Making Peace

The United States And Conflict Resolution

Allan E. Goodman

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429714993
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

As recent conflicts in Panama and the Persian Gulf demonstrate, we know much more about making war than we do about making peace. Such conflicts are not likely to disappear, and this volume reviews what has and hasn't worked in negotiating an end to war. Six case studies-ranging from World War I to the Persian Gulf crisis-illustrate a variety of actors, stakes, and strategies involved in the peacemaking process. Key turning points toward peace or deadlock are identified along the way. Making Peace also provides discussion questions, historical backgrounds, and theoretical introductions to show different-and differentially successful-avenues to peace.

1
Introduction

All wars end. But not all—or even most—wars end by diplomacy. Prior to the nineteenth century, the majority of wars ended with either a decisive military victory of one country over another or with the surrender of one side, based on the admonitions of military experts and their calculation that victory was militarily or financially inconceivable. At times, if the continuation of conflict was viewed as a threat to the stability or security of other more powerful nations, a settlement was externally imposed, and the war was forced to a reach a conclusion. In relatively few cases, exhaustion or the approximate equality of opposing forces led to stalemate. Frequently, it was the prolongation of this condition that prompted both sides to reevaluate their original war aims and motivated their leaders to seek a rapid settlement in order to end the conflict.

More recently, with the advent of the modern mass army and the introduction of the international balance-of-power concept at the Congress of Vienna, negotiation has become more prevalent as a means of war termination. Between 1800 and 1980, for example, there have been more than sixty interstate wars of which two-thirds ended by negotiation. Civil wars (of which there were twenty-one during this period) and anticolonial wars (fifty-two), however, seem less amenable to negotiated settlement. Roughly one-fifth of these conflicts ended by diplomacy, although negotiation was attempted in nearly every case.¹

Why Study War Termination?

The focus of this book is on the methods of ending military conflicts through negotiated settlements and the special challenges that negotiating for peace poses for diplomatic personnel and, more broadly, for the future welfare of participating nations. The need for expertise and comprehensive knowledge in this area is not likely to diminish in the foreseeable future. Even detentes—or ententes, for that matter—between the most powerful members of an international system do not guarantee that their leaders reject the use of force in the pursuit of future national aims or that a host of lesser powers will settle their disputes peacefully. In addition, although the apparent end of the cold war may reduce the number of conflicts precipitated by East-West tensions, the recent invasions of Panama by the United States and Kuwait by Iraq are stark reminders that warfare remains an operative instrument of foreign policy.

In fact, the potential for renewed regional conflict, over many historically disputed territorial claims, is probably greater in an international system where the superpowers enjoy détente and act with restraint. Under these controlled conditions, in the interest of cooperation, both the Soviet Union and the United States may try to avoid assuming the role of a "world policeman" and refrain from exploiting regional instabilities to the other's disadvantage. Thus, dissident and separatist groups may receive little help from the superpowers, and the United States and the U.S.S.R. may also be unable to exert significant influence over the course of such conflicts. As sources of external assistance are reduced, the struggles will probably take on a more intense character and become dominated by the demands and the outlooks of the extremes. So, in the period ahead, there is likely to be substantial political turmoil and even war in much of the Third World. The prevailing belligerent attitudes in such countries as Iraq, Cuba, North Korea, Libya, and Vietnam present obstacles to peaceful negotiations. These nations appear untouched by trends toward East-West detente and democratization; the leaders of these countries, in fact, seem more rather than less inclined to use force in order to influence regional affairs. In this type of international environment, negotiating for peace will remain one of the most difficult challenges facing nations and their diplomatic representatives.

The subject of war termination is treated in two ways in this book. The introduction presents an overview of the nature of war termination by looking at the issues involved in answering three questions:

1. What conditions offer the best chance for negotiations during wartime?
2. How are war termination negotiations conducted?
3. Which strategies promote success in war termination negotiations?

These questions are then posed with reference to the key turning points in six conflicts in which diplomats attempted to negotiate for peace. Each conflict is presented as an abridged version of the following case studies, which were developed for the Pew Initiative in Diplomatic Training: (1) Negotiating the End of World War I is adapted from Robert F. Randle, Making Peace with Germany, 1918: The Pre-Armistice Negotiations (Pew case study no. 435). (2) Concluding the War over Suez is adapted from Michael G. Fry, The Suez Crisis, 1956 (Pew case study no. 126). (3) Ending the Vietnam War is adapted from Allan E. Goodman, The Vietnam Negotiations, October-December 1972 (Pew case study no. 307). (4) Mediation During the War in the Falklands/Malvinas is adapted from Chaim D. Kaufmann, U.S. Mediation in the Falklands/Malvinas Crisis: Shuttle Diplomacy in the 1980s (Pew case study no. 431). (5) Resolving the Lebanon Crisis is adapted from Richard Haass and David Kennedy, The Reagan Administration and Lebanon, (Pew case study no. 340). (6) Diplomacy During the Persian Gulf War, by Allan E. Goodman, is a new case study describing the negotiation process in relation to the recent Persian Gulf war.

These particular conflicts were selected because of their similarity to the types of conflicts that may emerge in the future of international affairs, for the reasons previously mentioned. The original text of each of these cases was considerably longer than could be accommodated in the volumes in this series, so what the authors presented has been abridged, and a common structure has been imposed. The case studies that result, moreover, are sharpened to focus on a few key decision points in the negotiations so that the text promotes the practice of teaching about war termination by asking students to examine the motivations and actions of diplomatic representatives and national leaders and to explore alternative courses of action under the circumstances.

What Leads to Negotiations during Wartime?

The subject of war termination generally has received very little attention in social science and historical literature, and it is rare in the curricula of most schools and programs of international relations to devote a whole course to the subject. International Negotiations, a bibliography published in 1989, contains, for example, a total of twelve references on war termination out of 5,500 citations of English language books, journal articles, doctoral dissertations, government documents, and conference reports.² And at the fifteen member institutions of the Association of Professional Schools of International Affairs (APSIA) in the United States, only a handful of courses in history and international relations devote substantial time to the study of how wars can be ended (versus how they start). Devoting such scant teaching resources to the subject of war termination—especially the practicalities involved in the actual process—is probably justified on the premise that it is unlikely that many of the future diplomats being educated today will find themselves actually involved in negotiations to end a war. All students will find themselves negotiating situations of conflict—and most will want to seek peaceful resolution. In a broad sense, the cases serve as a laboratory for the practical application of knowledge by allowing students to correlate theoretical principles to specific cases. Each case also contributes to students' understanding of historical detail and negotiating mechanics by illustrating the chronology and perspectives of the period and examining the strategies and techniques of the negotiating process. The subject is important in the procedural training of diplomats as well, because most who have been involved in war termination efforts came to the assignment largely by surprise. There is really no way of predicting who, among today's students, might eventually need to master and implement the methods of promoting peace.

Furthermore, the rationale for initiating negotiations during wartime is still not very clear. The few systematic studies that have been conducted to study potential relationships between such quantitative variables as casualty levels, the size of and asymmetries between the opposing forces, and the length of a war and the likelihood of a negotiated settlement of the conflict, moreover, "have not been particularly conclusive."³ This, of course, does not mean that such indicators of military power and effectiveness are irrelevant, only that, in isolation, they do not appear to provide the stimulus for the leaders of belligerent states or guerrilla and separatist forces to decide to risk negotiating while fighting. In cases where such negotiation occurs, the parties to the conflict may be disingenuous about working toward a legitimate settlement and choose to manipulate the process, using it to buy time and weaken the will of their opponents.⁴

Therefore, perhaps the best starting point to understanding why wars end through solutions arranged by diplomats is to initially consider the act of war itself in political terms. Thus, the following observation by Carl von Clausewitz is particularly useful for framing an answer to the question of what conditions offer the best chance for negotiations during wartime:

Since war is not an act of senseless passion but is controlled by its political object, the value of this object must determine the sacrifices made for it in magnitude and also in duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.⁵

Although some wars occur inadvertently, most of them are the result of a conscious decision by the leadership of a state or other organization to seek political objectives (e.g., power, autonomy) by military means. In making this decision, the leaders have in mind not only what they want to achieve but also an estimate of how long it is likely to take to secure this objective and at what cost, Clausewitz is pointing out to negotiators the importance of looking for the turning points—and the pressures and developments on the battlefield that one might reasonably predict would provoke them—that raise doubts, not regarding the original aim of the war, but of the initial estimates of its cost and duration. If these doubts can be ascertained by at least one side, it is likely that the conflict could be settled by bargaining over the terms for a cease-fire and some form of a political settlement.

Is the element of doubt a mutual requirement? For negotiations to succeed in reaching a settlement—which, by definition, allows each side to gab some but not all of its objectives—the answer to this question is probably yes. For if one side of a military conflict remains convinced that they have the time and resources to achieve their original goals—or that they have no real alternatives to pursuing victory that would be politically acceptable and allow them to remain in power—they may enter negotiations with a slate of concealed motives, such as testing the determination of the other side to continue to fight or allowing time to regroup their forces and prepare for a new offensive.

Accordingly, in each of the cases featured in this volume, the reader will want to look for those pressures and developments that affected the leaders' assessments of the value of the war objectives—i.e., the expected benefits of continuing the war when weighed against its mounting costs—as well as the degree to which these perceptions are shared by the parties to the conflict. The key variables to look for are the following:

1. stalemates, i.e., conditions under which neither side seems able to prevail by following the strategy and tactics with which they began the war;
2. resource constraints, which occur as a result of sudden or unforeseen changes in the manner in which both sides planned to finance the war, or which serve to rule out a change in strategy and tactics;
3. external political and economic pressure from allies and neighbors to end the conflict, because its continuation threatens their security; and
4. internal political pressures and changes, which prompt leaders to rethink the wisdom of continued fighting, or to doubt their ability to mobilize the public support necessary to maintain the level of sacrifice required to fight rather than negotiate.

The student should aim at developing both an understanding of the motives for initiating a war and the evolution and transformation of such motives, over the course of the conflict, in ways that allow the diplomats—and require the leaders—to propose that negotiating is preferable to battle.

The Process and Dynamics of War Termination Negotiations

There is no standard process for negotiating an end to warfare. In some cases, armistice talks are proposed and occur instantaneously (e.g., World War I); in other situations, talks about talks may continue for years before actual bargaining about the specific terms of a settlement begins (e.g., Vietnam, 1962-1971). In still other cases, negotiations may begin almost simultaneously with the fighting (e.g., Suez) but later become deadlocked as each side prepares to escalate the conflict (Falklands/Malvinas). Despite such variation, it is still helpful to identify specific phases in the negotiation process—phases that may vary considerably in length. In each phase, moreover, certain key decisions have to be reached. Consequently, each of the case studies is organized to stimulate analysis and discussion of the following.

The Decision to Negotiate. In this phase of negotiation the parties to a conflict explore the possibility of settling their differences by negotiating.⁶ Such "prenegotiation" activities can range from the activities of civilian decisionmakers and opinion leaders who begin to question the assumptions of the necessity of the war or the likelihood of its being won to the initial stirring of public discontent with the sacrifices required to continue the fighting. These activities may also include the development and receipt of new sources of information regarding the strength, motives, and current objectives of the adversary.

Getting the Belligerents to the Table. This phase of the war termination process involves the attempts by diplomats and leaders to set a time, place, and agenda for an actual meeting. Negotiations to end a war can take place in many different ways and in many diverse locations. For instance, the setting may be as rugged as a tent or other temporary structure erected near the front lines of the fighting or as elegant as a grand palace in a neutral country, which has lent its good offices to facilitate reaching a settlement. Diplomatic representatives may remain stationary for the duration of a conference or they may continuously travel back and forth between the capitals of the warring parties. Mediators may choose to remain on neutral ground or shuttle between the countries of the combatants with new proposals and ideas regarding the arrangement of a settlement.

The Decisions Required to Break Deadlocks in Bargaining. Negotiations to end a war rarely proceed smoothly. Ironically, it often appears that the closer bargainers move toward reaching a settlement, the more difficult it becomes to secure the final deal. Negotiations may be disturbed ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Foreword
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 2 NEGOTIATING THE END OF WORLD WAR I, 1918
• 3 CONCLUDING THE WAR OVER SUEZ, 1956
• 4 ENDING THE VIETNAM WAR, 1972
• 5 MEDIATION DURING THE WAR IN THE FALKLANDS/MALVINAS, 1982
• 6 RESOLVING THE LEBANON CRISIS, 1982-1983
• 7 DIPLOMACY DURING THE PERSIAN GULF WAR, 1990-1991
• About the Book and Editors