Foundations for Conceptual Research in Psychoanalysis

Anna U. Dreher

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780367105112
• eBook ISBN: 9780429913891
• Topic: Psychology
• Subtopic: History & Theory in Psychology
• Index: Psychology

In clear language and with an extraordinary depth of scholarship, Dreher describes the history of psychoanalytic research and dissects the structure of empirical and conceptual research endeavours.

Chapter One
Preliminary methodological reflections

An example of conceptual reflections in Freud

Conceptual reflections—however unsystematic they may be—have a tradition in psychoanalysis that reaches back to Freud. But what is understood by such reflections which, so to speak, might be regarded as the precursors of later systematic conceptual research? Two simple examples from Freud’s Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (1916–17) may help to illustrate this in a first approximation. In Lecture 20 Freud explores the meaning of the term “sexual”—or, as we would say today, he tries to grasp “sexual” conceptually.

Seriously, it is not easy to decide what is covered by the concept “sexual”. Perhaps the only suitable definition would be “everything that is related to the distinction between the two sexes”. But you will regard that as colourless and too comprehensive. If you take the fact of the sexual act as the central point, you will perhaps define as sexual everything which, with a view to obtaining pleasure, is concerned with the body, and in particular with the sexual organs, of someone of the opposite sex, and which in the last resort aims at the union of the genitals and the performance of the sexual act. But if so you will really not be very far from the equation of what is sexual with what is improper, and childbirth will really not be anything sexual. If, on the other hand, you take the reproductive function as the nucleus of sexuality, you risk excluding a whole number of things which are not aimed at reproduction but which are certainly sexual, such as masturbation and perhaps even kissing. But we are already prepared to find that attempts at a definition always lead to difficulties; so let us renounce the idea of doing better in this particular case…. On the whole, indeed, when we come to think of it, we are not quite at a loss in regard to what it is that people call sexual. [Freud, 1916–17, pp. 303–304]

This quotation clearly shows that for Freud the task of defining central psychoanalytic concepts is by no means a trivial matter. It also shows how he weighs the various aspects of a concept—in this case “sexual”—against each other. He is not content with any one-dimensional definition of the concept of sexual, be it as gender differences, the sexual act, or the reproductive function. Freud even advises against premature attempts at definition as such attempts may only narrow down the meaning of the concept. The resulting definitional uncertainty, however, does not lead him to eliminate the concept from his theoretical reflections, for we as scientists are “not quite at a loss in regard to what it is” that people call “sexuality”; we have, as we would say today, a certain implicit knowledge from the world in which we live. It may well be justified, therefore, that scientific endeavour takes everyday language as a starting point and builds on it a not yet precisely explicated and defined conceptualization of “sexual”.

At the end of this lecture, and after having gone through all the relevant considerations, Freud performs his famous extension of the psychoanalytic concept of sexuality and describes the difference between its psychoanalytic and everyday notion:

We have only extended the concept of sexuality far enough to be able to comprise the sexual life of perverts and of children. … We have, that is to say, given it back its true compass. What is called sexuality outside psychoanalysis relates only to a restricted sexual life, which serves the purpose of reproduction and is described as normal. [Freud, 1916–17, p. 319]

Another brief example is reported in Lecture 21 and may serve to demonstrate the overall importance of conceptual differentiations in the formation of psychoanalytic theory:

Whereas for most people “conscious” and “psychical” are the same, we have been obliged to extend the concept of “psychical” and to recognize something “psychical” that is not “conscious”. [Freud, 1916–17, p. 321]¹

This conceptual extension of “psychical”, which now was to include unconscious processes, was, as we know, a constitutive factor in the foundation of psychoanalysis and has remained one of the central features that distinguish it from academic psychology. Behaviouristically oriented psychologists and physicians—or, to be more precise, those orienting themselves along the lines of observable behaviour—still reject the concept of the dynamic unconscious as unscientific, and to this day cognitive psychology uses “unconscious” merely in a descriptive sense, for example in “implicit memory” or “implicit learning”, as “not accessible to consciousness”, or “not communicable through language”. Very often unconscious processes are explained in terms of an analogy with computational processes, at best as “automatic background processes”, but not as psychodynamic—which would mean those contents and processes which are not allowed access to consciousness due to the operation of repression.

It is of decisive importance to realize that Freud’s conceptual differentiations and extensions were not the result of playful or even arbitrary efforts, but that his definitions rested on—in the Freudian sense—empirical, clinical-psychoanalytic grounds. How relevant this interaction is, Freud demonstrates with the example of the concept of sexuality:

It only became possible to extend the libido theory to the narcissistic neuroses after the concept of a “narcissistic libido” had been put forward and applied—a concept, that is, of an amount of sexual energy attached to the ego itself and finding satisfaction in the ego just as satisfaction is usually found only in objects. This entirely legitimate development of the concept of sexuality promises to accomplish as much for the severer neuroses and for the psychoses as can be expected of a theory which is feeling its way forwards on an empirical basis. [Freud, 1919d, pp. 209–210]

It may already be clear at this point that for Freud, both empirical research and conceptual reflections in psychoanalysis each have their very own justification, in the same way as they are mutually interdependent. New empirical findings make existing evidence appear in a new light, suggesting conceptual differentiation and modification of old concepts. New concepts enable us to collect and safely establish new empirical evidence. On the whole, progress in psychoanalysis takes place to a similar degree both through the clarification of its existing conceptual system and through the occasional creation of new concepts.

Empirical and conceptual

From a methodological point of view, two terms are central for the purpose of my argument—namely, “empirical”, and “conceptual”; admittedly, these are unclear terms themselves and thus in need of some prior specification. For an initial understanding, let us assign these two terms to specific types of research, ignoring their interconnections for the time being:

1. empirical—to the various forms of empirical research;
2. conceptual—to all systematic attempts to clarify the explicit and implicit use of concepts.

Let me make one preliminary remark: Why do I speak of “concepts” and not of “theories”? The main reason I prefer “concept” and “conceptual research” to the more technical and often used "theory” and “theory development” is because “theory” seems too comprehensive a term. Theories, as I understand, comprise systems of scientific statements, whereby these statements are considered correct because they are based on experience. Concepts, in turn, are only components of such systems, and thus much smaller units. As psychoanalysis encompasses many concepts and their relationships to each other, the consideration of one concept at a time seems a more moderate and more manageable procedure than the testing or development of the whole theoretical edifice. Also, if we used the word “theory”, this might lead to the misunderstanding—at least amongst researchers firmly grounded within the empiricist tradition—that in psychoanalysis, too, any further development of scientific theory will only happen through empirical testing of hypotheses derived from those same theories. Another reason why I prefer “concept” is that the word “theory” is at times understood to represent something like a final definition under which empirical phenomena could be subsumed. The term “concept”, on the other hand—meant to emphasize the thought movement involved, as well as the scope of meaning—takes into consideration the rule-bounded use of a concept and thus underlines the context-dependency and the preliminary character of all research activity.

However, let us now return to the aforementioned two types of research and start with a discussion of empirical research. There is a minimal consensus amongst all empirical researchers, which Stegmüller describes as follows: “It is impossible to gain an insight about the real world and its laws by mere reflection and without empirical control (via observations)” (Stegmüller, 1978, p. 346; italics in the original; trans. E.R.). In the context of psychoanalysis, the term “empirical research” is understood in different ways. I use it to refer to all those research activities that claim to generate and integrate relevant empirical evidence for psychoanalytic theory. (“Evidence” is interpreted broadly here, more broadly than, for instance, the term “datum”, which usually has a technical meaning and often designates a quantitative measurement, which again results from the operationalization of a concept.)

1. Empirical research means all classical case studies produced on a clinical-psychoanalytic basis—that is, those that have as their basis of evidence the analytic situation between analysand and analyst. The analyst himself processes the data and organizes them.
2. Empirical research also refers to research activities where the basis of evidence comprises only a segment of the analytic situation—as, for example, tape transcripts—and to activities where other persons participating in the research process organize the data in a systematic way. This is mostly the case in more recent quantitative psychotherapy research. Here, however, researchers go beyond their original data by collecting further empirical data—for example, from questionnaires or frequencies from coding systems.
3. We find similar procedures in basic research relevant to psychoanalysis, where empirical data are imported from neighbouring disciplines—for example, from psychology, medicine, or ethnology.

If, at the moment, the situation regarding the various empirical research activities relevant to our considerations is still somewhat unclear, there is a further attempt to clarify it in chapter two.

In the second type of research, which I have described earlier as conceptual, the issues raised are as follows:

1. On the one hand, it is examined whether the concepts used and the statements derived from them are logically consistent and compatible with other theoretical statements. These claims were put forward by, for instance, the proponents of Logical Empiricism or of Critical Rationalism, and empiricists today still embrace to a large extent the underlying theoretical positions of this type of research. Such “examinations or analyses of logical consistency” would also include “formal concept analyses”, which are common today in the cognitive sciences. There, computer programmes carry out syntactic examinations of systems of statements, whereby those systems are checked for general and logical consistency;
2. On the other hand, we are concerned with the analysis of the use of a concept within a defined conceptual field—as in Wittgenstein’s later philosophy—that is, with the rules of its use in a specific scientific or practical context; this type of research is commonly referred to as the “(philosophical) analysis of concepts”.
   Both have the aim of creating concepts that are unambiguous and as precisely defined as possible and of making suggestions as to their use or differentiation in as meaningful a way as possible; both are also said to be useful tools for empirical research and to further scientific dialogue. Incidentally, within the empirical sciences, such as experimental psychology or quantitative social science research, the clarification of concepts, in the sense of an examination of logical consistency, should be part of the procedure for the testing of theories in any case. As Popper writes, for example:
   From a new idea, put up tentatively, and not yet justified in any way—an anticipation, a hypothesis, a theoretical system, or what you will—conclusions are drawn by means of logical deduction. These conclusions are then compared with one another and with other relevant statements, so as to find what logical relations (such as equivalence, derivability, compatibility, or incompatibility) exist between them. [Popper, 1935, p. 32]²
   Unfortunately, empirical researchers—including those in psychoanalytic psychotherapy research—often forget to mention, when testing hypotheses, that their hypotheses should not only be tested empirically, by suitable procedures, but they should also undergo an examination of logical form in order to establish consistency and derivability.
3. Last but not least, conceptual research in psychoanalysis attempts to widen the narrow framework of a clarification of concepts solely determined by logic and is thus more closely related to the (philosophical) analysis of the use of a concept. It has as its focus the central concepts of psychoanalysis—like, for instance, the concept of psychic trauma, the concept of narcissism, or that of transference. Its main concern is the optimal clarification of such concepts while taking into account the latest developments in psychoanalytic research, whereby the historical development of a concept and its current use in clinical practice are not to be neglected. If one were to list all that might be helpful for the clarification of a concept, one might find the following thematic areas:
   • the investigation of the historical context of a concept’s origin;
   • the history of a concept viewed against changes of psychoanalytic theory;
   • the current use of a concept in clinical practice;
   • a critical discussion and, possibly, formulation of a suggestion for a different use of the concept.

In order to be able to integrate these various aspects and to do justice to each of them individually, we must of course use very different methods. A systematic literature analysis, for instance, which is committed also to philological standards, would help the historical reconstruction of the development of a concept. An outstanding example of this is Grubrich-Simitis’ work, especially her 1996 book, Back to Freud’s Texts. Such careful literary research can map out the essential points of change in a concept in psychoanalytic history since Freud, as has been demonstrated, for example, by Sandler, Dare, and Holder in The Patient and the Analyst (1973, 1992). In addition, such literary research can contribute towards the preliminary clarification of a concept or help to identify and work out any residual ambiguities. (By considering the two domains—origin and change—it is possible to integrate questions as to the history of science and the sociology of knowledge into such conceptual studies.)

Further to this, conceptual research in psychoanalysis allows us also to generate evidence as to the explicit as well as the implicit use of a concept in clinical practice by way of expert interviews. Here I should like to draw attention to one particular aspect, which makes this kind of research into “psychoanalytic” conceptual research: while it is true that a simple inventory of the current uses of a concept could be put together by recourse to behaviouristic or philological methods, these methods are not sufficient when we want to deal with a concept’s implicit use in the clinical-psychoanalytic work of experienced practitioners—that is, when we wish to include aspects of a concept’s current use that have not yet been made explicit. As we shall see, this has resulted in the development of special research procedures: in some projects concerned with the clarification of psychoanalytic concepts, for instance, interviews by experienced psychoanalytic clinicians who form part of the research project (in the role of conceptual researchers) of experienced psychoanalytic clinicians (in the role of “experimental subjects”) were introduced. The data gathered were...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• CONTENTS
• ABOUT THE AUTHOR
• Introduction
• 1 Preliminary methodological reflections
• 2 About the Freudian “Junktim”
• 3 Research with and without numbers
• 4 Conceptual research in the Hampstead Index Project
• 5 Conceptual research in the Trauma Project
• 6 Concluding methodological reflections
• REFERENCES
• INDEX