New Directions In Economic And Security Policy

U.s.-west European Relations In A Period Of Crisis And Indecision

Werner J. Feld

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429711749
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The contributors to this volume examine selected aspects of economic and foreign policy relationships between the United States and Western Europe from historical as well as contemporary perspectives. Topics focused upon include the unsuccessful attempts by the Soviet Union and the Western allies in the 1950s to remedy the division of Germany; the circumstances leading to the 1955 peace treaty between the Soviet Union and Austria; the impact of the Marshall Plan and earlier U.S. aid efforts on the economic recovery of Austria; and the effects of divergent public opinion in Western Europe on the formulation and implementation of contemporary U.S. and NATO security policies. Bruno Kreisky's essay is unique inasmuch as the former chancellor of Austria bases his observations on personal contacts with many world leaders, including U.S. presidents from Truman to Reagan. The contribution by Senator Mathias offers unusual insights derived from his long tenure on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

1
The Basic Issues

Thomas Klestil

The fact that only yesterday we witnessed the opening of a Dialogue Congress, "United States-Western Europe-Japan" in nearby Alpbach and that today we participate in the opening of this seminar on European-American relations demonstrates convincingly the vital importance we attach to these relations; we recognize existing problems and are determined to identify and eventually solve them. In spite of frequent mutual assurances of the high quality of these relations and unanimous political statements at the end of high-level summit meetings, we do indeed face disagreements and differences of opinion we cannot ignore. We live in a world which faces serious difficulties. There has been a general deterioration in the international political and economic climate which poses a serious challenge for world peace and stability. The state of East-West relations following the crises in Afghanistan and Poland, the suspension of the INF negotiations, regional conflicts and unrest such as we see between Iran and Iraq and in Lebanon, the tides of protectionism threatening the development of the free market economies, the accumulated debts of the developing countries, the budget deficits and the rising interest rates in the industrialized countries and the high dollar are problems that have no easy solutions.

Despite the economic recovery and demonstrated NATO solidarity, the dominant mood in the relations between the United States and Europe is one not of triumph but of a certain malaise and recrimination. The reasons go far beyond the rhetoric and the momentary emotional expressions of political leaders. The malaise derives from fundamental differences and doubts about economic and security issues. Western Europe is still far behind the United States in the high technology revolution. It has, in Washington's view, failed to address the need for economic adjustment as decisively as the United. States, and this leads to a more protectionist attitude when Europeans try to defend their older industries and standard of living by keeping the United States out rather than by facing up to the competition. (Unfortunately, we can see similar developments in the United States as well.)

Second, between the United States and Western Europe there are profound differences of attitude toward the Soviet Union and in the interpretation and expectation of detente. Although Washington now presents itself as an advocate of dialogue and arms control, the Reagan administration's fundamental inclinations toward the Soviet Union are still much different from the position of the Western Europeans who for geopolitical, historical, economic, and human reasons just have to follow a different and less confrontationist policy.

Third, Western Europe is unsettled by the approach the United States has taken toward the Third World. Many in Western Europe, including Mrs. Thatcher, viewed the U.S. intervention in Grenada and the CIA's mining of Nicaragua's harbors as unacceptable violations of international law. On a less legalistic plane, the Middle East has always been a focus of transatlantic disagreements. Most Western European governments reject Washington's largely uncritical endorsement of Israel's policies and fear the potential consequences for oil supplies which are more vital for Western Europe than for the United States.

Related to these central themes is a whole spectrum of particular disagreements. The West Europeans oppose the Reagan administration's escalating efforts to restrict the flow of technology to Eastern Europe. Geography and technology lag predispose Western Europeans to much more extensive relations with the Soviet Union than the United States needs or desires. The West Europeans point out that they have been less inclined to have their attention diverted from central East-West issues by peripheral conflicts like Central America, and that throughout the years they have been steadier in support of Western defense than the United States.

All of these considerations have led some Europeans to ponder a more Eurocentric approach to economic and security policy. They feel Western Europe could maintain its standard of living without too much difficulty by keeping the Americans out and enhancing trade within Western Europe and with the East. Similarly, there is a yearning for West European military solidarity independent of the United States. Partly from such sentiments, the French President Mitterand has a vision of establishing a more united Europe, to bind West Germany more closely to the West, and to bolster West European defense and foreign policies.

Faced with such a difficult situation, Western Europe and the United States, sharing the common values of freedom and democracy, are each undertaking serious efforts to protect and promote these ideals. I am still a "Europtomist." The common values we share are stronger than the differences that may threaten to divide us. The United States and Europe need each other, the Pacific cannot replace the political, strategic, and economic concept of the transatlantic partnership and cooperation. Consequently, I am confident that we will succeed in overcoming the existing disagreements.

It was Chancellor Bruno Kreisky who, about a year ago in an address delivered in Brussels, appealed to the Europeans:

Let's stop criticizing the United States, let's not forget what we Europeans owe to this great nation and her people, and let's start a dialogue among friends.

This seminar, ladies and gentlemen, is an important part of this ongoing dialogue and will, I am sure, contribute to working out together solutions for the problems we face.

2
America and Europe: Conditions for a Democratic Partnership

Bruno Kreisky

Just before President Kennedy was assassinated, I gave a speech concerning European-American relations. Former President Truman did me the honor of introducing the speech. During his introduction he made me feel very proud by calling me a "working politician." I would like to reflect on some ideas that then came to my mind.

Cold War Policies

The cold war started right after the end of World War II or, rather, after the Potsdam Conference. President Truman, with the help of Dean Acheson and George F. Kennan, developed the "policy of containment" as a counterstrategy. I would translate this technical term as a policy of building dams against the expansionist policy of Stalinist Russia. This policy was successful despite its defensive character. Allow me to enumerate some very crucial results of the containment policy.

1. The Berlin Blockade, imposed by Stalin, was overcome thanks to the American airlift operation and the resistance of the Berlin population led by Major Reuter and Willy Brandt.
2. Yugoslavia was able to pull out of the East bloc without major repercussions. At that time, Stalin did not dare react the same way his successors Khrushchev and Brezhnev later would in Hungary and Czechoslovakia.
3. In Greece the civil war was brought to an end. Consequently, the dangerous Soviet attempt to turn Greece into a Soviet satellite was halted.
4. The Marshall Plan was realized despite the opposition of the Soviet Union which forbade its satellites to participate and in spite of the opposition of the two biggest communist parties in Western Europe--ose in Italy and France. The East further reacted by reviving the once-dissolved Comintern.

The Marshall Plan was crucial for Europe and the regeneration of the European economy. As a result of the Plan's success, the communist parties in the West, especially in France and Italy, have remained without decisive political influence even though they played a dominant role in the resistance at the end of World War II.

A conference of the Foreign Ministers of the Allied Powers aiming at German unification and peace in Europe took place in 1954 in Berlin; I had the honor to be present. Even though this conference failed to meet its goals, for Austria it was of eminent importance. Our delegate for Foreign Affairs, Figl, and I were invited to have lunch with Molotov at the Soviet Embassy in Berlin. During this lunch Molotov suggested that if Austria would accept a symbolic military unit of 5,000 soldiers until the peace treaty with Germany was signed (we already had 50,000 Russian soldiers in Eastern Austria), the Soviet Union would accept an Austrian state treaty. Figl and I refused and Molotov went straight to the other Foreign Ministers where he repeated his offer. The Western allies didn't want to influence our answer and we didn't change our minds. It was no pleasure for us to return home and inform our people that 50,000 Russian soldiers would stay in Austria since we had refused Molotov's offer.

To our great surprise, we were invited to Moscow some months later. There was a great deal of discussion within the Federal Government over whether to take the invitation seriously or whether it was just a diplomatic maneuver in retaliation to Germany's integration in a new Western alliance. When Austrian Vice Chancellor Scharf (later President of our Republic) asked me how I felt about it, I recommended that he send a powerful delegation to Moscowi If the same thing were to happen to us as had happened to the president of Czechoslovakia in Berchtesgaden, we should be strong enough to say no. Or, if they made a fair and acceptable offer to us, we should be strong enough to accept right away. In the actual negotiations, we achieved results we had not even dreamed of: we regained our oil fields; otherwise, Russia would still be in Austria today exploiting our oil resources.

Concerning the German question, I consulted the second most influential Soviet politician, Nikolai Bul-ganin. He responded that the neutrality of a state is only based on a sheet of paper. A small country would never dare to ignore this agreement whereas a big country would regard it as only a sheet of paper and not consider it binding. And what, he added, would Austria do if Germany, with its 80 million inhabitants, decided to regard her neutrality as no longer valid? Should we go to war? This seemed a very authentic answer to my question of whether Germany could adopt a solution to her problems similar to the state treaty of neutrality that Austria had decided upon.

Detente

In my opinion, the policy of detente, which I support, came into existence with the signing of the Austrian State Treaty. It was the attempt of Khrushchev to revise Stalinist domestic and foreign policy. And Helsinki? Helsinki was the affirmation of the policy of detente. Now, I would like to explain to my American friends why we judge this policy so differently than they do. The Viennese, for instance, live close to the border with the East bloc countries, right next to the Iron Curtain. It is obvious that they feel differently about detente than people in California do. The policy of detente could not do away with the demarcation line but it made the line more permeable and, as a result, countries on both sides do not now treat each other with the same polemic attitudes as they did during the cold war.

I have been talking about the importance the policy of detente had for the Western European states bordering the East bloc countries. It was also important for Eastern Europe. It was, to a limited extent, possible for them to develop their own independent identities. There is no question that Hungary was rather successful in establishing its own identity as was Poland for a time. Rumania's foreign policy is not of a Stalinist type. In Bulgaria, as well, there were some attempts to develop an identity independent of the Soviet Union.

The Soviet Union did not really interfere in Poland's activities until recently. Everyone feared the Soviet Union would undertake a military intervention similar to that imposed on Czechoslovakia and Hungary. I am convinced that General Jaruzelski should not be judged as harshly as he is judged today. We should not forget that when Germany made its lightning attack on Poland in 1939 there was already a military dictatorship in Poland under Marshall Pilsudski. That is, even before World War II Poland was governed by an authoritarian military regime. The after effects of military rule cannot fade away in a day. I am sure that the viewpoints of the Polish military forces are communist. However, I feel that Poland should be satisfied to live under the rule of the Polish army and not under the army of another country.

The End of Detente

It seems to me that the end of detente became visible with the Soviet invasion into Afghanistan and the deployment of the SS-20 missiles. The assault of, Afghanistan was surely one of the worst miscalculations the Soviet Union ever made. The Politburo was convinced the rest of the world would be indifferent about the identity of the Afghan communist leader, whether his name was Amin or Karmal. Therefore, they thought the political risk would be rather small, If the Politburo members had been aware that the Soviet goals would still not be reached after four years, surely they would have hesitated. I personally regard the deployment of the SS-20s as a concession to the marshalls, personified by Ustinov; there is no other explanation for it.

Sharing Kissinger's opinion, I conclude that the U.S. administration during those days used language that caused many misunderstandings in Europe; When there are talks about a limited nuclear war, people in Europe necessarily begin to guess about where this war might take place. They draw the conclusion that it could be Europe, and this idea makes them nervous. Therefore, the peace movement is based on political reality; still, it could not prevent the deployment of the missiles. In any case, the peace movement, together with the Greens and the Alternatives, is a new component of the European political culture. The policies of the Greens as they have developed in various forms all over Europe are based on the issues that concern them: environmental pollution (often they make unrealistic demands) and pacifism. These two issues turned out to be quite a political force. The growth of the Greens has destabilized the traditional party system but has also had the positive effect of forcing traditional party members to adapt to and absorb new ideas as well as to force them to take care of many issues they thought they could neglect.

There is no doubt that the United States, due to the character of modern warfare, is going to defend not only itself but Europe too. If I consider the friendship between the United States and Europe as an axiom of our politics, I have to draw some conclusions. First of all, as Ambassador Klestil put it, it is exclusively the right of the American people to elect their president—we have neither the chance nor the right to interfere. We must accept the results of their elections and the actions of the constituted government. In respect to the choice of the American people, we have to adapt our cooperation to the conditions caused by their will. We must also trust the Senate and the House of Representatives, those two democratic institutions where obstinancy can be observed despite their unequal majorities and their ability to moderate planned measures. As an example, the quarrels about the Nicaraguan question are not to be taken that seriously. But I am afraid of any kind of imprudent activity in Nicaragua since, from the military point of view, it would not be as easy as in Grenada. Secondly, it might cause a situation in Europe similar to the one during the Spanish civil war when European political culture was not composed by political parties but by Catholic and Protestant camps which ignored party platforms and replaced them with camp ideologies. I do not intend to spread propaganda about Nicaragua now since I am not fully informed about the problems there. I, myself, agree with those politicians who often insist that Nicaraguan leaders hold the forthcoming election as correctly as possible. At the same time, I warn everyone to be cautious of involvement in this country. Once several hundred people are dead, the situation might develop into a real war. I, personally speaking, would be content to hear both Houses of Congress support the softer line policy.

Future Dealings with the Soviet Union

There is something else I want to mention: Europe can not afford an economic war with the Soviet Union. The percentages of trade between Western Europe and the Soviet Union might give the impression that they are of marginal size but, in reality, especially in certain areas, the Soviet Union is a very important trade partner for the metallurgical industries of Germany, Austria, France, and others.

Secondly, Europe is not self-sufficient with regard to its oil resources. Only very few European countries have access to British and Norwegian oil. As a consequence, we are forced to import our energy resources. It really doesn't make much of a difference to me whether we depend on oil from the Gulf region or from Khadaf fi or from the Soviet Union. Furthermore, the export of oil to Austria, Germany, Italy, and other countries is of vital importance to the Soviet Union. For the Soviets it means being paid in standard currencies which enables them to finance their own imports. Therefore, the Soviet Union is not in any position to make diplomatic maneuvers with its oil just as we cannot afford to listen to the suggestions of certain American friends that we reduce our imports of Soviet energy. I am even convinced of the contrary, that is, we should form a European confederation to consolidate our oil resources.

Another essential point for East European and West European relations is to soften the demarcation line. That is the reason why, despite the deployment of the SS-20s, the government of the Federal Republic of Germany makes a number of attempts to keep its relations with the German Democratic Republic from deteriorating. Strauss and Lambsdorff made trips to Leipzig for this purpose. This is a good example of how eager they are not to waste the fruits of detente. I am sure that, regardless of the results of a summit meeting between President Reagan and Soviet leader Chernenko, the mere will to meet each other, if the meeting takes place before the next presidential elections, is a clear si...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Tables
• Foreword
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1 The Basic Issues
• 2 America and Europe: Conditions for a Democratic Partnership
• 3 American-Western European Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy
• 4 Divergent Perceptions in the United States and Western Europe About Solutions to Security Problems
• 5 European-American Relations: Developments After 1945
• 6 Foreign Aid and Austria's Economic Recovery After World War II
• Contributors