From Brezhnev to Gorbachev

Infighting in the Kremlin

Baruch A. Hazan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367006532
• eBook ISBN: 9780429718120
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: World History
• Index: History

From 1982 to 1985, the period on which this book focuses, the Soviet Union was governed by a succession of ailing old men—Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko—who, supported by an equally elderly Politburo, were often physically incapable of controlling and directing the bureaucratic state machine and party organization. This unprecedented situation precipitated a secret and bitter power struggle within the top Soviet leadership between two main factions: the Chernenko apparatchiks, who had risen to power under Brezhnev and owed their positions to him; and the supporters of Andropov, including the younger, more dynamic, and power-hungry members of the party elite, who had been advocating fairly bold reforms to deal with the grave social and economic problems facing the USSR. Dr. Hazan provides a detailed analysis of this hidden power struggle as he examines the final years of Brezhnev's reign and the brief ascendancies of Andropov and Chernenko. These rapid changes led to the demise of the old guard in the Politburo and the emergence of a new breed of leader in Mikhail Gorbachev, culminating in the final consolidation of his power at the 27th CPSU Congress. Drawing on an extensive range of primary sources and using vivid examples of how the factions exploited the gigantic propaganda machine of the Soviet mass media, the author looks behind the Kremlin's walls to explore the essence of Soviet politics. The book describes the power base of each of the recent Soviet leaders and analyzes the steps they took to consolidate their positions and tighten controls over the bureaucracy and the military.

1
Introduction

The thorny issues of leadership and of leaders' succession have plagued many generations of Marxists. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels treated almost all political leaders, both historical figures and their own contemporaries, with open contempt, repeatedly stressing that the issue of leadership could only be analyzed in terms of the specific historical circumstances and that leaders were actually produced by history itself. Paraphrasing Claude-Adrien Helvétius, Marx asserted that every social epoch needs its own great men, and when it does not find them, it invents them.¹ He thus implied that all leaders are replaceable but failed to explain just how leaders are thrown up by the historical process.

Development of the Communist Concept of Leadership

The negative attitude of Marx and Engels toward leaders affected their analysis of the leadership of the proletarian revolution. In this context they reiterated their aversion to individual leaders: They pointed out that collective leadership had initiated and implemented all important historical acts, maintained that the only genuine revolutions are those without leaders, and denounced "any personality cult."² Marx even went further. He concluded that the proletariat has no need for leaders; in fact they often, as in the case of the Paris Commune, can "hamper real action" instead of inspiring it.³

Engels later significantly modified this view, holding that even in the supposedly leaderless Communist society a number of organizations, such as industrial enterprises, would still require persons to coordinate planning and other activities;⁴ thus he provided the modern leaders of the Communist world with some ideological justification for their existence. Nevertheless, Marxist teaching provides no guidelines for the selection or replacement of leaders in the Communist society, leaving Marxist disciples with the task of developing the ideological justification for the existence of Communist leaders.

Georgiy Plekhanov qualified Marx's theory that leaders were the product of historical circumstances. Plekhanov asserted that, although leaders are powerless to alter the course of history—which is determined by independent forces—"influential leaders can change the individual features of events and some of their particular consequences."⁵ Plekhanov further asserted that leaders, though limited in range and effectiveness by material circumstances, "by virtue of the particular traits of their character, can influence the fate of society."⁶ He praised men who "see further than others and desire things more strongly than others," thus possessing qualities that "make them capable of serving the great social needs of their time."⁷

Lenin further clarified the leadership issue presented in Marx's writings and offered a completely new view on the role of the leader in the revolution. He did not share Marx's contempt for leaders. On the contrary, doubting the abilities of the proletariat and fearing its tendency to act spontaneously and therefore in a misdirected and dangerous manner, Lenin stressed the important role of the party leadership in controlling and directing the action of the proletariat. According to Lenin, even if the working class were defeated and the party dispersed, as long as a leadership cadre survives eventual victory is assured.⁸

Lenin charged the leaders of the proletariat with many tasks: to educate the proletariat, to raise the level of its consciousness through agitation and propaganda, and to lead it toward victory by acting as mass mobilizers, organizers, and strategists and by stimulating heroic actions that would serve as the motive force for a revolutionary chain reaction. The "spark" concept was one of Lenin's favorite ideas: The leaders were to provide the spark to ignite the combustible social material and thus set off a general explosion, whereas the Russian Revolution was to serve as the spark that would initiate a worldwide conflagration.⁹

Only after the victory of the Russian Revolution and the establishment of the Communist regime in the Soviet Union did the inadequacy of Marx's views on leadership become clearly apparent. The emergence of a Communist power created a new world situation and demonstrated that Marx's doctrine on leadership was totally unrealistic. Instead, Lenin and his successors developed the theory of the "dictatorship of the proletariat" to explain the form of the Communist state. The term dictatorship implied an authoritarian political system, the leadership of which was not limited by legal or constitutional constrictions or indeed by public opinion, and a regime in which coercion and physical and mental terror were the accepted instruments of government. In this system, the basic goal remained the achievement of communism through rapid industrialization and radical social transformation. However, the role of the masses in this process was to be strictly passive: They were expected obediently to implement the plans of leaders whom they did not have the power to appoint or remove. Indeed, strict discipline, a rigid hierarchy, and an extensive system of paternalism in all areas of life became the main characteristics of this regime.

The authoritarian political structure was headed by a small group of leaders that enjoyed a complete monopoly of the decisionmaking process and ensured the implementation of their decisions through an elaborate bureaucratic apparatus, assisted by propaganda, agitation, terror, and coercion. Consequently, the leaders of the dictatorship of the proletariat quickly acquired a special status for themselves. In total disregard of Marx's dictum, Marx himself and the Soviet leaders became the subjects of unprecedented personality cults, which for Lenin (up to the present) and Joseph Stalin (until his death) carried with them quasi-religious adulation. Surprisingly, these personality cults, which encompassed to varying extents all Soviet leaders, became an element of continuity in the Soviet political system.

In the seven decades of its existence, the Soviet regime has often relied heavily on ideological formulations and justifications to justify actions that offended international law or the accepted norms of human and international behavior. However, questions of leadership in general or succession in particular were not decided on an ideological basis. Instead, they were usually determined by a political struggle that had little relation to Marxism but much in common with the succession struggles in other dictatorial regimes. Personal ambition, collusion, ruthlessness, and political skill, as well as the ability to generate support at the right moment among the state organs, were the factors that determined the outcome of the succession struggle in the USSR.

Toward the end of his life, Lenin perceived the dangers posed by his own and perhaps future successions in the USSR. Being well aware of the tremendous ideological gap in this area, he tried to deal with the problem by preparing his "Testament." In it he evaluated the positive and negative qualities of the top Soviet leaders of his time. He stopped short of recommending anyone as his heir but nevertheless voiced concern regarding the immense power that Stalin had accumulated through his position as general secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) Central Committee and the manner in which he might exploit this power. Lenin called for Stalin's removal on the grounds that he was too rude and capricious and not sufficiently loyal or polite. Stalin's supporters had the "Testament" suppressed: It was published in the USSR only in 1956 and had no influence on the succession struggle. Ironically, Stalin emerged as Lenin's heir. The whole affair established the precedent that the succession issue in the USSR would be solved by a power struggle in which the leaders' personalities had a decisive influence. This proved to be the main characteristic of Soviet leadership and its succession during the subsequent decades of Communist rule.

Features of Soviet Leadership and Succession

Individual, not Collective, Leadership

Although the Soviets claimed to have collective leadership (a huge propaganda effort is invested in creating the impression that individual leadership does not and can not exist in the USSR), Soviet history shows that, except during very brief periods following Stalin's death and Nikita Khrushchev's ouster, the Soviet political system has essentially been dominated by a single leader. The problem of the specific position or positions to be occupied by this leader developed some years after the establishment of the Communist regime and was solved in different ways during subsequent Soviet history. In his "Testament," Lenin did not discuss the official institutions of the top leadership (except for proposing an increase in the membership of the Central Committee); he dealt with the actual personalities of the top Soviet leaders of his time. The "Testament" was concerned with the future leader, not with future collective leadership. It evaluated not the different ideological positions of the leaders but their personal characters. Thus in the very political system that by definition rejects the existence of personal leadership, the issue of first succession was approached in purely personal terms and was eventually solved through a violent power struggle in which the winner, Stalin, employed physical terror against opponents and allies alike to acquire and consolidate his power. Nevertheless, although Stalin (commonly cited as the classic all-powerful single leader of the Communist state) set the pattern followed by his successors (each according to his abilities), Lenin first perceived the succession in the USSR in purely personal terms.

Significance of the Post of General Secretary

Lenin held the post of chairman of the Council of People's Commissars (Sovnarkom), equivalent to that of prime minister. Although already acknowledged as the founder and leader of the Soviet state, he held no official party office; yet because of his personality and charisma, as well as his role in directing the October Revolution, he was the undisputed leader of the USSR. Stalin, who followed him, used the office of general secretary of the Central Committee to generate the power and support necessary to ensure his own election. From his election to the general secretaryship (during Lenin's lifetime) to his death, Stalin never relinquished this post, making it the mainstay for the political leadership of the USSR and a necessary prerequisite for any person aspiring to become the top leader. Indeed, at the time of Lenin's death, Stalin showed no interest in assuming Lenin's official position as Sovnarkom chairman to demonstrate that he was Lenin's true successor. He had already invested the office of general secretary with such power that he did not need another official post to assert himself as the new Soviet leader. During World War II and subsequently, Stalin took over the chairmanship of the Council of Ministers, a move copied by Khrushchev after 1958. However, in neither case did these additional offices alter the fact that the post that served as the source and proof of the top leader's power was that of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

Use of Central Committee as a Legitimizing Body

Nikita Khrushchev increased even further the importance of the office of general secretary. He was astute enough to acquire the post of general secretary for himself. He eased Georgiy Malenkov out of this post only a few days after Stalin's death, giving Malenkov the post of chairman of the Council of Ministers, from which he could be subsequently ousted without difficulty. Lacking Stalin's charisma, he made skillful use of the party apparatus as an instrument for communicating and implementing his programs. Khrushchev's approach was most evident in the brilliant manner in which he used the Central Committee in 1957 to banish the "antiparty group"—establishing a precedent for using the Central Committee as the ultimate legitimizing authority in the Kremlin power struggle. In October 1964 Leonid Brezhnev and his supporters used the Central Committee as the means for the public ousting of Khrushchev himself. The CPSU Central Committee played the same legitimizing role during the 1982-1985 successions. Although the real decision on the successions of Yuriy Andropov, Konstantin Chernenko, and Mikhail Gorbachev was clearly made by the Politburo, in all three cases the Central Committee officially legitimized the Politburo decision.

Khrushchev introduced a further novelty into the Kremlin power struggle. After ridding himself of Lavrentiy Beria, Stalin's ruthless KGB chief, who made an unsuccessful bid for the leadership, he ended the use of physical terror in the power struggle among the Soviet leaders; no longer would lethal consequences befall the losers, as they did in Stalin's time. The fact that Chernenko gained supremacy in his second attempt demonstrated that after 1953 a failure in the succession struggle did not necessarily represent a lethal blow to the defeated side.

The Triple Crown

Brezhnev, obviously fond of the external symbols of power and status, added to his official posts the chairmanship of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, a position that he held from 1977 until his death in 1982. From that point until the ascent of Gorbachev, the acquisition of the "triple crown" (the posts of general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium, and chairman of the Defense Council) provided the ultimate and visible proof that the new leader had established himself. In both Andropov and Chernenko's cases (see Chapters 2, 3, and 4) the election to the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium signaled the end of the succession struggle or at least of its most crucial stage.

Gorbachev's rise to power changed this pattern. Although apparently adding the post of chairman of the Defense Council¹⁰ to his position as general secretary, he declined the post of chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, explaining that he intended to devote himself to party work; instead he initiated the election of Andrey Gromyko to this post (Chapter 7). Thus Gorbachev abandoned one feature of the Soviet succession but strengthened another, namely, the supremacy of the office of general secretary.

The Age Question

Soon after Gorbachev's ascent, many observers remarked that his relative youth (fifty-four years, the youngest man in the Politburo) might indicate a change toward a more youthful top leadership. This interpretation is correct only if Gorbachev's age is being compared to those of Andropov and Chernenko at their successions or to Brezhnev's at the time of his death. Although Gorbachev was much younger and more vigorous than Andropov and Chernenko, who succeeded as old men in poor health, both Lenin and Stalin were in their forties when they came to power whereas Khrushchev (fifty-nine years) and Brezhnev (fifty-seven years) were little older than Gorbachev. Thus, in the socalled pattern relating to the age of the Soviet leader, Andropov and Chernenko, not Gorbachev, were the exceptions.

The Personality Cult

The cult of personality was an integral component of the tenure of all the Soviet leaders before Gorbachev. The cult surrounding Lenin seemed to develop from his natural charisma; however, his heirs, Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev, each promoted a specific cult, which not only served to inflate the leader's ego through mass adulation but also had clear political goals, such as strengthening his image vis-à-vis his colleagues, supporters, and opponents, blocking and neutralizing criticism from below, delaying his decline, and counteracting the effects of any political, economic, and social failures. Although Andropov and Chernenko did not have enough time to develop their own cults, each possessed some of the necessary preattributes. Andropov, the former KGB (Committee for State Security) chief had developed the image of being an innovator, strict disciplinarian, and ascetic; Chernenko lacked Andropov's qualities and track record, but he inherited Brezhnev's apparatus almost intact and, given time, would have had little difficulty in using it to foster his own personality cult.

Gorbachev has many positive qualities—charm, eloquence, an image of sincerity, and a populistic aura—which could easily form a basis for developing his own personality cult. However, from the very beginning of his tenure, and especially during the 27th CPSU Congress (Chapter 8), he publicly expressed his aversion to the practice of adulating the leader. Of course, he may resort to the device of a cult at a later stage. Sooner or later Gorbachev will have to show some concrete results in his foreign and domestic policies. This situation could become acute for him after the nuclear reactor disaster at Chernobyl, which is likely to seriously hamper the implementation of his ambitious agricultural plans and further strain the Soviet foreign currency reserves by necessitating increased food purchases from the West. A properly developed personality cult could effectively shield Gorbachev from criticism prompted by disappointed expectations.

Death—Prime Force in the Succession

The Soviet succession is a party issue, decided by a small group of party leaders (the Politburo and Central Committee Secretariat, with the apparent consent of the top KGB and Soviet Army leaderships), who use a party instrument—the Central Committee—to anoint the leader of the largest country in the world. In the cases of Andropov and Chernenko (Chapters 3 and 4) the Central Committee was also used to decide their elections as chairmen of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, an example followed later in the election of Gromyko (Chapter 8). Th...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• About the Book and Author
• Title
• Dedication
• Copyright
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 2 SUCCESSION IN THE USSR: BREZHNEV'S TWILIGHT AND DEATH
• 3 ANDROPOV SUCCEEDS: RUDIMENTARY CONSOLIDATION
• 4 ANDROPOV'S ECLIPSE: RULING BY REMOTE CONTROL
• 5 THE SECOND CHANCE: CHERNENKO SUCCEEDS, THE TWOFOLD DECISION
• 6 TOO LATE, TOO SHORT: CHERNENKO RULES
• 7 THE SMOOTH SUCCESSION: GORBACHEV AT THE HELM
• 8 CLEARING AWAY THE DEBRIS: THE SECOND FRONT
• 9 CLOSING THE CIRCLE—The CONGRESS
• 10 CONCLUSIONS
• Appendix A: Indicators for Ranking of Soviet Leaders
• Notes
• Index