Honduras

Caudillo Politics and Military Rulers

James A. Morris

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN:
  9780367018726
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429724473
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the retirement of longtime dictator Tiburcio Carías Andino (1932-1949), the search for institutional stability in Honduras has led to both democratically elected governments and the imposed discipline of military rule. Social and economic change has contributed to the growth of middle-class urban groups, strongly organized labor unions, and a vigorous peasant movement. The Honduran armed forces, established in modern form only after World War II, filled the vacuum of political power that developed as the Liberal and National political parties failed to address the problems created by change and national development, but the authoritarianism of military rule has been countered by historical patterns of caudillo politics. Despite the revolutionary turmoil that surrounds the country, Hondurans have successfully conducted national elections and installed a freely elected civilian government after more than ten years of military rule. It is within this mix of "traditional" and "praetorian" governing modes that Hondurans have fashioned a style of politics conducive to compromise, which accounts for the country's relative tranquillity today. In this first comprehensive study of contemporary Honduras—its land, people, economy, and politics—to be published in English, Dr. Morris also outlines the historical context that has shaped the society of this now geopolitically important nation and conditioned its political dynamics over the past three decades. His analysis illuminates the characteristics that distinguish Honduras from its Central American neighbors and that may dictate a unique course for its political evolution.

1
Caudillos, Enclaves, and Political Uncertainty, 1876–1956

While exploring the New World during his fourth voyage (1502-504), Christopher Columbus touched upon the Caribbean island of Guanaja off the northern coast of Honduras. Landing on the Central American mainland at a point now called Cabo de Honduras near the present city of Trujillo, he claimed the territory for the Spanish Crown. Later, when the explorers rounded the Cape of Gracias a Dios near the Honduran-Nicaraguan frontier, a storm threatened the fleet's safety, and Columbus is reputed to have expressed his thanks to God after they had escaped the storm-tossed watery depths (or honduras), thus giving the cape its name. The region left behind, then known as Higueras, was sparsely populated with nomadic Indian tribes, and it was nearly twenty years later before Spain renewed its interest.

As part of the Captairi-Gerieralcy of Guatemala, Honduras was located on the fringes of the Spanish colonial empire. It was not until 1786 that Spain created the Intendancy of Comayagua. This marked the beginning of a regional rivalry between Comayagua and Tegucigalpa. The former was the seat of colonial authority and then the republican capital until 1880 when Tegucigalpa, riding the crest of a revived silvermining boom, became the political capital of Honduras. The latter city was first settled near the end of the sixteenth century, when silver deposits were discovered nearby.¹ Though the silver mines were the most important in Central America, scarcity of labor and the exhaustion of the veins had left them practically dormant at the end of the 1700s. The colonial experience of Honduras was one of neglect due to such things as lack of interest by the Spanish Crown, administrative inefficiency, and more urgent concerns elsewhere within the colonial realm Geographical isolation and the physical ruggedness of Honduras also limited penetration into the region. Scarcity of labor, lack of appropriate technology, and nonexistent infrastructure hampered the development of mining and other types of industry. To further weaken Spanish influence, the Catholic church never acquired extensive wealth or power in Honduras.²

The colonial provinces of Central America declared their independence in 1821. The region never became involved in a war of liberation, but merely took advantage of Mexico's revolt against Spain. The United Provinces of Central America were unable to consolidate a confederated system of government, and after several years of intraregional rivalry the union collapsed. In January 1839, Honduras became the second province (after Nicaragua) to declare itself a separate state. There followed a series of frustrating attempts at reunification, mostly with Nicaragua and El Salvador. Guatemala, however, dominated regional affairs, and events in Honduras were influenced by Guatemalan intervention and support for rival factions. The transfer of power in Honduras more often than not was disorderly and violent, except in 1852 when Jose Trinidad Cabañas peacefully assumed the presidency. The first half century of independence was a period filled with turbulence, regional disunity, and the absence of national perceptions. An ephemeral nationalism and the lack of a strong and cohesive ruling class (oligarchy) left Honduras open to outside interference and exploitation by international intrigue and economic interests.

Era of Liberal Reforms

During the 1870s, the Liberal-Conservative battles of Central America were resolved in favor of the Liberals. In Honduras, the era was launched with the presidency of Marco Aurelio Soto (1876-1883). New ideas about economic development were introduced, the state became more supportive of entrepreneurial ventures, and public lands were made available for private purchase or homesteading. New economic policies were decreed to stimulate both domestic and foreign investment in Honduras, as Liberal leaders sought to modernize the country's economic structures. Technology and capital were needed, and most would have to be imported one way or another.³

By 1880, a new constitution had been put together, and codes had been decreed regulating commerce, customs, mining, penal affairs, and the military. The separation of church and state was reinforced by the expropriation of church property and banishment of tithes. Control of the cemeteries was transferred to local governments (municipios). Monetary stabilization policies were drawn up, and President Soto established the Casa de Moneda. Tax exemptions were granted, and national lands were often granted as part of investment agreements. Foreign investors, especially mining and banana-plantation developers, were to obtain generous concessions. The long-range strategy of Honduran leaders was to promote agricultural development. With the export of agricultural

Statue of Honduran military hero Francisco Morazán, who governed the Central American Union from 1829 until 1838.

surpluses the country would then be able to finance imports of goods, machinery, and technology.

Throughout the nineteenth century, the Honduran economy—although varied and relatively self-sufficient—was disaggregated. Production was at subsistence levels, and contact with world markets was minimal. These conditions added to the isolation of Honduras and allowed the country's archaic social and economic structures to linger on well into the twentieth century. In contrast, coffee-growing elites in Guatemala, El Salvador, and Costa Rica had been able to consolidate their positions economically and politically. Those national economies relied upon coffee exports to finance imports and some programs of national development. In the wake of Liberal reforms, Honduras attempted to emulate its neighbors, but coffee production did not truly develop until well after World War II. Thus, a solid ruling class did not emerge that was able to support or even benefit from the expansion of exports. The policy of favorable land concessions, new commercial codes, and the willingness of the state to accept foreign capital on liberalized terms all led to higher levels of foreign investment in mining and agricultural enterprises, so that international economic interests eventually dominated production within the Honduran export sector. Since coffee production was minimal and grew slowly, the mining and fruit companies were alone in their ability to provide the country an export capacity. It was through foreign-controlled enterprises, for the most part, that Honduras was first integrated into the expanding capitalist world market.

With Liberal reform, the Honduran mining sector was revived with British, French, North American, and some Honduran capital. The new codes established a series of concessions and privileges for investors, including lands, rights of way, free import of goods and machinery, and other tax exemptions. In 1880, the New York and Honduras Rosario Mining Company was organized and obtained its first twenty-year concession from the government.⁴ Regardless of these efforts, by the end of the nineteenth century the mining industry had once again declined as financial problems, falling silver prices, and unpromising claim sites contributed to a rash of business failures.

Introduction of the Banana Industry

The decline in mining activity coincided and merged with the ascendance of the banana industry. North American investors began to build plantations along the northern coast of Honduras under terms similar to those granted to mining concessions. Commerce in bananas and other tropical produce had originated in the Bay Islands during the 1860s and 1870s. Ships made occasional visits to Roatán to take on extra cargo that was profitable in New Orleans and eastern seaboard cities of the United States. Until just after the turn of the century, banana production in Honduras depended on numerous small, independent producers, and competition among them was advantageous for produce buyers. Though cultivation was predominately by Hondurans, access to markets and overseas transport were in the hands of foreign shippers and brokers.

Improvement in shipping and regular schedules helped to increase banana exports. By 1892, bananas constituted nearly 12 percent of all Honduran exports. The next thirty years brought dramatic growth to this industry along the North Coast, transforming the region into a dynamic economic zone that provided new revenues for the state. From 1890 to 1930, the production of bananas, mostly by U.S. companies, catapulted Honduras into the position of the world's leading banana exporter. It was during this "golden age" that major foreign investments were made in the departments of Cortés, Atlántida, and Colón.⁵

By the second decade of the twentieth century, three companies dominated production and marketing in Honduras. In 1899, the Vaccaro family—which had been plying the fruit trade between Central America and New Orleans—was successful in receiving a concession to develop lands in the Aguán River valley along the northeastern coast of Honduras. In 1904, the Vaccaros and their partner obtained another concession, valid for seventy-five years, in which they acquired lands in exchange for the construction of railroads. This contract exempted the Vaccaro Fruit Company from many contemporary and future taxes. In 1926, an array of enterprises under the aegis of the Vaccaros was consolidated into the Standard Fruit and Steamship Company.

Along the western portion of the Honduran coast near Omoa, another land concession of 2,024 hectares on both sides of the Cuyamel River was granted to William F. Streich in 1902. Streich later sold his failing business to a more aggressive entrepreneur whose subsequent exploits lend a colorful page or two to Honduran history. At first, Samuel Zemurray's business dealings were supported by the prosperous multinational United Fruit Company; but by 1911, Zemurray was able to organize the Cuyamel Fruit Company, free of financial entanglements with United. Part of Zemurray's success was due to the realization by government officials that he represented the only serious competition to the United Fruit Company. It was deemed desirable to avoid monopoly control over what was now an important source of state revenue. In addition, the leader of Cuyamel was fully involved in presidential politics, especially the revolt that placed Manuel Bonilla into the presidency (1912-1913). In 1912, Cuyamel received a long-term lease on another 10,000 hectares of land.

The largest and most powerful banana company was, and still is, the United Fruit Company (now United Brands). A Boston-based businessman, Minor C. Keith, merged his various produce-import operations to form United Fruit. Honduran subsidiaries were the Truxillo Railroad and the Tela Railroad companies, named for the North Coast ports from which their produce was shipped. United Fruit became an even more preponderant economic and political force when it absorbed Zemurray's Cuyamel in 1929. For his part, the resourceful Zemurray ended up as United's director of tropical operations.

By the end of the 1920s, the banana companies had control over large expanses of the most fertile lands in northern Honduras and employed around twenty-two thousand workers. The foreign-owned companies operated—and in effect owned—the railroads, including the National Railroad that ran 100 kilometers from Puerto Cortés to Potrerillos.⁶ The docks and ships were also part of the network of foreign investments. The companies owned local electric facilities, ice plants, communications systems, sugar mills, commissaries, and soap factories, as well as the largest, most important bank in the country.

The expansion of the banana industry opened up the isolated and diffkult-to-settle littoral along the northern coast. Foreign investors brought needed infrastructure development, introduced agricultural technology, and helped provide public works and other services to growing towns and cities such as San Pedro Sula, Puerto Cortés, Tela, El Progreso, and La Ceiba. Thousands of jobs were created, along with a general economic stimulus that spread throughout the North Coast region. Although the state had supplied the conditions for new and expanded investments, the country was unable to finance the opportunities that were created. In the context of an expanding capitalist world economy, foreigners were more able to take advantage of the investment opportunities than were Hondurans. The long-term impact on Honduran social and economic development posed contradictory issues for the country's economic and political evolution.

One consequence was a reduction in the number of independent Honduran banana growers. Transport and overseas marketing were controlled by the foreign-owned companies, so that growers were often forced to sell their properties at bargain rates or at least accommodate their operations to those of the fruit companies. The companies also built the rail lines primarily to meet their needs of transporting produce to the ports of Trujillo, La Ceiba, Tela, and Puerto Cortés, with the long-range consequence being the failure to develop major routes of transport connecting the dynamic North Coast region with the mountainous interior of Honduras.

As the North Coast economy grew, its labor needs expanded. Workers were brought from Jamaica, the Cayman Islands, and the Lesser Antilles to work on the railroads, operate the docks, and harvest fruit. This external source of immigration was complemented by the arrival of Honduran migrants from the more densely populated western part of the country. New towns sprang up, and the larger towns such as La Ceiba and San Pedro Sula became busy commercial centers. Urbanization and the environment of the work place produced conditions that were to lead eventually to the formation of an organized working class.⁷

More generalized consequences of mining and the banana plantations concern the failure of Honduras to develop a strong ruling class that might have been more able to defend the country's economic and political interests. As mentioned earlier, national economic and governing classes—the so-called coffee elites—had been consolidated by the midnineteenth century in El Salvador and Guatemala, and to a lesser extent in Nicaragua and Costa Rica. The rapid expansion of foreign investment into Honduras around the turn of the century displaced local entrepreneurs and inhibited the formation of a national economic elite. Honduran political and economic elites were enlisted by the foreignowned enterprises as employees or consultants. Working for the multinational corporations or acting as an intermediary between business and government became the principal means of social and economic mobility. Thus to a great extent the perspectives of the Honduran ruling classes were shaped by their relationship as "clients" of the banana companies. Their economic fortunes and not infrequently their political welfare became linked to the activities of the export economy, and as such their political and economic autonomy was limited.

The alliance between foreign capital and the landholding elites paralleled the "duality" of the Honduran economy. The traditional precapitalist economic and social structures of rural Honduras coexisted with the export sector that was limited geographically to the North Coast. The coastal region had evolved as an "enclave" society. As an economy it had added to infrastructure development, provided new sources of revenue for the state, and to some degree increased capitalization of the national economy, but on the whole had not had an integrative or stimulating effect upon Honduran development outside the North Coast.⁸ Most of the development that did occur was localized and benefited the export sectors.

Though perhaps defined by capitalistic/precapitalistic distinctions, the boundaries of the enclave economy and society were not the only barriers to Honduran national integration. Social and political fragmentation also was reflected in the relative absence of an established aristocracy or sense of class interest, that had developed in other parts of Central America. Rather, the status, economic well-being, and social mobility of Honduran governing elites became intertwined with the growth of the state and its dependence upon an externally controlled export sector. The ruling groups that did emerge competed for the wealth and political resources offered by the large foreign-owned corporations. The alliance between political caudillos and foreign interests inhibited the evolution of any coherent vision among political leaders that emphasized national interests.

The Carías Years

The personalistic mode of politics and the disposition to engage in compromising relationships presented United Fruit and other foreign investors several opportunities to gain access to the state and to cement relations within the class of governing elites. Throughout the 1920s, politicians of the Liberal Party of Honduras (PLH) became concerned about the economic power increasingly exercised by the United Fruit Company. Liberal leaders therefore promoted the Cuyamel Fruit Company to offset growing monopoly control, and Cuyamel evolved as one of the Liberal party's principal financial supporters. This situation changed drastically when Zemurray sold Cuyamel to the "octopus"—that is, United Fruit.

United meanwhile had embarked on a long-term strategy of cultivating its own coterie of Honduran political elites.⁹ The company decided to back Tiburcio Carías Andino, an aspiring caudillo politician who had become a central figure in the National Party of Honduras (PNH). By weaving personal loyalties into extended relationships and using the backing of United Fruit Company resources, Carías was able to fashion a power base through which he was eventually able to extend his influence over most of Honduras. In 1932, United's efforts were rewarded when the National party faction headed by Carías won office.

"Barring the possibility of a rebellion, the new executive will take office on February 1, 1929, for a term of four years." This news account, although speculative, reflected the political disunity and rivalry that had plagued Honduras since the dissolution of the original Central American confederation in 1838. Early e...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Illustrations
• Foreword
• Preface
• 1 Caudillos, Enclaves, and Political Uncertainty, 1876-1956
• 2 The Setting: Land and People
• 3 Modernization and New Elites, 1956-1972
• 4 The Era of Military Rule, 1972-1982
• 5 The State and Elections
• 6 The Political Sectors
• 7 The Economy and National Development Policy
• 8 The Region and International Relations
• 9 The Politics of Frustration
• Notes
• Conversion Chart for Measurements
• Abbreviations
• Selected Bibliography
• Index
• About the Book and Author