Liberal Nationalism in Iran

The Failure of a Movement

Sussan Siavoshi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367013967
• eBook ISBN: 9780429712876
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the rise and fall of the liberal nationalist movement in Iran. It provides an analysis of the National Fronts' successes and failures, focusing on their interactions with both the other contenders, including the government and international factors..

Chapter One
The Rentier State and Civil Society: Iran Since Mid-Century

The 1977-79 Iranian Revolution embodied the most dramatic change in the modern history of Iran. Still, on the eve of the revolution Iran had already experienced close to three decades of rapid transformation wrought by both external and internal factors.

Externally, the development of the cold war affected the political fate of Iran. After World War II the United States gradually replaced Great Britain as the major influence in many parts of the world, including Iran. During the same period the Soviet Union had asserted itself as a global superpower. The transformation of the international scene to a system dominated by these two powers made the positions of geopolitically sensitive countries such as Iran of prime importance. In the eyes of the Western cold warriors, Iran's long border with the Soviet Union and its location by the Persian Gulf necessitated a close and special relationship between it and the West. This relationship was initiated upon the instigation of the 1953 coup d'etat and was perpetuated through financial and military aid and through political support to the pro-Western regime of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who had replaced his father as monarch in 1941. Relying on this support, the Shah managed to create a powerful quasi-military state that he ruled as an uncontested autocrat.

Internally, Iran enjoyed an impressive increase in oil revenues, which reached a peak in the early 1970s. In Iran, oil revenues, which basically took the form of rent paid by foreigners to the Iranian state for exploitation of this natural resource, led to the emergence of a rentier state. This rentier nature of the Iranian state enabled it to become autonomous from domestic social forces and determined its specific course of development.

At the same time rapid population growth affected the social picture within Iran. The population increase led to large migrations of the rural population to the cities, which contributed to a very rapid growth of urban areas and activities. Together, the population growth and the state's increasing oil revenues led to a socioeconomic and political transformation that has shaped modern Iran since the middle of the twentieth century.

An Overview of Political Trends: 1941-1977

During the rule of Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, the Iranian state continuously increased its control over Iranian society. The state was characterized by a dictatorial regime that relied heavily upon the instrument of coercion. But "dictatorship" is too general a concept to reveal the specific features of the state during this era. The Iranian state was a modernist, foreign-dependent, repressive entity.¹ Its modernist character resulted from its efforts to promote quick economic development. Its developmental policies required more than merely close associations with foreign business; they also necessitated a dependent relationship, particularly in managerial and technological fields. And its repressive character was apparent in the regime's heavy reliance on such institutions of coercion as the army and the secret police. The regime was characterized by oppressive power and a consistent, virtually continuous attempt to eliminate or at least subordinate all rival centers of political power.

This repressive, domestically autonomous, regime was not built overnight. The gradual concentration of power in the state-and ultimately in the hands of one man-occurred in gradual stages. The first stage began after the 1953 coup d'etat and lasted until 1960. After a brief interlude, the second stage began with the implementation of the Shah's White Revolution in 1962 and continued until 1977. Prior to this more or less continuous trend-from 1941 to 1953-the Shah was far from being the central figure in the evolving political scene.

Mohammed Reza Shah became the Shah of Iran when his father, Reza Shah, was forced to abdicate by the Allied powers in 1941. Despite its declaration of neutrality, Iran was occupied by Allied forces. The occupation and Reza Shah's abdication broke the existing dictatorship, and constitutional order was restored. A free press was revived and many political parties emerged.²

Freedom was not the only product of the occupation and Reza Shah's abdication. The war and the occupation produced economic and social disruption. The socioeconomic turmoil contributed to the intensity of political activities and political crises that characterized the period between 1941 and 1953.

During these years the Iranian state was far from strong and autonomous, and the power of the young Shah was far from substantial. Power was shared among the Majlis (the Iranian parliament), the cabinet, the Court, and the provincial powers as well as the Allied forces, which exerted a great deal of influence in determining policy outcomes. Out of this situation emerged the important and exciting years of 1949-1953-the era of the ascendancy of Mohammed Mosaddeq and his Melli movement.

In the autumn of 1949, Iran was preparing for the elections tor the 16th Majlis. The elections were dishonest and were protested by a group of people headed by Mosaddeq and a number of other prominent individuals. The protestors took sanctuary on the palace grounds, and the Shah succumbed to their pressure. He ordered an investigation and promised new elections. As a result, the Tehran election was declared invalid and a new election was held.

The relatively honest second elections resulted in election to the Majlis of eight members of the newly formed liberal nationalist organization called the National Front, including Mosaddeq. Despite the numerical insignificance of these deputies in a Majlis of more than 130 deputies, the real impact of their efforts, which were backed by a large percentage of the middle class and the politically aware segment of the population, was very significant indeed. Between 1949 and 1953, Iran's political development--and the resultant economic implications--not only shook the Shah, the Majlis, and the whole country, but also attracted the attention and concerns of the world's biggest powers.

In 1950, the focus of attention within Iran gradually shitted from domestic issues, such as the military budget, land reform, and progressive taxes, to the issue of oil concessions. At that time the government was trying to pass a bill through the Majlis to make some adjustments regarding the 1933 oil agreement. Mosaddeq and the National Front, backed by some other groups, denounced the whole deal as a sellout. They argued that the revisions would not change the unfair nature of the oil agreement, and they demanded the nationalization of the oil industry. Nationalization of oil and its implication for national independence soon became an issue that drew intense public attention. The growing middle class and politically aware segment of the population found a leader in the person of Mosaddeq.

In May 1951, Mosaddeq accepted the offer of premiership from the Majlis and became prime minister. Within a year Mosaddeq became the embodiment of the Iranian struggle for independence and democracy.³

In the meantime, the Majlis, which was the center of attention for several years, faded in the shadow of a charismatic prime minister and a public that supported him. This shift started to become apparent on July 16, 1952, when Mosaddeq tried to exercise his constitutional right as prime minister to choose the minister of war. The Shah challenged his choice, and Mosaddeq resigned in protest. But instead of voicing his protest by appealing to the Majlis deputies, who were mostly royalists or pro-British conservatives, Mosaddeq went directly to the public and presented this constitutional issue to them.

The Majlis gave a vote of confidence to Ahmad Qavam as prime minister. The attentive public, led by the National Front and the popular religious leader, the Ayatollah Kashani, protested the election of the new prime minister and asked for the return of Mosaddeq. People from all walks of life, including workers, professionals, students, and civil servants, participated in the large demonstrations that characterized those fateful days. The Bazaars also played a crucial role in that period; in most major cities Bazaars were closed down and the Bazaaris joined the demonstrations. After five days of mass demonstrations and bloodshed, the Shah gave in and, as the public had demanded, Mosaddeq triumphantly resumed his position as prime minister. The July 1952 episode definitely demonstrated the presence of a politically activated Iranian society. It also bore witness to the weakness of the Court and the popularity of Mosaddeq.

However, Mosaddeq's triumph was short-lived. Too many forces and too many problems challenged Mosaddeq and his administration. The National Front became fragmented; many of its important leaders split with Mosaddeq. The split within the National Front provided the opportunity for its challengers-conservative forces, including the landlords, big merchants, and the Court-to seek alliances with the defected leaders of the National Front against Mosaddeq and his loyal followers.

In the meantime, the idea of overthrowing Mosaddeq began to receive increasing support from both U.S. and British policy makers. The growing cold-war mentality in the West could not tolerate or even comprehend the notion of non-alignment, the policy pursued by Mosaddeq. In addition, the economic aspirations of the "Free World," especially a profitable oil agreement, could only be realized once Mosaddeq's democratic regime was toppled. Therefore, a plan for a coup d'etat was formulated, and Kermit Roosevelt of the Central Intelligence Agency was sent to Iran to finance the coup.⁴ In addition, many corrupt army officers who had been purged by Mosaddeq and who opposed Mosaddeq's measures in limiting the power of the military began to organize their activities against him. In pursuing their goals these officers sought the support of some of the incumbent army commanders, such as Nowzari and Ashrafi, in Tehran. Ultimately some sensitively positioned commanders either acquiesced or collaborated with the instigators of the coup d'etat.⁵

On August 19, 1953, a coup d'etat was successfully carried out. The very exciting, emotional era of Mosaddeq's liberal, democratic, and popular politics came to an end.

The 1953 coup d'etat did not immediately lead to the creation of a personal dictatorship. It first paved the way for a conservative, oligarchic regime in which power was shared between the Shah, on the one hand, and the leading bureaucrats, powerful landlords, big merchants, and other old-guard politicians, on the other hand From 1953 until the popular uprising of 1963, Iran witnessed a gradual shift in this "balance of power" toward the state.

The Shah ultimately succeeded in concentrating power in his own hands. Several factors contributed to his success in that endeavor. First was international, or more specifically U.S. intervention. After the coup d'etat, the United States became the unrivaled dominant foreign power in Iran. The United States' fear of Soviet intentions in Iran and the economic opportunities presented by a new oil agreement increased U.S. interest in Iran. Perceiving the Shah as an archenemy of the communists, the United States began its generous financial aid to the Iranian regime.

The formalization of a new oil agreement also helped the "normalization" of the political economy and ended the economic crisis that had seriously afflicted Iran during Mosaddeq's tenure. In addition to consolidating financial resources, the Shah resorted to repression to guarantee the stability of his regime. In a very short time, the state's repressive apparatus became the most important guarantor of the regime's survival. In 1957, the secret police, or SAVAK, was set up. U.S. advisers, along with Mossad, the Israeli secret organization, helped the Iranian regime to organize and train its personnel. Not only did such U.S. aid add to the effectiveness and efficiency of this organization, it also added to the resentment the Iranian public felt toward the United States.

Until 1960 the Shah avoided policies that would alienate the landlords, the religious leaders, and the Bazaaris. The two groups that the Shah truly controlled in these early post-coup years were the intelligentsia and the urban working class. The Shah achieved this control through a combination of enticement policies and repressive tactics.

In early 1960 things changed. After a period of economic growth in the late 1950s, Iran experienced a serious economic crisis. Inflation, growing corruption, and escalation of the military budget were some of the signs of this crisis. Iran was badly in need of additional foreign aid and loans. In the meantime, the liberal administration of John F. Kennedy came into office in Washington. At the time, the Kennedy administration believed that the best way to fight communism in the Third World was through adoption of liberal reforms. The Shah promised Kennedy that he would take some liberal steps, such as bringing some of the oppositional leaders into the cabinet. The resultant period of relative liberalization provided the opportunity for some opposition forces to resurface in Iran. At the same time, parliamentary elections were conducted in a more meaningful fashion. As a result, some independent deputies, including one leader of the National Front, were elected. But as a general rule, governmental pressure was exerted against the candidates representing the National Front.

In 1960, Iran, particularly Tehran, was the scene or several demonstrations and strikes in response to the deteriorating economic climate. The situation became serious, and after vacillating among the options the Shah chose Ali Amini, the former ambassador to the United States, as his prime minister.⁶ It was during Amini's term that the land reform policies were announced. Amini also tried to cut the military budget, but the Shah fought him over this issue, and the United States once again sided with the Shah. The Amini government lasted only fourteen months, and the Shah tried to take credit for land reform by including this program in a six-point policy called the "White Revolution," later known as the "Shah-People's Revolution." Part of the reason for launching the White Revolution was political; the Shah sought both to get rid of the landlords' influence and to create another base of support among peasants and the working class.

Land reform and the overall policy of the Shah's White Revolution threatened the landlords and two other powerful, traditional urban groups: the religious community and the Bazaaris. For the ulama, the Shah's overall policies of the early 1960s, including the granting of voting rights to women and the secular local election bill, were intended to undermine the former's sphere of influence. For the Bazaaris, these reforms harbingered vast state intervention in commercial activities, which would limit the Bazaar's autonomy. The dissatisfaction of the religious community, coupled with public grievances arising from economic and political crises, led to the 1963 uprising. The army interfered, many people were killed, and the leader of the uprising, the Ayatollah Khomeini, was imprisoned. He was finally sent into exile in 1964.

The 1963 crisis was probably a lesson for the Shah. Realizing that he did not have popular support and possibly understanding that the legitimacy of his regime might always be questioned because of the 1953 CIA-backed coup d'etat, the Shah began to pay more attention to the building of efficient coercive organizations to further stabilize his regime. The liberalization policies of 1961-63 were a test for the legitimacy of his regime, the results of which were disappointing and probably embarrassing for the Shah.

When the crisis was over in mid-1963, the Shah was read...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• 1 The Rentier State and Civil Society: Iran Since Mid-Century
• 2 Mosaddeq and the First National Front
• 3 The Second National Front
• 4 The Islamic Revolution and the Liberal Nationalist Opposition
• 5 Prospects for Secular Liberal Nationalism in Iran
• Selected Bibliography
• Index