuller philosophy and is not given justice by being dealt with discretely.

In Chapter 3 I describe McTaggart’s argument against time in more detail. In doing this I show that B-theory answers to McTaggart’s claim that time is unreal leave the B-theorist denying time as we know it, in much the same way as McTaggart. This means that although B-theory arguments against McTaggart’s position may have strength, they do little to move forward from a position of temporal scepticism. In § 3.2 (§§ 3.2.1-3.2.3) I explain McTaggart’s argument against the reality of time. This leads to some problems in respect of how we think we experience time (§§ 3.2.4-3.2.5). In § 3.3 I show that McTaggart’s argument also requires that we assume that it is events that change and not things. This assumption is difficult to accept and is almost universally rejected. In § 3.4 I look more closely at the vicious regress involved in the contradictory nature (according to McTaggart) of the phases of change in the A series. If the vicious regress can be successfully defended then McTaggart’s argument would be greatly strengthened. To see if this is possible I analyse six arguments against the vicious regress. In § 3.5 I conclude that it is difficult to accept that it is events and not things that change. We need to take a strong idealist view to accept this. Even so, defence of the vicious regress can be found. McTaggart certainly provides us with enough suspicion about the reality of time to encourage us to see what it is he replaces it with.

In Chapter 4 I set out to see whether any of our commonly held views on time can be fully coherent. In § 4.2 I look at what I consider all the major views that either influence our opinions about time or to which we make recourse when we need some answer about its nature. In § 4.3 I look closely at the nature of the A series. In § 4.4 I conclude that none of our commonly held views provides a satisfactory answer. Indeed, having looked more closely at the A series (which, based on McTaggart’s view, is essential for the reality of time) the matter only seems to get worse. It may be, however, that analysis of these views is misleading. It is possible that time will not yield to this sort of scrutiny and this, by itself, does not mean that it is unreal. However, I conclude that it is unsatisfactory that no conventional view provides an answer to some natural questions we have about time’s nature.

Because the results in Chapter 4 are unsatisfactory, in Chapter 5 I look at some general positions on time that can be adopted in relation to our experience of it. My hope here is that since precise answers to time’s puzzling nature may not be implicit in the way we describe it (our views of it), our experience of it (and positions we adopt to it) may provide something intuitively more positive. I look at three important positions that we can adopt when we consider time. In § 5.2 I look at the idea that there is ‘reality of consciousness plus being’: this is where we commonly expect to find an idealist like McTaggart. In § 5.3 I look at the idea that there is ‘reality of becoming plus consciousness’. In § 5.4 I look at the idea held by science of ‘a four-dimensional universe with no becoming’. In § 5.5 I conclude that McTaggart’s position is surprisingly close to the views held by science. It also appeals to some of our common sense values. For these reasons, together with the conclusions arrived at in Chapter 4, in § 5.6, I justify why I think it is important to find out what he has to say on the subject.

In Chapter 6 I look at McTaggart’s suggestion for an atemporal world as a replacement for the misleading world of time. In § 6.2 I describe McTaggart’s atemporal C series. In § 6.3 I describe how the atemporal series is coherent with McTaggart’s fuller description of reality. In § 6.4 I describe how the C series can illuminate our puzzled view of time. Its ‘inclusiveness’ is similar to the apparent asymmetry of time (§ 6.4.1) and its ‘direction’ is similar to the apparent direction of the B series. In § 6.5 I describe some fundamental relations between the temporal world as we experience it and the atemporal C series. In § 6.6 I look more closely at the distinction between apparent and actual time. ‘Apparent time’ is the time in our experience that does not seem to resemble what time may really be (many of our views on time are like this). ‘Actual time’ is the measurable time of our everyday world. Actual time and apparent time I call ‘true’ time and the atemporal order that in McTaggart’s idealist world is reality I call ‘really true’ ‘time’. In this way we can keep the confusing notion of our experience of actual time as true time, separate from a plausible explanation of what it may really be in really true ‘time’. In § 6.7 I conclude that it is reasonable to look beyond McTaggart’s claim that time is unreal. However, his atemporal world is not easy to accept in total. Indeed, this is at the root of the problem. Because he proposes a complete metaphysics we get easily bound up with his ontological quest and may find ourselves rejecting atemporality for the wrong reasons.

In my Conclusion I provide a summary of the conclusions and explain why I think pursuing the idea of atemporality is worthwhile. I propose that although McTaggart’s ‘dynamic’ view demands much of us this does not necessarily lead us to wholesale rejection of his thesis. I also conclude that his personal preoccupation with the loving self may (for some) detract from the logic of his argument. Nevertheless, I find that there is something in his argument for the atemporal self that has psychological appeal. Overall, I conclude that some elements of his atemporal vision are worthy of further scrutiny in the contemporary world. They should not be thrown out just because they form part of a rather suspicious whole. I conclude that we can accept the atemporal features of his argument without having to accept his system in total. The central elements of the atemporal world have psychological appeal and this idealist view is not out of place in modern times. I argue that McTaggart’s atemporal world is a strong foundation for a new atemporal thinking which can at last break away from the confusing philosophical models of temporality that confuse us more than time itself.

Note

1   G. Rochelle, The Life and Philosophy of J.McT.E. McTaggart, 1866-1925 (Lewiston, New York, Edwin Mellen, 1991).

2 McTaggart’s Philosophy

2.1 McTaggart’s works

In this section I provide a brief synopsis of McTaggart’s important publications.

McTaggart’s full metaphysical exposition is found in The Nature of Existence.¹ A popular version of the main course of his thinking can be found in Some Dogmas of Religion.² His important essays are collected in Philosophical Studies.³

Philosophical Studies contains the essence of his idealist philosophy. All the fundamental aspects of metaphysical enquiry are tackled: the existence of God, belief and the nature of mysticism,⁴ time,⁵ eternity,⁶ causality,⁷ the nature of self,⁸ and the central, and connected issues of immortality, the nature of good, individual purpose and value.⁹ There is also a brief clarification on the question of propositions applicable to themselves,¹⁰ his reasons for considering philosophy of prime importance,¹¹ and an outline of how he thought metaphysics best defined.¹² An overview of McTaggart’s intention is best had from his essay ‘An Ontological Idealism’ published in 1924. A comparison of this with one of his earliest works, ‘The Further Determination of the Absolute’ (written in 1893), reveals the remarkable consistency of his conclusions. It also show...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Preface
• 1 Introduction
• 2 McTaggart’s Philosophy
• 3 McTaggart’s Denial of the Reality of Time
• 4 Time and the A Series
• 5 Some Philosophical Positions on Time
• 6 McTaggart’s Timeless World
• 7 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index