A Theory of Master Role Transition

Small Powers Shaping Regional Hegemons

Feliciano de Sá Guimarães

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781000067736
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In this book, Feliciano de Sá Guimarães offers an original application of Role Theory. He proposes a theory of master role transitions to explain how small powers can change regional powers' master roles without changing the regional material power distribution.Master role transition is the replacement of an active dominant master role by a dormant or inactive role located within one's role repertoire. Guimarães argues that only a combination of four necessary conditions can produce a full master role transition: asymmetrical material interdependence, altercasting, domestic contestation and regional contestation. In each one of these conditions, a small power uses material and ideational tools to promote a master role transition within the regional power role repertoire. To test his model, Guimarães turns to five case studies in Latin America, Southern Africa and South Asia: the 2006–2007 Bolivia–Brazil gas crisis, the 2008–2009 Paraguay–Brazil Itaipú Dam crisis, the 2008–2009 Ecuador–Brazil Odebrecht crisis, the 1998 South Africa–Lesotho military intervention crisis and the 1996India–Bangladesh Ganges water crisis. A Theory of Master Role Transition is an excellent resource for those studying both theory and method in International Relations and foreign policy analysis.

1 Introduction

One of the most famous dialogues in Thucydides’s History of the Peloponnesian War is about a troubled and dangerous relationship between a weak city-state in Greece (Melos) and a powerful one (Athens). In the Melian dialogue, Athenian envoys are sent to the neutral city of Melos to convince them to join the Athenian empire against rival Sparta. Upon arrival, they announced the now famous quote:

You know as well as we do that when we are talking on the human plane questions of justice only arise when there is equal power to compel: in terms of practicality the dominant exact what they can, and the weak concede what they must.¹

Many studies on small powers quoted this sentence, but no one cared to look at what Melians had to say about it, and what were the practical consequences of their altercation.

Melos was a neutral city-island in the Aegean Sea disputed by both Athens and Sparta, although the Dorian people who inhabited the island were of the same ethnic group as Sparta. Melian councilors were fully aware of the imminent invasion by Athens and promptly replied to the envoys:

To our way of thinking, at any rate, there is advantage in you preserving the principle of the common good (no invasion of neutral cities): that is, that anyone who finds himself in danger should receive fair and equitable treatment… . This principle is proportionately in your interest much more than ours, given the massive retaliation you would face as an example to others (neutral cities) should you fall from power.

They continued: “And how could it be in our interest to be your slaves? How does that compare with your interest in being our masters?” The Athenians envoys bluntly answered: “Because submission offers you the alternative to a much more terrible fate (destruction): and because we gain by not destroying you”.²

It seems that the Melians were giving in to Athenian threats, arguing that Athens would only face actual punishment for their aggressive behavior when the empire eventually falls sometime in the future. However, as the conversation goes on, the Melians tried to show more considerable implications if Athens decides to invade a neutral city. They argued:

At present, there are several neutrals: do you want to make enemies of them all? When they see what you are doing here, they will expect an attack on themselves before long. And this would simply serve to strengthen your existing enemies and bring you others who, left to themselves, would have had no such intention.³

What the Melians were trying to say is that if Athens decided to invade a neutral city, other neutral ones would think twice before opening their gates for conversations and would not so easily side with the aggressive Athenian empire. However, as the Melians probably expected, their hopes and arguments did not pay off: Athens invaded and destroyed the city of Melos, enslaved its population and installed a garrison there for future incursions against Sparta. What Athens did not expect, though, is that other neutral cities in the Greek world would start to view Athens with greater suspicion and Sparta with respect, just like the Melians predicted. The growing fear of Athens among neutral cities turned out to be a vital ingredient for Sparta’s final victory in the Peloponnesian War.

Another anecdote always found in the studies about small powers is the adventure depicted in Jonathan Swift’s classic Gulliver’s Travels, published in 1726. The book tells the story of a certain British first surgeon and captain of the Royal Navy, Mr. Lemuel Gulliver, and how he managed to escape from the fictitious land of Lilliput, where no one was taller than three inches.⁴ Small powers studies go as far as repeating what Robert Keohane had asked in the late 1960s: “[Can] Lilliputians tie-up Gulliver and make him fight for them?”⁵

What almost no one cares to say is that Lilliputians were not interested in making Gulliver fight for them. On the contrary, they wanted to verify his intentions and, if necessary, eliminate him. To do so, they not only successfully tied up Gulliver during his sleep but also managed to keep him imprisoned for days, they drugged and transported him to the capital, and they even injured him with “smart arrows” to show they were serious.⁶ The Lilliputian Emperor Golbasto Gue only gave the order to free Mr. Gulliver when it was clear that he would cooperate.

One can argue that the most important victory for the Lilliputians was not their mischievous strategy of tying up Gulliver while he was sleeping, but Gulliver’s perception, after he was freed and could stroll around the capital of Mildendo, that Lilliput should be forgotten and never revisited by other explorers due to the frivolous and unscrupulous nature of its inhabitants. No doubt convincing a powerful and dangerous giant never to set foot in or threaten a small kingdom only by the use of ropes, arrows and the inhabitants’ evil nature should be congratulated as an excellent foreign policy strategy for small powers.

The example of the Melian dialogue seems to be the typical case of a small power’s incapacity to deal with an aggressive and superior power when it resorts to its material advantage. Melos’ hoplites stood no chance against Athens’ naval and land superiority. In the chilling scenario of Greek war, the lack of material resources should suffice to characterize small powers’ incapacity to survive in a world in which military might was decisive. On the other hand, the Lilliputians’ case points out to a more nuanced performance of a small power facing fearful odds. The fact that Gulliver gave up on the Lilliputians and never wanted to revisit Lilliput allowed the emperor to keep his iron-fist control over the population. Thus, the general question I ask in this book is the following: How can a small power act more like the Lilliputians and less like the Melians to turn the odds in its favor?

1.1 The Puzzle

In this book, I use the literature of Role Theory to show that small powers are capable of changing regional powers’ roles by manipulating the ideational relationship they establish with them and, eventually, create a more favorable regional scenario. Role Theory allows us to conceive the multiple dimensions of identity-making processes, while at the same time understanding the construction and transformation of identities in an interactional way among different actors within the structures of the community at stake. Thus, changing regional hegemons’ roles can be feasible for small powers despite their material incapacity, because what matters most in role-based models is not material resources per se but how they are perceived and incorporated in role-making processes. Not every small power has to face (or always be afraid of) the fate of Melos.

The current trend in small powers literature focuses on analyzing behavior and performance calls for new evidence of small powers’ success in accomplishing their foreign policy goals. After spending too much time trying to define the concept with no clear-cut lines for smallness, more recently the literature has been studying the performance of small powers in regional and global arenas.⁷ Long argued that the analysis of small powers states “should pivot from the poorly specified category of smallness to instead prioritize the dynamics of the relationship in which these countries are engaged”.⁸ Where to find and how to understand the real influence of small powers became the new mantra in several studies.⁹

In this regard, I believe that the keyword for researchers interested in the actual performance of small powers should be asymmetry.¹⁰ I agree with Long that studying asymmetric power relations involving countries with no material resources should be the new focus of small powers literature instead of overstretching categorizations of smallness.¹¹ I also agree with Rostoks, for whom the relational power – or to be more precise, relational weakness – is an essential characteristic of small powers.¹² Nevertheless, how can one understand the dynamics of power asymmetries involving small powers if smallness is still understood in terms of material imbalances that place small powers at a disadvantage from the start? In other words, is it possible to look beyond material power considerations of smallness for foreign policy initiatives?

In my view, the new behavioral analyses of small powers are excessively focused on issue areas where small powers already tend to have more influence, such as climate change or human rights, by the use of some smart niche diplomacy.¹³ The assumption is that material capacity is less relevant in these issue-areas and, therefore, small power strategies tend to be more successful. These studies are still locked up somewhat in general material-based considerations that confine the success of small powers foreign policy to narrow areas where material power is not traditionally relevant or decisive. Even when some studies focus on roles or identities, they necessarily derive these concepts from the position small powers enjoy in a material power distribution, which always limits their action and success.¹⁴ Thus, since power asymmetry is a pivotal dimension to understanding the relationship between small powers and greater powers, is it possible to look beyond issue-based analysis and material unbalances and focus on general models of success and influence for small powers?

Role Theory becomes relevant in answering this question because it allows one to understand the relationship between small and regional powers not as a top-down interaction, in which regional powers usually have the material advantage, but as a more horizontal and nuanced perspective. Role Theory allows one to understand that smaller countries can influence regional powers’ self-conceptions and regional aspirations despite material asymmetries and the issue at stake. In other words, Role Theory de-emphasizes material asymmetries in foreign policy change and interactions by looking into how these material imbalances are incorporated – and changed – in role-making processes. Since Role Theory focuses on role conceptions, role changes, and role interactions, I will show that the fluid construction of roles expected by Role Theory opens space for small powers to act and be successful in their interactions with more powerful actors despite their apparent material weakness.

Indeed, I argue that the new trend of studying small powers’ performance in asymmetric interactions has to develop exclusive identity-based models to escape from the predominance of very demanding material considerations as a baseline assumption. My analysis goes beyond issue-policies approaches of performance by creating a model based predominantly, but not exclusively, on discursive and identity-oriented strategies – models in which material considerations are understood from a role conception perspective rather than fixed categories of power. For Role Theory, role perceptions about material power are more important than material capacity per se.¹⁵ That is, material power is only relevant if role conceptions incorporate them as such. My case analysis will show that material unbalances or asymmetrical interdependence, instead of limiting small powers’ influence, can be transformed into an asset to pressure regional powers to change their identities. As Neumann and Gstohl have rightly argued, “Small powers have often been confused with weak states, although the distinction between small and great does not coincide with the distinction between strong and weak. While the former is a distinction of quantity, the latter is of quality”.¹⁶

1.2 The Model

I argue in the book that small powers promoting regional powers’ role learning is not an easy task. Role learning means that regional powers learn a new set of beliefs about their dominant role that eventually leads to role change. There are four very demanding conditions for role learning to occur. The first one is a material consideration. Only interactions marked by some degree of asymmetrical material interdependence between regional and small powers produce the initial conditions for a full role transition to be eventually developed within the regional power role-set. That is, although Role Theory builds its theoretical apparatus using normative and ideational arguments, I argue that material aspects are still important to set the stage to develop ideational considerations later on. However, this material interdependence is not a sufficient condition for small powers to change regional powers’ dominant roles in their respective regions. They need to be followed by three other ideational considerations.

The second condition is a discursive one. Small powers need to design an antagonist narrative that is effective enough to put the regional power in a problematic normative situation. In Role Theory terms, this narrative is called altercasting, that is, the small power’s manipulation of the regional powers’ own role conception.¹⁷ Small powers accuse regional powers’ dominant roles of imperialism or colonialism, an accusation that directly affects regional powers’ conceptions about their ‘Self’. The narrative creates an internal division within regional powers’ governments about their regional roles that is powerful enough to force political leaders to reconsider their master role v...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Foreword
• 1 Introduction
• 2 A Theory of Master Role Transition
• 3 The 2006–2007 Brazil–Bolivia Gas Crisis
• 4 The 2008–2009 Brazil–Paraguay Itaipú Dam Crisis
• 5 The 2008–2009 Ecuador–Brazil Odebrecht Crisis
• 6 The 1998 South Africa–Lesotho Operation Boleas Crisis
• 7 The 1996 India–Bangladesh Ganges Water Crisis
• 8 Conclusions
• Index