In this section we will review and evaluate the medical model, and three psychological and social models: the normative or statistical model, the adaptation model, and the growth or developmental model. The purpose is to reveal the problems with some of the most used models of psychosocial health, and propose more fruitful ways to conceptualize healthy spirituality.
The Medical Model
At the beginning of the twentieth century, psychotherapy emerged primarily from the medical field of psychiatry. Since then, the medical model has had, and continues to have, an important influence on views of mental health and illness. This model is based on the metaphor of biological disease, and can be summarized as having three elements:
1. Specific symptoms are indications of dysfunction.
2. These symptoms cluster in patterns that can be diagnosed as diseases.
3. The occurrence of disease indicates that the system is out of balance, and homeostasis needs to be restored.
Symptom
An example of a symptom is a hallucination, seeing or hearing something that other people don’t hear or see. Symptoms such as hallucinations and delusions (thought disorders) are thought of as occurring in clusters, which characterize particular syndromes. The combination of hallucinations and delusions most commonly occur in the syndrome that is labeled paranoid schizophrenia.
In many areas of biological medicine, specialists can test for specific disease mechanisms and determine, for example, the presence of a viral infection or a genetic defect to confirm a diagnosis. This is not yet possible in psychiatric medicine. However, in recent decades psychiatry has learned to use psychotropic drugs for their pragmatic effects in relieving symptoms, without a necessary correlation to diagnosis. Symptoms such as hallucinations or delusions are likely to diminish strikingly when certain drugs are used, which provides some evidence for a biological root for these symptoms, at least in some patients (Oltmanns & Emery, 2001). A biochemical imbalance or a neurological dysfunction may exist. These can appropriately be treated biologically, though the mechanisms of the disease process may be unknown, and these symptoms may not necessarily be part of a full syndrome or “disease” classification. In short, the effectiveness of a biological treatment such as a psychotropic drug does not necessarily imply the correctness of the whole medical model.
The model has no clear criteria for determining whether or not a particular behavior or experience is a symptom. Some of the symptoms listed in the American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) are dysfunctional in certain contexts, but are not so in other societies or social settings. A specific behavior, such as seeing a vision, in a particular cultural context may not indicate dysfunction. In some Native American cultures, a youth who has not yet found his life direction is expected to go on a “vision quest,” and that journey often includes experiences that traditional Western psychiatry would call hallucinations. In these instances the assumption that the behavior is a symptom seems culturally inappropriate.
A further criticism of the medical model is that some behaviors have been labeled “symptoms” simply because they are statistically rare or uncommon behavior, not because they are either dysfunctional or part of a syndrome. They are abnormal in the sense of falling at one extreme on a normal curve. For decades psychiatry treated homosexual behavior as pathological, though no evidence proved it caused harm or that it was associated with other symptoms of mental disorder (Hooker, 1957, 1972). If we think of sexual orientation as a range from totally heterosexual to totally homosexual, the latter was labeled pathological solely because it was less common. Logically, bisexuality would seem to be the most flexible orientation, and either extreme (totally heterosexual, for example) might be seen as fetishistic! In short, the biological metaphor of medical diagnosis has been used in ways that, intentionally or not, masked the value judgments and the cultural ethnocentricity which led to the diagnosis. Objectively, neither homosexual acts nor visions confirming an identity are necessarily “dysfunctional.”
Diagnosis
Though the diagnosis of biological diseases in terms of clusters of symptoms has proved a fruitful approach, its application in the mental health field has not been as successful from the point of view of scientific data. Beginning with Emil Kraepelin’s (1923) Textbook of Psychiatry, followers of the medical model have assumed that a fixed set of mental disorders exists, and that their obvious manifestations cut across cultures. This assumption is called cultural universality (Sue, Sue, & Sue, 2000, p. 9). The medical concept that a series of symptoms form clusters that can be appropriately labeled “syn-dromes” or diseases has wide prevalence, and undergirds the major diagnostic categories used to provide insurance coverage (the DSM), but has little empirical validation. Studies for decades have shown little consistency in the use of diagnoses such as schizophrenia. Even the symptoms that are assumed to be defining are not the same between cultures. For example, a key symptom in defining schizophrenia in Germany, labeled Gedankenentzug, is not noted as a defining symptom in either British or American textbooks (Marsella, 1979). (Gedankenentzug refers to a patient’s experiencing the loss of thoughts but believing the thought has been taken away from him or her by someone or something outside of him or her [Ute Binder, 2001, personal communication; Marlis Pörtner, 2002, personal communication].)
The primary empirical bases for the clusters that have been called “syndromes” are statistical procedures (factor analyses) based on data limited to American and British cultures. By insisting on the use of the DSM, medical insurance companies have reinforced the perception that these categories are scientific, when in fact they are culturally biased. An additional factor in the failure of researchers and practitioners to recognize the cultural bias of these concepts is the increasing specialization in practitioner training. Persons trained in psychology or medical psychiatry are likely to have little awareness of anthropology. Yet the relativity of normal behavior was emphasized as early as 1934 by anthropologist A. Hallowell. He stated that the cross-cultural investigator:
As the training of practitioner counselors increasingly includes courses in multiculturalism, the recognition of the role of culture is increasing, but it has yet to fully permeate the mental health field at the level of training and research. In research, the official diagnostic systems of the medical model continue to serve as the constructs for most empirical studies in psychopathology, regardless of culture. And in clinical practice, official diagnostic systems of the medical model provide the definitions of mental illness (Oltmanns & Emery, 2001). This is “an unfortunate commentary on the ethnocentricity of [Western researchers and] practitioners.” (Marsella, 1979, p. 244).
Homeostasis
The third element of the medical model is the belief that the system is out of balance. The concept of balance within a system is one of the more useful contributions of the medical model. It was originally applied at the biological level. At the biological level, it isn’t important that two bodies have the same quantity of H20 or of potassium, as long as the amount of water and potassium are in balance with the other elements in a particular person’s system. Health implies that everyone should have the opportunity to achieve their individual optimal condition biologically, not that everyone fit a uniform and absolute standard of biological performance or measurement (as the World Health Organization [WHO] definition of health clarifies) (World Health Organization, 1958).
The concept of homeostasis can also be applied at the intrapsychic level, and at the social level (e.g., family systems). Intrapsychically, one person need not have the same way of treating work and play as another person, but they must achieve some balance. The whole mechanics of the id, ego, and superego in Freudian theory can be seen as a physical metaphor for the individual’s attempt to achieve homeostasis. The cognitive parallel to homeostasis is called the principle of consonance (in social psychology), or congruity (in client-centered and self-theories of psychotherapy). We will examine this in more detail in the next section of this chapter.
Homeostasis as a definition of mental health ran into trouble because it gave the false impression that successful functioning is primarily a matter of stability, of staying the same. It suggests the image of the healthy person as standing still, standing in one place. But a healthy person, biologically, is not only capable of standing, but of moving and developing. To continue with the metaphor of balance, it would seem more accurate to define health as the ability to risk a temporary imbalance, then to regain balance, risk and regain again. This is, after all, what we do in walking. Moving through life is like moving through space: it demands a dynamic balance, not a static sameness. This leads us to a model that emphasizes growth and with it an openness to new experience. Developmental or growth models have been proposed by learning and developmental theorists as well as by “third force” therapists, and contrast to the symptom and disease emphasis of traditional psychoanalytic and behavioral therapists. This type of model will be discussed more fully. But first we will look at earlier psychological models that parallel the medical model.
Psychological and Social Models
In both the medical and the psychological models it is important to clarify the criteria for assessing a behavior as pathological or dysfunctional. The early psychological models, parallel to the medical model, tried to avoid value issues and claim objectivity. The normative or statistical model of abnormality focused on particular behaviors and whether these behaviors were common and accepted in the society.
This attempt failed once we recognized that a behavior is not dysfunctional simply because it deviates from the norm. Some “abnor-malities” are highly functional. For example, a very intelligent person who is at the extreme end of the normal curve of IQ scores is likely to be more capable of adapting than is a “normal” person (Sue, Sue & Sue, 2000). Thus the adaptation model gradually supplanted the normative model. A behavior was judged in terms of whether it was functional in adapting to the social setting; it allowed that some statistically uncommon behaviors or abilities are functional. Second, unlike the statistical model, the adaptation model recognized that behaviors that seem dysfunctional in one setting may be functional in another. For example, a Plains youth seeing flying objects in the sky during a vision-quest may be functional, whereas an urban Caucasian youth seeing UFOs would likely be viewed as having dysfunctional hallucinations.
The major problem with the adaptation model...