The folding into each other of pathologised, therapeutically intended and normative constructions and practices suggests instead the need to disrupt the normative rather than scapegoat the therapeutically intended.
(Malson 2008, p. 39)
For Susan Bordo, we might better understand a culture through interrogation of its designated ills; for Helen Malson, it is a cultureâs norms that must be probed. The pro-anorexia phenomenon offers an opportunity to critique both factions: it has been pathologised in the press and in scholarship, yet all too often its texts are indistinguishable from normative constructions of the female body. In order to appreciate how pro-ana online spaces came to be, first we must attend to the cultural landscape from which they emerged. As such, the first two chapters of this book are contextual, interrogating the disciplining of the female body within medicine and popular culture, respectively. In this first chapter, I explore the history of the medical gaze, tracing the way the female body has been discursively produced by medicine. As I highlighted in the introduction to this book, the pro-ana phenomenon has been examined at length in the health sciences and has, therefore, been framed as a medical issue. However, pro-anaâs relationship with medicine is more complex than this and feminist and socio-cultural scholars of the phenomenon read it as an affront to medical authority (Bell 2009; Day and Keys 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Gailey 2009). Mebbie Bell, for instance, argues that pro-ana spaces ââteachâ individuals how to perform a ânormalâ body in order to evade the regulatory authority invested in the medical gazeâ (2009, p. 152). Thus, whilst there is important work on pro-ana in the health sciences, to read it as solely medical disregards the extent to which it is constituted by mainstream thinness culture. To be clear, my argument is not that anorexia is borne out of young womenâs uncritical consumption of media images of thin bodies (cf. Malson 2009, p. 143), nor do I suggest that pro-anorexia is. Rather I propose that pro-ana culture utilises media images of thin bodies as well as the language of health and medicine in order to service its aims. In so doing, it disrupts the constructed boundaries between acceptable and pathological renderings of thinness.
This chapter, then, outlines how the medical gaze became an almighty force in Western culture, specifically attending to the impact this has had on women. It is divided into four sections. The first explores the development of the medical gaze during the European Enlightenment; the second interrogates how the medical gaze played a part in the subordination of women: their removal from the medical profession and subsequent objectification â here I attend to the medicalisation of the female body and the construction of norms of femininity. This leads to the third section where I explore the cultural construction of anorexia nervosa. I suggest the way anorexia has been utilised as a form of social control is symptomatic of the treatment of womenâs bodies in Western culture, as well as the ubiquity of disordered eating. In the final section, I interrogate opportunities for resistance under the medical gaze.
The development of the medical gaze
Any discussion of the Western medical gaze must begin by looking to the Enlightenment period. It is well documented that during this time Western culture witnessed a significant shift in medical knowledge and practice: it was a process whereby doctors were conceptualised, through a discourse of scientific objectivity and authority, as the arbiters of bodily meaning. As societal faith in an all-powerful God was waning, belief in the abilities of the medical practitioner was growing, and medicine came to replace religion (Ehrenreich and English 1979; Hepworth 1999; Turner 1996). As Foucault argues, âIn the patientâs eyes, the doctor becomes a thaumaturgeâ (1967, p. 275), and as the doctorâs power grew, the patient ceased to be actively involved in their own medicalisation: âonly an external fact; the medical reading must take [the patient] into account only to place him [sic] in parenthesesâ (1973, p. 7). This dehumanising process rendered all individuals subservient to the medical gaze, regardless of gender. The gaze sought to penetrate all aspects of society, âgrowing in a complex, ever-proliferating way until it finally achiev[ed] the dimensions of a history, a geography, a stateâ (Foucault 1973, p. 29). Foucault calls this manifestation of control on the micro and macro levels, âbio-powerâ, suggesting that it âwas without question an indispensable element in the development of capitalismâ (1976, pp. 140â141). Illness and morbidity had to be prevented in order to maintain a productive workforce and âthis preventive focus later became instrumental in structuring a national health care system in Englandâ (Hepworth 1999, p. 21). Thus, as Martin Hewitt reminds us, âthe entrance of the human sciences into administration was not guided by humanitarianism but by the advent of disciplinary technologiesâ (1983, p. 243).
Control over the population then, was enacted through technologies of normalisation where bodies came to be differentiated and managed by their proximity to or aberrance from the norm (Foucault 1973, 1976). As such, what was considered healthy and what was considered normal became interchangeable â a legacy that persists. For instance, in the present day, the healthy citizen is encouraged to use the Body Mass Index (BMI) calculator to determine whether they are of a healthy weight, through measurement against a regulatory norm (Czerniawski 2007). Technologies of normalisation are by no means limited to the regulation of body weight though: Miah and Rich (2008, p. 53) note that public health websites such as the NHS and BBC not only provide advice on disease prevention, but they also feature lifestyle advice more broadly. Deborah Lupton views such guidance as âa form of pedagogy, which like other forms, serves to legitimize ideologies and social practices by making statements about how individuals should conduct their bodiesâ (1994, p. 31). Consequently, health is deployed as a means of obscuring unhealthy practices, a device which, as I show in later chapters, pro-ana users adopt in order to safeguard their spaces. Used in this way, health is reduced to discourse because, as Foucault argues, âpower is tolerable only on condition that it mask a substantial part of itself. Its success is proportional to its ability to hide its own mechanismsâ (1976, p. 86). If the disciplinary practices in which we engage are recast as necessary for our own good, we are much more likely to enact them. Simon J. Williams therefore suggests that health is âa contested notion and an elusive phenomenonâ (2003, p. 42; emphasis added). What it means to be healthy is increasingly ambiguous which, in turn, renders it susceptible to appropriation, whether by public health services, the diet industry or â as I will argue â creators of pro-ana online spaces.
Above all, contemporary culture elides good health and weight loss: âReformulated as health maximising, weight-loss practices, particularly dieting, have now been made to appear necessary, beneficial and hence seemingly above reproachâ (Malson 2008, p. 29). The impact that this has had on understandings of âobesityâ1 is therefore extensive: it is widely seen as dangerous; as a health threat in need of prevention (Cogan 1999, p. 231). Compulsory thinness and the avoidance of âobesityâ are often framed as moral obligations and scholars of Fat Studies have argued that if one is âobeseâ, one is understood to be a moral failure (Hartley 2001; Haworth-Hoeppner 1999; LeBesco 2004). This has led to a repudiation of the fat body in Western culture, which is both justified and encouraged. As Cecilia Hartley (2001, p. 65) points out, âfat-phobia is one of the few acceptable forms of prejudice left in a society that at times goes to extremes to prove itself politically correctâ. If âobesityâ and fatness are conflated with illness (LeBesco 2004, p. 30) then thinness has, albeit fallaciously, come to be read as a marker of good health and good morals (Bordo [1993] 2003). In this current (Western) climate of plenty, only the most disciplined individuals are able to achieve thinness. This, in turn, makes the quest ever more elusive.
Dieting as a moral obligation, however, is not new and Bryan S. Turner locates it within nineteenth century control of disease, whereby cleanliness of both the masses and the individual corresponded with one another:
The diseases of civilization were to be countered by personal salvation and clean water. The dietary management of the body was thus parallel to the management of water and sanitation in the environment, since both were aimed at moral control of impurity.
(1982, p. 165)
Cleanliness and dietary management are both concerned with âpolicing the boundaries of the body, by maintaining strict control over what enters and what leaves the bodyâs orificesâ (Lupton 1994, p. 32). As I discuss in chapter four, thinness and cleanliness continue to be elided and this discourse manifests in pro-ana online spaces and mainstream guidance around healthy-eating alike. Although self-regulating the body through diet may sound Foucauldian, Turner (1992) points out that in Foucaultâs examination of Jeremy Benthamâs Panopticon, he overlooks the science of diet and its relationship to capitalism. Turner argues that the provenance of the dietary regime lies in the work of eighteenth-century physicist to the elite, George Cheyne, who advised upper-class individuals on how to control their weight through careful eating and exercise; practices which then permeated all strata of society (1992, p. 192). What began as a specific lifestyle for the elite became an aspiration for all, but this was not a lifestyle for the poor, rather for âpeople who could afford to eat, ride horses and enjoy the luxury of a regular vomitâ (Turner 1992, p. 190). Thus, possession of a slim body was not simply a means of showing oneâs distance from the working class, rather, as Bordo points out, âthe gracefully slender body announced aristocratic status; disdainful of the bourgeois need to display wealth and power ostentatiouslyâ ([1993] 2003, p. 191). Thinness, as it is today, was a way of indicating oneâs refinement, but only the refined had the resources to achieve it. Consequently, the thin cum healthy body is not accessible to everyone: it is located at the intersection of a range of privileges, as chapter fourâs critical enquiries demonstrate.
More widely, the political economy of medicine maintains a number of systemic inequalities. According to Foucault, this stems from what he calls âthe great confinementâ in the classical age where those believed to be disruptive to order, âthe unemployed, the idle, and vagabondsâ, were very literally incarcerated (1967, p. 50). The poor and disenfranchised were alternately confined and deployed to contribute to the economy: âcheap manpower in the periods of full employment and high salaries; and in periods of unemployment, reabsorption of the idle and social protection against agitation and uprisingsâ (Foucault 1967, p. 51). This meant that even those who departed from socially acceptable norms were rendered useful during this time. Although confinement does not operate so literally today, there are still many instances in which medicine is deployed to increase an individualâs capabilities and thus make them useful under late-capitalism. Using examples such as the prescription of anti-depressants or meditation to divert patientsâ attention from socio-economic factors which may be impeding them, Lupton argues that âin their relative dominance over patients, doctors are empowered to make statements that reinforce dominant capitalist ideologies by directing patientsâ behaviour into non-threatening channelsâ (1994, p. 108). In this way, medicine colludes with capitalism to shore up the status quo by, at times literally, anaesthetising its subjects. The medical gaze thus operates as a form of social control on both the individual and societal level. Through bio-power, we become self-regulating, self-disciplining citizens. Our quest may be one which aims for good health, but health, as we have seen, is often deployed to obscure practices which uphold the hegemonic order. Nowhere is this more prominent than in the treatment of women by medical authority.
The medical gaze and women
Foucaultâs account of the birth of modern medicine, whilst important to this study, neglects to address the position of women. In order to make way for medical authority as we now know it, women were effectively ousted from the profession and rendered passive objects of a gaze, which would ensure their subordination for centuries to come (Ehrenreich and English 1979). This crucial moment deserves sustained discussion: consequently, the remainder of this chapter, whilst drawing upon a Foucauldian framework, focuses on the side-lined history of women and medicine. As I have shown, medical discourse has long impelled individuals to engage in regulatory practices which it legitimates under the umbrella of science, a form of âobjectiveâ authoritative knowledge. But the development of this knowledge, together with the process by which it was legitimated, was by no means neutral; rather as I will now explore, it was masculine.
Barbara Ehrenreich and Deidre Englishâs (1979) important work on womenâs expulsion from the medical profession describes how their mutual support networks were effectively destroyed in the name of medical legitimation. Women were isolated from one other and subsequently made dependent upon those same men who had banished them. The purging of midwives in the early twentieth century was a pinnacle moment in ensuring womenâs inferior status:
With the elimination of midwifery, all women â not just those of the upper class â fell under the biological hegemony of the medical profession. In the same stroke women lost their last autonomous role as healers. The only roles left for women in the medical system were as employees, customers, or âmaterialâ.
(Ehrenreich and English 1979, p. 88)
With women confined to the margins, menâs status as experts was confirmed, and it was middle-class men who were said to possess the expertise to transform conventional medicine into âscientificâ medicine (Ehrenreich and English 1979, p. 70). As a result, the medical profession became, as it arguably remains, primarily the reserve of the middle-class, white patriarch.
Because women have long been seen to âoccupy the world of private emotion and affections, whereas men are allocated to social roles emphasizing reason, instrumentality, and public responsibilityâ (Turner 1995, p. 95), science did not look kindly on them. Consequently, âthe very notion of the dispassionate scientist, whose mind transcended his body, defined science as a male pursuit. The object of scientific knowledge â that is nature â was femaleâ (Hesse-Biber 1996, p. 19; emphasis added). If women were too weak and lacking in reason to be doctors, then they were perfectly positioned to be patients (Ehrenreich and English 1979, p. 92; see also Turner 1995, pp. 102â103). This subjugation served a...