Circumventing deadlock through venue-shopping: why there is more than just talk in US immigration politics in times of economic crisisâ
Natascha Zaun, Christof Roos and Fabian GĂźlzau
1. Introduction
The global economic and financial crisis since 2008 has proved to be a major challenge for the Western world. It resulted in both a rise in unemployment rates and a decrease in public spending in many European countries and the United States (US).
External shocks such as the economic crises have been found to substantially impact immigration policies in the past. Given the rise in unemployment and the decreased demand on the labour force, crises can be expected to produce âa climate conducive to a restrictive regimeâ (Beets and Willekens 2009, 6; Newton 2008, 60). Cases in point are the Depression of 1920/21 in the US and the economic downturn following the oil crisis in the 1970s, both of which led to the implementation of more restrictive immigration policies (Hatton and Williamson 2009). Yet at the same time, a crisis also makes more pronounced the hardships of undocumented immigrants that have no access to social benefits and thus suffer significantly when losing their occupation. Increased restriction of labour migration, moreover, can lead to migrants seeking access via humanitarian channels for refugee protection or family reunification (Czaika and De Haas 2013).
The recent crisis has been described as the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression by the International Monetary Fund (The Guardian, 10 April, 2008) and can thus be expected to have significantly impacted immigration policies in the US, as the US were hit particularly hard by the crisis (Huffington Post, 21 June, 2012; The Atlantic, 20 March, 2013). For instance, the US faced a substantial rise in unemployment and a GDP decrease in the crisis years from 2008 to 2012. This article aims at answering the question of how and to what extent the global economic crisis has impacted US immigration policies and politics.
We find that while there is no policy change induced by Congress, substantive changes at the state levels and through presidential Executive Orders can be observed. While policy change is blocked through deadlock in Congress, pressures from their constituencies for either liberal or restrictive changes encourage politicians to search for alternative venues to realise their policy aims. Actors interviewed for this study substantiate the claim that the crisis had an accelerating impact on policy change at levels other than Congress. We argue that this situation can be explained based on a combination of both venue-shopping as introduced by Baumgartner and Jones (1993) and the multiple streams model suggested by Kingdon (1995). While both the policy stream (i.e. policy ideas that are present among politicians and experts) and the problem stream (i.e. the non-functionality of the current immigration system) would call for change, the political situation of deadlock in Congress impedes change. The reason for impeded change is that both actors with liberal preferences and actors with restrictive preferences present in the Congress rather have incentives for defection than cooperation on the issue matter, as defection results in more favourable policy outcomes for each of them. They are more willing to accept the absence of the policy change they desire than they are willing to adopt changes to the status quo based on the policy preferences of their adversaries. Thus, proponents of restrictive change, such as political actors from (mainly Republican governed) US states that are affected disproportionately by undocumented immigration, foster restrictive change on the local level and adopt policy aiming at immigration control enforcement that has so far been blocked in Congress (Jones and Chou 2014 ; Steil and Vasi 2014 ). In contrast, examples for liberal change are the executive orders launched by President Obama aiming at temporary relief from deportation as well as the right to apply for work permits for certain undocumented immigrants.
With this study we aim to contribute to the wider debate on whether external shocks entail either restrictive or liberalising policy change. Our core finding is that while external shocks create pressures for change, these pressures need to be taken up by political actors in order to be transformed into actual policy change. Where change does not happen, pressures for change look for alternative venues and entail a politicisation of the issue. This study is based on an analysis of literature as well as policy documents on a number of decisions that have been made in the immigration policy area in the US between 2008 and 2012. In addition, we conducted 15 interviews in Fall 2012, at the height of the economic crisis, in which collective actors, such as unions and employers, but also politicians and experts from think tanks, elaborated on what they considered viable policies in times of crisis.
2. Multiple streams and venue-shopping as a theoretical framework to study policy change in times of crisis
We aim at explaining the impact of the crisis on US immigration policies by drawing on Kingdonâs multiple streams approach and combining it with the venue-shopping theory (Baumgartner and Jones 1993). According to Kingdon (1995), policy change can be explained by a convergence of the problem stream, the policy stream and the politics stream. Analogously, the lack of change is based on an absence of this convergence. In line with Kingdon, the problem stream means the issue or the policy problem to be addressed. The policy stream covers the policy ideas that aim at its solution. The politics stream is the institutional setting and the political actors involved. In this article, we argue that the absence of a political stream favourable to change can account for the policy deadlock that we observe in US immigration politics in Congress. Moreover, we argue that the absence of such a favourable political stream can be best explained by drawing on the deadlock game in game theory. Following this model, non-cooperation is most beneficial to all actors involved, both individually and collectively, which eventually leads to policy stasis. Yet, given the immense pressures for change by their constituencies, which were amplified through the economic crisis, we argue that proponents of change look for alternative venues to pursue their aims. Thus, we contribute to the empirically rich body of literature on policy stasis in the US (Mansbridge and Martin 2013; McCarthy 2007) by adding an as of yet missing theoretical explanation for this state of affairs.
According to the multiple streams model, the policy stream concerns policy ideas that are constantly around in what Kingdon calls the âpolicy primeval soupâ (Kingdon 1995, 116). These policy ideas are usually based on different preferences. While some actors might be more concerned about immigrantsâ effective access to rights, others might favour a limitation of immigration levels or aim at more selectivity in immigrant admission. Based on these preferences, actors build ideas of both causal relationships (i.e. about what is) and what could be policy responses to tackle problems. The policy ideas thus are solutions which they can sell to decision-makers. Yet, crucial events are needed for these policy ideas to get noticed and gain political weight (Kingdon 1995, 113). In fact, dissent about the number, nature and national origin of desirable immigration is a constant feature of the US debate (Zolberg 2008 [2006]). At the same time, immigrants are depicted as âvillainous invadersâ and âheroic foundersâ (Newton 2008, 1). Thus, a crisis entailing a rise in numbers of unemployment can arguably help promoters of restriction of immigration gain ground (Newton 2008, 60). These could use the event to argue for a cut in immigration to ensure a stronger protection of national workers. Simultaneously, a crisis highlights the hardship undergone by undocumented immigrants as their socio-structural position makes them especially vulnerable to economic slumps (Papademetriou and Terrazas 2010 ; Tilly 2011 ). Yet, to implement restrictive or liberalising policy changes, the political stream has to come in as well. The political stream comprises things such as âthe public mood, pressure group campaigns, election results, partisan or ideological distributions in Congress, and changes of administrationâ (Kingdon 1995, 145). For instance, it has been argued that the increasing number of Latino voters puts pressure on the Democrats to introduce liberalising changes for the legalisation of their as of yet âirregularly stayingâ family and friends. In 2005, 84% of the Latino population supported the legalisation through the so-called âpath to citizenshipâ (Suro 2005, 10). We assert that it is particularly the political stream which impedes change in Congress through deadlock. According to game theory, actors involved in a deadlock game benefit rather from defection than from cooperation. In this sense the game is a zero sum game. Each actor would benefit most in case of their own defection and the cooperation of the other actor. Yet, the second best outcome for actors would be that both of them defect. The least beneficial outcome for either of them would be obviously their own cooperation and the defection of the other actor. Thus, an outcome where both of them defect is highly likely.
However, with the crisis, the problem stream that supports the preferences of proponents of both liberal and restrictive change swells and their policy ideas face a rising demand with the electorate, at least in some highly affected states (Fetzer 2006). Thus, with deadlock in Congress, politicians need to look for alternative political venues (Baumgartner and Jones 1993) to pursue their aims and satisfy their constituencies. Our time of observation (2008â2012) spans, at least partly, from the 110th (2007â2009) to the 112th Congress (2011â2013). During the 110th Congress under the Bush administration, the House of Representatives as well as the Senate had a Democrat majority.1 In the 111th Congress, Obama was presiding over a Democrat majority in the House and Senate. Eventually, Republicans gained the majority in the House of Representatives in the 112th Congress, however, still under Obama administration. Generally, immigration politics in the US is divisive and politicians do not necessarily hold uniform positions that reflect a party platform (Ilias, Fennelly, and Federico 2008, 748). On specific issues, however, a partisan divide has become visible. Republicans more often prefer restrictive policies, particularly as regards border enforcement (Fetzer 2006; Milner and Tingley 2008). Democrats, on the other hand, have stronger preferences for the legalisation of undocumented immigrants (Boyer 2012, 2â3; Lopez and Minushkin 2008).
We argue that the situation of deadlock in Congress in combination with the crisis makes policy-makers particularly susceptible to the dynamics of venue-shopping. While US policy-makers have already passed immigration policies in alternative venues before the beginning of the crisis, we argue that dynamics of venue-shopping in this area have intensified with the crisis.
Republicans searched for venues where they did not encounter liberal veto players. The Democrats could circumvent restrictive veto players through presidential Executive Orders, which the president was able to pass without any interference of the opposing party in Congress. How the crisis promoted this search for alternative venues can be shown by applying the multiple stream model to US immigration politics.
3. The problem stream: an ineffective immigration system in times of economic crisis
The US immigration system in the 2010s is widely acknowledged as dysfunctional. Not only has President Obama characterised the system as âbrokenâ,2 but there is also consensus in scholarly debates that the current status quo is âbad for migrants, employers and the national interestâ (Martin 2011a, 24). This is especially due to high hurdles immigrants face. Unless someone has family-ties to US citizens, it is quite difficult to immigrate to the US. Visa streams for high- and low-skilled immigrants are criticised as they are overly complex and do not match business demands adequately (Hansen 2009, 11â13; Hanson 2009, 4). In addition, a large number of undocumented immigrants entered the country in the past two decades, of which some moved to states that did not previously have experiences with immigration (Jones-Correa 2012, 4).3 The latest estimates from January 2012 suggest an overall number of 11.4 million undocumented immigrants residing in the US, with a share of 59% being of Mexican origin (Baker and Rytina 2013). It is estimated that 30â45% of the unauthorised population legally entered the country but then overstayed their visa (Hanson 2009, 3; Pew 2006).4 The economic crisis hit legal and, in particular, undocumented immigrants most severely, as sectors in which many immigrants had previously found employment (i.e. construction, retail and food) were highly affected by the economic downturn (Green and Winters 2010, 1068; Papademetriou and Terrazas 2010, 44â46; Tilly 2011, 679). Scholars, moreover, found that the economic crisis led to stagnating numbers in the (estimated) population of undocumented immigrants or even decreasing undocumented immigration (Hoefer, Baker, and Rytina 2012, 1).
The last major legislative reforms addressing the shortcomings of the US immigration system were the Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) in 1986, the Immigration Act of 1990 and the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) in 1996 (Migration Policy Institute 2013; Schain 2012, 210â215). While IRCA tried to tackle the situation of a growing population of undocumented immigrants with amnesty and employer sanctions, the Immigration Act of 1990 aimed especially to raise the numbers of skilled workers through the creation of the H-1B visa programme (Schain 2012, 210â215, 104 Stat. 4978, §205). In addition, the IIRIRA combined greater border enforcement with a cut in social security benefits for immigrants (i.e. Social Security Federal public benefits, 110, Stat. 3009; see also Newton 2008, 53â63). Moreover, the IIRIRA enabled âlocal and state police [ ⌠] to enforce federal immigration lawâ (Varsanyi 2010, 2) under provision 287(g). This is remarkable paradigm shift since immigration enforcement was an exclusive federal competence with states having âvirtual...