Kuwait's Foreign Policy

City-state In World Politics

Abdul-Reda Assiri

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367012779
• eBook ISBN: 9780429713484
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book assesses the dynamics of Kuwaiti foreign policy since 1961 and explores the role of Kuwait as a small state in international politics. It analyzes the impact of ideology, religion, and value systems on Kuwaiti foreign policy as well as the impact of domestic forces on political actors.

1
Historical Overview and Foreign Policy Goals

In comparison to its neighbors, Kuwait’s ancient history is little known. It appears to be a country born out of a vacuum. In the early 1970s, European experts on the area (Winstone and Freeth) summarize this contradiction:

In simple translation, Kuwait is the Little Fort. To Europeans who skimmed the surface of Arabia for five hundred years or so, it was a sandy littoral, a lip of the Gulf, south of Basra, which gave them no great need to pause in their tracks. They also called it Qurain, the Little Horn. Or Grane, or sometimes Grains.¹

However, today Kuwait is considered one of the richest Third World nations. The country is engaged both in social transformation and political developments which have changed the basic tenets of its system yet still maintain the traditional Arabic and Islamic values.

Historical Overview

Some evidence has been discovered on the Kuwaiti island of Failaka that suggests that the Greeks had discovered it in ancient times. A stone found in 1937 bears a Greek inscription: “SOTEL (ES) An ATHENIAN AND SOLDIERS (?) TO ZEUS SAVIOUR POSEIDON ARTEMIS SAVIORS.” According to the legends, a ship belonging to a Greek admiral, Nearchus, was wrecked in 325 B.C. while on an expedition for Alexander the Great, and Stoles and his men arrived on the shores of Kuwait, where they gave thanks for their rescue. Similarly, it had been claimed that Failaka was an important center for trade with India, and that the island was a port of call for Greek ships, and might have been used as a base for them as well.²

It has also been recorded that Moslem troops settled in northern Kuwait en route to proselytize the Persians. It is thought that Khalid Ibn Al-Walid faced the Persians in the battle of “that Al-Salasil” in Kadhima, north of Kuwait, about 633 A.D. Nothing specific was recorded about Kuwait, however, until the eighteenth century. The Danish traveller Carstein Neibuhr, who visited Arabia in the 1760s, referred to Kuwait as follows:

Koueit or Graen, as it is called by the Persians and Europeans, is a sea port town, three days journey from Zobejeur, or old Basra. The inhabitants live by the fishery of pearls and of fishes. They are said to employ in this species of naval industry more than eight hundred boats. In the favourable season of the year, this town is left almost desolate, everybody going out either to the fishery, or upon some trading adventure. Graen is governed by a particular Schiech, of the tribe of Othema, who is vassal to the Schiech of Lachfa, but sometimes aspirs [sic] at independence. In such cases, when the Schiech of Lachfa advances with his army, the citizens of the Graen retreat, with their effects, into the little island of Feludsje. Near Graen are the remains of another Portuguese fortress.³

But the history and politics of modern Kuwait are synonymous with those of its ruling house, Al-Sabah, which migrated from the Arabian peninsula (Najd) to Kuwait with other tribes in 1716. The Al-Sabah family is a branch of the Utub tribe from Najd, which is in turn an offshoot of the Anaiza tribe. (The ruling families of Bahrain and Saudi Arabia trace their origin to the same tribe; thus social bonds reinforce the political links among the three ruling houses.) Within Kuwait a triumvirate ensued, with the house of Al-Sabah responsible for the affairs of the state; that of Al-Khalifa in charge of trade; and that of Al-Jalahma controlling maritime matters (i.e., pearl-diving and fishing). The pact continued up to 1756, when the Al-Sabah seized power, which they have virtually monopolized ever since. Thereupon, a primitive and uncomplicated system of government ensued. This is not to say that there is hereditary succession from father to son. In fact, hereditary succession has never been considered obligatory in Kuwait. The Al-Sabah choose a successor by the method traditional among tribes, that is, “by selecting a member of the ruling family who has already proved himself to have the requisite qualities of personality, leadership, and good luck.”⁴

Despite its size, harsh climate, and bleak topography, its geographical location made Kuwait a bone of contention in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries among the major powers of Germany, Great Britain, Russia, and Turkey. Regionally, Kuwait was engaged in the tribal struggle between Ibn Saud and Ibn Rashid.⁵ As the Gulf became an arena for international competition and rivalry, Kuwait was marginally drawn into the power game.

The Persian occupation of Basra (1775–1779) opened up the first opportunity for an official Kuwaiti-British linkage, as British trade and desert overland mail from India, the Mediterranean, and Europe were diverted to Kuwait. The resulting economic prosperity, among other things, influenced the Kuwaitis to conquer Bahrain in 1783.⁶ In addition, in 1793–1794, the British residence moved its office from Basra to Kuwait because of local sectarian fighting in southern Iraq. In 1821, the British office moved again to Failaka Island as a result of misunderstandings with the Ottoman governor in Basra.

On the regional level, Kuwait experienced a score of potential and real threats from its neighboring Arab tribes. In 1783, 1794, and 1796, both the Banu Kaab and the Ibn Saud attempted unsuccessfully to attack Kuwait. Ironically, the chief of the Ibn Saud and his family were later to seek asylum in Kuwait (1893–1901), until he was able with Kuwaiti help to regain his territory in Najd—a turnabout that illustrates the flexible posture Kuwait’s leaders have adopted in dealing with their neighbors. During the rise of Wahhabi in the peninsula in the late eighteenth century, Kuwait could not fail to feel the effects of the general upheaval caused by the religious fervor of that movement.⁷ The zealot Wahhabi order tried in 1792 and 1793 to attack Kuwait, but was repulsed by the combined forces of the British commercial office, the East India Company, and the ruler.

It has been argued that the Ottoman Empire maintained a quasi-sovereignty over Kuwait throughout the eighteenth century. Apparently, in 1756, the Kuwaiti ruler Sabah I negotiated with the Ottoman governor at Basra for the independence of his territory, under the suzerainty of the Ottomans. Later, Jaber I (1812–1859) helped the Ottoman governor of Basra to regain his territory after the latter was expelled by Iraqi tribes. Henceforth, and up to the reign of Mubarak the Great (1896–1915), Kuwaiti shaikhs “paid an annual tribute of 40 bags of rice and 400 Frasilah of dates” and received from their suzerain “every year a dress of honour.”⁸ In 1838–1839, the Ottomans placed an envoy in Kuwait in an attempt to lessen the impact of Wahhabism and strengthen the ties with the Empire.⁹ In 1871, the Ottoman government bestowed on Sheikh Abdullah the title of Qaim-maqam, (governor of a sub-province) and abrogated the decree which had made Kuwait part of Al-Hasa province. This change also made Kuwait part of the more important Basra “Villiat” (province), and allowed it to run its own internal affairs. In return, foreign flags on Kuwaiti ships were replaced by Ottoman flags until World War I. There was a great deal of sympathy between Kuwait and Mohammed Ali (the Vali of Egypt); when in 1818 his troops occupied the coast of the Gulf in an effort to suppress the Wahhabis, Kuwait was left free since the Kuwaitis were sympathetic to the Ottomans and opposed to the Wahhabis. In sum, Kuwait’s policy concerning Ottoman suzerainty over it was to “ignore the claim on most occasions, to deny it on others, and to tolerate it when danger threatened from another quarter.”¹⁰

Despite the earlier connections with Britain, a real opportunity for Kuwaiti-British rapprochement arose only in the late 1800s, as a result of factors in and around Kuwait. Mubarak Al-Kabir (the Great) had assassinated his half-brothers Mohammed (ruler 1892–1896) and Jarrah in 1896. Mubarak, who was relegated by his ruling brothers to the undignified role of overseeing the bedouins outside Kuwait city, was in essence a warrior, a born conspirator, and a strong personality with a lust for power.¹¹ Mubarak accused his brother of incompetency and of being too closely aligned with the Ottoman empire. But Mubarak then needed a countervailing ally to buttress his claims, particularly after his slain brothers’ sons and their supporters escaped to Basra and sought aid from the Ottomans and from other tribes to regain their father’s throne. Thus, to resist Ottoman pressures, Mubarak sought and received British protection in a bid to escape absorption by the larger neighboring countries.¹² On January 23, 1899, Mubarak signed an agreement with Britain stating that he

does hereby pledge and bind himself, his heirs and successors not to receive the Agent or Representative of any Power of Government at Kuwait territory, without the previous sanction of the British government; and he further binds himself, his heirs and successors not to cede, sell, lease, mortgage, or give for occupation, or for any purpose any portion of his territory to the Government or subjects of any other Power without the previous consent of Her Majesty’s Government for these purposes.¹³

The forces that compelled both parties to reach this agreement were numerous. The Russians had attempted in December 1898 to gain Ottoman approval to build a railroad from Tripoli (Lebanon) to Kuwait. Similarly, in 1899, Germany tried to build a railroad from Berlin through Istanbul and Baghdad, with a terminus in Kuwait. In 1897 the Ottomans sent a health inspector to Kuwait, and in January of that year, the Ottoman government issued a decree appointing Mubarak Qaim-maqam of Kuwait. In 1899 Mubarak rejected a request by the Ottomans that he leave Kuwait for Constantinople, with the promise that he would be appointed to the consultative council and that he would be granted a monthly stipend. In 1901 the Ottoman government tried to expel him from Kuwait but was prevented from doing so by the presence of a British naval ship. These developments, taken together, gave Britain the incentive to sign a treaty of protection with Mubarak. The treaty was meant to protect Kuwaiti rulers from external threats and internal opposition; it also tended to reduce the role of the tribes in politics,¹⁴ since the Shaikh would rely more on British support for his rule and perhaps adventures. Explicitly, the treaty stated that Mubarak and his successors were linked to Britain, and were not allowed to lease or sell any part of their territory without British consent. Implicitly, it meant that externally Kuwait had entered into the British sphere of influence, while remaining a free emirate (principality) in its internal affairs; and that the succession was limited to Mubarak’s lineage of Al-Sabah.¹⁵ Despite the limitations in the treaty, Mubarak was widely held to be the only independent Shaikh in the Gulf region.¹⁶

Mubarak thus managed in one stroke to eliminate the possibility that his brothers’ heirs might reclaim the sheikhdom, to reduce local opposition to his rule, and to shield Kuwait against external threats. The alignment with Britain proved to be a far-sighted policy, both for the ruler and his country. After the treaty was signed, Mubarak did not “care the least about foreign affairs,” merely appointing “an agent in Bombay … to look after the needs of Kuwaitis who travelled over there.”¹⁷

In 1903, Lord Curzon, Viceroy of India, visited Kuwait, and as a result a British Residence was established in Kuwait, despite Ottoman protests. The visit marked the consolidation of British influence in Kuwait.¹⁸ Between 1900 and 1906, when the Gulf became a market for contraband arms trade to India, Persia and Afghanistan, the British, who feared that arming the tribes there might lead to insurrection against British rule, were able to convince the ruler to impose a ban on arms trade to Kuwait. Britain and the Ottoman Empire resolved their disagreements about Kuwait in a 1913 treaty, but the outbreak of World War I prevented its ratification.

The new arrangement made Britain responsible for the defense and external relations of Kuwait. Despite the 1899 treaty, the Russians attempted, through visits by Russian emissaries (for example, there was a Russian consul in Bushire [Iran] in 1901) and through visits by their naval ships Askold, Varyag, and Boyarin, to lure Mubarak away from the British, but to no avail.¹⁹ During World War I, Britain stationed troops in Kuwait to blockade the Ottoman Empire and as a link in the broader context of special British security interests.²⁰

Although the Kuwait authorities were free to conduct their own affairs, British advice and influence proved important to the Al-Sabah, as the mer...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Illustrations
• List of Acronyms
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Map of Kuwait
• Map of the Middle East
• 1 Historical Overview and Foreign Policy Goals
• 2 Self-Defense and Survival (1961–1963)
• 3 Pragmatism and Balance (1963–1979)
• 4 Ambivalence and Tilting (1979–1986)
• 5 Anxiety and Uncertainty (1987–1989)
• 6 Conclusion and Prospects: Domestic Stability and International Outlook
• Appendix A
• Appendix B
• Appendix C
• Bibliography
• Index