Revival: Swiss Neutrality (1946)

Its History and Meaning

Bonjour Edgar

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780815368946
• eBook ISBN: 9781351253543
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Peace & Global Development
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Up to a generation ago, the Swiss citizen lived with a feeling of security in foreign relations which we can hardly credit today. Neutrality has come to be taken so much for granted as the fundamental principle of the Federal constitution, and had been so generally recognized in Europe, that it seemed unthreatened and even inviolable. It blended with the republican and democratic ideal to form a national myth of almost religious sanctity. As the axiom of Swiss foreign policy, it had certainly suffered attack both in theory and in fact, but since such crises had always been successfully overcome, Switzerland's faith in the inviolability of her neutrality had merely been confirmed. It was as if the country were girdled with high, protecting ramparts, behind which its people could go about their lawful occasions unmolested. It was in this period of calm in Switzerland's foreign relations that international law assiduously sought a formula for the theory of neutrality.

Chapter 1

ORIGIN AND GROWTH OF SWISS NEUTRALITY

The absolute neutrality of Switzerland as a political principle is generally dated from the year 1674, when the Federal Diet declared that the Confederation, as a body, would regard itself as a neutral state and intervene on neither side in the war which had just broken out. In this way the Confederation proclaimed the axiom of its foreign policy to the forum of Europe. It must not, however, be assumed that the fundamental principle of Swiss political life was then established by a single voluntary act. On the contrary, the principle of neutrality had emerged very slowly from the treaty policy of the old Confederation, and awakened only gradually to a realization of its own nature out of the limbo of international entanglements. It had taken two hundred years of painful experience for the Confederation to grasp its own vital necessities, for the policy of expansion to be abandoned and Switzerland trained in the political abstinence of neutrality. And for a long time to come it remained an elastic formula, in which the most manifold aspects of abstinence in foreign policy found what may be called a national expression.

It is unnecessary at this point to provide a list of written statements of neutrality in the early history of the Swiss Leagues, though the list would be surprisingly long. Neutrality in the policy both of single members of the Confederation, and of the Confederation as a whole, can be traced back almost to its foundation. The idea of Swiss neutrality is actually almost coeval with the idea of a Swiss nation. There are instances in plenty to show that not only in mediaeval times, but quite particularly in the transition from medieval to modern history, the idea of neutrality was officially known to the Confederation. In Swiss records we first encounter it denoted by the German word “stillesitzen,” to sit still. The term “neutralitet” first occurs in 1536. The use of this foreign word which, being derived from Low Latin, was internationally intelligible, first became customary in Switzerland in the course of the 17th century.

Research into the origins of neutrality in foreign affairs brings to light a whole group of causes. In the following discussion the order in which they are presented is no indication of their order of importance in the development of neutrality.

It has always been the custom to date Swiss neutrality from the battle of Marignano. That great defeat, it is argued, checked further expansion on the part of the Confederation, whereupon it took refuge in neutrality. There is a certain truth in the argument, since it was actually the collapse of its highly expansive power policy which threw the Confederation back upon itself. That must not be taken to mean that its strength was broken, and that it was converted to abstinence in foreign policy at one blow. The Confederation continued to give proof in plenty of its overflowing vitality and linked its cause to that of princes. But the resistance it encountered and the defeats it suffered abroad checked the course of its reckless militarism and compelled it to take thought.

Many Swiss then realized that so loose a congeries of states, so half-baked a political organization as the Confederation was at that time, did not possess the necessary strength either for a uniform foreign policy or for clear-cut military aims. Their experiences in Italy had taught them a bloody lesson. Any advance in that direction implied one step, the centralization of the Confederation. Every state which has entered on the path of power in foreign policy has first had to go the way of internal union, whether it be France at the time of the Revolution or the dictator states of today. But for the Confederation, at the end of the Middle Ages, it meant the surrender of its cardinal constitutional principle, namely, federation; it meant the sacrifice of regional and communal autonomy; in a word, the abandonment of everything that bore the name of Swiss. At that time a solution of the kind seemed as impossible as it had done at the end of the previous century, when the federal order triumphed in the Compact of Stans. It was for the sake of the federal state that the Confederation abandoned its policy of aggression and approximated to the political principle of neutrality at a time when other countries were turning their energies outward in wars of conquest or adventuring on the high seas to open up far-distant lands. In their Swiss forms, there is a secret affinity between freedom and neutrality. Not that the motive here put forward had by that time become fully conscious. The majority had but a vague notion of the ultimate motives of their actions and the connection between them.

The religious cleavage had at least as great an influence on the development of the idea of neutrality as the collapse of the policy of power. We know how the religious conflict accentuated the existing territorial chaos and undermined the national cohesion of the Confederation, till Switzerland almost ceased to exist as a living organism. This internal disintegration could not but contribute to the paralysis of any external action. The two faiths lived in a reciprocally neutralizing equilibrium. Since each took up the cause of its co-religionists abroad, it thwarted the aims of its Swiss countrymen. Had one religious party taken up arms for one religion in Europe, the other would have immediately followed suit. The result would have been a devastating expansion of the European crisis on to the territory of the Confederation. This in its turn would have brought about the disruption of Switzerland and hence threatened her national existence with destruction.

From the outset there was no lack of attempts to draw the Confederation into the European wars of religion. Foreign potentates and certain Swiss of both creeds furthered such aims, but in the end, political common sense always succeeded in averting the ultimate disaster. The Confederation held aloof from the wars of religion both in the 16th and the 17th centuries. When Gustavus Adolphus of Sweden sought a religious alliance with the Swiss protestants, there was a party in Zurich which was more than ready to meet him halfway But although individuals were passionately in favour of the alliance, the government returned a negative answer.

Later, when the religious strife in Europe had somewhat abated and had ceased to provoke wars, Switzerland was slow to go the same way. Even at the beginning of the 18th century, in the dawn of the Enlightenment, outside observers were surprised to note that both home and foreign policy were still determined by the religious conflict. But ultimately, even the religious division lost its edge. What remained ineffaceable was the cultural and intellectual antagonism born of the difference in religion. Owing to that difference, two distinct national types have developed, whose features are still clearly distinguishable. Protestant Switzerland continued to remain in close touch with protestant Europe. We have only to think of the wealth of relations in every sphere of life between the protestant cantons and protestant Germany as well as England, Calvinist Holland, the Huguenot parts of France, and protestant Poland. Catholic Switzerland remained in contact with catholic Europe, with France, Spain, certain Italian states and the catholic territories of the old German Empire, and here too, the old community of faith, transcending national frontiers, proved fruitful in its results. It was in this way that the cultural cleavage in Europe was carried into Switzerland. If these two divergent currents were to be blended in one political whole, they must of necessity adopt neutrality as the axiom of their foreign policy. Neutrality was, it is true, powerless to fuse the conflicting forces, the almost countless local peculiarities, of the Confederation in one creative whole, but it prevented a disruption of the Confederation, which would have meant political dissolution.

The fact that the Confederation was composed of different racial and linguistic groups had no effect whatever on the development on neutrality. For at the time of which we are speaking, Switzerland was officially of Germanic race and Germanic tongue throughout. It was not until the second half of the 19th century, in the period of the rise of national power states, that the component elements of the country began to become aware of a kinship with neighbouring cultures, an awareness which, as we well know, proved to be a surprisingly disruptive force in the first world war. This recent development, which was not foreseen by former generations, has imparted a new meaning to the idea of neutrality and engendered new forces of union. Thus here too, the heritage of the fathers has proved a blessing to the sons.

The treaty system of the Confederation was also of such a nature as to force abstinence in foreign policy upon it. Both Switzerland as a whole and the various groups and members which composed it had entered into foreign alliances in all directions. In many cases, commitments ran counter to each other, and in case of war would necessarily have cancelled each other. In haphazard fashion, as each case arose, the Confederation had woven about itself a network of treaties which now threatened to enmesh it. If it had fully fulfilled every point in a single treaty, the threads which bound it on some other side would have snapped. This strange tangle, knotted by the need of protection and the spirit of gain, could hardly now be disentangled even by the experienced hands of the members of the Diet.

The most fateful involvement was that with France. It went back to the perpetual peace with Francis I of 1516 and the protective alliance of 1521. In these two treaties the Confederation committed itself to never permitting its soldiery to be used against the king of France and to closing the Alpine passes to his enemies. The king was further allowed to engage 6 to 16,000 mercenaries on Swiss territory, though they were only to be used for purposes of defence. In recognition of these concessions, the king undertook to send artillery and cavalry to the help of the Confederation if it should be attacked, and to pay considerable pensions to every member. Further, mutual economic preferences were agreed on, in which it must be admitted that Switzerland was the sole and great beneficiary. These agreements made the king of France the first friend of the Confederation. Nor did France ever take undue advantage of her privileged position, having a clear sense of her own interests. For if she had brought the Confederation into conflict with its other allies, it would have recalled the Swiss troops serving with the French forces, and hence deprived French foreign policy of one of its most potent weapons. It was for that reason that French diplomacy repeatedly intervened, often at the cost of great efforts, in order to prevent any interference in Swiss religious and political disputes, just as it was successful in restraining the Confederation from becoming too deeply involved in European quarrels. The rareness of civil war in Switzerland, in spite of acute internal tension, and the total absence of foreign wars, bear eloquent testimony to the skill of French secret diplomacy. By her ceaseless care for the peace of Switzerland, both at home and abroad, in the gravest crises, France not only did much to keep her alive, but also, though unwittingly, promoted the development of the idea of neutrality.

The omnipotent influence of France, which made itself felt into the finest ramifications of intellectual and cultural life, overshadowed that of the second great ally of the Confederation, the house of Hapsburg. The alliance between the Confederation and Austria was certainly older, and the Austrian diplomats did not fail to make good and skilful use of that argument to the Diet, which set great store by age and permanence. Yet for many reasons, that superb old museum piece, the Eternal Compact with Austria of 1511, lost much of its prestige. In that treaty the two signatories had promised not to allow their troops to take the field against each other and, should attack threaten, to keep vigilant watch. Later, the Alpine passes had to be kept open for Austria also. Not only this stipulation, but another concerning mercenaries were at variance with cardinal provisions in the French treaty. It was the Swiss statesmen’s task to steer a course through these vaguenesses and inconsistencies.

Beside and across these, the strongest threads in the Swiss treaty system, individual cantons had formed alliances in many quarters. In 1577, although France objected, the catholic cantons concluded an alliance with the rising house of Savoy, and ten years later expanded the existing Capitulation of Milan into an alliance with Spain. Here too, promises were given of a supply of mercenary troops and the opening of the passes. These treaties had, it is true, been primarily aimed at the protestant Confederates, but they were also definitely hostile to France. On their side, the protestant Swiss entered into relations with the German protestants and with Venice. The relative positions of the partners to the treaty, however, shifted so radically after the revocation of the Edict of Nantes that the inner, catholic cantons became protégés of France. The Protestants, on the other hand, till that time the most loyal friends of France, sought contact with England under Cromwell and William of Orange, and even concluded a far-reaching military capitulation with Holland, one of Louis XIV’s most bitter enemies.

The consistency with which the Confederation managed to find a practical way of reconciling incompatible written commitments, and sought the golden mean in the conflicts of the great powers, was a powerful factor in its education in neutrality. The Swiss were past-masters in appealing from one treaty to another and thus in playing off the members of the Confederation against each other. In confidential conversations, foreign ambassadors more than once expressed their admiration for the diplomatic skill of these peasants. From the national point of view, the involvement of the Confederation in the politics of the great Powers, and the rifts it caused at home, were certainly disastrous, yet it all turned out to the national advantage in the shape of neutrality.

The development of the balance of power in Europe coincides fairly exactly with the rise of Swiss neutrality. That is not fortuitous; the equilibrium of the great Powers is actually an important presupposition of the Swiss policy of neutrality. As soon as the European family of states came to be regulated by the principle of equality, and not by that of predominance, though tensions were not relieved, Switzerland could feel secure. At all times the small have profited by the disputes of the great. The Confederation, the point at which the interests of the great Powers intersected as they did perhaps in no other small country, lived for a long time on the rivalry of its great neighbours. It might even be said that the balance of power born of the rivalry of the great Powers is the air in which the neutrality of the minor states thrives, while any ascendancy on the part of any one of them is the gravest threat to its existence. The neutrality of the state of Prussia-Brandenburg was also fostered by similar conditions, although in aim and essence it differed widely from that of the Confederation. Swiss neutrality was intrinsically conservative, without ambitious schemes for the future, content with itself, consciously choosing a neutral attitude so that it might come unmolested through the strife of the great Powers; Prussia-Brandenburg, on the contrary, restlessly progressive, pursued its policy of neutrality in order to secure the political and territorial expansion its rulers so eagerly coveted.

The entire history of the Confederation, from its origins to the present day, shows how consistent was the policy by which Switzerland sought to prevent the ascendancy of any one Power. She regularly joined the opponents of any Power aiming at hegemony. When, for instance, she sided with Charles V against Francis I in the famous imperial election of 1519, it was because the union of the crown of France with the imperial crown of Germany would have meant a far too dangerous conglomeration of power. In the following century she kept the friendship of Louis XIV until the growth of his power began to cast its shadow over Europe. But at that moment she began to turn an attentive ear to William of Orange’s ideas on the balance of power, and English political thought found a striking response in Switzerland. The most impressive example of how mortally neutrality is affected by the predominance of any one power is given by the Napoleonic epoch. A harsh light is cast on the situation by Napoleon’s remark: “Vis-à-vis de moi, votre neutralité est un mot vide de sens.” And later on it was not only radical resentment which actuated the young federal state in its hostility to Napoleon III, but the dawning suspicion of the possibility that he might rule the world. Swiss feeling about the dominant position of Germany under Bismarck is of the same nature.

The ascendancy of any single power, however, is not the only thing which threatens Swiss neutrality. Perfect harmony among them is equally dangerous. We can see this, for instance, in the post-Napoleonic period. The policy of the Holy Alliance led to infringements of Swiss sovereignty and a disregard of Swiss neutrality such as had only been experienced under Napoleon’s protectorate. And finally, after the first world war of 1914-1918, the union of Europe in the League of Nations meant a restriction of Swiss neutrality.

Geographical conditions have also contributed to making neutrality the guiding principle of Swiss foreign policy. The Confederation, with its enviable and dominating key-position in the Alpine massif, situated in the heart of an over-populated Europe, in the midst of a crowd of jostling nations and exposed to their pressure, with partially open frontiers, its territory dove-tailed with that of so many restless neighbours, was faced with national perils which can only be compared with those threatening the German Empire. During the Thirty Years’ War, the heritage of danger inseparable from a central position was demonstrated with great force to the Confederation by the inrush of alien powers on to German territory and its transformation into the theatre of the European struggle for power. The Confederation eluded the danger by girding on the armour of neutrality; it did not completely cut Switzerland off from the outside world, but protected her from military embroilments.

Within the Confederation itself, certain members were bound to a form of neutrality established by treaty. From the beginning of the 16th century, every “state” joining the Confederation had to promise to “sit still” in case of civil war among the other members, that is, to assist neither side but to pave the way for negotiations. True to this promise, the members concerned held strictly aloof from participation in civil wars and sought, in some cases successfully, to restore peace. The part played by Basle in the home policy of the Confederation may actually be described as pacifist. A neutral attitude was always imposed on the common bailiwicks. This curious feature of Swiss federal policy contributed to the rise and preservation of Swiss neutrality as a whole. The old Swiss theory and practise of impartial arbitration in cases may also have worked to the same end.

Chapter 2

THE SCOPE OF SWISS NEUTRALITY

The conception of the scope and limitations of Swiss neutrality at the time of its origin and development differed markedly from that of today; it may be described as looser, broader and vaguer. In order to obtain a precise idea of it, we must survey the earlier practise of neutrality as a whole, and deduce its essential features from that survey. For while the Diet took no pains to provide any clear definition of neutrality in its official pronouncements, international law, then in its infancy, did not remedy the defect. The members of the Diet certainly spoke from time to time of “traditional neutrality” as “the fundament of the Confederate Republic,” or called neutrality “the pillar of its peace,” but further definition was cautiously avoided. It is true that international lawyers of the time—Grotius in Holland or Emer de Vattel of Neuchatel, who was more familiar with conditions in Switzerland—sought to find a place for neutrality in their systems, but they did so quite superficially and the position of Switzerland was merely alluded to. Practice hastened ahead of theory. It is notable that the Swiss practice of neutrality was governed by stricter principles than its doctrine in international law, and indeed the idea of a more absolute neutrality was first conceived and put into practice in Switzerland. We may even regard the development of the idea of absolute neutrality as a specifically Swiss contribution to European international law.

One essential difference between early neutrality and that of today lies in mercenary service. On the whole, under the ancien régime there was no objection to Switzerland supplying troops to foreign powers in spite of her neutrality, and even after 1815, that is, after the international recognition of her permanent neutrality, Switzerland had no hesitation in concluding militar...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• INTRODUCTION
• 1. Origin and Growth of Swiss Neutrality
• 2. Scope of Swiss Neutrality
• 3. Means for the Preservation of Neutrality
• 4. Swiss Neutrality in the Fluctuations of the European Balance of Power in the Eighteenth Century
• 5. Attacks on Swiss Neutrality by Revolutionary France
• 6. Fictitious Neutrality at the time of the Helvetic Republic and the Mediation
• 7. Breach of Neutrality in 1813
• 8. Recognition of Permanent Neutrality of Switzerland
• 9. Limitation of Neutrality under the Control of the Great Powers
• 10. Internal Threats to Swiss Neutrality
• 11. Defence of Neutrality in the Struggle for Federal Reform
• 12. Preservation of Neutrality at the time of the National Wars of Liberation
• 13. The Effect of Foreign Wars on the Differentiation of Neutrality
• 14. Meaning of Neutrality in the Age of Imperialism
• 15. Armed Neutrality in the First World War
• 16. Return from Differential to Integral Neutrality
• 17. Hostile Criticisms of Neutrality
• 18. Supernational Significance of Swiss Neutrality
• 19. What is a Neutral Outlook?
• 20. Appendix: Act of Recognition and Guarantee of the Perpetual Neutrality of Switzerland and of the Inviolability of Swiss Territory, November 20, 1815