National Interests And Presidential Leadership

The Setting Of Priorities

Donald E. Nuechterlein

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429726422
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Many scholars have ignored the concept of 'national interest†simply because no logical, systematic means of dealing with this key aspect of international politics has been available. A new approach to defining national interest forms the basis for this study of presidential decisions on U.S. involvement in foreign wars. Professor Nuechterlein looks at various crisis situations to determine what defense, economic, world order, and ideological interests are at stake; he identifies sixteen cost/risk and value factors that affect the U.S. view of which interest is most vital in a given situation. In any dispute, it is the interest that is considered vital—too important to compromise—that is the key element in crisis decisions. Professor Nuechterlein uses his analytical framework to examine the ways Presidents Wilson, Roosevelt, Truman, Johnson, and Nixon perceived the national interest when making their decisions to begin or extend U.S. war involvement. He assesses the value of National Security Council participation in the decision-making process and presents case-study analyses of three imminent U.S. foreign policy concerns—Quebec's possible separation from Canada, the Panama Canal Treaty, and the potential for race war in South Africa—with an epilogue on the challenges facing Carter. The author suggests that the most important U.S. national interest in the future will be economic, with energy conservation a top priority.

1.
National Interest: What Is It?

Since the founding of nation-states, statesmen and scholars have used the term national interest to describe the aspirations and goals of sovereign entities in the international arena. Today foreign ministers, military strategists, and scholars discuss the vital interests of countries in ways that suggest everyone understands precisely what they mean and will draw the correct conclusions. In fact, the opposite is true: the study of international politics as well as the art of diplomacy suffer from widespread ambiguity about the meaning of national interest. As a result, many scholars and statesmen believe the term should be abandoned. Some even think that the very effort to identify the goals of nation-states is pointless because national leaders show no consistency in pursuing national goals. But the criticism is misplaced. Abandoning the concept of national interest would solve little. Whether we like it or not, the phrase is unlikely to be dismissed from our vocabulary simply because some critics find it useless. Rather than create more jargon in an attempt to find an alternative phrase, would it not be wiser to retain the term and provide a broader conceptual framework for discussing the interests of states? Scholars and statesmen might then be able to find some common ground in defining the issues, even though they do not reach agreement on what policies states ought to pursue to defend their interests. In a word, is it not time for serious students of foreign policy and international politics to agree on basic definitions regarding the goals of states so that we may get on with the job of better explaining state behavior?

This is no easy task. A major part of the difficulty is that national interest has become so closely associated with the “realist” school of thought in the 1940s and 1950s that it is difficult for many scholars to think of this concept without being heavily influenced by the interpretations of Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, and the disciples of the realist cult. Even though other scholars have successfully challenged many of Morgenthau’s views in the last twenty years, many students of foreign policy and international politics are still hung up on the idea that national interest is somehow synonymous with the acquisition of national power, especially military power. The realist school maintained that there was no room in their conceptualization for anything labeled idealism because they considered this to be the antithesis of realism—looking at the world the way it should be rather than the way it actually is. But why should the term national interest be defined so narrowly as to exclude all state aspirations except the acquisition of power? Why should not the pursuit of freedom of the individual and democratic government be considered a valid goal of U.S. foreign policy? Do we seriously believe that the pursuit of world socialism is not a national interest of the Soviet Union, one that goes beyond the interest of building a powerful Russian state?

Another problem we encounter in trying to construct a new and more useful conceptual framework for national interest is that the realists have convinced us that each sovereign state has an objective national interest. They also argue that defining this interest should be the responsibility of a select few experts who understand the world of international politics and are best able to divine the policies a state should follow to enhance its national interest vis-à-vis other states. This view has no room for public opinion of the nation, which would interfere in what these philosopher-kings decide; indeed, it has little room for a legislature either. The realist school would have us believe that the definition of national interests should be isolated from the political interplay in a democratic system of government; in their view, the president (read: a few principal foreign policy advisers) should have a free hand to make foreign policy, because petty politics and selfish interests ought not to influence a rational and impartial assessment of the nation’s external needs. We continue to be influenced by this narrow view of foreign policymaking when we use the term national interest; and many scholars find it difficult to make the intellectual leap from this view to the one proposed here: that the determination of a nation’s interests is the result of a political process in which conflicting private interests, bureaucratic politics, and the so-called totally dispassionate view of the facts by policy planners play a role—and should play a role.

Another difficulty is use of the word rational. The realists claim that to be rational about a nation’s interests is to divorce oneself from all personal and political considerations. In this view, to think about foreign policy issues in political terms is somehow indecent. But why should this definition be so restricted? Is not the person who views national interests and foreign policy as separate from practical political considerations being rather idealistic, and perhaps naive?

Before attempting to redefine national interests in a broader context, therefore, certain qualifications must be made about the use of terms. First, it is assumed here that the leaders of nation-states act rationally in the pursuit of state objectives, i.e., that they follow policies they believe will enhance the wellbeing of their societies, whatever the constitutional system. It is not a question of whether the state actions are cost-effective, wise, or moral; we simply assume that foreign policy decisions are made with some degree of reasoning—that they are not purely the result of guesswork or chance. Second, it is assumed that the number of persons involved in deciding national interests will vary from state to state, depending on the type of government. In a free democratic society, many persons—both official and private—exert influence in deciding what issues are vital interests; in a totalitarian society, far fewer persons make this determination.

Let us then proceed to definitions. The national interest is the perceived needs and desires of one sovereign state in relation to the sovereign states comprising its external environment.¹ Several aspects of this definition require elaboration. First, we are talking about the perception of state needs, which suggests that decisions about the national interest are the result of a political process in which a country’s leaders ultimately arrive at a decision about the importance of a given external event or crisis to the country’s well-being. It is also clear that this definition pertains only to fully sovereign states, not to international organizations or dependent territories; for better or worse, we live in a world where decisions to use force, to impose trade restrictions, to enter alliances, and to provide foreign aid are made only by the governments of sovereign states. This definition also draws a distinction between the external and the internal environments of states; the way in which a government deals with the internal environment of the state is usually referred to as the public interest, but the way it deals with the external environment is the national interest. Finally, this definition implies that we are talking about the interests of the nationstate in its entirety, not the interests of private groups, bureaucratic entities, or political organizations within the state.²

Basic National Interests

Simply offering a definition of national interest does not, however, provide the scholar or policymaker with any guidelines to help identify such an interest. To do this, we need additional definitions of the basic interests of nation-states—those national needs that form the underpinnings of their foreign policies. They may be described as follows:

1. defense interests: the protection of the nation-state and its citizens against the threat of physical violence directed from another state or against an externally inspired threat to its system of government
2. economic interests: the enhancement of the nationstate’s economic well-being in relations with other states
3. world order interests: the maintenance of an international political and economic system in which the nation-state may feel secure and in which its citizens and commerce may operate peacefully outside its borders
4. ideological interests: the protection and furtherance of a set of values that the citizens of a nation-state share and believe to be universally good.

Several things must be said about these basic national interests. First, the order in which they appear does not suggest any priority of one over another, although it may be argued that unless a nation-state can defend its territory and citizens—either through a strong defense or in alliance with a major power or both—none of the other three interests is likely to matter much. Second, it is obvious that these four basic interests are not mutually exclusive and that policymakers must accept trade-offs among them. For example, the economic interests of certain industries within a state may sometimes be sacrificed in order to enhance a world order interest involving another country whose friendship and cooperation are needed to enhance stability in an important part of the world. Japanese automobile and transistor radio exports to the United States are an example. Third, as used here, a nation’s ideology is an important part of its national interest—although it may not be adhered to as strongly as the other three, it is nevertheless important in determining how a nation reacts to international issues. The charge made by critics of U.S. foreign policy in the post-1945 period that the government supported dictators instead of democratic forces in various allied countries is evidence of one kind of ideological view held by many Americans. Another kind is that the United States should withdraw support from countries even if they have democratic systems due to racial policies enforced by their governments. South Africa is an example.

The key point here is that sovereign states—particularly major powers—have interests that cut across all of the four elements listed above and that compete for attention and resources from their governments. Bureaucratic politics and pressure group politics within states center on questions of which basic national interest should receive priority and resources—often to the detriment of others. In the 1950s, when the United States seemed to have unlimited resources to devote to international activities, all of the four basic interests received strong support; in the 1970s, however, when the U.S. economy was strained by the Vietnam war and when its competitive advantage with Germany, Japan, and other countries was declining, the U.S. government had to give higher priority to economic interests and somewhat less to world order interests, as the Nixon economic “shocks” in 1971 dramatized.

One other point about the definition of basic national interests should be emphasized. Defense interests, as described here, entail only the protection of the homeland, the citizens, and the political system of the nation-state; they do not include alliances with other states, although they may include strategic bases whose primary function is the protection of the homeland. For example, Israel requires the strategically located Golan Heights for the defense of its territory; but its close political relationship with the United States is required for world order reasons—namely, to insure that the Soviets do not tip the military balance in the Middle East by intervening on the side of Israel’s enemies. World order interests deal with a multitude of international issues, many of which are handled through international organizations; but insofar as political objectives are involved, a primary objective of world order interests is to maintain a balance of power favorable to one’s own feeling of security. Before World War II, the United States did not pay much attention to world order interests because it thought it could be secure and prosperous without being actively involved in the League of Nations or in alliances. In the postwar era, it reversed field and decided it must pay far greater attention to world order interests because the old structure of international relations had been shattered by the war. Wilson’s dream of 1918–1919, which Congress and the American people had rejected, was revived in the Truman period and resulted in such unprecedented actions as the Marshall Plan, the North Atlantic Treaty, and the Truman Doctrine of aid to Greece and Turkey to stem Soviet pressure in the Eastern Mediterranean. Not one of these three dramatic foreign policy moves between 1947 and 1949 was absolutely necessary for the protection of North America; indeed, several influential political leaders—among them Senator Robert Taft and former President Herbert Hoover—argued strongly that an alliance with Europe was not essential to the safety and well-being of the United States. This “Fortress America” concept did not prevail in postwar U.S. foreign policy, however, because public sentiment had shifted as a result of World War II and seemed ready to accept the necessity of giving high priority to world order interests as well as to strictly defense interests. Yet in the 1970s, largely as a result of the Vietnam experience, there is renewed questioning in Congress as to whether it is desirable to give such heavy emphasis to world order interests (some critics call it the “world policeman role”) when both U.S. economic interests and ideological interests (support for freedom abroad) have suffered from an overemphasis on alliances and anticommunism.

In sum, the four basic national interests outlined above are dynamic factors conditioning the behavior of nation-states, and changes in priority among them are usually measured in years and decades, rather than in months. In democracies of the Western type, these changes in emphasis among the basic interests are decided after much debate in their legislative forums and information media, and they are usually sustained when new governments come to power. Again, drawing on twentieth-century American history, one may argue that during World War I there was little change in the United States’ view of the priority among these basic national interests: even though Congress and the public supported Wilson’s conclusion that the nation had to intervene in the European conflict, they did not share his view that the United States had to reorient its priorities and give far greater attention to world order interests. Americans fought in that war essentially for defense (German U-boat attacks on U.S. vessels) and ideological interests (to prevent autocracy from dominating European politics). But the idea that U.S. participation in the postwar world order was essential to ensure the benefits of military intervention did not inspire the American people, despite Wilson’s heroic efforts. Thus, after World War I, the United States again concentrated its energies on economic and defense interests and rejected both world order and ideological interests as the forces of world totalitarianism gathered momentum in the 1920s and 1930s.

Intensities of Interest

Identifying the basic national interest, or interests, involved in foreign crises is only the first step in determining foreign policy. The next step is to assess the intensity of that interest, or stake, which the political leadership of a country believes is involved. For example, a government may be deeply concerned about a coup d’etat in a friendly country, but the intensity of its concern will depend on several factors, such as distance from its own borders, composition of its government, the amount of trade and investment that exists there, and historical relationships. Policymakers must also look at the potential costs of attempting to counter an unfavorable event or trend in another country—for example, the effectiveness of various policy options in changing the course of events, and risks of war.³ Thus, the degree of interest the United States, or any major power, has in a specific international issue results from thinking through the values and costs perceived to be involved in coping with the issue. Ultimately, a government concludes what it should do and what policies it will adopt; but the process of deciding the degree, or intensity, of interest (concern) that the country should exhibit involves trade-offs among the four basic interests described above. For example, a change in government through a coup d’etat may be distasteful to the United States for both ideological and world order reasons, but if there are important economic ties with that country and if there is no threat to the United States itself, it is likely that ideological concerns and potential security problems will be subordinated to economic considerations.

In order to analyze the differing degrees of interest a government believes may be involved in international events, it is useful to categorize these intensities as follows:⁴

1. Survival issues: when the very existence of a nation-state is in jeopardy, as a result of overt military attack on its own territory, or from the threat of attack if an enemy’s demands are rejected. Hitler’s ultimatums in the late 1930s are examples. The key to whether an issue is survival or vital on this scale is the degree to which it is an immediate, credible threat of massive physical harm by one nation-state to another. By this definition, probably no economic, world order, or ideological issues qualify; only defense interests, as defined above, would reach this level of intensity. The distinction becomes more meaningful if the use of strategic nuclear weapons is factored into the equation: only if the issue is sheer survival, i.e., only if...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• Preface
• 1. National Interest: What Is It?
• 2. When Is an Interest Vital?
• 3. Wilson’s and Roosevelt’s Perceptions of National Interest
• 4. Truman’s and Johnson’s Perceptions of National Interest
• 5. Comparing Presidential Decisions in Four Foreign Wars
• 6 Nixon’s View of the U.S. National Interest in Cambodia
• 7. The National Security Council and the War Powers Act
• 8. The Panama Canal Issue
• 9. The Prospect of Quebec’s Separation from Canada
• 10. The Threat of Race War in South Africa
• 11. Epilogue: The Challenge to Carter
• Notes
• Index