Section preface
Phil Barker
As we shall discover, most dictionaries define ethics as ādealing with what is good or bad, right or wrongā. When applied to professions, ethics is concerned with āmoral duties or obligationsā ā what the professional ought to do in any given situation: the principles of conduct or standards of professional behaviour. Although professional ethics might appear special it is, in effect, merely a narrow description of the kind of āmoral conductā considered ārightā or āgoodā when applied to people in general.
The key lies in the word āconductā, indicating how people conduct their affairs, both in relation to themselves, other people, the animal kingdom, if not also the planet that sustains us all. āHow should I act?ā is the most ubiquitous ethical question, which might be asked in any situation. Although it is an unfashionable view, most human behaviour involves conduct. Aside from the small proportion of reflex behaviours, everything else that we ādoā involves choice or the possibility of choice.
Unfortunately, āchoiceā has become something of a weasel word in the mental health field, where the idea is peddled that āchoiceā is something that can be given or otherwise āfacilitatedā, when in reality it can only be restricted. Or at least, that is the case where people are free to conduct their lives, in whatever way they see fit.
This reminds us that the idea of āpsychiatricā or āmental healthā ethics is problematic, if not a contradiction in terms. In principle, ethics is only meaningful where people ā or groups of people ā are self-governing and have the opportunity to make choices free from any coercion. Rarely is this the case in the mental health field. The limits imposed on a personās exercise of freedom ā however explicit ā continue to haunt contemporary practice.
In this opening section, I seek to set the scene for the detailed examination of specific ethical dilemmas and related topics, which begin in Section 2.
In Chapter 1, I discuss some of the key ideas which have been developed over the centuries, and explore their relevance to the contemporary world of mental health. I propose that there are no new ethical dilemmas, far less any new theories to explain or resolve them. Almost everything that we believe today, concerning the moral challenges of everyday life and how we might respond to them, is a revised version of some older ideas about life and how it should be lived. Such philosophies have merely been revised to suit the language or the social context of some ābrave new worldā.
In Chapter 2, I begin to examine the key ethical dilemma within the psychiatric or mental health field: that the fundamental assumptions concerning āmental illnessā and āagencyā ā the personās capacity to act freely ā risks rendering the idea of āpsychiatric/mental health ethicsā meaningless. However, this is not a nihilistic view, merely a candid appraisal of the field at the present time. It is, of course, possible to aim for the development of such a genuine ethic. However, this will require major changes in the way professionals, and the services they represent, conduct themselves with the people embraced by such services. In some senses our ideas about ethics have changed little over thousands of years. We continue to tussle with much the same problems as our ancestors and develop new theories that often differ little from those they seek to displace.
Finally, in Chapter 3 I discuss the extent to which moral dilemmas, regarding what ought to be done, vary across the different disciplines embraced by the field, and the many different situations, which professionals encounter. To what extent has our thinking about āmental illnessā really changed? To what extent are we merely recycling older, outmoded models of human problems: trying to avoid confronting the personal, social and political issues that we obscure with our increasingly technical concepts of āpsychiatric disorderā?
This chapter provides an introduction to the detailed examination of the professional context of ethical inquiry, which begins in Section 2.