Lectures on the Moral Government of God

Nathaniel Taylor

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN:
  9780429647659
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

Originally compiled in 1859, this book is a collection of Nathaniel Taylor's lectures considering the moral government of God. The moral government of god was the great thought of Dr. Taylor's intellect, and the favourite theme of his instructons in theology; to vindicate the ways of God to man, was the object to which all Dr Taylor's energies were consecrated. This collection presents a complete and connected view of all that he wrote on this fundamental topic in theology, and to the lectures on moral government have been appended other essays and lectures on subjects that are naturally connected with this.

The Moral Government of God.

Section II
The Moral Government of God as Known by the Light of Nature.

Lecture I.

Thesis to be established in three leading propositions.—First, God administers a Moral Government in some sense; for, 1, men are moral beings; 2, God has given them a law.—Shown from the manifestation of the tendencies of action to good and evil—No opposing evidence.—Perversion of a design does not disprove the reality of the design; nor the fact that such perversion was foreseen; nor that the perversion is universal.—The perversion observed may be temporary.—Tendency to wrong, not greater than to right action.—Cause of the certainty but not of the necessity of such perversion.—The only proper method of reasoning.—Conclusion.

MY object in several lectures on the subject proposed, is to establish the proposition, that—

GOD IS ADMINISTERING A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT OVER MEN.

For this purpose I propose:

I. To show that God is administering a moral government over men in some proper import of the language.

II. To prove the equity of his administration; and—

III. To prove his rightful authority.

In proving the first of these propositions, we shall show that. God is administering a moral in distinction from a providential government. In proving the second, i. e., the equity of his administration, we shall show that he has given to men the beet law; that he strictly adheres to the principles of equity in its administration, and will sustain its perfect authority.

In proving the third, i. e., his rightful authority, we shall show his benevolence or absolute moral perfection. And when these things are shown, the perfection of his moral government is proved.

In the present lecture, I enter on the proof of the first of these propositions, viz.:

I. God is administering a moral government over men in some proper import of the phrase.

I have already defined moral government to be the influence of authority on moral beings, exercised by a moral governor, through the medium of law. To support the proposition now before us, it is necessary only to show that mm are moral beings, that God has given them a law, and that he enforces conformity to his law by the influence of authority.

1. Men are moral beings; that is, they possess the powers of moral action, and are placed in the circumstances requisite for their exercise. The fact that men are moral agents, I shall here take for granted; having given what I deem sufficient proof of it in other lectures, and also because I suppose it will not be denied.

2. God has given to men a law, which is a decisive expression of a moral governor’s preference of some action to its opposite.

That God has given a law to men, I argue, from the fact that he has made them moral beings; in other words, from their constitution and the circumstances of their existence.

Whatever may be the design of our constitution, and the circumstances of our being, of that design God is the author. What I claim then is, that God in creating men moral beings, and placing them in circumstances requisite to moral action, clearly manifests his will or preference, that men should act morally right rather than morally wrong. The proof of this position rests on this obvious and undeniable principle, that the clear manifestation of adaptation or tendency to an end in the structure or nature of any thing which is made, is decisive proof that this end was designed by the maker, provided there is no opposing evidence.

I will now state as briefly as may be, the argument from man’s constitution and condition as a moral being, and then show that there is no opposing evidence.

It is then impossible in the nature of things that God should create a moral being, without placing him under a stronger motive—a far higher inducing influence to the performance of right, than to the performance of wrong moral action. Whether a moral agent be created or not, depends on the will of God. But that right moral action is the necessary means of the highest happiness of a moral agent, is eternal truth—truth which no more depends on the will of God, than the equality of all straight lines from the center to the circumference of a circle. Right moral action is benevolent; wrong moral action is selfish. According therefore to the essential and immutable nature of things, right moral action, be the limited temporary self-sacrifice it may involve what it may, tends to secure the highest happiness of the agent, as well as that of others; and wrong moral action, afford what limited temporary enjoyment it may, tends to secure the highest misery of the agent and of others. These ideas enter into our necessary conceptions of right and wrong moral action as their essential elements. As we cannot conceive of matter without solidity and extension, no more can we conceive of right and wrong moral action, without conceiving of the one as tending to secure the highest happiness, and of the other, the highest misery of a moral being.

There is another philosophy, which maintains that the highest happiness of the individual may come into competition, and so be inconsistent with, the highest happiness of the whole, and that therefore the individual may be bound to sacrifice his own to the general good. This philosophy, endorsed as it is by great names, I regard as absurd and self-contradictory, though admitting that a moral being may be under obligation to sacrifice much and even all of what may be called his own happiness, for the sake of the general good. But there are two facts here which must not be forgotten. The one is, that there must be some motive to this voluntary sacrifice of his own happiness, for there can no more be choice without a motive than an effect without a cause, and there can no more be motive except in the form of good or happiness to the agent, than there can be motive which is not motive. To suppose a being then voluntarily to sacrifice absolutely all his own happiness for the sake of the general good, is to suppose him to act without a motive, that is, to act with a motive and without a motive at the same time, which is a contradiction and an absurdity.

The other fact will explain the mystery. This is, that what ever degree of the agent’s own happiness may come into competition with the general good, and which for this reason he may be bound to sacrifice for it, still his own happiness, in one respect—even his own highest happiness—can never come into competition with general good. This is the happiness of being good and doing good; the happiness of promoting the general good, which he can never be required to sacrifice. This is not only his own highest happiness, but it will ever be great in proportion to the sacrifice. Nay more; just and adequate views of the nature of a moral being, and the true tendencies of action on his part, show that if perfectly benevolent, he must be perfectly blessed. To such a being, under every loss of happiness possible to him, there are fountains remaining, adequate to fill every capacity of happiness, even the fountains opened amid the throne of God and the Lamb. Or in the language of philosophy, such is the nature of a moral being, that perfection in character is perfection in blessedness. This is the fact which gives such peculiar grandeur and glory to a moral agent. Moral agency in its very nature, involves a power so to occupy the mind, so to bless the moral being with the right object of affection, that any loss or sacrifice of good which is possible in the case shall be accounted as nothing. Paul understood this, when he spoke of “suffering the loss of all things, and counting them as dung that he might win Christ,” “as having nothing and yet possessing all things.”

Such then is the nature of man as a moral being, that his perfection in happiness depends on the use he makes of his powers; in other words, on his moral character. And if it be not true from the very nature which God has given him as a moral being, that one kind of moral action will secure his perfection in happiness, and another produce his perfect misery, then is the eternal distinction between right and wrong action annihiliated. I claim then, that the obvious and undeniable facts in the nature and condition of man as a moral being—supposing no evidence to the contrary—are the most decisive manifestations and proofs that the will of God is, that mam, should always act morally right rather than, morally wrong.

Indeed it is inconceivable, on the supposition of no opposing evidence, that there should be any single source of proof so deeisive as this, any so fitted to place the fact of the divine preference of right to wrong moral action on the part of man, beyond all denial and doubt. If the design of the Maker can be discovered from that which is made, if the structure and position of an eye or a tooth show this, then do the nature and condition of man as a moral being, show that he is made to act morally right rather than morally wrong. It is then—on the supposition of no opposing evidence—the will of our Maker, it is the law of God, that man should always act in the exercise of the great principle of love or benevolence.

Our argument is thus far hypothetical. I proceed now to inquire—is there any opposing evidence to set aside or weaken that which has been adduced? All that can be offered is furnished in the fact of the universal perversion of moral agency on the part of man.

All that can be necessary here is to ascertain and apply the correct principle of judging in such a case. I maintain it to be this—that the perversion of a design clearly manifested in the structure and condition of a thing, which perversion can be easily accounted for consistently with the reality of the design, is no evidence against its reality.

To test the correctness of this principle, let us suppose a watchmaker to have made a number of watches of exquisite workmanship, foreseeing that in the wisest and best disposal of them he can make, they will be so perverted or misused as to defeat temporarily the end to which they are so perfectly adapted. Let it be farther supposed, that by giving the requisite information and direction, he shows a most decided preference of the right to the wrong use of them, and with ample skill and power to repair the machinery, and thus in a great degree to redress the foreseen evil, he actually adopts a course of measures which insures such a result. I ask, is the supposed perversion in such a case to be traced to the will of the watch maker? Is it not rather manifest, that the supposed perversion is a direct contravention of his preference? Do not the perfect structure of the watches, and his directions respecting them, furnish indisputable proof that in every instance he prefers the right to the wrong use of them?

On precisely the same principle of reasoning, I claim that the perversion of moral agency on the part of man, does not furnish the least opposing evidence to that given by his conetitution and condition, that God prefers right moral action to wrong. I shall hereafter attempt to show, by the best kind of moral evidence, that he will in fact repair in a great degree the evil done, having actually adopted a course of measures perfectly fitted to such an end. All however that my present purpose requires is, to say that these things may be true. This cannot be controverted. It is possible that the greatest good required exactly the present system, but not the perversion of moral agency in a single instance, under the present system—it may be true, that it is impossible that God should adopt the best moral system and prevent the perversion of moral agency in any greater degree than he does prevent it; it may be better, that moral agency should in every instance be rightly used rather than perverted under the present system; and of course it may be true that the Creator, notwithstanding the actual perversion of moral agency, prefers that every human being should act morally right rather than morally wrong.

If it be said that God might so have increased the tendencies to right action as to have prevented moral evil, either wholly or partially, I answer; this cannot be proved as I have already shown, and is therefore entitled to no consideration. Besides, to have altered the system in one iota, might have been to change it for the worse, and produced more sin than it would have prevented. The fact then that God did not increase the tendencies to right action, is no proof that he does not in every instance prefer right to wrong action under the system as it is.

Is it further said that the omniscient Creator foresaw the universal perversion of the moral agency, and therefore must have intended or purposed its actual existence? This is readily admitted, admitted as the only truth which can form a basis for confidence, submission and joy, in view of such an amount of evil as exists under the divine government. But I have said the perversion of moral agency may be in respect to divine prevention, incidental to the best system. God then may have purposed the existence of the evil, rather than not adopt the best system to which the evil may be thus incidental. But this fact would give no shadow of proof that he does not prefer right to wrong moral action under this system.

Is it still further said, that all this would be quite credible, were moral agency perverted only by an individual moral agent, but not so in view of its universal perversion by a world? I answer, that the perversion of moral agency by a single world may sustain the same relation to its non-perversion in other worlds, which its perversion by a single individual would sustain to its non-perversion by all other individuals, even the relation of an infinitesimal to infinitude. Of course this perversion by a world affords no more proof that the Creator does not prefer right to wrong moral action in every instance, than would its perversion by a single individual.

But not to rest the argument on the hypothesis of other worlds. It is sufficient for my present purpose to say, that there may be a future state of existence for man, and that the present may be one of probation in relation to future allotments, even under a redemptive system. The results may show, supposing this to be the only world of sentient creatures, that the greatest good required, not indeed the perversion of moral agency rather than the right use of it under this system, but the very system under which the perversion takes place. Of course it may be true, as I have before shown, that God prefers the right use of moral agency to its perversion, in every instance of moral action under the present system.

It may be still further said on this point: the perfection or imperfection of a moral system is not to be decided, merely by what are or may be only its temporary results in obedience or disobedience, but by its nature, its adaptations, tendencies and probable issues. The reason is, that a moral government may be perfect, and yet result in the temporary disobedience of its subjects. Such possibility is inseparable from its nature as a moral system. It may be in a high degree imperfect, and yet result in temporary obedience; such possibility being also inseparable from its nature. Effects which are good or bad, and which are connected with their causes by a physical necessity, may be the just criteria of the nature of their causes. It is not so however in respect to the supposed results of a system of moral government.

Temporary obedience merely, is no proof of the perfection of a system of moral government, nor is temporary disobedience proof of its imperfection; for such obedience may exist under an imperfect, and such disobedience under a perfect system of moral government. If therefore, from our knowledge of the system itself—its law, its subjects, its author, his providence or conduct toward his subjects—we have no means of forming a judgment respecting the tendencies and final issues of the system, then plainly we have no sufficient data for any conclusion respecting its perfection. It is indeed quite supposable, that such premises should exist in the ease, as not only to warrant, but to demand a conclusion. Be this however as it may, and momentous as the question is, what may prove in the end under a moral government, to be merely temporary results in obedience or disobedience, are an utterly insufficient basis for any conclusion respecting its perfection. If these are the only sources of evidence on the question, then there is none. All that we can say is, the system may be perfect and it may not be. And yet philosophers have derived their principal, not to say their sole objection against the perfection of God’s government and God’s character, and in this way against his revelation and against all religion, from the existence of moral evil in the world. But who of them all knows whereof he affirms? Who in his ignorance, is certain that any degree of moral evil in this world is inconsistent with such issues of the system in a future state, as shall show, in brightest manifestation, the perfection of the system and the character of its Author?

But it may here be said, that there is a greater tendency, under the present system, to wrong than to right moral action on the part of all men, and that the author of the system designed that it should be so. That the alleged greater tendency^* exists under the present system is denied, as involving an absolute impossibility in the nature of things. The objection concedes that men are capable of moral action, and are of course moral beings. But a moral being is one whose highest happiness depends, and who knows that it does, on acting morally right. There can be no tendency to moral action in a moral being, except ultimately to obtain happiness by acting; and the greater the happiness known by the agent to depend on one kind of moral action, the greater the tendency to that action. When he knows as a moral agent must, that his highest happiness depends on his acting morally right, there is of course a greater tendency in his case to act morally right, than to act morally wrong. To suppose a greater tendency in his case to act morally wrong than morally right, is to suppose that his highest happiness depends, and he knows it, on his acting morally wrong, when his highest happiness does not depend on his so acting, and when he knows that it does not—which is a twofold contradiction, and an absolute impossibility in the nature of things. I am not saying, that a moral being, with that knowledge which is necessary to constitute him such, may not act morally wrong. But I maintain that if he does, he so acts, having the knowledge that his highest happiness consists in acting morally right; and that therefore in so doing, he does not act according to the greater tendency. Nor am I saying, that when a moral agent acts morally wrong, there is not a previous certainty of his so doing; nor that there is not a cause, ground, or reason of such previous certainty. But I maintain that there is nothing in these, which, when speaking reflectively for the purposes of philosophic truth, can be properly called a greater tendency to wrong than right moral action—provided any thing more be meant by the language, than that there is that in the nature of the motive—which in distinction from power is the cause of the wrong moral act—compared with the motive to right moral action, that gives the certainty of the wrong instead of the right moral action. I have no occasion to say, that the phrase may not be, properly, or according to common usage, applied to the cause of wrong moral action in a further meaning than that now specified, nor do I admit that it can be. It seems to me to be applied, in a further meaning, by none but philosophers, and only by that class of philosophers and divines who maintain the doctrine of necessity as opposed to moral liberty, and to be therefore not a proper, but a mere sectarian or partisan usage.^* Granting however that common usage sanctions the propriety of speaking of a stronger tendency to wrong than to right moral action, still, as we have before shown, it is in every such case, the language of appearance, and in its actual meaning when thus employed, entirely false. And what if usage sanctions the propriety of the language of appeara...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Original Title
• INTRODUCTION
• CONTENTS
• SECTION I. WHAT IS A PERFECT MORAL GOVERNMENT? OR, MORAL GOVERNMENT IN THE ABSTRACT
• SECTION II. THE MORAL GOVERNMENT OF GOD AS KNOWN BY THE LIGHT OF NATURE