Music and War in the United States

Sarah Kraaz

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9781351762687
• Topic: Media & Performing Arts
• Subtopic: Music

Music and War in the United States introduces students to the long and varied history of music's role in war. Spanning the history of wars involving the United States from the American Revolution to the Iraq war, with contributions from both senior and emerging scholars, this edited volume brings together key themes in this vital area of study. The intersection of music and war has been of growing interest to scholars in recent decades, but to date, no book has brought together this scholarship in a way that is accessible to students. Filling this gap, the chapters here address topics such as military music, commemoration, music as propaganda and protest, and the role of music in treating post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), enabling readers to come to grips with the rich and complex relationship between one of the most essential arts and the conflicts that have shaped American society.

PART I

Military and Domestic Music

1

THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR

The Continental Army

Raoul F. Camus

On June 14, 1775, the Second Continental Congress authorized the formation of an “American Continental Army,” and within the next few days, it appointed a number of brigadier and major generals, with George Washington as general and commander in chief. But authorizing an army and appointing a few generals does not make an actual functioning army. It is important, therefore, to consider what the situation was before this authorization.¹

From the very beginning, the settlers depended on their own militia for protection from outside forces. While the militia system in Europe had atrophied with the rise of national armies, the colonies could not afford the luxury of a standing army—men whose sole purpose was the military. While it varied from colony to colony, the colonial militia usually consisted of every able-bodied male sixteen to fifty years of age (later eighteen to forty-five). The militiaman was expected to equip himself with a flintlock musket and the necessary accoutrements at his own expense and serve for a brief period of time, normally unpaid.² Training and organization were rudimentary; each colony formed its own militia following British models. Militiamen supported the British army in the Seven Years’ War (1756–1763, normally referred to as the French and Indian War in America). It is outside the scope of this chapter to provide a complete history of the events leading to the formation of the Continental Army, but some background is necessary.

Following the Seven Years’ War between France and England—with other countries involved—the British government decided to station permanent troops in America, to be supported by new taxes on the colonists. Opposition was quick and grew with each British attempt to have the army enforce unpopular laws and taxes. When British troops were transferred to Boston from the frontier to suppress protests over the taxes imposed by the Townshend Act, incidents from both sides were set in motion: the Boston Massacre (1770), the Boston Tea Party (1773), and the Coercive Acts intended to punish Boston and the colonists. The colonists responded by strengthening their militias. Units that could muster at short notice (minutemen) were formed, and military supplies were gathered. It was the British attempt to seize the military stores in Lexington and Concord that actually ignited the Revolution. Militia units from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Connecticut rushed to Boston’s defense. This is the army that George Washington took command of on July 2, 1775—an army of men whose temporary enlistments would soon expire.

With the change from individual combat to pike warfare in the sixteenth century, military tactics required the men to march in step, advancing or retreating in block movements. Because the large snare drum could be heard over the noise of battle, it was used to set the marching cadence and transmit orders. The sixteenth-century cylindrical wooden rope-tensioned drum, normally emblazoned with the arms or crest of the king or colonel, would be about 2½ feet by 2½ feet, with two gut cords across bottom. A fifer was often added to help soldiers recognize the various signals through specific melodies. The fife was a one-piece wooden cylindrical flute with a mouthpiece and six finger holes. The fifers and drummers were primarily signalmen, not musicians.

The smoothbore matchlock arquebuses and pikes became obsolete with the introduction of the flintlock musket in the middle of the seventeenth century.³ Once the socket bayonet was developed, it became the standard infantry weapon. The drum was still used to set the cadence and transmit orders, but by the eighteenth century, it had been reduced to about 18 by 17½ inches. Figure 1.1 shows a snare drum that is reported to have been carried by Luther W. Clark at the Battle of Guilford Courthouse on March 15, 1781.⁴

The soldier’s day was regulated by the various beats of the drum, which indicated to him the passage of time as well as the action that was expected of him. In addition, actions that were not regulated by the clock or did not apply to the army as a whole were directed by signals. All these beats and signals, referred to as the camp duties, were to be given by the drum, and the soldiers were expected to learn them and instantly obey them.

It was the responsibility of the drum major to teach and supervise the fifers and drummers. He was often assisted by a fife major, who would be expected to teach the fifers. It should be stressed that the fifers and drummers were men who held the rank of corporal and were paid accordingly. The romantic stories of boy drummers date from the Civil War, not the Revolution. Specific hours were set aside for practice, and drummers playing at other times without orders would be punished. There being no system of notation as yet developed for drum rudiments, instruction was by rote, using terms such as strokes, rolls, flams, and drags. For the fifers, however, there were at least five tutors published in London before the Revolution. In addition to fingering charts, these tutors usually contained the English duty, the Scots duty (for the Scottish regiments), and miscellaneous popular marches. Except where there was a specific melody associated with the beat, the fifers were free to choose any melody to accompany the standard marching cadence.

FIGURE 1.1 Snare Drum.

During battle, the drummer was expected to march right behind the advancing line, continuing to give signals as required. Following the battle, the drummer was expected to help the wounded. The drummer was also required to administer punishments such as lashings with a cat-o’-nine-tails or the ceremony of drumming criminals out of camp.

Because of their importance as signalmen, as well as the need to identify them quickly in battle, the musicians were dressed differently and usually more elaborately than the soldiers. An intricate color code developed—that of reversed facings. While the British soldier’s coat was red, each regiment had a distinctive color for its uniform linings, cuff, and lapel facings. The musician’s coat would be the color of the facing. During the Revolution, when over forty British infantry regiments were stationed in America, the colonists could have seen drummers wearing coats of blue, gray, orange, white, four shades of yellow, two shades of green, two shades of buff, or royal red. Under the coat would be a white or buff waistcoat and matching breeches, with black gaiters. The musicians carried a short sword with a scimitar blade and wore a black bearskin cap with a silver-plated crest of the king’s cypher or monogram. The drum was painted in the color of the regimental facing so that the shell would match the drummer’s coat. By 1781, with supplies mainly from France, the Continental soldier finally had a uniform, making the army look more like the traditional European professionals. In contrast to the British army’s red coat and the French army’s white coat, the Continentals adopted a blue coat. Figure 1.2, by Donna Neary, a modern artist specializing in military uniforms of the period, illustrates what is meant by reverse colors. The shaded portions of the private’s and drummer’s coats would be dark blue. The unshaded portions of the coats (the ground of the drummer’s coat and the collar, cuffs, and lapels of the private’s coat) would then be white, buff, red, blue, or scarlet depending on the branch and geographical location.

The large, undisciplined, unorganized mass of men besieging Boston in 1775 can hardly be called an “army” in the European sense: there were no uniforms or brightly emblazoned drums, and each colony had its own organization. Virginia men were to be clothed in a hunting shirt, implying that they were skilled riflemen—a weapon more accurate than the smoothbore flintlock. Others wore their usual civilian clothes. It was George Washington’s challenge that prompted them to form an army out of these various militia units—which had been founded on British models. Officers were appointed and regiments formed. While there were variations between the colonies, most seemed to follow the recommendations of the Massachusetts Provincial Congress in April 1775, which adopted an infantry regimental formation of 598 men: a colonel, a lieutenant colonel, a major, an adjutant, a quartermaster, a chaplain, a surgeon, two surgeon’s mates, and ten companies. Each company was to have a captain, two lieutenants, an ensign, a drummer, a fifer and fifty-five enlisted men.⁵

FIGURE 1.2 Donna Neary, Private and Drummer, Continental Line, 1781.

The Manual Exercise as Ordered by His Majesty in 1764 was the standard training manual for the militias and was reprinted many times in the colonies. In 1773, Timothy Pickering prepared An Easy Plan of Discipline for the Militia to supplement the British text.⁶ Used along with other miscellaneous military works, this variety of manuals resulted in a lack of standardization.

Militiamen were normally called to duty for a limited amount of time. In order to maintain an army that would otherwise cease to exist at the end of 1775, Congress developed a plan to have a Continental Army of one artillery and twenty-seven infantry regiments, all enlisted for the year 1776. Each regiment was to consist of a headquarters staff and eight companies of ninety officers and men, including one fifer and one drummer. Recruiting was slow, and by March 1776, Washington had just over 9,000 men, not the 20,000 authorized. The general supply situation had improved somewhat, and the British had been forced out of Boston, but Washington had suffered reverses in several battles and had been forced to retreat to Pennsylvania. His victories at Trenton and Princeton boosted morale somewhat, and the army went into winter quarters at Morristown.

To avoid the problem of raising a new army each year, Congress had authorized eighty-eight regiments to be enlisted for the duration of the war. France had agreed to send muskets, powder, and other badly needed military stores. General Gates had captured British General Burgoyne and his troops at Saratoga, but it was very difficult for Washington to keep his little army from collapsing. With Howe and the British forces comfortably settled in Philadelphia, Washington moved what few troops he had into Valley Forge for his second winter encampment (December 19, 1777–June 19, 1778). The devotion of this small group of men, in spite of the shortages of food, clothing, and shelter, may be summarized by Baron Friedrich von Steuben’s comment that no European army would ever have remained in existence under such desperate conditions.

Von Steuben arrived at Valley Forge in February 1778 and offered his services as a volunteer. Washington asked von Steuben, a former Prussian drillmaster, to serve as acting inspector general of the army in charge of training the troops. Von Steuben immediately set to work developing a drill manual that adapted Prussian techniques to American individualism. He organized a model company and drilled it himself. He then used that company as a cadre for all the troops in the encampment. Washington was very pleased with the results and had von Steuben confirmed as inspector general with the rank of major general.

To assist von Steuben in training the army, subordinate inspectors were appointed for each brigade. Music was considered of such importance that a subordinate inspector was appointed for its standardization and supervision. John Hiwell was appointed inspector and superintendent of music in the army on August 19, 1778, with pay and rations equal to a captain of artillery. Hiwell held the rank of lieutenant in Crane’s 3rd Regiment of Artillery, and in at least one order, he is referred to as a fife major. He apparently was in charge of Crane’s band of music (see the following) and was a logical choice for such an important position. He immediately set to work and ordered the drum and fife majors to report to his tent to receive his instructions. He worked to have damaged instruments returned and replaced, fifes sorted according to key, and the pitch standardized. He regularly submitted requests to the quartermaster for instruments, complaining about their being lacking in the various regiments, and he constantly encouraged the drum and fife majors to improve the work of the musicians in their charge. This was especially true once...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• Table of Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Contributors
• Introduction
• Part I: Military and Domestic Music
• Part II: Remembering: Music and Memory
• Index