A Theory About Control

Jack P. Gibbs

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367160197
• eBook ISBN: 9780429720536
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Ethics & Moral Philosophy

Moving beyond his 1989 book, Control: Sociology's Central Notion, Jack Gibbs develops in this new book a comprehensive theory of control in all its biological, technological, and human dimensions. His treatment goes beyond conventional ideas about social control to show why self-control and proximate control are essential to understanding human interaction. He also argues that thinking of control in terms of the counteraction of deviance is insufficient. Tests of Gibbs's control theory, based on data from sixty-six countries, add credence to his claim that control could be the central notion for sociology and perhaps for other social sciences.

Part One
Preliminary Considerations

If a scientific field's progress must be judged by only one criterion, the most conspicuous possibility is an increase in the number, range, and/or scope of accepted theories. However, when a scientific field is plagued with issues and problems, that condition precludes progress. It is not just a matter of the issues and problems being such that they cannot be overcome by any theory; worse, they may be such as to eliminate the possibility of effective consensus in assessments of theories and thereby preclude progress.

Unfortunately, two particular problems and a particular issue in sociology make it extremely unlikely that any theory will be accepted by even a majority of sociologists. So this part of the book, comprising two chapters, largely pertains to those problems and that issue.

The first problem is the extreme diversity of sociology's subject matter (see Boudon, 1980:3, and Gibbs, 1989:3). That diversity makes it inevitable that each theory is limited to only a minute fraction of sociology's subject matter; consequently, numerous sociologists are not likely to be impressed by any theory, viewing it (rightly) as alien to their specialty or interests. Such judgments are not constructive, but all a theorist can do is make the limits of his/her theory explicit rather than follow the tradition of "grand" theory and create the impression of an all-inclusive theory. That disclaimer is set forth early in Chapter 1, and it is all the more needed because of the argument that control could be sociology's central notion, meaning that sociologists can describe and think about all or virtually all of sociology's subject matter in terms of control. Although the theory set forth in Chapters 3-7 pertains to control, it does not follow from the central notion argument, not even if valid, that the theory is all-inclusive. However, if the argument is valid, the theory can be expanded much more readily than can a theory not focused on the field's central notion, control or otherwise.

The second disclaimer in Chapter 1 relates to an issue rather than a problem, Sociologists have never realized effective consensus as to appropriate criteria for assessing the merits of a sociological theory, and no theory can resolve that issue. All that the theorist can do is identify what he/she takes to be appropriate criteria, and in Chapter 1 one particular criterion is described at length. That criterion is predictive power, and a large part of the chapter is devoted to a description of predictive power's seven dimensions. Such treatment is justified because many sociologists ostensibly have a narrow conception of that criterion, commonly equating it with predictive accuracy, which is actually only one of predictive power's seven dimensions.

The suggestion is not that numerous sociologists reject predictive power as the appropriate criterion for assessing a theory merely because of confusion. Unfortunately, there is a plethora of reservations about the criterion, some of which are truly understandable. Nevertheless, sociology always has been fertile ground for epistemological nihilism; hence, sooner or later many sociologists will be attracted to "postmodernism" (a term used here as a generic label for all "posts"—postempiricism, postpositivism, etc.—and hermeneutics and deconstructionism). But if there is anything that sociology does not need, it is more epistemological nihilism; and its escalation can be checked only by promoting some particular criterion for assessing theories. So reduction of epistemological nihilism is the principal justification for the concern with predictive power, even though that concern diverts attention from the theory and may alienate some readers.

The second and final problem stems from recognition that a simple identification of a candidate for sociology's central notion will not do. Whether control or something else, an elaborate conceptualization is virtually certain to be needed. In that connection, contemporary sociology suffers from far too little conceptual work, perhaps in part because Weber and Parsons tarnished that line of work by contusing conceptualizations with substantive theories. Be that as it may, Chapter 2 offers an elaborate conceptualization of attempted control, including a fairly extensive typology. But the conceptualization is not offered in the naive belief that even the majority of sociologists will see the need for it; to the contrary, some sociologists appear indifferent if not hostile to conceptualizations, even to the point of believing that constructive research and impressive theories are possible without confronting conceptual issues and problems.

1
Claims and Disclaimers

As argued at length elsewhere (Gibbs, 1989), control (more precisely "attempted control") could be the central notion for the social and behavioral sciences, meaning that professionals trained in one of those fields can describe and think about all or virtually all of the field's subject matter in terms of control. If the argument comes to be accepted, it will further the integration of the social and behavioral sciences, an advance if one grants that those disciplinary boundaries are either extremely vague or arbitrary (unconstructive in either case). However, even if it could be demonstrated that the subject matter of the social and behavioral sciences can be thought of in terms of control, that demonstration would not warrant unqualified acceptance of control as the central notion.

Whatever the field or the central notion candidate—control or something else—acceptance of it requires considerable evidence that describing and thinking of phenomena in terms of the notion furthers the field's coherence. That point is consistent with a corollary argument—no field can realize maximum coherence without a central notion. Yet a central notion must do more than further conceptual integration; it must also promote the formulation of impressive theories.

The extent to which a central notion candidate meets the requirement cannot be known without using it extensively, all the more because there are at least two major ways that the use of a central notion can promote the formulation of theories. To the extent that the notion enters (directly or indirectly) into definitions of a field's terms, it promotes conceptual integration. Granted that scientists discover order, they also create it through conceptual innovations; and conceptual integration facilitates the formulation of theories. Indeed, what could be taken as the ultimate goal—a synthesis of all theories in a field—virtually requires conceptual integration. The second way by which a central notion facilitates the formulation of theories cannot be described without making still another disputable claim. Describing or thinking of phenomena in terms of a particular notion prompts recognition of possible empirical associations, possibilities that might otherwise have gone unrecognized. That claim is supported by the theory in Chapters 3-7, for it is a product of thinking about diverse phenomena in terms of control.

Although the theory might interest various social and behavioral scientists, the author's discipline, sociology, is the immediate consideration. If the argument about a central notion and control does not hold for sociology, it must be interred in the cemetery of ideas. For that matter, limited space alone precludes observations beyond sociology, and only the practitioners in a particular social or behavioral science are qualified to assess the extent to which control can be used to describe and think about their subject matter.

The First of Two Major Disclaimers

Given that the theory (Chapters 3-7) encompasses seventeen constructs or concepts, by any reasonable standard it has considerable scope. Nevertheless, the theory bears on only a minute fraction of sociology's subject matter. The theory may be expanded eventually, and some observations along that line are made in the last two chapters; but the immediate concern is a disclaimer.

The suggestion is not that control should be identified as the subject matter of any social or behavioral science, nor that the ultimate goal is necessarily an all-inclusive theory about control, let alone a synthesis of all sociological theories. It is one thing to claim that a field's subject matter can be described and thought of in terms of some designated notion, but quite different to equate that notion with the field's subject matter.

As for an all-inclusive theory, if defensible, it would provide the field with maximum coherence. Yet it could be that no theory about control, or whatever the central notion in question, will answer all of the field's questions adequately, perhaps not even the major questions. On the other hand, neither the possibility nor the desirability of an all-inclusive theory is denied.

To claim that a notion can be used to describe and think about a field's subject matter does not imply that the notion refers to some ultimate cause. Stated otherwise, the idea of a central notion is far less monistic than it may appear. Thus, should one argue that technology is the direct or indirect cause of all human behavior, including social and cultural phenomena, surely the argument would be monistic; but it would not imply that one can truly describe and think of all human behavior in terms of technology. After all, to assert that "X is the cause of Y" is not to describe and think of either variable in terms of the other; and phenomena may be described and thought of in other than causal terms.

The foregoing is consistent with the depiction of science as a vast competition in which the participants seek to discover or create (analytically) as much order as possible. Maximum order, however defined, may never be realized; and it may be that in any particular field no one ever gives an acceptable answer to all of that field's questions, though eventually the unanswered questions are likely to be abandoned. In any case, the immediate point is that scientists may create as much order analytically as they discover, and the proposal of a central notion candidate is actually an attempt to create order analytically on a vast scale. The claim is radical only if one assumes the possibility of science without conceptualizations.

The Inexplicable

Although the search for an ultimate cause of human behavior (or of some derivative, such as society or culture) may never end, currently many scientists and philosophers appear to regard the search as sterile; and alleging that a theory does not identify an ultimate cause is destructive criticism. Nonetheless, in any scientific field certain phenomena are commonly regarded as inexplicable or simply taken as a given. Thus, physicists use the notion of force extensively; but they are inclined to take particular kinds of forces as given, and it may well be that many physicists would argue that an attempt to explain the very existence of forces is premature at best. However, far from frustrating, recognition of "inexplicables" in a field may promote consensus in assessments of theories. Rather than resort to the feckless demand that a theory identify the ultimate cause of the explicandum, a theory may be judged as commendable if it reduces the explicandum to one phenomenon in the field's subject matter, one so basic that it is taken as inexplicable or simply as a given.

At least at certain levels, variation in properties or dimensions of attempted control cannot be explained. Consider the simplest dimension of the extent of attempted control at the national level—the sheer frequency of attempts during some period (e.g., any calendar year). Even if research resources were such as to establish the values of that variable for just a few countries, there would be no prospect of explaining international variation in those values. To be sure, the variation probably reflects international contrast in population size, but how could variation in some kind of per capita rate of attempted control be explained? The question defies an answer not because there are no obvious possibilities; to the contrary, there is a multitude of possibly relevant factors. To illustrate, the U.S. "control rate" might reflect not just variation in geographic factors (terrain, weather, natural resources, etc.) but also innumerable historical factors, such as the timing of the arrival of various peoples and their sociocultural characteristics.

The foregoing should not be construed as claiming that variation in properties or dimensions of control is forever inexplicable. Rather, the problems (some purely practical, such as limited research resources) in pursuing an explanation are so formidable that taking control properties as givens is justified.

Second Major Disclaimer

Whatever the merits of the theory in Chapters 3-7, it will not resolve the most crucial issue in the social and behavioral sciences. Stating the issue as a question: what is the appropriate criterion or criteria for judging a scientific theory's merits? The question is rarely confronted in sociology, and the few answers given suggest negligible consensus.¹ Moreover, the trend in recent years has been an increase not just in dissensus but also in the seeming reluctance of numerous sociologists to confront the question, even those who have not fully embraced antipositivism (e.g., Boudon, 1980).

For nearly three decades the dissensus has contributed to and reflected an astonishing proliferation of schools, camps, or perspectives, with some of the more common labels being: critical sociology, emancipatory sociology, hermeneutics, and postpositivism. However, even before the 1960s there was scarcely effective consensus in sociology as to the appropriate criteria for judging theories.² One major source of dissensus was Talcott Parsons' sociology (especially The Social System [1951]). His indifference to and ostensible ignorance of systematic sociological research contributed more to dissensus in assessments of theories than has the shrillest critical sociologist. Nevertheless, at one time the "appropriate criterion" question was much better understood, if only because there was much more agreement as to the meaning and perhaps acceptance of two key terms, "scientific" and "theory." Today, nothing is gained by invoking the notion of science, because social and behavioral scientists, sociologists especially, have quite divergent conceptions of science (see, e.g., Cancian, 1990, and Geertz, 1990, for observations on feminist views of science). Then it is doubtful that the majority of social and behavioral scientists would agree when defining a theory, let alone accept both of two related arguments endorsed here: (1) that theories are the ultimate concern in any science and (2) the question about the appropriate criteria for judging theories is thus the paramount question.

The situation may be even worse than the foregoing suggests. Many sociologists are now so committed to reducing everything to value judgments that they appear to misunderstand arguments about sociology as a science. Contemplate David Altheide's declaration (1990:70): "I wish to challenge the basic assumption often made that sociology is not as good or as developed as physics or chemistry." Althiede may have construed the invidious comparison as somehow introducing a moral issue (hence, his use of the word "good"), but that in itself suggests a determination to view all sciences in moral terms. Yet Altheide's declaration does not exemplify the characteristic incoherence of postmodernism. Savor the quality of Stephen Pfohl's statement (1991:9), writing as President of the Society for the Study of Social Problems: "In using the word postmodernity I am referring to the Historical (sic) emergence of a terrifying new social formation structured around the dense and high velocity technological rituals of image management, informational CAPITAL, cybernetic-like mechanisms of social control, and the predominantly white male and heterosexist militarization of everyday life and culture."

Smoke Screens

Far from confronting the paramount question (supra), avowed antipositivists have focused on issues that divert attention from it. Only a few brief observations can...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of Tables and Figures
• Foreword
• Preface
• PART ONE PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
• PART TWO THE INTRINSIC PART OF THE THEORY
• PART THREE THE THEORY'S EXTRINSIC PART AND ONE SERIES OF TESTS
• PART FOUR FINAL CONSIDERATIONS
• Appendix: A Formal Mode of Theory Construction for Sociology
• References
• Name Index
• Subject Index
• About the Book and Author