Policing Drugs

Karim Murji

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9781138325685
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429833151
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

First published in 1998, this influential volume develops previous research by the author and explores issues and solutions regarding the roles of law enforcement, drug referral and official and media reactions. Section one analyzes the rationale for drug enforcement and evaluates the strengths and weaknesses of four main approaches. It looks at the pressure on the police to take action in local drugs markets, particularly within a context where the police emphasize their responsiveness to public demands in a more "consumerist" age. Section two examines welfarist policies directed towards drug users and minor drug offenders. Section 3 focuses on the media and coverage of crack-cocaine and ecstasy in the 1990s - particularly where these have been based upon police briefings and reports.

I
LAW ENFORCEMENT

1

Drug Enforcement Strategies

Karl Marx once wrote that ‘the criminal produces the whole of the police and of criminal justice’.¹ In the ‘age of the dealer’ (Campbell, 1991) the drugs business has been one of the key sources of productivity for policing and criminal justice. Drugs have been at the forefront in making the case for far-reaching changes in law enforcement, producing legislative innovations such as the 1986 Drug Trafficking Offences Act, which brought into law powers of asset seizure and forfeiture. Drugs have helped to nationalise and transnationalise policing in the shape of the National Criminal Intelligence Service (which incorporated the former National Drugs Intelligence Unit), the National Crime Squad (constructed from the former Regional Crime Squads) and Europol. Furthermore, drugs have also been a major reason for the ever increasing array of International Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties between many governments, authorising mutual powers of search, seizure and mutual assistance between law enforcement agencies. In the post-cold war 1990s, the Secret Intelligence Services have also been playing a role in drug enforcement. Drugs therefore stand second only to terrorism as a major stimulus to developments in law enforcement (Dorn and South, 1991; Dorn et ai, 1991, 1992).

Throughout this period the focus of enforcement has been almost entirely on the search for the ‘big trafficker’ and weighty drug seizures. The value of ‘high level’ enforcement strategies has however been called into question. A common response to the perceived or actual shortcomings of drug enforcement is the call for some form of decriminalisation or legalisation of drugs. Another response is an interest in ‘low level’ enforcement aimed at street or retail drug markets. This is not to say that street-level enforcement as such is new. More significant is the attention that has been paid to it and the support for it from particular individuals from across the political spectrum. In this chapter I examine four approaches to drug enforcement. Three of these are high level approaches that are dominant in thinking about drug enforcement. In reviewing the arguments for and the limitations of each of these, I argue that their shortcomings have led to arguments for a fourth way, low level enforcement. The four approaches are presented in a logical order from crop programmes to interdiction to organised criminal networks. Greatest attention is paid to the theory and practice of interdiction because of its significance for the subsequent argument. Drawing on economic models of the drug market and the behaviour of drug buyers, the arguments for low level drug enforcement are described and some concerns are raised.

Two qualifications should be noted at the outset. First, this discussion is mostly based on literature looking at drug enforcement in the United States, though parallels are drawn with developments in Britain, where similar trends have been identified (Pearson, 1989, 1992; Dorn et al., 1992; Dorn and Murji, 1992a, b; Collison, 1995). Secondly, while law enforcement is tiered at three levels - the upper, middle and level lower levels of enforcement, corresponding in Britain to national/regional crime squads, county drug squads and local CID/uniformed policing (see ACPO, 1985) - this does not necessarily mean that the drug market is tiered or structured in any corresponding way. Indeed even the notion of a tiered drug market should be regarded as problematic (Dorn and South, 1990; Dorn et al., 1991).

High level enforcement

Enforcement agencies tackle drug importation, distribution and the crime networks associated with both of these using a variety of methods. Drug enforcement can aim to interrupt and disrupt the supply of illicit drugs to the market, mainly through crop programmes in source countries, interdiction at the borders or by targeting key individuals in trafficking organisations as part of an organised crime approach. Together these constitute the three conventional approaches guiding supply reduction efforts (Moore, 1988, 1990).

Crop programmes

The first approach is based on the idea that the most effective method of enforcement is to ‘strike at the source’ of the problem (Moore, 1988, 1990). This strategy has a simple and straightforward appeal. It offers a clear solution to the problem of how to reduce the supply of drugs. But its simplicity is also part of the problem. The ‘source’ could be seen as any one of a number of places, from the point at which plants are grown, or at the borders where drugs come in, or the trafficking organisation that distribute drugs. Since the late 1980s, a process of re-imagining has seen drugs users and buyers as ‘the source’. In a ‘zero tolerance’ climate, terms such as ‘demand reduction’ and “user accountability’ have meant measures targeted at drug users and buyers since, in this view, it is the demand for illicit drugs that ultimately enables, supports and maintains the existence of illicit drug markets. As Inciardi points out, this position rests on a number of premises including: ‘that if there were no drug abusers there would be no drug problem...that drug abuse starts with a willful act...[and] that most illegal drug users can choose to stop their drug-taking behaviors and must be held accountable if they do not’ (Inciardi, 1991: 11). Demand reduction is therefore only a partial counterweight to the prevailing emphasis on supply side policies, though it does include more of an emphasis on the need for education and prevention programmes rather than just law enforcement. In practice, demand reduction not only operates alongside law enforcement but can also be seen as an enforcement tool. For example, the police department in Los Angeles have made use of the demand reducing DARE (Drug Abuse Resistance Education) programme and even said that it is their only hope for future generations, since the current generation of drug users is considered to be ‘already lost’ (Kleiman and Smith, 1990; for a discussion of demand reduction, and its relationship to US drug control policies under the former ‘drugs czar’ William Bennett, see Dorn and Murji, 1992a; Dorn and South, 1993).

Locating the ‘source’ as the point at which the ‘raw material’ is produced does not solve the definitional problem. Although crop eradication and substitution programmes have been heavily promoted by successive US governments and under the aegis of United Nations agencies, their success has been mixed at best. Farmers in so-called ‘source’ countries have been encouraged in various ways to substitute coca leaf, opium or marijuana plantations with other crops. Where farmers are recalcitrant, drugs crops are simply destroyed through aerial spraying of defoliating chemicals. An immediate problem with this approach is displacement and replacement. Crops eradicated or substituted in one area can easily be grown elsewhere. One consequence of such replacement has been that, in the case of marijuana in the US, the ‘home grown’ replacement is more potent than the imported variety (Kleiman, 1989). A second problem is that spraying from the air causes what is euphemistically referred to as ‘collateral damage’ to other crops, hence raising environmental questions that at least cut-across, or possibly go well beyond, drug policy concerns (del Olmo, 1987). The alternative - clearing plantations at ground level - is cumbersome because plans for ground-level clearance programmes are obvious long before any action can take place. That leaves plenty of time for counter-measures (Moore, 1988).

Another problem is that governments in ‘source’ countries may not be able to carry through substitution and eradication policies, perhaps because of relatively weak control of some regional areas and/or guerilla warfare, or corruption. The contradictory demands of US drugs and foreign policy concerns have also confused the picture, and the latter have often been seen to win out over the former (Moore, 1988; see also Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Reuter, 1992). Finally, crop programmes do not of course apply to synthetically manufactured drugs such as ecstasy, amphetamines and LSD. In these cases, the ‘source’ becomes the laboratory and this has stimulated policing methods based on ‘chasing the chemicals’, that is, monitoring the sales of precursor chemicals that can be used in drug manufacture (see Dorn et al, 1992, chapter 9).

Interdiction

A second conventional method is the reliance on interdiction as the principal means of stopping drugs at the border. Public announcements about the seizures of large quantities of drugs are fairly commonplace and the weight of drugs captured acts as a rough and ready indicator of enforcement success. But whatever the quantity of drugs interdicted, an unknown percentage still gets through. Two more substantial problems with interdiction have been identified by Reuter et al. (1988). One is the process of ‘modelling adaptations’. Drug smugglers always seek to utilise forms of importation that carry least risk. As enforcement pressure bears down on particular routes, amounts or methods of importation, drug importers are likely to change or modify their methods. This process of’learning by doing’ is not unique to this level of the market since law enforcement and drug markets continuously interact and shape one another (Dorn and South, 1990; Dorn et al, 1992). A second problem is that the economics of drug production and smuggling mean that the ‘replacement cost’ of drugs seized is low and adds little to costs at the retail level. Reuter et al.’s (1988) explanation for this is that interdiction primarily effects the smuggling costs of drug distribution. Because replacement costs to traffickers are a relatively minor part of the total cost to the distribution system, successful interdiction can make only modest contributions to overall consumption. In the case of cocaine for example, only a small part of the final price of the drug (perhaps around 10 per cent) is accounted for by the costs of smuggling (see also Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Moore, 1990; Wagstaff and Maynard, 1988).

A key justification for interdiction is that seizures will induce shortages in the market, driving up prices at the retail level and so lead to reduced consumption. Interdiction is expected to raise retail prices by imposing costs on those who have to replace the seized drugs, by increasing both the risks associated with smuggling drugs and the uncertainty about income and supplies for dealers at the retail level (Reuter and Kleiman, 1986; Reuter et al, 1988; Reuter, 1992). It is the role of prices that I want to focus on here. Their significance as a means for evaluating enforcement efforts is clear: ‘The single most important bit of empirical evidence on the effectiveness of supply-reduction efforts is data on price and availability of drugs in illicit markets’ (Moore, 1990:121). There are however considerable difficulties with using price data as a measure of the effectiveness of supply reduction. First, the reliability of the data on prices is questionable. Secondly, there is the question of whether the purchase price is a sufficient measure of the impact of supply reduction measures. What the street price does not measure (except perhaps indirectly) is what is called the ‘search time’, which includes time spent searching for a ‘connection’, and the difficulties and dangers for consumers in making the deal. Thirdly, there is the problem of separating the effects of supply reduction efforts on price from the other multiple factors which effect price, such as demand. Movements in demand in relation to supply can cause prices to rise or fall even if the effectiveness of enforcement efforts remains constant or declines (Moore, 1990). Nevertheless, Moore points out that ‘the price of drugs in illicit markets remains one of the principal empirical measures available for assessing the effectiveness of supply-reduction efforts’ (Moore, 1990: 123). For present purposes it may be sufficient to note that the continuing reliance on prices as measures of supply-reduction efforts tend to be heavily hedged with qualifications about their reliability (for example, see Wagstaff and Maynard, 1988; Moore, 1990). This makes them rather less revealing than they might at first sight seem. A linked point is that the use of data on arrests and seizures as a measure of organisational productivity is also subject to qualifications which significantly reduce their usefulness (Polich et al., 1984; Wagstaff and Maynard, 1988).² Setting aside some of these problems, we can turn to consider the role that prices are expected to play at the retail level by drawing upon simple supply and demand economics. As the supply of a commodity becomes scarcer while demand remains the same or increases, its price will rise. That price rise will consequently sap some of the demand as those unable to afford a particular commodity adapt their economic behaviour accordingly. As far as drugs are concerned, supply reduction efforts should raise the prices of drugs and consequently drive some users out of the market, though the effectiveness of interdiction as a means for achieving that has been questioned.³ Minimising supply and availability and increasing the price of drugs is a cornerstone of what Moore (1990) calls the ‘drug policy perspective’ (see also Moore, 1979; Reuter and Kleiman, 1986).

There is an obvious line of counter-argument, which sees the attempt to force up prices as being both limited and counter-productive. Limited because of the view that demand for drugs is not particularly responsive to price increases, and counter-productive because price increases might result in the commission of greater amounts of drug related crime (Wagstaff and Maynard, 1988). But:

This conclusion has recently been challenged on the grounds that the price elasticity of demand for drugs may not be so low as previously thought. One reason is that users of drugs such as heroin tend (or are at least able) to switch to other drugs as the price of heroin (or whatever) rises. The existence of substitutes means that the demand for hard drugs may not be so price-inelastic. Other writers suggests that demand may be price-elastic at least over some price ranges. At low prices some of the market demand will be from occasional users, whose use may be expected to drop (or even cease) as the price rises. Thus, even if addicts’ demand may be price-inelastic at low prices, the market demand need not be. At high prices addicts’ demand may be price-elastic, since as prices become very high they will find it harder and harder to fund their habit. They will be more likely to be detected when engaging in theft and therefore more likely to be arrested. They may also be more likely to enter treatment programmes voluntarily as supporting their habit becomes more difficult. The upshot of all this is that supply-side law enforcement may, after all, have a role to play (Wagstaff and Maynard, 1988: 55).

As this quote indicates a key point around which differing positions are constructed is the elasticity of demand by users. Any claim that demand is perfectly inelastic (i.e. not at all responsive to price changes) is clearly untenable since, as Moore points out, there is no good which is perfectly inelastic: ‘Everything seems to respond to price’ (Moore, 1990:114). But what of the lesser claim that demand for drugs is somewhat inelastic though not perfectly inelastic? Under such conditions, usage must decline, or at least patterns of usage must change in relation to price increases and availability (for an example, see George and Fraser, 1989).

Supply reduction efforts do contribute something to increasing prices, where these are taken to be of a money or non-money kind, as we will see in the ‘risks and prices’ model. Enforcement measures which disrupt the market can, indirectly, lead to a reduction in the volume of drugs which pass through the market by creating increased uncertainty for sellers and buyers, as we will see in the ‘market constriction’ model. Here then are two embryonic arguments for policing ‘down market’, or low level drug enforcement. One is that price increases might play a role in persuading ‘heavy’, perhaps addicted, users to enter drug treatment (‘taking early retirement’ as it has been described by Gilman and Pearson, 1991). A second is the discouragement of novice or newer users from entering the market, or at least to consume less often, both leading to an overall decline in market turnover (cf Wilson, 1985; Pearson, 1989). I return to this in the discussion of low level enforcement below.

Tackling organised crime

The third conventional approach is based upon the attempt to arrest and imprison the main individuals at the top of drug trafficking organisations. This ‘Mr...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgement
• Introduction
• Part I: Law Enforcement
• Part II: Drug Referral
• Part III: Official and Media Reactions
• Bibliography
• Index