Values in Social Work

Michael Horne

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9780429781940
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 1999, this second edition of Values in Social Work has been extensively revised from the first edition, incorporating new case study material and extended areas of analysis.

Values in Social Work encourages the reader to critically examine social work values as they relate to the processes whereby individuals become 'clients', how values work in practice, and the nature of social work practice in society.

Michael Horne begins by describing and critically examining the central social work values of respect for persons and self-determination. He goes on to illustrate and examine what happens to these values in social work practice, describing and analysing actual cases based on interviews with social workers. The author concludes with a theoretical framework that seeks to critically understand the nature of social work values in the context of the function and nature of social work in society.

Thus, Values in Social Work takes the subject of values, often treated in an abstract and theoretical way, firmly into the arena of contemporary social work practice. As such the book is a valuable resource to social workers, social work students and the reader interested in a values based exploration of social work.

Part I
Values in theory

'Value talk' in social work often consists of lists of what it is considered the moral or ethical principles of social work are, or should be. These are often referred to 'traditional', 'classic' or 'decontextualised' lists (Hugman and Smith 1995, p. 3) in that they are an attempt to elucidate a set of basic universal ethical principles upon which social work is based. Whilst the lists vary, there are generally strong similarities between them. Timms (1983, p. 46) gives five typical inclusions in a 'value list':

1. To respect the client.
2. To accept 'him' for 'himself'.
3. Not to condemn 'him'.
4. To uphold 'his' right to self-determination.
5. To respect 'his' confidence.

Butrym (1976, Ch. 3) describes three fundamental assumptions on which social work is based:

1. Respect for persons.
2. 'A belief in the social nature of "man" as a unique creature depending on other "men" for fulfilment of his uniqueness' (p. 45).
3. 'A belief in the human capacity for change, growth and betterment' (p. 45).

From these 'values of a very high order of abstraction' (p. 47) she then lists six 'middle-range conceptualisations of moral principles', based on Biestek's classification (1974), that are directly relevant to social work practice:

1. Acceptance
2. Non-judgmental attitude
3. Individualization
4. The 'purposeful expression of feelings' and 'controlled emotional involvement'
5. Confidentiality
6. Self-determination

The analysis below concentrates on 'respect for persons'. Basically all other social work values are derived from, and are a part of the meaning of, this ethical principle. This will be followed by an analysis of the value the 'client's right to self-determination', which is one of the central principles (as far as social work is concerned) that is derived from 'respect for persons', and which is also one of the most contentious and open to debate regarding its applicability (and limits) in contemporary social work practice.

Judging from the brief lists offered above, this approach most obviously ignores (at least explicitly) the value of 'respecting the client's confidence', which appears in Timms' and Butrym's lists, and also the purposeful expression of feelings and 'controlled emotional involvement' from Butrym's 'middle-range' list. All the other values are expressions of 'respect of persons' and 'client self-determination', which itself indicates the centrality of these two values in providing a value-base to social work. Because of this the following analysis of the social work 'value' literature and theory concentrates on these two values. Also, by focusing on respect for persons and client self-determination we are able to identify a number of critical questions about the efficacy of social work's ethical base.

1 Respect for persons

The concept of 'respect for persons' is fundamental to most discussions of values in social work literature, both as a moral principle from which other principles are derived, and as a prerequisite for morality itself. One of the most influential writers on social work values has been Raymond Plant, who describes respect for persons as 'not just a moral principle, on the contrary it is a presupposition of having the concept of a moral principle at all' {Plant 1970, p. 20). Plant goes on to say that other values, such as self-determination, are implicit in 'respect for persons'. (I will discuss whether or not this is the case in the next chapter.) Downie and Telfer, two influential writers on social work values, go even further than Plant: the attitude of "respect for persons" is morally basic ... not only is it the paramount moral attitude, but also ... all other moral principles and attitudes are to be explained in terms of it' (Downie and Telfer 1969, p. 33).

As far as its fundamental importance to social work practice is concerned, the following quote from BASW illustrates what it sees to be the practical implications of 'respect for persons':

Basic to the profession of social work is the recognition of the value and dignity of every human being irrespective of origin, race, status, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, belief or contribution to society. The profession accepts responsibility to encourage and facilitate the self-realisation of the individual person with due regard for the interest of others. (BASW 1996, para. 6)

Plant himself indicates that in relation to social work practice, the values of individualization, acceptance and self-direction (self-determination) are in fact implicit in 'respect for persons': 'They are deductions from this concept in that they are part of its very meaning. Respect for persons is, on this view, the basic value of casework' (Plant 1970, p. 11).

Ends and means

The principle of respect for persons is derived from the eighteenth-century German philosopher, Immanuel Kant. The most common way of describing what is meant by this principle is that people should be treated as ends in themselves, not as means to ends. This comes directly from the categorical imperative (a command that one should adhere to, in order to act morally) that one should 'Act in such a way that you always treat humanity, whether in your own person or in the person of any other, never simply as a means, but always at the same time as an end' (Kant in Paton 1948, p. 91).

The concept that each person is an end in herself argues for an equal evaluation of each individual which is not based on what are considered to be morally arbitrary features such as experience, ability, intelligence, social standing, or any other 'empirical' quality. Whilst every individual possesses a number of such features which help to determine her role in society; in themselves, these do not constitute her value as an end. According to 'respect for persons', such variations are arbitrary and exist on 'top of' the evaluation that each person has 'a legitimate claim to be valued equally with any others' (Budgen 1982, p. 34). Zofia Butrym describes 'respect for persons' as being 'due to the inherent worth of man [sic] and is thus independent of his actual achievements or behaviour' (Butrym 1976, p, 43).

Plant sums up this philosophy in the following quotation from Kant which he cites:

A man deserves respect as a potential moral agent in terms of his transcendental characteristic, not because of a particular conjunction of empirical qualities which he might possess. Traits of character might command admiration and other such responses, but respect is owed to a man irrespective of what he does because he is a man. (Plant 1970, p. 12)

In other words, to treat someone as an end is to treat her as being of unconditional moral worth.

Rationality

The basis of, or justification for 'respect for persons' is, according to Kant, the individual's possession of rationality - the rational will. Before describing this, it should be pointed out that 'rationality' is not to be taken as being contrasted with 'irrationality', but with 'non-rationality'. For example, many clients come or are sent to see social workers because they are considered not to be behaving rationally. This does not mean that they are to be regarded as being irrational - rather that their ability to make rational decisions may be temporarily affected or lessened through some form of stress, crisis, illness, etc. The case of children, people with learning difficulties and people with mental health problems is more complex and will be discussed in the examination below of what and who constitutes a person (or 'personhood').

According to Kant, an individual's absolute worth comes from her possession of the rational will, which enables one to think and act in a rational manner. Budgen describes two ways in which the exercise of the 'rational will' can be seen, first by 'the ability to choose for oneself, and more extensively to formulate purposes, plans and policies of one's own' (1982, p. 34); and second, by 'the ability to carry out decisions, plans or policies without undue reliance on the help of others' (quote from Downie and Telfer 1969, p. 20). To impair a person's abilities to choose and execute her own plan is, as Downie and Telfer put it, to that extent to 'destroy' her as a person (1969, p. 21).

Autonomy

The main feature of Kant's analysis of the 'rational will' is the autonomy of the will - that is, our ability to act in the pursuit of our own self-chosen goals - to act in pursuit of our own personal conception of the 'good life'. Within our liberal, democratic society (relatively so at least), autonomy is valued very highly, both as a means to the achievement of our goals and as an end in its own right. In addition, someone who is seen as being autonomous, and as being 'independent' is also likely to be recognized as a 'worthwhile' member of society. This point is particularly pertinent in the context of social work with clients where the aim is to increase or develop the individual's ability to live independently; that is, without the assistance of social work/care support.

As Budgen, and Downie and Telfer, have pointed out, people have their own chosen purposes and projects, so to treat someone as an end is to value the individual and recognize the individual's right to live according to her purposes and projects. To treat someone solely as a 'means' would, for example, be to make a false promise to them in order to secure a loan which one had no intention of repaying.

Richard Lindley (1984) cites Aldous Huxley's novel, Brave New World, as an example of a society in which the majority of the people were without any autonomy, that is, they were not treated as ends in themselves. Rather, they were treated instrumentally, in that their wills were manipulated, allegedly for their own benefit. Therefore, pleasant though the Brave New World may have been for its inhabitants, it nevertheless seriously violated the Kantian principle of 'respect for persons'.

It is important to be aware that each person, as the possessor of a rational will, is able to live according to her own projects, purposes and rules, but another person may possibly live according to a different set of projects and rules. So whilst it may be morally acceptable to use rational argument to try and get the other person to change her mind, it would be morally wrong (that is, a denial of her as a person?) to attempt to make her change her mind by the exercise of power, coercion or manipulation. On a strict interpretation of the Kantian principle, as rational beings, we should always respect the autonomy of others. To do otherwise would be morally wrong, since the principle which justified the behaviour could not be accepted by the other person or persons, and therefore could not be 'willed to be a universal law'. The CCETSW paper on values in social work puts this in the following way:

A rational being cannot propose to act on a principle if he cannot propose at the same time that others should act upon it. 'Man' should be seen as an end in himself; to use a person as a means by deceiving or manipulating him is to deprive him of the respect and opportunity for choice which one would expect for oneself. (CCETSW 1976, p. 22)

The obvious social work value which has its roots in this aspect of 'respect for persons' is the concept of self-determination - the ability to choose for oneself, and the ability to carry out actions and policies, etc., of one's own. (This value/concept is discussed in detail in Chapter 2.)

A further aspect of 'respecting a person' involves an awareness that certain roles, projects, values, etc., apply to everyone alike, for example, social workers and their clients. So, in helping with a client's problems, the social worker is morally bound not to do so at the expense of the social norms which apply to all.

This is interesting and potentially problematical, because it could be seen as possibly clashing with respecting a person as an autonomous (self-determining) being, which itself involves assisting the client in the pursuit of the actions and policies that she wishes to implement. Or, it may limit or deny the social worker's responsibilities to try to remove the social, economic or political (structural) impediments to the realization of their client's aspirations.

Not very helpfully in terms of resolving possible conflict, Downie and Telfer describe social work as having to cope with the rights and duties of different social roles, so that the self-determination of clients as moral agents is maximized, and balanced against the rights of others within a liberal democracy. BASW (1996) alludes to this 'reality' in its code of ethics: the principle that 'The profession accepts a responsibility to encourage and facilitate the self-realisation of each individual with due regard to the interest of others' (consistent with the notion of 'autonomy') is followed by the commentary that: 'Social workers are often concerned with trying to harmonise conflicting interests and failing harmony, to arrive at the least damaging solution for all concerned. It is therefore, sometimes not possible to ensure that there will be no detriment to the interests of others, or to the client's interest' (BASW 1996, para. 6).

'Personhood'

Central to any description of 'respect for persons', certainly within the framework of social work, is the definition of who and what constitutes a person, or 'personhood', implicit within which is the question of whether it applies to all human beings 'irrespective of origin, race, status, sex, sexual orientation, age, disability, belief or contribution to society' (BASW 1996, para. 6). For example, how does it apply to children, elderly people, people with learning difficulties, people with mental health problems, etc., who might be seen as not being able to act rationally or with autonomy?

Noel Timms (1983, p. 61) comments that some commentators see 'respect for persons' as actively promoting discrimination against those who may not count as persons, or as being 'fully persons' according to what are agreed to be the criteria of 'personhood'.

Downie and Telfer (1969, p. 35) provide a possible solution to this question of who to include as 'persons' by suggesting that 'respect' entails different emphases depending on the individual concerned. By their criteria, 'respect for persons' applied to rational individuals with full capabilities is the central case; particular individuals may approximate to this central case to a varying extent. Budgen (1982, p. 39) follows Downie and Telfer's argument through by suggesting that children can be seen as potential persons, the senile are lapsed persons, the mentally ill are temporarily lapsed persons, and people with learning difficulties can be considered to be permanently potential persons (!).

The important point is that according to Downie and Telfer (1969, p. 35) there are still sufficient resemblances between the above groups and fully 'rational' persons to justify including them in the principle of 'respect for persons'. A second aspect of their approach to 'persons' is to stress that there are possible attitudes (other than 'respect for persons') which are helpful in dealing with people in this 'minimal' sense. They suggest that affection and pity are relevant in dealing with this group of persons (as well as being relevant for dealing with fully rational persons). Whilst affection and pity in themselves are not moral attitudes, they are consistent with 'respect for persons' and can reinforce it. A final aspect of Downie and Telfer's solution to the problem of 'minimal' persons is that, all persons possess (equally) the characteristic of 'feeling', and as 'feeling' beings, all persons should be treated with 'respect for persons'.

Mentioned above was the fact that some commentators have been critical of 'respect for persons' because they see it as promoting discrimination against non-fully rational, or minimal persons. One such commentator is David Watson. Referring to 'minimal' persons, he writes:

... a caring profession adopting this principle [respect for persons] must stigmatise individuals not exercising these [rational] capacities ... the ability to choose for oneself etc. are hardly possessed by very young children and the senile, and not possessed at all by some severely mentally handicapped individuals; 'respect for persons' provides little or no moral reason, respectively, for the care of these individuals. We are only obliged to control them. Caring professions working with these individuals must find another principle if talk of 'caring' is to be taken seriously. (Watson 1980, pp. 59-60)

This criticism is extremely potent given that a great many users of social/ care services, are those very individuals that would not be considered 'full' persons according to the criteria described above. This brings into question the efficacy of respect for persons as the underlying moral imperative for the profession of social work. At best it appears to legitimate a limited form of 'care' based on pity or affection, and at worst it provides a rational for interpreting care of and for 'minimal' persons primarily within a paradigm of control.

Watson's solution is to construct a principle of respect for human beings', on the grounds that this offers a wider range of characteristics than is included in 'respect for persons'. Watson comments that 'respect for human beings' could entail 'valuing the capacity to be emotionally secure, the desire to give and the capacity to receive love and affection, as well as the distinctive endowments of a human being' (1980, p. 61).

However, it is not at all clear just what Watson's replacement of 'persons' by 'human beings' actually introduces that could not be accommodated within 'respect for persons' itself. As Budgen states, 'though "respect for persons" assumes choosers one can see it as capable of generalisation to the problem groups ... such a the confused elderly' (1982, p. 40).

The distinction which Watson makes between 'respect for persons' and 'respect for human beings' appears to be arbitrary. There is no logical d...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface to the second edition
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I Values in theory
• Part II Values in practice
• Part III Values in context
• Bibliography
• Index