Nationalism and Globalisation

Conflicting or Complementary?

Daphne Halikiopoulou, Sofia Vasilopoulou, Daphne Halikiopoulou, Sofia Vasilopoulou

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2013
• eBook ISBN: 9781136635984
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Nationalism and globalisation are two central phenomena of the modern world, that have both shaped and been shaped by each other, yet few connections have been made systematically between the two.

This book brings together leading international scholars to examine the effect of globalisation on nationalism, and how the persistence of the nation affects globalisation. With a range of case studies from Europe, the US and Asia, the authors focus on the interaction between globalisation, national identity, national sovereignty, state-formation and the economy.

• Part one provides theoretical reflections on the flexibility and plasticity of the terms nationalism and globalisation focusing on the ways in which nationalism has shaped and has been shaped by globalising forces.
• Part two examines the relationship between nationalism and globalisation in different historical eras and different regions, questioning established approaches.
• Part three focuses on contemporary issues including the economic crisis, labour migration and citizenship and the theme of global culture.

The result is a highly topical account that considers the conceptual landscape of Nationalism and Globalisation.

With an interdisciplinary approach, Nationalism and Globalisation will be of interest to students and scholars of political science, sociology, history, economics and international relations.

PART I

The Historical Flexibility of Nationalism and Globalisation

1

NATIONALISM MIGHT CHANGE ITS CHARACTER, AGAIN

John A. Hall

It has been both necessary and easy to poke holes in extravagant claims suggesting that globalisation has so undermined the power of the nation-state, by hollowing it out both from above and below, that it has lost its place in the modern world (Hall 2000). For one thing, comparative historical sociology makes it clear that the nation-state was never all-powerful, thereby diminishing any view of massive decline. For another, there is every sign that many national groupings still seek their own state, in the advanced as well as in the developing world. And it is all too easy to continue with a negative critique. How globalised is the world in fact (Wade 1996)? Might it not be the case that while the North is better integrated, much of the South has no real significance for world capitalism (Mann 1997)? In this connection one ought to remember not just the high levels of trade before the First World War but quite as much the considerable interchange within the great European empires of the time – interchange which does not of course show up in trade statistics. Finally one must always remember continuity in the historical record. An appreciation of the nature of empire does help us to understand the position of the United States within the modern world political economy: differently put, not everything can be reduced to nationalism and globalisation.

The purpose of this chapter stands in contrast to all of this in seeking to be completely positive. My claim will be that one can go beyond a static understanding of globalisation and nationalism so as to explain difference and change within these categories. A stylised historical contrast, largely concerned with the advanced core of the world’s polity, stands at the back of the whole chapter. The increase in global trade and connectedness at the end of the nineteenth century was followed by the great European disasters of the twentieth century, thereby refuting the hopes of those who had argued that commerce would bring peace. In contrast, contemporary globalisation seems much more secure, with attempts to coordinate capitalist society standing in stark contrast to the beggar-myneighbour policies of the interwar period. The explanation that will be offered for the difference rests on a particular understanding of nationalism. It is well known that much of the theory of nationalism derives from late Habsburg society. Nonetheless, there is insufficient appreciation of the contribution to the theory in question of one prominent figure within that world, namely Sigmund Freud. I do not have in mind Moses and Monotheism, despite the interest of that treatise, but rather Freud’s characterisation of libido – as sticky, attaching itself to different desires and neuroses. This is how we should see nationalism, changing its character according to the forces with which it interacts. One can, of course, to take a single example, speak of Quebec nationalism in the abstract, but what helps understanding most is the realisation that its identity was different under the Catholic church, during the drive for secession and, most recently, when a measure of accord had been reached with the rest of Canada.

The following theoretical positions can usefully be borne in mind when confronting the two historical periods in question. First, attention needs to be given to the causal claims at the back of Gellner’s (1983) theory of nationalism. Social pressure derives from industrialisation, according to Gellner, as Ruritanians enter into cities, and seek, when led by nationalist intellectuals, to create a world that allows them to function in their own language. Very much a part of such pressure are generalized attacks on the position of ethnically visible minority groups, above all the Jews, which were over-represented in the most desirable forms of employment. Geopolitical theories, secondly, stand in marked contrast. We will see what is involved in detail during the course of this chapter, but the two elements at work can be noted immediately. The way in which states manage their nations is a first element, the level of intensity of interstate competition a second. Finally, it is mandatory to turn to the work of Karl Polanyi, for he is the theorist who most clearly relates nationalism to globalisation (Polanyi 1944). The central thesis of The Great Transformation is simple, namely that capitalism so disrupts lives that society eventually seeks a state to protect itself – with tariff walls then held to be responsible for creating international trade conflicts which in turn spill over into war.

The Dark Continent

Rather than giving details of the sheer destruction and mayhem involved in Europe’s twentieth century, let us turn immediately to assessing the extent to which the theoretical traditions identified help explanation.

Socio-economic change certainly created intense pressures from below. Gellner’s theory does a very great deal to describe the Bohemian world from which he came (Hall 2010: Ch. 10). For one thing, the rise in Czech educational standards led to an insistence on gaining access to top positions – an insistence that implicitly meant downward mobility for German speakers, and still more for Jews. For another, urbanisation meant continual pressure in local and national politics. Imperial censuses classified nationality in terms of language of daily use, a method viscerally opposed by Czechs because categorisation by mother tongue would have increased their own numbers. Classification mattered enormously, because funding for education depended upon it. So both Czech and German nationalist leaders sought ever more to cage peoples within their groups, going to extreme lengths to do so. It is very noticeable of course that the census return had no room for multiple identities, nor any place for those who were loyal to the empire (Bugge 1994; King 2002). So form did much to dictate content, creating ever more intense nationalist struggle. But we must be very careful at this point. Social scientists are prone to confuse conflict with catastrophe, to imagine that pressure leads to fundamental social change. This is very often not the case, as Simmel ([1922] 1955) demonstrated when showing how conflict could lead to integration and the resolution of difficulty. If in the Bohemian case there was certainly no resolution, there was a good deal of stability. Czech leaders had always been afraid of true independence, fearful of trying to live as a small state between Germany and Russia. Their greatest desire was for cultural rights that would protect the nation within a larger political frame that would give them protection. Their situation was bearable, for they had gained some rights. It is important at this point to place the Habsburgs in comparative context (Lieven 2000). Any attempt by Vienna to homogenise its territories was bound to be difficult, given the paucity of Germans. It was this that led Gellner (1997) eventually to see the Habsburg empire as a ‘kindergarten of the nations’. No such softness characterised other polities. What mattered here was the belief that national homogeneity would lead to increased strength through the removal of potential fifth columns and an increase in cooperative capacity. It was this belief that made Max Weber’s obsession with Polish labour within the East Elbian aristocratic estates entirely representative of his age. The Tsars could perhaps make a nation-state out of their possessions – for Russians would be a majority within the empire if the Ukrainians were persuaded to be merely ‘little Russians’. Here nations were genuinely imprisoned, with ever greater pressure being placed upon them. All of this is to correct or at least complement Gellner’s socio-economic view of nationalism. It was often less social developments amongst the Ruritanians that increased the salience of nationalism than the way in which the Ruritanians were treated by their respective megalomanias. The analytic point is simple: voice brings loyalty whilst its absence makes exit both rational and attractive (Hirschman 1970). The removal of any sort of voice for Ukrainians and its diminution for Finns in effect drove them to nationalism. And any sign that Vienna would try to homogenise their territories would be sure to diminish the loyalty of the nations within their control.

So there was potential force in nationalism, driven both by social change and by state demands. Danger was turned into pure dynamite by a second political factor, again neatly illustrated by the politics of Weber. The great German social scientist was a Fleet Professor, convinced that imperial possessions were needed for the nation to be strong, by providing its industries with raw materials and with markets. Differently put, globalisation only made sense if it was national. In one sense this conviction was ill-founded: the German economy was becoming ever more powerful within Europe without an empire – with the economic returns of imperial possessions for Britain and France anyway being very much open to question. But the belief was real, and what matters in economics is less the real than what is believed to be real. And Weber’s view was not entirely illogical. Free trade was fine for the British but their pushing of this ideology could be seen as hypocritical given that the Royal Navy would ensure the safety of their supplies at all times. Interdependence for Germany would be much more risky since it could face – and eventually did face (Offer 1989) – a blockade by that same fleet. Furthermore, empires might not pay now, but who was to say that they might not be necessary in the future – a viewpoint in fact espoused by no less a figure than Lord Rosebery. All of this can be summarised in the Freudian terms identified. Nationalism and imperialism were joined together in a powerful mixture that demanded expansion (Kaiser 1990).

As it happens, there was some awareness amongst political leaders that war would unleash the novel forces identified, and in consequence considerable restraint was shown in the years leading up to the First World War (Darwin 2007). Several attempts were made to allow all the European great powers imperial possessions overseas. With hindsight we can see the wisdom of the political leaders in question. For once war had started the combination of nationalising homogenisation and imperial demand unleashed ethnic cleansing, population transfer and mass murder within Europe itself. The dynamics of the situation have been neatly captured by Michael Mann (2005): to fear the disloyalty of a minority with a homeland elsewhere suggested the sense of pre-emptive control or cleansing, with a minority recognising that this might happen being prone to secede and to call for support from elsewhere. The aftermath of the First World War led to such geopolitical insecurity as to rule out an economically open world in the interwar years. And the high point of the intermingling of nationalism and imperialism came in Germany’s quest for Lebensraum in Mitteleuropa, albeit Stalin’s treatment of many national groupings was all too similar.

It is important to specify the argument being made at this point. No claim is being made that nationalism and imperialism, even when linked together, caused the onset of war in 1914. Rather they made the stakes and intensity of conflict, once it had started, altogether greater than anything seen before in European history. But what then did occasion war? Negatively, we can say that it was not caused by the factors identified by Polanyi. Society did not so lean on political leaders that international trade conflict resulted, leading in turn to war. Insofar as protectionism gained sway in the late nineteenth century it resulted much more from the fiscal needs of states, faced with military change, than with pressures from below (Hobson 1997). Whereas both socio-economic and geopolitical theories have much to tell us about the character of European disaster, Polanyi’s account has little relevance at this point. The onset of war is best explained in geopolitical terms as the result of miscalculation on the part of state elites, above all that of Imperial Germany (Mann 1993; Snyder 2000). In a competitive international system peace depends upon the ability to calculate clearly. In the German case this meant, as Bismarck had always known, that Germany should never become involved in a war on two fronts. But this is precisely what occurred – and, one might add, not just in 1914. The personal rule of the Kaiser allowed for factions to develop arguing respectively for a world policy and for advance to the East. No clear priorities were established, with the result that Germany ended up starting a war against the encirclement that it had itself created. Though the largest part of the explanation for this lies in the structure of the German state – that is, the fact that it was a court rather than any sort of body capable of rational calculation – nationalist sentiment did play some role. Radical right intellectuals felt that the state was not nearly nationalist enough; their electoral advance in 1912 placed some limits on the autonomy of the state.

Horror Mitigated

The summary account of the great European disasters of the twentieth century makes for a startling contrast with the post-war world. European states entered the greatest period of economic growth in their history. This in turn led to the creation of the European Union, and, in very recent years, to its ability to expand at the end of the Cold War so as to include a large number of new members from Central Europe, the Baltic area and the Balkans. At a more general level, the world economy has seen a huge increase in trade, now reaching levels higher than those of 1913 (Hirst and Thompson 1996). One can note that trade has changed its character. Much trade before 1913 depended upon portfolio investment. In recent years one can begin to speak of a genuinely interdependent world economy, in which integrated worldwide production within single firms has enormous importance: perhaps a third of world trade now takes place within companies – though we cannot be sure, since much is hidden from official national statistics. One point to be made immediately is that this new form of globalisation may yet have a significant impact on nationalism. If the United States wishes to act against Japanese car production it will no longer, so to speak, just take on Japan itself. Any such move will now face opposition from American workers in Ohio, where Honda has some of its main factories. None of this is even for a moment to say that there are no danger spots in the modern world that involve nationalist demands. Still, there has been considerable change, especially amongst the most powerful states of the world polity, and we must now ask whether the theories that we have identified help us to understand what is involved.

A rather divided picture must be offered of the socio-economic variable at the centre of Gellner’s work. The fact that Europe is now relatively free from visceral nationalist conflict can partly be understood in his terms, as the lessening of force of the national principle now that industrial society is securely established. Certainly there has been a considerable change, most evident perhaps in the presence of protections for minorities within the European Union. But it would be a mistake to congratulate ourselves too much. It is crucial to recognise a less pleasant reality that was quite as much in Gellner’s mind, namely that stability would result once the national principle as he understood it had been implemented. That has taken place: there are perhaps just three exceptions west of the Ukraine to a general situation in which a dominant e...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: bridging the gap between nationalism and globalisation
• Part I: The historical flexibility of nationalism and globalisation
• Part II: Between history and theory
• Part III: Contemporary issues
• Conclusion: Nationalism and globalisation: conflicting or complementary?
• Index