Israel And Syria

Peace And Security On The Golan

Aryeh Shalev

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780429710865
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book demonstrates that the strategic importance of the Golan Heights lies in three spheres: defense, deterrence, and bargaining asset. It examines security arrangements that are a crucial element for Israel's security and for the prevention of war with Syria during the transition period.

Part I
Political and Historical Background

Chapter 1. Political Background

At the end of October 1991, in Madrid, Israel began negotiations on a peace settlement with its neighbors-Syria, Lebanon and Jordan--and with the Palestinians on an interim (autonomy) agreement. The talks were largely the initiative of the United States, the world's only superpower following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The United States had strengthened its position internationally, and particularly in the Middle East, by leading the coalition to victory over Iraq following that country's invasion of Kuwait. Washington now moved to exploit its achievements and dampen the Middle East powder keg.

Israel and Syria entered into negotiations following considerable hesitations. Some of their considerations were peculiar to each country; others were surprisingly similar or even identical. Among the major reasons,¹ the first was that each country continued to perceive the other as aggressive. Further, Syria has always appeared to view Israel as a state whose very existence conflicts with its interests. It views Israel as looking for a suitable opportunity to take over the entire Middle East "from the Nile to the Euphrates." Deep-rooted feelings of enmity and hatred for Israel seem to motivate the Syrian leadership. This attitude was succinctly expressed many years ago by Syrian Defense Minister Mustafa Tlas: "No country is more hostile to Israel than Syria, or hates the Israelis more than our country."² Syria views its conflict with Israel and with Zionism as deep and basic--a "fateful struggle"³ in which the return of the Golan Heights to Syria is but one stage. Meanwhile, in the Israeli view, Damascus has consistently been hostile, refusing to resolve the conflict and make peace.

Accordingly, decades of mutual suspicion and mistrust have marked relations between the two countries. Because of Syria's unremitting militant hostility toward Israel, the latter has doubted whether Syrian policy has reached a turning point which could produce a process of substantial change.

In addition to these general considerations, each state has a central tactical consideration that contributes to its reluctance to negotiate: Israel believes that Syria wants the Golan Heights but is not ready for an agreement that will really remove the threat of war. Syria believes that without military pressure exercised by itself, or political pressure from Washington, Israel will not give up the Golan, and that even if Israel were willing to withdraw from most of the Golan, Syria could not make the kind of peace Israel wants.

One key question is whether there are signs, in Syria and the other neighboring states, of a basic strategic shift regarding Israel. This does not seem to be the case. Note, in this connection, a comment by one of the world's foremost orientalists, the late Eli Kedourie:⁴ "In my view, there has been no change" in the Arab world's attitude toward Israel, and Assad "remains the same opportunist he always was." The Syrians, Kedourie added, are champions of pan-Arabism, have ambitions to lead the Arab world, "and it will be difficult to reach a settlement with them." Israel, he emphasized, cannot rely on President Assad or anyone else, only on security arrangements. Western visitors to Damascus report that Syria considers itself to be negotiating with the United States, not with Israel, and indeed, wants to drive a wedge between them. The results of the June 1992 election in Israel made it all the more difficult for Syria to engineer such a break.

What, then, besides the return of the Golan Heights, does President Assad want to achieve in the conflict with Israel? Experts on Syria maintain that it is important for him to conclude his political career as a nationalist Arab leader who did not submit to Israel, and that he wants a settlement in which Syria acquires the status of a powerful and dominant Arab state in the Levant (Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, the Palestinians) as a counterweight to Israel.

Syria seems to have been quick to grasp the significance of the outcome of the Gulf War and the onset of a "new world order." Hence its consent to the US proposal to begin negotiations with Israel on a peace settlement based on UN Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 (concurrent with negotiations between Israel and other Arab states and the Palestinians). In agreeing to hold talks, Syria abandoned two of its previous basic conditions. The first was its insistence on a prior Israeli commitment that negotiations would lead to a full IDF withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Instead, Syria accepted a US pledge to support a territorial solution based on Resolutions 242 and 338 (without interpreting them). The second condition it abandoned was its longstanding demand that negotiations be held under UN auspices. Instead, Damascus agreed to hold direct talks with Israel.

Besides grasping the lessons of the Gulf War, President Assad also understood early on the change that had occurred in the status of the Soviet Union and, consequently, in its willingness to back Syria and supply it with advanced weapons. The implications were twofold: Syria's prospects of achieving "strategic parity" with Israel were greatly reduced, and the likelihood that Iraq would dispatch large forces to assist Syria in the event of a war with Israel was diminished.

Assad first used the term "strategic parity" during the Rabat summit conference of Arab states in 1974, referring to the need to place the Arabs' military strength on a par with Israel's. At the end of the 1970s, following the signing of the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty (March 1979), Assad revised the concept, holding that it was up to Syria alone to reach the goal of parity in military might with Israel, in order to cope with Israel by itself and change the status quo.

According to Assad, strategic parity entailed three objectives: First, to enable Syria to withstand an Israeli attack alone. The Syrians believe they attained that goal some years ago. In 1986, Assad stated: "If we are attacked, we have the capacity to defend ourselves."⁵ Three years later Vice President Abd al-Halim Khaddam added: "We have reached the point at which Israel will realize that it cannot carry out an adventure without taking Syria's defensive capabilities into consideration. "⁶

Second, strategic parity was intended to allow Syria to negotiate from a position of strength that would enable it to achieve a political settlement on its terms. As President Assad put it, "Without parity between us and Israel, it will be difficult to achieve peace."⁷ And, again: "Anyone who wants to see a just peace in the region...must have the conviction that a strategic balance must exist in the region."⁸ Defense Minister Tlas was blunt: "We must be so strong militarily that when, one day, we talk with the Israelis we will not have to hide the stick behind our back, but lay it on the negotiating table. This is the only language the Zionists understand."⁹ Strategic parity was therefore a prior condition for Syria's ability to enter into a political process in which it could hope to make concrete gains.

A third purpose of strategic parity was to provide Syria with an offensive option to liberate by force the Golan Heights and the other territories, in the event that the mere declared existence of strategic parity did not induce Israel to accept Syria's political terms. In the words of Defense Minister Tlas, "Only by violence can the occupied territories be liberated."¹⁰ Syrian Information Minister Ahmad Iskander Ahmad added: "We want Syria to be capable of winning a victory and of liberating the occupied Arab territories."¹¹

It was long clear to the Syrians that the attainment of strategic parity depended, above all, on the supply of qualitative weapons from the Soviet Union, and in the quantities required. "Strategic parity with Israel will be achieved by the arming of Syria,"¹² President Assad stated in 1985, and Defense Minister Tlas declared: "As long as...the Soviet Union supplies us with weapons, we shall not relax our war on Israel."¹³

Syria's prolonged effort to achieve strategic parity had a price: growing economic hardship, necessitating even a temporary reduction in the order of battle, in 1987. Nevertheless Damascus persisted, because of the high national importance ascribed to this objective. However, some observers maintain that even before the sea-change in Soviet foreign policy, and before the Soviet Union's decline as a superpower, it was clear to President Assad that strategic parity with Israel was beyond his reach. The reason: Israel received from the United States weapons of a higher quality than those available to Syria. According to this account, Assad contented himself with achieving a deterrent capability vis-a-vis Israel.¹⁴

Ultimately, the revision in Soviet policy, followed by the breakup of the Soviet Union, reduced the possibility that Syria would be able to launch a war against Israel unaided. This included a new public stand on the idea of Syrian strategic parity. Already in late 1989 the Soviet ambassador to Damascus expressed his country's opposition to the offensive element in the strategic parity concept, as this was no longer compatible with Moscow's foreign policy.¹⁵ Moscow now suggested that Syria work to achieve a "parity of interests" (i.e., a political settlement) with Israel rather than "strategic parity."

Further, Iraq's defeat in the Second Gulf War and the loss of much of its military infrastructure means not only that Iraq is no longer a military threat to Syria. It is also doubtful (at least in the foreseeable future) whether, in the event of a war with Israel, Iraq could substantially reinforce the Syrian armed forces. Thus the threat to Israel's eastern front has been reduced.

For the Syrian leadership, the absence of a military option means the inability to change, at least for the near future, the status quo of Israeli rule on the Golan Heights. Therefore, despite its many drawbacks, the only possibility to get back the Golan is to emulate the route taken by Egyptian President Sadat in the 1970s, namely the way of negotiation.

Yet despite this Syrian assessment, or perhaps because of it, Damascus has engaged in a major military buildup since the Second Gulf War. Taking advantage of the collapse of the Soviet Bloc in Eastern Europe and the thirst for foreign currency shown by its former member-states, the Syrians have been able to purchase, relatively cheaply, large quantities of advanced weaponry. For example, in early 1992 Czechoslovakia began supplying hundreds of high quality T-72 tanks to Syria. The Syrians also added divisions to their ground forces. And the better part of the aid funds Syria received from Saudi Arabia following the Second Gulf War were earmarked not to improve the standard of living in the country or for civilian investments, but for arms acquisitions.

At bottom, then, Syria's basic conception--that the largest and most powerful army possible is required in order to pressure Israel-remains unchanged. Damascus believes it can bring Israel to make concessions in negotiations. It also seeks to limit the freedom of action of Jordan and the Palestinians in the talks, thus preventing Syria's possible isolation.¹⁶ All this, by virtue of the very existence of its large and powerful armed forces. And if absolutely necessary, the Syrians would also be in a position to attempt to use military force in order to achieve their immediate goal of regaining the Golan Heights.

As for the so-called "new world order" that, according to some concepts, has evolved in the aftermath of the Gulf War and the breakup of the Soviet Union, and particularly its effect on the Arab-Israel conflict, we may postulate that, first and foremost, the emergence of the United States as the only superpower translates into greater American influence in the Middle East. The end of the Cold War and consequently of US-Soviet competition, particularly in the Middle East, has produced a more balanced US global policy. To this equation must be added Syria's interest (and that of other Arab states) in fostering good relations with Washington (although not to the point of dependence) and Israel's overriding dependence on the Americans.

Secondly, many states, especially in sensitive regions such as the Middle East, are now less prone to resort to military force for conflict resolution. When military action becomes less likely, priority is given to moderating conflicts globally. This is particularly so in the Middle East, where political solutions are now preferred.

Finally the global, or UN system (with the US at its center), now exercises a powerful regional influence in the Middle East, if only because of its strengthened ability to operate in unison and to impose sanctions in crisis situations.

The foregoing suggests that the difficult process launched in Madrid has a fair prospect for success. This scenario gains credence given the basic US inclination to support the central interest of each party: Washington backs the Syrian demand of territory for peace, but also Israel's insistence on true normalization.

A few words must be devoted to the personality of Syrian President Hafez al-Assad, who dictates his country's position in the negotiations. According to books by British journalist Patrick Seale¹⁷ and Prof. Moshe Maoz of the Hebrew University,¹⁸ Assad is highly intelligent (though he never completed academic studies), has an excellent memory, takes a comprehensive approach and is aware of world politics. He is one of the world's most forceful individual rulers and his regime is extremely personal in character. President Assad is the dominant figure in Syria in foreign relations and in intelligence assessments. He makes his own decisions, although he listens to others' opinions, He does not react quickly, needing time to think and formulate a position. Not being impulsive, he does not make dramatic shifts. He is cautious and has sharp instincts. At bottom, he is neither a strategist nor an ideologue, but a highly capable tactician, a pragmatist who takes a realistic view of a situation and its attendant possibilities, and a master of brinkmanship. He is a virtuoso negotiator, impossible to unnerve, devious and unpredictable. Above all, he plays his cards close to the vest.

Chapter 2. The Palestine-Syria and Israel-Syria Border

General Background

The demarcation of the border between Syria and Israel (before 1948, between Syria and Palestine), certain to be a highly contentious issue in peace talks, was already the subject of negotiations on three earlier occasions:

First, from 1916 to 1926--between France and England, the Mandatory powers in Syria and Palestine, respectively. The talks began before and continued after Turkey's defeat in World War I. They did not always proceed smoothly, but ultimately resulted in an agreement (March 7, 1923) on the location of the international boundary between Syria/Lebanon and Palestine. In 1926 a good-neighbor agreement was signed between the French government in Syria and the British government in Palestine.

Secondly, following the Israeli War of Independence negotiations were held between Syria and Israel on an armistice agreement (March 4-July 20, 1949). These focused on the location of the armistice demarcation line. Israel wanted a line corresponding with the international boundary, whereas Syria sought a line to the west of the international frontier which would reflect, as far as possible, its gains during the war.

Third, from October 9, 1952 until May 27, 1953, Israel and Syria held secret, high-level talks on dividing the Demilitarized Zone (DZ), most of which was situated west of the international boundary. By its very entry into these talks, Israel agreed implicitly that part of the DZ west of the international boundary would become Syrian territory.

Because the basis for the demarcation of the international boundary was, as noted, the Anglo-French agreement of ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Preface
• Introduction
• Part I Political and Historical Background
• Part II Major Obstacles in Peace Negotiations
• Part III Topography and the Balance of Forces
• Part IV Security Risks for Israel
• Part V Security Arrangements in the Transition Period
• Notes
• About the Author
• Appendices
• Tables
• Maps