FBOs and development
The term “faith-based organization” began to feature in Western public policy discourse in the late 1990s. In the USA, where the term is most widely used, faith-based social service re-emerged on the political agenda during the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations. In 1996, the Republican Congress passed and President Clinton signed into law the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act, as part of a neoliberal agenda to roll back the state and reform the social welfare system (Cnaan and Boddie 2006). Under the Charitable Choice provision of the Act, faith-based organizations “can compete for public funding on equal footing with secular providers without giving up their essential religious character” (McGrew and Cnaan 2006: 23). Charitable Choice provision had been proposed by Senator John Ashcroft, a Pentecostal Christian, to encourage the participation of non-profit organizations (including FBOs) in federally funded welfare service provision (Cnaan and Boddie 2002). More controversial was President Bush’s “Faith-Based Initiative”, introduced in 2001, which pledged to increase FBO involvement in publicly funded social service provision (Ebaugh et al. 2003). The “Faith-Based Initiative” represented a change in thinking about church-state relations and signified “a move away from strict separation towards greater accommodation of religion by government” (Segars 2003: 4).1
In Britain, FBOs have also become increasingly prominent in welfare provision and public policy in recent decades. Since the mid-1990s, successive governments have recognized the potential of faith communities to contribute to social capital and welfare provision, especially in urban contexts characterized by fragmentation, racial and religious tensions, and increasing crime levels. Faith communities are also seen as sources of volunteers and physical resources (Furbey and Macey 2005; Dinham and Lowndes 2009). The New Labour government (1997–2010) introduced a series of initiatives intended to strengthen the relationship between government and religious communities (Jochum, Pratten, and Wilding 2007). Since 2010, the Conservative-Liberal Democrat Coalition and successive Conservative governments have sought to develop a localism agenda, heralded by the introduction of former Prime Minister Cameron’s notion of the “Big Society” and the 2011 Localism Act. The Big Society was intended to be contrasted with the big state of New Labour and to endorse the proactive role of the voluntary sector in fixing Britain’s “broken society” (Alcock 2010: 380). A key aim of the localism agenda is to return power from the state to the citizen and place the responsibility of social change in the hands of the people (Dinham and Jackson 2012). It is seen as a potential opportunity for voluntary groups, including FBOs, to play a greater role in delivering social services to their communities. The British government also recognizes the important contribution made by faith communities to international development. In June 2011, the Department for International Development (DFID) formed the Faith Partnerships Working Group to strengthen its “collaboration with faith groups to transform poor people’s lives and achieve the Millennium Development Goals” (DFID 2012: 2). DFID works with a variety of faith groups in Britain and around the world.2
Religious actors have a long history of development activity in Africa stretching back to the colonial era (Haustein and Tomalin 2017). However, the increased interest in FBOs by international development actors is linked to the “NGO-ization” of African society since the 1980s in response to structural adjustment and neoliberal reforms imposed by international donors and implemented by African governments (Freeman 2012; Burchardt 2012; Dilger 2009). Structural adjustment was accompanied by a change in international aid policy as funds were increasingly channelled through international and domestic NGOs rather than given directly to governments. As Freeman (2012) notes, this change in foreign aid policy led to an explosion of NGOs involved in a variety of development activities. International development agencies favoured NGOs because it was believed that, as grassroots organizations, they “would be able to stimulate the participation of local people in their own development and empower them to take up new activities that would increase their wellbeing and lead to economic growth” (Freeman 2012: 6). Initially, religious institutions had to accept constraints due to the secularism of development aid. Haustein and Tomalin (2017: 87–88) note that, even before the emergence of FBO terminology, some religious actors in Asia and Africa functioned as “gatekeepers to local communities to facilitate the entrance of NGOs”, while others “made important modifications to gain NGO funding, by founding development wings or adjusting their project plans and funding applications to the required language”. However, the recent re-emergence of religion in development policy and practice has meant that religious institutions are now encouraged to form FBOs to tap into funds reserved for religious organizations. Burchardt (2012: 15) refers to this as the FBO-ization of the religious field, the “expansion of activities in the cultural vicinity of churches that are carried out by church members, organized through voluntary non-profit organizations, and oriented towards social service provision and advocacy”.
One reason that development donors have increasingly chosen to support FBOs is their perceived comparative advantage over not only state organizations but also secular NGOs in the achievement of development interventions (Tomalin 2016; Leurs 2012). Scholars refer to the added value of spiritual and cultural capital that religious groups can contribute to development, their ability to mobilize their members, their closeness to grassroots communities, their financial self-sufficiency, and their capacity to deliver services efficiently and cost effectively (Leurs 2012; Berger 2003; James 2011). However, as Tomalin (2016: 79) notes, there is “little evidence to support generalized claims that FBOs are distinctive and have a comparative advantage over secular NGOs”. Most of the studies available are case studies of individual FBOs rather than comparative assessments of FBOs and secular organizations. Existing comparative studies show considerable overlap between the development aims and activities of FBOs and NGOs (e.g. Davis et al. 2001; Leurs 2012). Another challenge of assessing FBOs in development relates to whether a “presumed distinctive attribute of an FBO is a product of its faith identity” or other non-religious factors (Tomalin 2016: 78).
There is a lack of conceptual clarity in the literature about how we should define and classify FBOs working in development. An ongoing debate is whether local congregations or the denominational bodies that run them should be included in the category “FBO”. Some scholars resist the inclusion of congregations and limit the definition of an FBO to registered organizations that resemble NGOs (e.g. Jeavons 2004). However, this runs the risk of excluding much informal faith-based development work with which donors might usefully engage (Tomalin 2016). Clarke and Jennings (2008: 6) argue for a broader definition which includes “any organization that derives inspiration and guidance for its activities from the teachings and principles of the faith or from a particular interpretation or school of thought within the faith”. McGrew and Cnaan (2006: 28) suggest that a congregation be considered a subset of faith-based organizations, albeit one whose primary purpose is not to provide social services but religious services. The UN shares this more inclusive definition (UNHCR 2014). In this book, I make a distinction between formal FBOs of the NGO variety and informal FBOs such as Pentecostal congregations that often include development initiatives among their outreach ministries. In any given African community, one may find a “complex web of initiatives”, including programmes run by multiple faith-affiliated sources alongside an array of international faith-based and secular agencies (Olivier and Woden 2014: 54).
One challenge for Western donors and policy-makers seeking to engage with FBOs is the diversity of religious organizations involved in development activities. Various typologies of FBOs have been proposed to help researchers and development actors to navigate the terrain (Clarke 2008; Sider and Unrah 2004; Tomalin, Haustein, and Kidy 2019). Sider and Unrah (2004) categorize FBOs in terms of the extent to which faith is manifest in different aspects of their work. At one end of the spectrum are “faith-permeated” organizations, in which “the connection with religious faith is evident at all levels of mission, staffing, governance, and support”. At the other end are secular organizations which have “no reference to religion in their mission or founding history” (2004: 119–120). They argue that classifying FBOs in this way helps funders choose appropriate organizations with which to work and also helps FBOs to understand and describe their religious character (2004: 132). In Africa, the complexity of faith-based development activity at local community level makes it difficult to classify FBOs into discrete types. As Olivier and Woden (2014: 68) note, “the bulk of community-level work often spontaneously emerges out of ‘congregations’ or is linked to individuals motivated by personal faith”. These informal community initiatives are difficult to know, measure, and support.
Some scholars have questioned the usefulness of the FBO/secular NGO distinction, especially in contexts where religion permeates almost every aspect of people’s lives (e.g. Tomalin 2013; Haustein and Tomalin 2017). As Tomalin (2013: 227) notes,
the model of an NGO-like FBO does not capture all types of religious organizations engaged in development activities, and the term “faith-based” may reflect a largely Christian view of religion and a Western (mainly US) context characterised by particular forms of secularism.
She argues that the way in which the debate about the distinctiveness of FBOs is articulated “reflects political priorities as well as a desire to promote FBOs as viable development partners, worthy of donor support” (2013: 227). Tomalin, Haustein, and Kidy (2019: 105) identify seven types of “faith actor” engaged in development:
1 Large, formal international FBOs, often with strong links to the UN.
2 International apex bodies representing faith traditions.
3 Formal FBOs and networks such as inter-religious councils.
4 Smaller formal FBOs that may have transnational ties but are not necessarily linked to international development organizations.
5 FBOs engaged in local development work, which may be linked to local places of worship, and are less likely to have formal links to the UN and other international processes.
6 Religious leaders invited to participate in global and national policy debates.
7 Places of worship in the Global South that may also support development at a local level.
As we will see, most Nigerian Pentecostal faith actors involved in development work belong to types (4), (5) and (7). Many Pentecostal development initiatives are carried out by the social engagement arms of local places of worship. Increasingly, however, Pentecostal churches and individuals are establishing formal Pentecostal NGOs, sometimes with links to the UN and other international development organizations.
The Nigerian context
The growth of FBOs in Nigeria is closely connected to the proliferation of NGOs in recent decades. The dramatic rise of NGOs in postcolonial Nigeria began in the 1980s during military governments (Smith 2012). Scholars attribute this growth to three main factors. First, economic decline and gaps in service delivery arising from the oil glut and structural adjustment encouraged the emergence of NGOs. Second, the political context under successive military dictatorships prompted the emergence of pro-democracy and human rights civil society organizations. Finally, donor preferences for funding NGOs rather than the state, which was deemed incompetent and corrupt, created a conducive environment for NGO proliferation (Leurs 2012; Davis et al. 2011; Obadare 2007). NGOs in Nigeria are involved in a variety of areas including poverty-related issues, HIV/AIDS, youth development, democracy and governance, advocacy, health, education, research and policy, and environment issues.
FBOs have also played an important role in development, especially in the areas of health, education, community development, human rights advocacy, and conflict resolution (Odumosu, Olaniyi, and Alonge 2009; Leurs 2012). Christian FBOs include apex bodies such as the Nigerian Catholic Bishop’s Conference, the Christian Association of Nigeria, and the Nigerian Supreme Council of Islamic Affairs; development organizations such as CRUDAN and CHAN; socio-political organizations such as the Justice Development and Peace Caritas Commission (Catholic); missionary organizations; and interfaith organizations such as the Interfaith HIV/AIDS Council of Nigeria (Odumosu, Olaniyi, and Alonge 2009). As Leurs (2012: 707) notes, many “are now labelled (and label themselves) FBOs and their development agendas have been inf...
