China's Political/military Evolution

The Party And The Military In The Prc, 1960-1984

Monte R. Bullard

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429711510
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Asian Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

In recent years the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has relinquished much of its political power to China's civilian leadership and has turned to the task of professionalizing the military. The transition of the PLA into a relatively apolitical force in Chinese society has occurred alongside great progress toward military modernization, with the foundation now laid for the PLA to become one of the world's most powerful military forces. Dr. Bullard traces the PLA's extremely important and almost revolutionary transition, examines the structural changes associated with it, and assesses current military policies and trends. He discusses in detail the political commissar system, the key institution for all political-military relationships in the Chinese military system.

1
Introduction

Analytical Issues

Political change in the People's Republic of China in recent years has defied explanation much less prediction. Scholars have applied models, projected trends, developed intuitive hypotheses and used nearly every social science methodology available to make sense of the events of the Chinese Communist movement. To say that this topic is important and has serious implications throughout the world is clearly an understatement. Whether used as a model in comparative developmental studies or as a factor in the analysis of international relations, political change in China demands attention.

One of the most illuminating approaches to the study of political change and political-military relations in China has been elite analysis. Professor Robert Scalapino points out that by definition elites are those who manipulate power and that power is the essence of the political process.¹ But once elites are selected as the focus of attention there are still major methodological questions which must be answered depending in part on the purpose of the study.

Scholars who have studied political change in China have found it helpful to construct a wide variety of models to organize data about elites. Harry Harding has recently written an excellent critique of the models.² For purposes of this study only two of the most used will be discussed: the bureaucratic model and the factional model.

A factional model is defined by its focus on groups of elites in conflict within a single political system. The model stresses analysis of the characteristics of group members to identify attitudes or behavior patterns which can be correlated with policy outcomes.

A bureaucratic model, on the other hand, focuses on institutions and formal roles within institutions to identify changing characteristics and relationships of roles which might suggest conclusions about institutional adaptability to, or stability in, a changing political environment. This model can also be used to organize data for comparison with a Weberian ideal-type bureaucracy to explain and predict bureaucratic behavior.

There are significant variations within each general model. Factional models, for example, can be divided into two categories based on the criteria for identifying a faction or group. One category includes the factions defined by the current issue orientation (for philosophies/ideologies, organizational interests, or selfish motivations) of the members. The second category includes the factions defined by common identity forming past experiences. Some studies include combinations of both types. More complex factional models attempt to correlate the factions with issues or events to determine influence relationships. Some of the factional models have been successful at establishing a relationship between elite types and specific political outcomes, but they are still very narrow and fail to see general political change or implications. Furthermore, the relationships are always explained from hindsight and these models have not been useful in predicting outcomes.

If the analytical purpose is limited to the prediction of succession or which policy or range of policies are likely to prevail over the short run then a relatively narrow focus on elite conflict is useful. This approach can say little, however, about the long range maturity and stability of the political system. If the concern is more than what domestic or foreign policy is likely to result from the ability of one individual or group to prevail, then a more fundamental analysis of the political processes and the political environment must be included. This means movement from a factional politics model to some form of bureaucratic model.³

Whether one selects the factional or bureaucratic model to organize data, the subject matter must be elites and the method elite analysis. Gordon Bennett divides elite analysis into four variables the environment (to include the time dimension), the issues, the nature of the elites, and the political outcomes of elite conflict.⁴ A fifth variable, the decisionmaking process, should be added.

Each of these variables includes subsets of variables, and most scholars up to this point have focused on the subsets, one or more of the five variables, or on relationships among the variables. There is no agreement as to which combination produces the best insights or predictive capacities. It is clear, however, that single factor analyses or reductionist approaches have not produced valuable conclusions, although most have developed and organized essential data which contribute significantly to more eclectic approaches.

A critical problem still to be resolved is one of level of analysis. Most approaches can be considered micro-political analysis, but some scholars have begun to move into the level of middle-range theory and macro-political analysis. The hope of someday reaching a general theory still exists, but in the meantime middle-range theory or macro-analysis based upon data from earlier micro-analyses has contributed significantly to our understanding of politics in China. This study will fall into the category of "middle-range theory and hypothesis of intermediate scope" as advocated by Scalapino.⁵ But before the elements of this effort can be explained a brief review of some of the analytical problems in the field and a description of the bureaucratic environment are necessary to place this approach into perspective.

Clearly some scholars work from a narrower data base than others. It is difficult, however, to categorize research efforts by the scope of the data base. It is possible to separate works by the degree of focus on particular variables, variable subsets or relationships between variables. It is also possible to break them down by complexity as measured by the number of variables or relationships considered. Finally, most works can be distinguished by whether they fit into a factional or bureaucratic model of political analysis.

At the least complex end of the factional analysis scale are works on individual elites. These studies assume, often correctly, that the individual under study exercises significant influence over politics and that an understanding of the background, behavior, and attitudes of that person will clarify the political policies over which he has influence. A major weakness of these studies is their lack of explanation for more general political change and the rapid obsolescence of the work when the individual elite member is removed from the political scene by purge, retirement or death. Some of these works do, however, include important insights based upon factional or bureaucratic analyses as well as biographic study.

At a slightly more complex level are the works that attempt to categorize groups of elites who influence policy based upon similar ambitions or attitudes (factions), similar organizational interests (interest groups) or some type of personal relationships (cliques).⁶ The search is for some commonality in the group's background which is likely to cause predictable political behavior or relationships; These categories also range from very simple to very complex.

The least complicated elite groups are those defined upon left or right leanings; they include the dichotomies between radicals and moderates, reds and experts, the Cultural Revolution Group (Jiang Qing faction) and Old Cadre Group (Deng Xiaoping/Zhou Enlai), or Dengists versus anti-Dengists. Another dichotomy is the classical Marxist analysis in terms of class background; bourgeois versus proletarian. Elites are also divided by their stand on current policy. There are those revisionists who take the "capitalist road" versus those who follow the correct party line.

One of the most important problems with this approach is identifying the members of a particular faction. For example, prior to 1976, Hua Guofeng had been identified as a radical and by implication should have been purged along with the Gang-of-Four. Instead he became Premier and Chairman of the Party. Nonetheless, these analyses can be useful in the larger examination of elite conflict at the national and provincial levels because they help to clarify the issues.

There are two other problems with dichotomies. First, they are always black and white by definition when the real world includes many shades of grey. This is especially true in Chinese politics where a shade of grey is perceived or interpreted as black at one time and white at another. Secondly, it is difficult to assign more than the top few leaders who make public speeches or whose background is well-known to one of the groups. For example, in the frequently discussed dichotomy, party versus army, there are real problems in identifying the members of each group. Key army elites are also party members and many party cadre have extensive military experience. Further, many military men have held concurrent positions in key party organizations as well as in the army. Neither party nor army is monolithic; seldom do all members of the "High Command" agree on any given issue, even one dealing with the role of the military.

Most elite groups have been identified by stands on policy issues, work style or personal relationships. An increasing number of analysts have attempted to identify groups based on past identity-forming experiences. The hope has been to correlate elite recruitment or mobility with environmental factors, elite conflict over issues, political styles, or policy outcomes. These approaches require the assembly of detailed biographic data which is generally available for senior elites but sparse at lower elite levels.

The assumption is that by identifying elite types which pervade, usually by sheer quantity, key policymaking or policy implementing organizations, explanations and predictions about policy can be made. These approaches go beyond background categorization and attempt to correlate the elite nature with other variables: issues, policy outcomes, historical periods, or organizational changes.

Data and conclusions based on these forms of microanalysis add significant depth to our understanding of the Chinese political system and elite conflict within the system. They have provided a sound foundation for more complex efforts which can begin to relate more of the variables.

Nearly all approaches reach conclusions which are based upon factional approaches to analysis, although some touch briefly on elements of a bureaucratic model. They attempt to explain political change within the political system, not of the political system. It will require more effort along the lines of a bureaucratic model to move in that direction.

These two models have yielded mixed results depending partially on the questions posed. The factional model has proven more useful for short range policy explanation and prediction. The bureaucratic model offers a more comprehensive explanation and more long range predictive capacity.

The bureaucratic model or some combination of bureaucratic and factional models offers more potential for prediction. It forces the analyst to use more macro-analysis, but based on micro-analysis. It is important to look at the forest and the trees to avoid getting lost in the trees.

This study will examine structural change in China during the period 1960 to 1984 by looking at institutional linkages in the political-military relationship. The institutional linkages which reflect structural change are called collectively the interlocking directorate. The interlocking directorate, for purposes of this analysis, consists of interlocking roles between five key institutions! (1) the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, (2) military regions, (3) military districts, (4) province party committees, and (5) province revolutionary committees or government organizations. Other national level organizations have been omitted from the analysis because the focus is on provincial level elites and their relationship to the Center. Some important national organizations, however, will be discussed in Chapter Three.

Schisms among the key institutions listed above have been a constant concern of the Chinese leadership and a major contributor to political disunity and national instability. During the period from 1960 to 1973 there was a clear effort to increase the number of interlocking roles probably in an attempt to reduce friction between organizations. This increase probably had the unintended consequence of concentrating too much power in the interlocking positions. As a result during the last decade the concept of interlocking directorate has come under increasing scrutiny and the emphasis has been on the quality of the interlocking roles rather than on the quantity. In other words, certain interlocking roles were identified as important to assure appropriate organizational relationships; e.g., the first secretaries of each of the province party organizations were assigned concurrent positions as first political commissars of military districts. These patterns of interlocking roles will be explained in more detail later in this book. The significance of refining the interlocking directorate phenomenon has become a key factor in change in the bureaucratic infrastructure which supports efforts toward a more rational and stable bureaucracy.

The assertion that the motivation behind the changes in the interlocking directorate is the result of efforts to reduce schisms between key organizations cannot be proved with available data. The fact that the interlocking directorate has changed in patterned ways and has become a decisive factor in Chinese politics can be proved through the elite analysis methodology of this study. The assertion that the result of these changes will lead to a more rational and stable bureaucracy will only be proven in time, but such conclusions are warranted in light of modern bureaucratic theory.⁷

Overview: The Bureaucratic Environment and Elite Conflict

A principal contention of this discussion is that recent analysis of Chinese politics has focused too much on elite conflict in terms of factional, clique or interest group analysis. This has led scholars to neglect the more difficult and perhaps more important factor of change of the political system. The factional analysis methodological approach often proves inadequate in explaining or predicting events in Chinese politics over the long run. For example, if one posits that the motivation for political change in recent years under Deng Xiaoping has been to assure that his faction, the "Dengists", get into the key positions and squeeze out all opposition, the system cannot be said to be moving toward stability because the opposition will inevitably try to figure out a way to return and gain political power. However, if one focuses on systemic changes and assumes that Deng's focus has been on the political process itself, rather than on factions, the ultimate conclusions are...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables
• List of Abbreviations
• Preface
• 1 INTRODUCTION
• 2 THE PLA IN TRANSITION
• 3 INSTITUTIONS, ROLES, AND RELATIONSHIPS
• 4 THE POLITICAL COMMISSAR SYSTEM: EVOLUTION, STRUCTURE, AND FUNCTIONS
• 5 THE INTERLOCKING DIRECTORATE--NATURE AND SCOPE
• 6 CONCLUSIONS
• Appendix A: Party Cadre Levels
• Appendix B: Government Cadre Levels
• Appendix C: Military Grade Levels
• Appendix D: PRC Elites Holding Interlocking Positions (1960)
• Appendix E: PRC Elites Holding Interlocking Positions (1973)
• Appendix F: PRC Elites Holding Interlocking Positions (1982)
• Bibliography
• Index