Emerging Powers in International Politics

The BRICS and Soft Power

Mathilde Chatin, Giulio Gallarotti

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9781351769143
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The rise of large and rapidly growing nations is having a significant impact on the global order, as their expanding influence reshapes the structure of power in the international system. These emerging powers are increasingly asserting themselves as major actors on the global scene. Leading this cadre of emerging powers are five nations referred to as the BRICS – Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. This book takes inventory of both the individual and collective soft power of this rising bloc of nations. Having embraced the potential of this newly emphasized type of power as a means of generating international influence, these nations have dedicated substantial effort and resources to implementing a soft power offensive.

This book was originally published as a special issue of the Journal of Political Power.

The BRICS and soft power: an introduction

Mathilde Chatin^a and Giulio M. Gallarotti^b

^aKing’s Brazil Institute, King’s College London, London, UK;^bDepartment of Government, John Andrus Center for Public Affairs, Wesleyan University, USA

In a new global order that has moved well beyond the bipolar world of the cold war, scholars are trying to assess how the power structure of international power is changing. Pre-eminent among the nations that will be challengers for primacy in the new world order are the emerging powers. Leading this cadre of emerging powers are the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). This special issue explores an important and neglected type of power possessed by the BRICS: their soft power, both individual and collective. This introduction summarizes the principal arguments of the contributions to this special issue, and also examines the concept of soft power.

Analysing the BRICS through a soft power prism

This special issue marks an attempt to analyse the soft power of five emerging economies referred to as the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa). The rise of new powers has been one of the defining features of international politics in the twenty-first century, and the impact of this rise on the equilibrium and the structure of the international system has become an important issue in the discipline of international relations (Destradi and Jakobeit 2015, p. 61). Increasing attention has been devoted to the rise of a group of large and rapidly growing nations that are changing the global power balance (Lesage and Graaf 2015). Kenkel and Cunliffe (2016, p. 1) note that: ‘states held to marginal status (…) have risen to become important actors on the global stage.’ Brazilian Ambassador Jaguaribe (2010) avers that the ‘BRICS label’ illustrates the key characteristic of the current global transformation, highlighting that the paradigm according to which developing nations cannot be relevant actors is no longer true.

The acronym was originally coined by Jim O’Neill in a 2001 Goldman Sachs report. Since then the BRICS nations have garnered much attention in academic and wider public circles. The Economist (2010) emphasises that the BRICS ‘matter because of their economic weight’. This fact is illustrated by Sharma’s (2012) description:

Over the past several years, the most talked-about trend in the global economy has been the economies of many developing nations swiftly converging with those of their more developed peers. The primary engines behind this phenomenon were the four major emerging-market nations, known as the BRICs.

In the early 2000s, Goldman Sachs (GS) reports forecasted that the weight of the BRICs, and especially China, would grow during the following decades: they would represent over half the size of the G6 in 2025 and their economies taken together would be larger than the G6 by 2039. In 2009, GS reports even concluded that the BRICs would become as large as the G7 by 2032. Interestingly, O’Neill’s perception of the rising importance of the BRIC nations led him to suggest a new G7 composed of the US, Japan, the EU (as a group rather than represented individually), Brazil, China, India, and Russia; and thus having the bloc better reflect the new structure of economic power in the world (Alcântara 2014). Indeed, as a bloc, the BRICS introduce a new major presence in the structure of the global political economy: BRICS collectively possess 30% of global land, 43% of global population, 21% of global GDP, 17.3% of global merchandise trade, 12.7% of global commercial services, 45% of world’s agriculture production, and 22% of global military spending.

Thakur (2014, p. 1792) argues that the BRICS serve as a flagship of the major emerging nations, permitting the member states to acquire prestige from participation in the bloc. Brazilian Ambassador Carneiro Leão also suggests that the group stands out and detaches itself from the other developing nations as ‘special emerging powers.’ In fact, the bloc creates distinctive standing and adds value to member states. The bloc has also transformed into a diplomatic forum representing increasing power, value and capacity of action for the member states, thus attributing to them a distinctive standing and an image associated with a ‘special mark’ (Sá Pimentel 2013, pp. 130–134). Along the same lines, Montbrial (2010) stresses that the BRICS have become a ‘real brand,’ to which the states composing the group dedicate great attention.

This special issue addresses this rising bloc of nations through the prism of an equally ascending concept and theory in international relations: soft power. Though much has been said about the growing importance of the BRICS, little has been said (outside of analysis on China) about how the bloc members fare in terms of soft power. Any important understanding of the position of the ascending bloc of nations would have to look at all dimensions of those nations’ power inventory. As emerging economies, the study of their soft power is all the more important because it may very well fill an important role for them relative to the advanced economies, all of which possess extensive hard power. Soft power is an especially important lens through which to study the international influence of the BRICS because it is such a crucial element of their power inventory, either because the hard power of some of the members is limited (as with South Africa, India and Brazil); or because some members have used their hard power in ways that have compromised their international standings in the community of nations (China and Russia) and hence have had to rely on soft power to mend their images. Moreover, every member of the bloc has pursued a vigorous strategy of leveraging its global status through soft power initiatives, with China demonstrating the most extensive soft ‘offensive.’ Hence, it is essential for scholarly curiosity to match foreign policy priorities.

Five of the seven articles in this issue assess the soft power of the individual BRICS nations, while two examine the BRICS as an entity. In the first article, Stuenkel tries to gauge how the BRICS are performing relative to leading Western nations with respect to soft power endowments. The author looks at the relative soft power positions of the BRICS in the three areas: public diplomacy, legitimacy/agenda setting and finally the attractiveness of the member nations as models and destinations. The article’s fundamental thesis is that the BRICS, while possessing impressive soft power resources, are still lagging strongly behind leading Western nations in their soft influence. First, in the context of public diplomacy, BRICS are in an ‘information war’ with Western nations. Media networks and language/culture dissemination initiatives are vigorously promoting the attractiveness of BRICS. While aggressive in these initiatives, the BRICS are falling short of the leading Western powers in this ‘charm offensive.’ Second, regarding legitimacy and agenda setting, some of the BRICS nations – Russia and China in particular – are pushing a revisionist rhetoric, which suggests they may at some point challenge the liberal Western order through their newly created financial institutions the NDB and CRA, as well as through their gradual engagement in providing public goods and dealing with security challenges. However, notwithstanding successes through the NDB and CRA, the BRICS still remain on the periphery of important multilateral decision-making. Third, the BRICS face their most serious shortcomings relative to the West when it comes to serving as role models. Yet, while the BRICS are lagging in the quest for soft power, they still can be expected to change the international landscape of relative influence. Indeed, Stuenkel embraces the importance of soft power as an important wedge for the BRICS to move forward.

Chatin evaluates the balance between Brazil’s military (hard) power and its soft power resources. Given Brazil’s historic paucity of hard power, it has relied more vigorously on its soft power as a wedge for international influence. This soft power quest has included the strategies and policies mentioned hereafter. Brazil has looked askance at military resolutions, much preferring diplomacy and mediation (e.g. its effort to mediate the Iranian nuclear issue). It has embraced a strong global leadership role in peace and security arenas. It has vigorously pursued a role of agenda-setter in a variety of issues. Brazil has proclaimed itself a champion for compliance with international law (e.g. its fierce condemnation of the 2003 Iraq invasion) and multilateralism (e.g. its participation to peacekeeping under the aegis of the UN). It has functioned as a bridge between developed and developing nations, sharing with the latter an inclination for principles like non-intervention and sovereignty. In this respect, Brazil has pushed a narrative for the reform of international organisations with more voice for the developing world, without subverting the established order. Furthermore, it has provided development assistance based on a rhetoric of South-South cooperation and expertise in implementing nationally successful programmes, and it has championed the defence of Southern interests in strategic negotiations. Chatin concludes that Brazil has indeed, through this multidimensional soft offensive, been able to attain international influence ‘well beyond its weight class of hard power’ and to vigorously fulfil its intended role of global soft power broker.

Rutland and Kazantsev posit Russia’s soft power strategy as one intended to reverse the nation’s existing ‘image deficit’, and to confront what Russian officials view as the West’s soft and hard offensive against its eastern European rival. The authors identify several central sources of Russian soft power such as higher education, impact of ‘Soviet nostalgia’ and particularly Russia’s achievements in ‘high culture’ (i.e. its artistic and scientific heritage). Furthermore, the authors identify initiatives aimed at boosting Russia’s soft power through a ‘cultural prism’: the broadcasting agency ‘Russia Today’ (breaking the monopoly of Western news organisations), Russian World (promoting Russian culture and language study), Russotrudnichestvo (spreading Russian influence in post-soviet states), the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics and the 2018 soccer World Cup. The authors underscore Russia’s soft ‘handicaps’, notwithstanding the development of a significant soft arsenal of power. Domestically, these handicaps derive from historical oppression (as evidenced by the controversial deaths of ‘dissidents’), bureaucratic corruption, organised crime, and a culture of homophobia. Internationally, Russia’s soft power has been hamstrung by its recent resort to military aggression in the Georgian war in 2008, in the Ukraine crisis in 2014 and in the present day Syrian civil war. Although considered by Russians as responses to threatened Russian interests, poll-data confirm the harmful international impact of those actions on Russia’s soft power. The authors conclude that Russia’s authoritarian turn since 2004, and its use of force in Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria, have reinforced negative stereotypes of Russia as a hard power. These stereotypes have severely hamstrung Russian efforts to marshal soft power as an effective policy tool.

Thussu focuses on the contributions of the media (i.e. expansion of digital media and internet), and Bollywood more particularly, to India’s endowment of soft power. Thussu presents Bollywood, the world’s largest film factory in terms of production and viewership, as a notable example of ‘global entertainment outside the Western world’ and clearly India’s most prodigious soft power resource. Explaining the links between Hollywood and Bollywood, and the diaspora’s influence in diffusing Bollywood-content, Thussu provides examples of Bollywood’s effect, especially among nations of the global South. For instance, while Bollywood films are particularly appreciated among Muslim audiences (suggesting Bollywood’s potential role in promoting anti-extremism), the industry has expanded as far as Latin America (e.g. the success of the Brazilian soap opera Caminho das Índias evidences the growing recognition of India’s cultural soft power). Indeed, the global silver screen makes India a robust soft power broker.

Zanardi examines two specific policy-areas, the Confucius Institutes (CIs) and China’s naval diplomacy, as part of China’s ‘Charm Offensive,’ which itself is embedded in a policy narrative of a ‘harmonious world’ and ‘peaceful development.’ The offensive is intended to counter the ‘China Threat theory’ and renew China’s image worldwide. Without ignoring the related criticism (e.g. organisational challenges posed by the implementation process, China’s interference in domestic affairs in pushing its agenda forward), the author sees the CI network as an effective lever of China’s ‘Offensive’:it is reflective of a strategy of cultural and language promotion, based on the heritage of Chinese ancient culture. Indeed, the author underscores a major goal of the network, which is to generate goodwill through cooperation and the development of contacts, and thus enable China to enhance its influence abroad. Insofar as the distinction between hard power and soft power can be blurred, the author also looks at China’s naval diplomacy by focusing on the provision of medical assistance and training. In fact, China has sought to project the image of a ‘benevolent naval power’ (even in regions usually outside its purview), so as to strengthen interaction with foreign navies so as to generate mutual trust and understanding, and to ease suspicions regarding its naval development and military modernisation. In this perspective, the author outlines China’s language promotion and its naval diplomacy as two initiatives leading the nation’s soft power policy. Although CIs and naval diplomacy have very little in common in Western literature, this article makes the point that in China they are both part of an Eastern vision of soft power, i.e. one that, according to Chinese philosophy, integrates direct (zheng) and indirect (qi) force within the same conceptual framework.

Van der Westhuizen sees a shift in South African soft power from Mandela’s Presidency (when the nation pursued a broader foreign policy intended to make the nation a noted multilateral player in the global arena) to the subsequent mandates of Mbeki and Zuma (favouring a ‘regional’ turn and gradually framing a ‘liberationist democracy’). Under Mandela, South Africa adopted a ‘very liberal world-view’ after the advent of democracy, which was manifest by a number of soft power initiatives: making a commitment to human rights (intervening in regional crises and reacting vehemently to abuses); supporting the established order through multilateral activism (signing international treaties, joining institutions and assuming leading multilateral positions/roles); associating foreign initiatives to a ‘myth of exceptionalism,’ and hosting the 1995 Rugby World Cup (i.e. projecting images of race and national identity). Thereafter, with the following administrations South Africa sought to rediscover its Africa identity and to strengthen its regional leadership. In this respect, South Africa turned to acting as a continental power broker in several ways: it reaffirmed regional commitments by hosting...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Citation Information
• Notes on Contributors
• Foreword
• 1 The BRICS and soft power: an introduction
• 2 Do the BRICS possess soft power?
• 3 Brazil: analysis of a rising soft power
• 4 The limits of Russia’s ‘soft power’
• 5 The soft power of popular cinema – the case of India
• 6 China’s soft power with Chinese characteristics: the cases of Confucius
• 7 South Africa’s soft power conundrum: how to win friends and influence people in Africa
• 8 Compound soft power: the BRICS and the multilateralization of soft power
• Index