International Humanitarian NGOs and State Relations

Politics, Principles and Identity

Andrew J. Cunningham

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781138049154
• eBook ISBN: 9781351689854
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Global Development Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

International Humanitarian NGOs and State Relations: Politics, Principles and Identity examines the often discordant relationship between states and international non-governmental organisations working in the humanitarian sector. INGOs aiming to provide assistance to populations suffering from the consequences of conflicts and other human-made disasters work in the midst of very politically sensitive local dynamics. The involvement of these non-political international actors can be seen as a threat to states that see civil war as a state of exception where it is the government's prerogative to act outside 'normal' legal or moral boundaries. Drawing on first-hand experience of humanitarian operations in contexts of civil war, this book explores how the relationship works in practice and how often clashing priorities can be mediated.

Using case studies of civil conflicts in Sri Lanka, Darfur, Ethiopia and Chechnya, this practice-based book brings together key issues of politics, principles and identity to build a 'negotiation structure' for analysing and understanding the relationship. The book goes on to outline a research and policy development agenda for INGOs to better adapt politically to working with states.

International Humanitarian NGOs and State Relations will be a key resource for professionals and policy makers working within international humanitarian and development operations, as well as for academics and students within humanitarian and development studies who want to understand the relationship between states and humanitarian and multi-mandate organisations.

1

The Relationship of the External in the Internal

Introduction

The goal of this chapter is to lay out the theoretical basis for the rest of the book. In the first part, the sets of norms used and understood by both the external and the internal will be presented, focusing on the normative concepts of ‘statehood’ and ‘humanitarianism’. This will be followed by a brief review of the historical and contemporary interactions between these two norm sets. In the second part, the theoretical framework will be introduced, with a discussion of the state of exception concept and securitisation theory and a presentation of the methodology used in the book.

Norms in tension

An introduction of the norm sets provides the necessary background to properly relate the external to the internal. As will be seen, the theoretical framework is based on this positioning. The state norm set will be discussed in relation to the political concepts of sovereignty, prerogative, the state of exception and securitisation. The contrasting humanitarianism norm set, grounded on moral concepts, will be discussed in terms of principles. This discussion will set up a tension that is the basis of the later analysis, a tension mediated through negotiations between the actors, negotiations that are conducted through discourse. First, however, the concept of norms must be introduced.

Norms

In this book ‘norms’ will be understood as ‘shared expectations about appropriate behaviour held by a community of actors’ (Finnemore, 1996: 22). Norms are socially constructed, rather than dictated, and in an idealised world are whole-heartedly shared by the relevant actors, although in the real world they are often highly contested and prone to mutual disagreement. Even within a set of norms there is often disagreement on what constitutes the proper understanding of the ‘shared’ norms. For example, individual humanitarian organisations may understand the norm of humanitarianism in a particular way. Difference are particularly marked between INGOs that only implement humanitarian programming and those that also implement development activities, as the role of humanitarian principles in negotiating access can sometimes vary.

What an actor understands to be appropriate behaviour – for itself and others, inside and outside their norm sets – creates a potential for action. How that understanding is actualised in behaviour, and how others react to these actions, is a critical question. The two ‘shared’ sets of norms under consideration in this study are those concerned with state behaviour and the behaviour of humanitarian actors. If even within norm sets there are differences of opinion, then between norm sets there can be considerable tensions. One specific way in which tensions can build is when there is a clash between international and local norms, as the global distribution of norms has not been straightforward. Newly introduced international norms do not encounter a normative vacuum at the local level. Local norms, even those borrowed from global sources before being adapted to local conditions, will often have a ‘robust legitimacy’ which moderates the reception of international norms (Acharya, 2009: 5). This point should be remembered when the case studies are reviewed.

Statehood

Defining the concept of the state is highly problematic. The term could more rightly be considered ‘an idea or cluster of concepts, values and ideas about social existence’ than an objective reality (Vincent, 1987: 4). A state is an abstract construct, a legal and political designation, a convenient fiction used to regulate political interactions. The term, and the designation, facilitates how different actors engage with each other – discrete universally accepted categories are easier to manage than vague ethnic or cultural constructs. But such a category is only superficial in nature. In practice, each state develops in a unique historical, geographical, cultural and religious context and will focus on different aspects of what it means to be a state. States have ‘different structures, political institutions, cultures and values. We do not see “the state”’ (ibid.: 7). The modern state system has been greatly influenced, and can be said to be derived from, Western political and philosophical developments. Although this model has greatly informed how non-Western states have formed and developed, there are regional and national differences that inform attitudes to the roles and responsibilities of states. The Asian values rhetoric and debate of the 1990s points to this¹ and will play a part in the Sri Lanka case study; as will be seen, the non-Western view on statehood will feature importantly in the other case studies as well.

Regardless of the problematic nature of the concept, a working definition of statehood should be proposed. Rather than a highly theoretical definition, commonalities will be elaborated upon. In this book, a state will be considered as a political entity that is acknowledged internationally to represent a defined geographical area and population. The key point is that a state is a political entity which faces outward – in other words, it can decide on who is a friend and who is an enemy. Changing perspective 180 degrees, a state is only a state if considered as such by other states. The rules of the game are that states are autonomous, that other states should not interfere in their affairs, and that all states are equal – de jure, if (certainly) not de facto.

Domestically the situation is muddier. In Max Weber’s oft-cited definition from his lecture ‘Politics as a vocation’ (1918), ‘a state is a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory’ (Weber, 1946). Coercive authority is an essential element of a state and helps a government to tie together its subjects (Laski, 1935: 21). Coercion plays a major role in both the creation of a humanitarian crisis itself and the need for negotiations to define the space for humanitarian action within the crisis. Allied with coercion are the themes of fear and the law, themes that will form the basis of all the case studies.

Another key aspect is that the state is separate from society – the public and private spheres are different constructs (Dunleavy and O’Leary, 1987: 2). States claim their ‘hegemony or predominance within a given territory over all other associations, organizations or groups within it’ (Vincent, 1987: 19). A state will, therefore, consider itself above society and, it will be argued, take a fundamentally political and instrumentalist view in its relations with civil society. The external face of statehood will be much less important in this analysis than an understanding of the relationship between those who represent a state and society and how political actors use coercion, fear and the law domestically to meet their political objectives.

Even more than for the definition of a state, sovereignty is an evasive concept. Indeed, ‘in spite of the agreement on some … basic issues, sovereignty remains an ambiguous concept’ (Biersteker and Weber, 1996: 2). In this book sovereignty will be very simply defined. Two core ideas should be understood: that there is ‘no final and absolute authority exist[ing] elsewhere’ – that is, outside the state – and that ‘there is a final and absolute political authority in the political community’ – that is, internally (Hinsley, 1986: 26). Therefore, a state is ‘sovereign’ in the sense that there is no higher external political authority that has the authority to make decisions² and that internally the state apparatus is the final political decision-making body.

In this sense sovereignty is one aspect of statehood; it is not itself so much a legal as as an integral aspect of the political classification of being an internationally recognised ‘state’. In the contemporary world sovereignty ‘bestows supreme political authority upon the government. That sovereignty is an institution simply means it is a set of rules that states play by’ (Sorensen, 2004: 103). Finally, as with statehood, the concern here is with the ‘internal face’ of sovereignty, for, ‘even though states may be sovereign relative to one another, they possess clearly different authorities over their own societies’ (Lake, 2008: 49). This book is concerned with this, the domestic understanding and use of sovereignty, which is the most important location of tension concerning the relationship between states and humanitarian INGOs.

Finally, it is important to be clear about the use of the terms ‘state’ and ‘government’. In this book, a government is made up of individuals who perform the actual ‘steering’ of the ship at any given time (Vincent, 1987: 29). Governments, which represent states, are in practice

composed of political actors who are simultaneously members of social sectors, classes and interest groups; they have their own ideological, ethical and religious beliefs; their own programmatic priorities; and their specific views on how best to fuse these complex personal traits with their roles as state officials.

(Pempel, 1992: 118)

Therefore, a government is a collection of officials holding formal power at a given time and place. A government represents the sovereign state. It is the only actually existing political entity that can be directly interacted with, as it is made up of people, and decisions are made by them, rather than by abstract political constructs.

Humanitarianism

The concept of humanitarianism is defined and used in different ways by different actors. A state-led humanitarian intervention which uses military resources will not be discussed, debated, understood and reacted to in the same way as a non-violent intervention by a humanitarian INGO. Even within the humanitarian NGO sector the term will be used in somewhat nuanced ways depending on the mandate and perspective of the organisation. In this book, humanitarianism will be defined as a Dunantist humanitarian organisation would define it. Dunantist organisations, named after the founder of the International Committee of the Red Cross Jean Henri Dunant, aim to subscribe strictly to the humanitarian principles upon which the Red Cross was founded and limit their action exclusively to humanitarian crises.

The core humanitarian principles are humanity, independence, neutrality and impartiality. Independence refers to proactive disengagement from political and military actors by humanitarian actors to limit coercive control of their action; neutrality to not taking sides in a conflict or engaging in political controversies; and impartiality to offering assistance to those in greatest need without discrimination. But at the heart of humanitarianism is, obviously, humanity. Humanitarians are concerned with human suffering, human interaction and the human ability to feel empathy and compassion for, and then respond to, the suffering of other humans. Humanitarianism is, in essence, a moral project. As a moral concern, there are characteristics humanitarianism is meant not to exhibit. Humanitarian action must not be profitable and must not be overtly political. Humanitarianism can be ‘conceived of as an unchallenged good characterised by impartial charity for a common humanity, and something which transgresses the confines of state sovereignty’ (Campbell, 1998: 498).

Discussions of principles often dominate debates within humanitarian organisations. On the notion of neutrality and remaining apolitical, there have been long arguments within the sector about whether humanitarian organisations are, indeed, existentially and practically, political or not. As not being a political agent is often seen as an essential component of humanitarianism, this is a core identity question. In theory, humanitarianism should be limited to humans helping other humans without any underlying political agenda, and as such NGOs are to remain politically neutral and independent from the control of political actors. Thus, to be internally coherent and consistent with the notion of humanitarianism they must stay outside of politics in the sense of not being overtly political actors. One should be reminded, though, of Schmitt’s warning that ‘we have come to recognize that the political is the total, and as a result we know that any decision about whether something is unpolitical is always a political decision, irrespective of who decides and what reasons are advanced’ [italics in the original] (Schmitt, 2005: 2). Humanitarian INGOs, almost by definition given the work that they do and the contexts within which they operate, are intimately involved with highly political issues. Humanitarian crises are some of the most politically complex and sensitive contexts imaginable, and politics is at the core of their cause, continuation and resolution. In this way, although not being political actors, humanitarian INGOs engage with political actors and work in contexts of intense political contestation. These political actors will, obviously, view any other actor – internal or external, self-proclaimed apolitical or not, as political actors in some regards. At the least, their activities will have political consequences that will be reacted to on the part of the main political participants in the crisis (Lockyear and Cunningham, 2017).

On another front, there is much confusion amongst states and aid organisations alike concerning the difference between actors that engage in ‘humanitarian’ activities as well as development operations (multi-mandate NGOs) and those that should be considered as purely humanitarian organisations. A Dunantist humanitarian actor, such as MSF, only implements activities in what are considered to be ‘humanitarian crises’. Humanitarian crises are situations where a population’s very existence is in jeopardy, either through structural violence, war, displacement, massive outbreaks of disease or natural or human-made disasters. Multi-mandate organisations, such as CARE or Oxfam, implement both development and humanitarian activities, and sometimes implement both kinds of activities in the same context. Purely humanitarian organisations ground their legitimacy in humanitarian principles exclusively, and differentiate themselves from development or multi-mandate organisations that are widely perceived to be more ‘political’, ‘activist’ and even sometimes ‘collaborative’ in nature. In making this distinction no negative judgement is usually implied, but the differences in perspective and scope of activities is germane to how an international NGO is perceived by the state.

From an operational perspective, humanitarian aid is understood to be assistance and action designed to save lives, alleviate suffering and maintain and protect human dignity amid crises. It is intended to be short-term in nature – once a crisis is over the need for humanitarian action stops. Humanitarian aid traditionally focuses primarily on material assistance – food, shelter, water, sanitation and medical aid. Development programming is, by definition, longer-term in perspective, and involves types of activities outside the remit of immediately saving lives, such as livelihood development, agricultural programming and education, as well as such activities as security-sector reform, governance capacity building and conflict resolution. This book will discuss the experiences of both types of actors in the following case studies and how their different perspectives impact on their relationship with the governments will be teased out where relevant.

States and INGOs

Given the above, how have, and how do, states and INGOs interact? This section will provide a brief overview of key themes in how states and the aid system have interacted from the Cold War onwards. The relationship between states and the aid system has changed and developed over time. Different issues have predominated and different types of actors have been at the centre of action and debate. A background knowledge of the changing relationship is necessary to situate the recent critiques of the aid system by states and states by aid actors. For the purposes of this historical review, aid is inclusive of all manner of aid mechanisms and is not limited to humanitarian aid.

The Cold War era

In much of the recent literature on the relationship between states and aid actors the issues are presented as newly emerging trends. But the discussion of foreign aid through the lens of politics is not new. Morgenthau, in 1962, discussed the fact that ‘policies of foreign aid are frequently suspect, as serving in disguise the traditional ends of colonialism’ and that ‘foreign aid is no different from diplomatic or military policy or propaganda. They are all weapons in the political armoury of the nation’ (Morgenthau, 1962: 306). From the beginning of the Cold War era aid was a tool in a state’s foreign policy toolbox. The Cold War era can be conceptualised as a period of hegemonic states (donor states) relating to recipient states (mostly post-colonial states) in a period of geopolitical polarisation. Aid was not based on need but was a political tool, driven by strategic geopolitical necessity – aid programmes were heavily influenced by short-term foreign policy decisions guided by the foreign policy establishment (Fleck and Kilby, 2008: 1). The objective was political influence rather than aid effectiveness (Dunning, 2004: 409–423). Aid was then seen as a method of buying influence, and military and economic interests were the most important determinants of aid, especially in the later part of the Cold War period (Bermeo, 2008).

Viewing aid from the perspective of a recipient state, aid created a ‘moral hazard’ (Dunning, 2004: 409). They could put into place policies and set goals at variance with the aims of donor states...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Table of Contents
• List of illustrations
• Acknowledgments
• Abbreviations
• Preface
• Introduction
• 1. The relationship of the external in the internal
• 2. The case of Médecins Sans Frontières and the Government of Sri Lanka, 2006/7
• 3. The case of Médecins Sans Frontières and the Government of Sri Lanka, 2008/9
• 4. Fear as discourse: The case of Chechnya
• 5. Law as discourse: The case of Ethiopia
• 6. Expulsion as discourse: The case of Sudan
• 7. Responses to securitisation
• 8. Politics, principles and identity
• Conclusion: The future
• Index