While Roma are both Europe’s largest minority, there is no “homeland” state that claims to guard their interest. The lack of “an external national homeland” [Brubaker, R. 1996. Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press] to watchdog and safeguard their rights has a particular effect on how Roma engage as political actors and subjects. International donors/foundations have assumed the role of “external homeland”. This article explores the effect that donors’ funding priorities have on Romani advocacy – specifically Romani journalism. Drawing upon multi-sited fieldwork in five countries, extensive document analysis, and interviews, Idemonstrate that the change in Romani media content over the past two decades reflects the shift in funders’ priorities, particularly in relation to the European project. “The Roma” become a tool for donors and European institutions to build a “European” identity while Romani-led advocacy becomes increasingly marganilized.
Introduction
In 2003, I was invited to Ohrid, Macedonia to observe a meeting of Romani media makers and outlets from across Central and Eastern Europe. For three days, more than thirty people, mostly Roma, engaged in lively discussions of file sharing, video editing, and trans-border news agencies. High hopes were accompanied by ambitious plans. The meeting was jointly organized by Medienhilfe,1 and the Open Society Foundations (OSF) Network Media Programme.2 The goal was to create a formal Romani Media Network.
Over a decade later, although there is much more information regarding Roma available via various media outlets, there is still no formal Romani media network. It is unclear whether Medienhilfe is still operational. And, perhaps more importantly, it would be hard today to fill the room with thirty people working specifically in Romani media. This paper focuses on how donors – most notably the OSF and the European Union (EU) – have shifted their priorities regarding Roma over the past decade and how this is reflected in Romani media.3
From its origins in the early 1990s Romani media has served two audiences: Romani communities and non-Romani populations (ERRC 1999). There was an understanding that if one is to recognize media as both a vehicle and measurement of advocacy, there needed to be support and space for both internal conversations as well as intervention within dominant discourses. However, since 2005, the targeted population for Romani media is now almost exclusively an international non-Romani audience.
Terminology and method
This article is based on my fifteen years of scholarly and advocacy work with Romani media throughout Europe, primarily in Central and Eastern Europe. The bulk of the interviews (twenty individuals) referenced were conducted between 2012 and 2014 during multi-sited fieldwork (Hannerz 2003) in London, Budapest, Prague, and Skopje as well as via phone, skype, and email. When information was gathered through interviews (regardless of medium) it is noted as “p.c.”. I am deeply grateful to Jeremy Drucker, Tihomir Loza, and Marie Struthers for providing access to documents of their programmes.
In the Romani language “Rom” refers to a Romani man whereas Romni refers to a Romani woman; “Roma” is plural and Romani is both adjectival and the name of the language. A person can be of Romani ethnicity but not consider themselves a “Romani journalist”, rather they are a journalist who happens to be Roma. When I use the term “Romani journalism” I refer to media that may, or may not, be made by people who identify as ethnically Romani but rather who hold a Romani positionality (Hill Collins [1986] 2008), that is: media created with a particular Romani lens. Of course, like all people, Roma are heterogeneous and what constitutes a Romani frame/lens is not static, nor should it be." (Petrova, Introduction 1999).
The who, what, where, when, and how of Roma in Europe
As discussed in the introduction to this special issue, there are ten to twelve million Roma estimated to be living across Europe. About eight million Roma reside in former socialist countries, including the former Yugoslavia. The lack of an “external national homeland” as a watchdog state is key because it runs counter to the way national minority rights have traditionally been understood and protected, in law, practice, and politics in Europe (Brubaker 1996), including the right to media in their own language (Downing and Husband 2005; European Convention on the Rights of Minority People, UN Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights). Unlike ethnic Hungarians, Albanians, Serbs, or Germans who reside in other countries, Roma do not have a specific nation-state safeguarding their interests.
Some scholars and activists worry that “Roma” are framed as a people who exist everywhere but belong nowhere: “They (Roma) are thus portrayed as a separate nation without a state” (Vermeersch 2012). Although potentially offering an opportunity to think outside traditional nationalist-driven policy, this is not the case rather, as Vermeersch continues, “By promoting this particular identity frame, however, the Council of Europe unintentionally supports the nationalisms that have pushed the Roma out of the other national communities in Europe” (10). With this logic, Roma do not belong to all states, rather they belong to no state.
This abdication of home often results in daily practices of segregation in schooling, housing, and recreation. Brubaker explains this process of “dissilimation” policies regarding Jews in many countries in the interwar period with eerie similarities to present-day Roma (1996, 93–96). The relegation of Roma to the margins – physically and in policy – in turn strengthens the majority population’s identity (Said [1978] 1994). Roma disappear in urban and rural spaces as well as in discourse and policy. They are simply not considered important enough to be a part of the conversation about the national imaginary (Anderson [1983] 1991; Plaut 2012).
When present in mainstream media, Roma and Romani issues are usually portrayed negatively but most often they are not portrayed at all (Plaut 2012). This may explain the tension surrounding Romani-specific media and media programmes. Although traditional understandings of minority rights recognize the need to have ethnic and linguistically specific media to serve the population’s specific needs, some have expressed concerns that doing so exacerbates Romani cultural segregation. This concern has been dismissed by those involved in evaluating such media programmes, pointing out that having a strong Romani cultural identity benefits all domestically and in Europe-wide (Walter 2010).
According to the United Nations and the Council of Europe, Roma are discriminated against in all European states. There has been a shift since 2005 to cast Roma as a European minority as can be seen in the Decade of Roma Inclusion and most recently in the European Roma Institute and the new Roma Integration 2020 initiative. Again, even when intentions may be good, by Europeanizing the problems of Roma one risks Europeanizing the solution. Thus Roma are reified (by institutions) as a homogenous group; local realities and national contexts are stripped away. This de-contextualization in the name of Europeanization may “leave us with the impression that the situation of the Roma is very similar across Europe and that formula-like solutions can be implemented” (Vermeersch 2012, 15). Although no government in Europe is particularly good to its Romani citizens, the mistreatment and the reasons behind mistreatment are not the same in every country. As Vermeersch cautions, “even if problems seem similar, causes may vary a lot from place to place and each community might possess different resources and dynamics to deal with these problems” (15).
Roma and the emerging project of democracy: a brief overview
As can be seen in the incongruent EU response to the 2015 “migrant crisis”, the political and social concept of “Europe” struggles in policy and politics. In this discord, it has become more difficult to see where the Roma might fit into this discourse of Europe and European-ness. Here is a group of people, living throughout Europe since at least the fourteenth century, suffering from systemic discrimination and, at times, grave human rights abuses, Traditional understandings of European minority politics would suggest that a “kin state” would watchdog their rights, but, there is no “Romanistan”.
Perhaps unique to the Romani context, non-state actors – specifically donor organizations, international organizations, and NGOs – have stepped into the traditional role of external homeland with varied levels of success and consistency. Donor organizations, most notably the OSF, have been most active in promoting Romani rights. International organizations such as the World Bank and USAID, some Western European aid agencies and embassies, and some UN agencies have also played an advocacy role. However, the “lobbyists” are external actors with evolving, shifting, and at times competing priorities, even if they have genuine commitment to advocate for Romani rights (Friedman 2014; Sobotka and Vermersch 2012). Funders shift their interests and money, and world affairs or a change of leadership can have a drastic impact on donor priorities.
Although often assumed to be a Central/Eastern European “problem”, many Roma have lived for centuries throughout the continent and original EU members do not provide ideal treatment of their own Romani populations. The Copenhagen Criteria4 were explicit about a candidate country’s commitment to minimum standards for the treatment of Roma and other ethnic minorities. However, once countries join the EU there is no incentive to ensure compliance (Bunsecu 2014, 42–43; OSI 2011, 5; Sobotka and Vermersch 2012). Although the EU has increasingly made funds available for Romani issues, it is inconsistent and primarily focused on keeping Roma from accession countries out of Western EU countries. One cannot forget that the EU is a political body balancing its internal struggles with the desire to carve out its own identity and agendas as an evolving transnational unit. In fact, according to Bunsescu, in countries such as Romania, Roma were often blamed by politicians and media for delaying accession into the EU (2014, 43, 48–49).
The danger in “Europeanizing” Roma
The discourse of homogenizing Roma across Europe can quickly slip into “a frame that argues that there is something in the category of “Roma” itself which mandates special treatment” because there is something inherently different about Roma as a group of people (Vermeersch 2012, 10, 14). This becomes especially true in the unfolding project of an expanding Europe, when ideas of what Europe is, and who is European, increase the importance of identity – who is included and excluded. As European identity struggles, it is not difficult to see how conversations about poverty or education change from what can be done to ensure that all members of our society enjoy equal rights and protection to “what is it about Roma that causes ‘them’ to be so different?” This is what Mamdani (2004) calls “Culture Talk”.
“Culture Talk” is the idea that there is something inherent in an “other’s” culture that explains away socio-economic and political inequalities (Mamdani 2004, Chapter 1). Things like a lack of running water, absence of paved roads, or school segregation – which are the responsibility of the state and greater society – are explained away by “their” culture: “They” are not clean, “They” prefer to live with horses, and “They” do not value school or education. Through a misrepresentation of another’s “culture”, very real problems, and thus potential solutions, become depoliticized.
The danger of Culture Talk is not only that it is inaccurate, but also that it strips away any agency that “those people” (in this case, Roma) may have in deciding how they want to live; as Mamdani (2004) puts it, “whereas we have culture, culture has them” (24, my emphasis). Such Culture Talk also serves to strengthen the boundaries between “us” and “them”. As Said ([1978] 1994) would offer, by ensuring that Roma are seen as not European, by not being Roma, an idea of “European-ness” is strengthened. It also serves to privilege the values, structures, and systems of the non-Roma society as the ideal. Rather than the state addressing the needs of their citizens who happen to be Roma, states are now turning to Europe to deal with “their Roma problem”. This is reinforced through media images of Roma to both Roma and non-Romani audiences.
The context: history and geography of journalism in Central and Eastern Europe5
All states in Central and Eastern Europe have some version of a public broadcasting system recognized as a public service. Since the fall of socialism, media outlets funded partially, if not entirely, by external donors emerged (Mihelj 2011). The diversity and quality of journalism in the region varies considerably and people bemoan the “oligarchy” of the private press; thus public broadcasters become a corrective.6 However these too are inconsistent. In countries such as the Czech Republic and Romania, public media are considered robust and healthy, whereas the governments of Hungary and Macedonia have been censured by a variety of international organizations for their increased repression of journalists and assault on free speech (Index on Censorship 2013; Budapost September 2014).7 Aside from public media, there is concern in most of the region that much of the private press is tied to the economic and political interests of the owner.8
Because the state borders of Europe do not correspond to the linguistic borders of the peoples of Europe, many provisions have been implemented to protect the rights of ethnic and linguistic minorities and to manage potential political strife mobilized in the name of identity (Friedman 1999a, 1999b; Gellner 1983). Protection of national and religious minorities is now presumed to be the state’s responsibility (Brubaker 1996; Gellner 1983; Kymlicka 1995). One of these rights is to provide all nations, including minorities, news and entertainment in their own language focusing on issues relevant to their people. This right is upheld both by not restricting such media in addition to providing financial and bureaucratic assistance, such as printing subsidies, radio/TV frequencies, and/or bandwidth.
If one recognizes that media are a means of both creating and promoting what Barnett and Duvall (2005) refer to as “productive pow...