The BrÄhmaį¹as
The BrÄhmaį¹as are a class of Vedic texts generally considered to have been composed in north India sometime between 1000 and 500 BCE. The precise derivation of the term āBrÄhmaį¹aā is unclear; it may refer to the ritualist-authors of the texts (from brahman, āpriestā), or it may refer to the texts as a collection of sacred knowledge (from brahman, āsacred utteranceā) (Winternitz 1981 [1909], 174). There are ten extant BrÄhmaį¹as; in modern, printed Sanskrit editions, they range in size from a few hundred to a few thousand pages. Each BrÄhmaį¹a is attached to one of the four Vedic Saį¹hitÄs or ācollectionsā: the į¹gveda, the SÄmaveda, the Yajurveda, and the Atharvaveda.1 However, between the Saį¹hitÄs and the BrÄhmaį¹as there are marked differences in language and in style; the language of the Saį¹hitÄs, which is in verse, is more archaic than that of the prose BrÄhmaį¹as, suggesting a significant gap in years between these texts (Keith 1925, 19). The historic relationship between the Saį¹hitÄs and the BrÄhmaį¹as is further complicated by the apparent existence of earlier, non-extant BrÄhmaį¹a-type texts that were closely aligned with the Saį¹hitÄs (Witzel 1997a, 298). This layer of ālostā texts may well account for the mass of shared material in the extant BrÄhmaį¹as, seen in the repetition of certain stock phrases; in the emphasis on a few key mythological episodes; and, in the common epistemological and ontological foundation that underlies much of the BrÄhmaį¹ic discourse (see, further, Witzel 1997a, 288; 297ā299).2
The raison dāĆŖtre of the BrÄhmaį¹asāand, so, too, the point around which their authorsā discussions begin and endāare the great Vedic rites of sacrifice. These sacrificial rituals hark back to the oldest layers of Vedic culture and are glimpsedāthough not fully describedāthroughout the Saį¹hitÄs. A chief characteristic of the BrÄhmaį¹as is their two-leveled discussion of the rites: as performance (vidhi, literally āinjunctionā) and as explication (arthavÄda) (Winternitz 1981, 187; Gonda 1975, 340ā341). Whereas the vidhi or āhow-toā portion of the text tends to be somewhat muted (the authors apparently presumed that their audience knew how to perform the rites), the explanations can be expansive, as the authors delve into the āhigherā and āmysteriousā meanings of the Vedic rites (cf. Malamoud 1998, 29ā30). Thus, a rather simple direction (vidhi), such as, āEntering the vow, he stands between the ÄhavanÄ«ya and the gÄrhapatya fires, turning eastward, he touches waterā (ÅB 1.1.1.1), leads to a discussion of the mystic import that connects the vow to the god Agni, and then to the (arthavÄda) declaration of the āhigherā meaning of the ritual object, namely, the water used in the rite, which connects it to āall thisā: āHe brings forward water because all this (the cosmos) is filled up by water; so by this first act, he acquires all thisā (ÅB 1.1.1.14).
Although the history of the BrÄhmaį¹asā composition cannot be recovered, a number of significant developmental elements can be discerned beneath the surface of these texts. Thus, occasional references to one ritualist contradicting another, or to certain obsolete or āincorrectā practices or interpretations (often said to be regionally based), almost certainly reflect the expansion of Vedic culture during the first millennium BCE (Witzel 1997a, 301ff.). With expansion, new schools were founded (evidenced in the compilation of new BrÄhmaį¹as), providing an opportunity for fresh interpretations of the ritual forms. Coordinate with this expansion was the rise of a large class of ritualists whose charge was to ensure that the rites were performed with the utmost accuracy but who also served to explicate the ceremonies. These ritualists were subdivided into groups of specialized functionaries, each charged with undertaking a specific element of the rite (see Müller 1859, 450; 469ff.). Among these functionaries was the brahman who performed the rite mentally as a means of averting possible errors in performance (Müller 1859, 450). This ritualist was said to be āall-knowingā; that is, to encompass within his own mind the rite in its entirety (Gonda 1975, 271). Although there is no certain evidence connecting the mental performance of the rite to the emergence of BrÄhmaį¹ic speculation, this element of the ritual resonates deeply with what has been broadly identified as the āinternalizationā of the sacrifice, āin which physiological functions take the place of libations and ritual objects,ā a notion which stands as a foundational element in ancient Indian philosophy (Eliade 1969, 111ā114).
European Indologists and the BrÄhmaį¹as
Throughout the nineteenth century, European (in particular, German) Indologists evinced an intense interest in the Vedic literature, producing critical Sanskrit editions and translations into European languages of these texts, a project that included several major BrÄhmaį¹as. However, as modern Indology changed direction from what was in fact a misguided focus on the Veda, the study of the BrÄhmaį¹as became peripheral. As a result, several BrÄhmaį¹as remain untranslated, and thus are inaccessible to Western scholars. Along with this early textual work, Western scholars produced a handful of important studies of the sacrificial ritual in the BrÄhmaį¹as (see, e.g., LĆ©vi 1898; Oldenberg 1919; Bodewitz 1973; Heesterman 1985; 1993; and Smith 1989), and a few other studies that focus on BrÄhmaį¹ic mythologies (see, e.g., Weber 1850, 1885; Hopkins 1909; and Doniger 1985). A. B. Keith, who translated several BrÄhmaį¹as, devoted considerable portions of his monumental work, The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads (1925), to discussing (albeit often dismissively) the nature of BrÄhmaį¹ic thought. Recently, Michael Witzel has produced a number of studies that draw deeply on the BrÄhmaį¹as, examining aspects of their thought (1979, 1996; cf. Oldenberg 1919) as well as exploring them for what they reveal of their socio-political milieu (1997a; 1997b; 1987; cf. Rau 1957).
The first generation of European Indologists to study the BrÄhmaį¹as almost universally disparaged them (the one notable exception being LĆ©vi 1898). In what may be the most oft-repeated description of these texts, F. Max Müller notoriously declared that the BrÄhmaį¹as were ātwaddle, and what is worse theological twaddleā (1867, 1, 113), likening their thought to the āraving of madmenā (1859, 389). These same sentiments occur in nearly every nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scholarly work that examines the BrÄhmaį¹as (for a conspectus, see Doniger 1985, 5; Tull 1989, 19, 16ff.; Tull 1991, 39; Smith 1989, 32ā33). In addition to being deeply troubled by the nature of BrÄhmaį¹ic reasoning (see Oldenberg 1919; cf. 1991, 12; Keith 1925, 440; Eggeling 1882, ix), these scholars took a dim view of the ritualistic atmosphere of the BrÄhmanas. With their post-enlightenment protestant view of āpriestcraft,ā these scholars were repulsed by the Vedic ritualistsā description of themselves as āgods among menā (ÅB 2.2.2.6) and found abhorrent the priestsā demands for a heavy recompense for their ritual work (see, e.g., ÅB 2.2.2.2-5) (Tull 1989, 17, 129 n.24).
The BrÄhmaį¹as as philosophy
As indicated in the foregoing, the BrÄhmaį¹as were composed with a singular focus on the Vedic sacrificial rites. Accordingly, areas that in modern usage broadly fall under the scope of philosophy, but that are related to everyday social existenceāsuch as ethics, the nature of justice, political power, and so forthāhave virtually no place in BrÄhmaį¹ic discourse. On the other hand, however, the BrÄhmaį¹ic thinkers were deeply engaged by metaphysical inquiry. Here, conditioned by the performance of the Vedic rituals, which entail a carefully orchestrated series of acts that are themselves divorced from ordinary reality, the BrÄhmaį¹ic thinkers developed a systematic method of inquiry that provided them access to meaning where no obvious everyday meaning existed (see Keith 1925, 482). As noted above, this system of thought is built on the notion that any number of identities can be found between entities, a system that is, as Sylvain LĆ©vi (1898, 9) noted long ago, ānet, logique, harmonieuxā (āneat, logical, and harmoniousā).3 Of course, that the system is neat and logical does not preclude the possibility that nothing of substance arises from it. The critical question in approaching the BrÄhmaį¹a texts as āphilosophyā then becomes whether this system of identification is merely a form of hollow symbolism, as nineteenth-century Indologists tended to see it, or if it holds within it substantial insights into the nature of being (ontology) and the nature of knowledge (epistemology).
A fundamental question of philosophy is, āHow is a thing known?ā The BrÄhmaį¹as contain innumerable declarative statements identifying one entity with another, in effect, creating a series of equations that define things by what they are akin to. Often the entities being identified with one another are linked through quasi-syllogistic reasoning; that is, if A = B, and B = C, then A = C. Here, in seeking out the underlying meaning of the rites, even the thinnest connections might be exploited. Thus, a typical example drawn from the Åatapatha BrÄhmaį¹a shows the author citing a numerical resemblance to connect the twelve verses in a particular prayer to the meter of the hymn (which has twelve syllables), then to the earth (since the name of the meter [jagati] approximates a word used for the earth [jagat]), to the god Agni (since the earth is the locus of the fire altar, also referred to as agni), and ultimately to the...