Microsociology

A Tool Kit for Interaction Analysis

Kai-Olaf Maiwald, Inken Suerig

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367250799
• eBook ISBN: 9781000556551
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Sociology
• Index: Social Sciences

This book offers an unprecedented, integrative account of the shape of social order on the microsocial level. Dealing with the basic dimensions of interaction, the authors examine the major factors which influence "structure" in social interaction by applying various theoretical concepts. Although the concept of "microsociology" is usually associated with symbolic interactionism, social psychology, the works of George Herbert Mead and Erving Goffman and with qualitative methodologies, this book reaches beyond interactionist theories, claiming that no single school of thought covers the different dimensions necessary for understanding the basics of microsociology. As such, the book provides something of a microsociologist's "tool kit," analyzing an array of theoretical approaches which offer the best conceptual solutions, and interpreting them in a way that is independent of their specific theoretical language. Such theoretical traditions include systems theory, conversation analysis, structuralism, the theory of knowledge and the philosophy of language.

Providing a distinct, systematic and incremental approach to the subject, this book fills an important gap in sociological literature. Written in an accessible style, and offering new insights into the area of microsociology, it will appeal to students and scholars of the social sciences and to those with interests in sociology, microsociology, interactionism and sociological theory.

1

Interaction

How presence becomes participation

This chapter lays the groundwork for the book by discussing and defining terms like “social action,” “social relations,” “communication” and “interaction.” Here we draw especially on the theories of Niklas Luhmann and Erving Goffman. We use Niklas Luhmann’s systems theory to establish a systematic connection between “interaction” and “society,” an entry point we deem essential to understanding why sociology deals with something as (seemingly) vague and arbitrary as interaction in the first place. Luhmann, who is probably more influential in German-speaking sociology than in English-speaking sociology, is a theorist who advanced Talcott Parsons’s systems theory in different respects. One important advance is a shift in the basic focus from the “actions” of individuals to “communication.” For Luhmann, social systems are constituted by communications related to semantic codes that are specific to the respective system, such as “just/unjust” in the legal system. Only communications with such a “dual” reference carry weight in the system. Second, Luhmann provides a stronger concept of the unity of autonomous social systems. He not only explores several sub-systems of society (such as the economy, law or science), but distinguishes three distinct levels of system-building: interaction, organization and society. These two advances in particular make Luhmann’s theory a fruitful starting point for our endeavor. However, since systems theory is a universal theory and not especially concerned with the particulars of the “interaction system” in itself, we use Erving Goffman’s interaction theory to explain the “social basics” of face-to-face interaction. The important point being made in this chapter is that face-to-face interaction can be seen as the “prototype” of social relations. Based on this, we discuss the consequences of presence, co-presence, participation and collaboration, concluding that even on the most basic level of social relations, there must be a social order at work which merits in-depth scrutiny.

Microsociology, as we have established in the introduction, seeks to approach “society” via social interaction, i.e. via actions that take place between people. In the sociological sense, there is no interaction between objects (unlike chemistry, for example, where different substances can “interact” with each other), nor is there any interaction between a subject (a person) and an object (a thing), e.g. “human-computer interaction.” We define interaction as the form of social action in which (at least) two acting subjects refer or relate to each other in their actions. Interaction is therefore the smallest unit of social relations, and people only have social relations with other people.

This is easier to comprehend if we bear in mind that the precondition for interaction and social relations is the capacity for social action. Here we can draw on Weber (1978 [1922]), who understands social action as intentional action which is related to one or more other (specific or non-specific) people, but does not require their concrete, instantaneous involvement. While Weber (ibid.) defines action in general as any form of human behavior to which the actor attaches a subjective meaning (i.e. the action is meaningful for the acting person himself or herself, regardless of whether this meaning is objectively ascertainable, true or right), social action is, according to its subjective meaning, focused on the behavior of others. Thus a rubbish collector acts socially when she empties the rubbish bins by the roadside; a father acts socially when he bakes a birthday cake for his daughter; a student acts socially when she proofreads a research paper for a fellow student. Acting socially, though, is not limited to doing good to others; this is where a scientific understanding diverges from an everyday understanding of “social” action. Thus the writing of a threatening letter is a social action, as is the setting of a particularly difficult examination, where it is obvious from the outset that half the students will fail. The criterion for social action, then, is the difference between self-reference and external reference, regardless of moral or ethical aspects. Thus we observe that many people have an intense “relationship” with their pet, but that the pet is not able to act socially in a subjectively meaningful way – and of course this applies even more to computers and chemical elements.

Weber (ibid.) assumes, however, that subjectively meaningful action is always (at least to a certain degree) action that can be understood by observers, insofar as it can be “adequately communicated in words” (ibid., p. 5). Here it is important, in the first instance, to note that understanding is also a subjective matter. In this context, Schütz (1967 [1932], p. 14) points out the different perspective of actors and observers as “the crucial distinction between understanding our own experiences of the other person and understanding the other person’s experiences.” We do not achieve “understanding” by completely decoding the subjective meaning of others’ actions, but by being able to ascribe a meaning to these actions, independent of what is subjectively meant. The lecturer who sets an extremely difficult exam may understand this as an interesting intellectual challenge, while the students who have to sit the exam see it as an intentional and unfair imposition. Although the way the lecturer “means” her action is different from the way the students interpret it, the lecturer’s action is not incomprehensible or meaningless for the students.

This example, however, should make it clear that a constant dissonance between self-understanding and understanding others – i.e. if observers always interpreted the (social) action of individuals differently from the way it is meant – is not conceivable in a human community. There is a simple reason for this: human communities are not agglomerations of actors and observers, but associations of people acting collectively. Thus when Weber observes (see previous) that understanding others has to do with something being “adequately communicable in words,” the phrase might seem tautological at first glance, but it brings together three important prerequisites of joint action: the availability of “words,” i.e. linguistic signs and sign systems which make things generally expressible or describable; the “adequate” use of such signs, i.e. the use of appropriate linguistic equivalents of whatever is meant to be expressed; and “communicability,” that is, the possibility of making something “common” and sharing it with one another. In this line of argument, then, comprehensible action is action about which members of society can communicate in a linguistically adequate manner. And that, in turn, must mean that it is possible to rely on an “objective,” shared meaning, a joint understanding. This is in fact exactly how we are socialized as members of society: not as individuals who act alone, with incommunicable motives and decision-making processes, but always, from the beginning, as people who act jointly with others, whose motives and decisions arise and are shaped and internalized in interaction with others, and are obviously open to modifications in this interaction. We will take a closer look at exactly how this works in Chapter 4 on perspective-taking. The point we want to make here is that there is something that goes beyond individual action and the observation of action, and constitutes the key feature of human communities: communication.

At this point we will begin by discussing the concept of communication used by Luhmann (1995 [1984]). According to this, communication is the synthesis of three selections: the specific information chosen from the endless possibilities of all information (what is said?); the utterance, i.e. the specific way this information is conveyed (how is it said?); and understanding as the distinction between information and utterance (what does it mean?). For example, the information that there is a traffic jam on the M1 can be communicated in the following way: “There’s a traffic jam on the M1.” This utterance can be understood differently from “There’s yet another traffic jam on the M1,” or “The traffic jam is on the M1.” Thus the way the information is conveyed already contains a categorization and an interpretation: there is no information that can only be conveyed in a single, specific, unambiguous way. Thus it is not the information itself but the utterance that is understood. The utterance is the interpretation of a piece of information, and understanding is therefore the interpretation of this interpretation. The possibilities for responding to the observation “There’s a traffic jam on the M1” are, on the one hand, more limited than the original selection of the information. “Bread” is certainly not a plausible response, while “Uh-huh,” “Which section?”, or “The M1 urgently needs upgrading” would all be fitting replies, showing how the utterance has been understood. As the response relates to the preceding utterance, then, we can say that the communication refers to itself. This is not about the information “in itself,” but about the distinctions and interpretations which are undertaken in the communication. We also see, however, that while communication tends to narrow down topics (e.g. from the general occurrence of traffic jams to the upgrading of motorways) and thus reduce complexity, there is always more than one possible way the topic can be narrowed. This phenomenon is referred to as contingency or even, to use Luhmann’s term (ibid., p. 103), “double contingency:” we can never be completely sure how the other person will choose to respond to the message, and this applies to all those involved in the communication. As there are always “action alternatives,” it is never clearly predictable how others will behave. This uncertainty, however, is absorbed to a certain degree by communication, because it refers to what has already been said, and not to what is still to be said. We can only form and stabilize our expectations about the behavior of the person we are talking to on the basis of what has already been said, and structure our own behavior accordingly:

Communication must follow on quite specifically from what has previously been said, and it must make it clear what can occur in response to this response.

(Kieserling 1999, p. 79, translated by N.B.)

We have already noted previously that communication is the key feature of human communities. Following Luhmann (1995 [1984]), we can even argue that communication is the constitutive and thus structure-forming element of society. We can, of course, understand this quite simply: if we were not able to communicate (in whatever manner), we would all be isolated individual beings, incapable of collective action. But what is it exactly that communication does to make us capable of joint action? In the singular chain comprising information, utterance and understanding, we can only discern a very basic level of “collective” action in the form of a joint focus (on the utterance). But if a single act of communication – in the form of an individual conversation – turns into a communication process where other communications follow on from it, this gives rise to an unlimited number of conversations, both synchronous and asynchronous, among an unlimited number of participants, conversations which always at least have the potential to relate to other conversations. This potential has its foundations in the difference between themes and contributions; nexuses of communication, according to Luhmann (ibid., p. 155), “must be ordered by themes to which contributions can relate.” This means that contributions can always be assigned to a theme (and not only to a particular person, a particular point in time, or a place where they were made); thus the theme is the overarching context which is able to connect individual acts of communication. It is therefore entirely possible for many different conversations among many different participants in different places at different times to have something in common: the theme. The more generally we understand “theme” here, the clearer it becomes that there are themes which have been, are, and will remain relevant in an especially large number of communications, for example law, education or health. Repeated references to a theme and the relevant contributions mean that certain selections are reproduced again and again in different times and places and by different people, and are made “common;” in this way expectations – not only about the specific person we are interacting with, but also about members of society in general – are consolidated. We take this to mean that social relations and therefore social systems would not be possible without the expectations consolidated (i.e. secured) in and through communication: expectations that we have of other people, and that other people have of us.

If, however, the term “communication” encompasses all this – from the three basic selections to the processual conversation and ultimately to the processes that form and reproduce society – what does the term “interaction” have to offer? In actual fact, these two terms are often used in combination or even synonymously. If we take a closer look at them, however, we can first observe that “communication” and “interaction” do not designate the same thing, in terms of the exact meaning of the words. As we have seen, communication is an exchange of information involving selection and understanding, while interaction is defined as reciprocal action. In general language use, the term “communication” has become firmly associated with the conveying of a message, and is often used with reference to communication technologies, i.e. channels of communication: telephone, letters, text messages, emails, video streaming, etc. We say, for example, that we are in “written communication” with someone, but we do not talk about “written interaction.” The concept of interaction is often encountered as an adjective: for some years we have been seeing the term “interactive” more and more often in certain contexts: as “interactive television,” an “interactive PDF” or even “interactive communication” (in connection with the Internet). In the first two cases “interactive” does not refer so much to the quality of reciprocal action, but more to new options for individual, instantaneous intervention in processes which previously occurred without our active involvement: for many years we were merely consumers of television programming, and had no influence on it, and a PDF file was initially conceived as a document to which no further changes could be made (e.g. highlighting, comments). As we have already noted, however, the fact that we can actively influence something does not yet mean, from a microsociological perspective, that this process constitutes interaction. When we compile our personal television schedule, or underline something in a PDF document, this is not even necessarily social action in a Weberian sense, as explained previously – unless we refer specifically to others in these activities, e.g. by including a TV documentary series which our partner likes, or underlining the passages in a colleague’s PDF which we want to discuss with her later. The second example makes it clear that this is social action in anticipation of interaction, but not yet interaction itself. In contrast, the notion of “interactive communication” on the Internet, seems – strictly speaking – to presuppose that communication is by definition not interactive, and only becomes so when this quality is added to it. The underlying concept of communication here, precisely because it relates to the Internet, is technology-driven. It refers solely to technical opportunities for participating in communication, but does not thematize the quality of communication in itself, which – as we have already established – must at least involve interpersonal interaction to fulfill the basic conditions: utterance and understanding.

Communication technology is thus the key point at which we can successfully differentiate between communication and interaction. The attempt has been made to establish such a distinction from the perspective of system theory, by treating interaction not as something completely different from communication, but as a special form of it: “communication among people who are present” (Kieserling 1999). This is communication between individuals who can physically perceive each other, i.e. who are within sight and earshot of each other. According to Kieserling (ibid., p. 67, tr. by N.B.), these are communications “which also communicate the fact that this is communication among people who are present.” The special emphasis here is on “presence.” But before we begin to explore which aspects and factors are connected with presence and perceptibility, and why these are crucial for interaction, we should first note that the presence of other people is not just the norm, but also the “first case,” in both phylogenetic and ontogenetic terms (that is, with regard to the development of both the human species and the individual). From a historical point of view, our first communications – as a species and as individuals – have occurred face-to-face. Both as the human race and as individual humans, our primary socialization has taken place in direct, immediate contact with other people. One might suppose that the explanation is simple: for most of human h...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Endorsement
• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Introduction: is society something big?
• 1 Interaction: How presence becomes participation
• 2 Sequentiality: How interaction is structured as a process
• 3 Institutions: What we take for granted in social action
• 4 Reciprocity: How social relations emerge from joint action
• 5 Taking the perspective of others: Who we are as far as others are concerned
• 6 Social roles: What we are to each other
• 7 Norms and rules: How we measure social action
• 8 Framing: How we know what we have to do
• 9 Typification: How we know who we are dealing with
• 10 Structural problems of action: How we adjust to the circumstances
• 11 Emotions: How feelings become part of social action
• 12 Practice or the pressure to act
• Epilogue: Structure and method
• Index