This survey traces the main developments in the history of trauma in four steps. (1) The first theories of this concept were developed by European and American physicians, neurologists and psychiatrists in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century. (2) Recent discourse-oriented histories of trauma have argued convincingly that these first diagnoses were constituted by and constitutive of specifically modern developments, such as the industrial revolution and the rise of modern nation states and welfare states. But if trauma is a product of modernity, this raises the question of whether genealogies of trauma should look beyond the established timeframe, locating the origin of this concept in discourses that emerged prior to 1850. (3) In the complex and turbulent history or, rather, politics of trauma, it is the establishment of the PTSD diagnosis in 1980 that marks a watershed moment, which heralded what has been termed a âshift in moral economyâ and the advent of present-day trauma culture. (4) The pioneers of trauma theory in the humanities participated in this shift, but their contested ethical stance raises the question of the current and future role of literary criticism in reading the traumatic wound. By addressing, in passing, some key achievements and shortcomings of extant genealogies, this survey also offers a brief historiography of the histories of trauma.
From railway spine to war neurosis: the beginnings of trauma theory
Isolated descriptions of what today we refer to as psychological trauma can arguably be traced all the way back to Homerâs Iliad (Shay 1994; Figley 2012: 454). Insofar as tragic events have caused humans immense and prolonged suffering since times immemorial, trauma may be deemed an âanthropological constantâ (Fricke 2004: 9). But since Judith Hermanâs, Bessel van der Kolkâs and Ruth Leysâ influential accounts of the history of trauma in psychiatry (Herman 1992; Van der Kolk, Weisaeth and Van der Hart 1996: 47â56; Leys 2000), the general consensus has been that the development of trauma as a scientific concept did not begin until the mid-nineteenth century. Marc Micale and Paul Lernerâs path-breaking interdisciplinary volume Traumatic Pasts: History, Psychiatry, and Trauma in the Modern Age, 1870â1930 and subsequent genealogies have foregrounded the context within which this concept emerged, particularly the context of the industrial revolution (Micale and Lerner 2001). The first systematic medical explorations of what would later be termed âtraumaâ began in the 1860s, when British medical practitioners investigated a mysterious condition called ârailway spineâ. This condition was ascribed to victims of railroad accidents who presented with physical disorders without having suffered any obvious organic injury. As a symbol of technological development and societal progress in the nineteenth century as well as of the dramatic changes brought about by modern life, the railway is intrinsically linked to the history of trauma. To a Victorian public rocked by frequent news of railroad collisions, the shocking arbitrariness and suddenness of railway accidents emblematized the dark side of the new golden age: an increased sense of vulnerability in the face of fast-moving technologies that exceeded human control and comprehension (Harrington 2001).
From its very first theorizations, trauma has generated controversial views about its aetiology. While the physician John Erichsen (1866) prominently attributed the railway spine syndrome to organic causes, namely to a concussion of the spine, the surgeon Herbert Page attributed it to emotional and neurological factors such as fright and ânervous shockâ (Page 1883). The Berlin neurologist Hermann Oppenheim coined the term âtraumatic neurosisâ for this paradoxical condition, in which victims of shock-like impact seemed physically unharmed, yet reported motor and sensory deficits such as paralysis and convulsions (Figley 2012: 455). In doing so, he introduced into psychiatry the Greek word for âwoundâ, âinjuryâ, which until then had been exclusive to surgery, thus paving the way for the notion that a shattering life experience can cause neurological and indeed psychological wounds analogous to physical wounds. In an 1889 monograph that initially exerted considerable influence on German psychiatry and legislation, Oppenheim (1889) maintained that traumatic neuroses constituted a distinct diagnostic entity. The Parisian neuropsychiatrist Jean-Martin Charcot, by contrast, subsumed them under the heading of the then-fashionable disorder hysteria. Although Charcot attributed hysteria to hereditary causes, thereby supporting the dominant neurophysiological paradigm of heredity, he associated cases of traumatic neurosis or âtraumatic hysteriaâ with physical accidents. He eventually ascribed an increasingly prominent role to emotional factors or ânervous shockâ â a term he adopted from Page â as causative agents (Charcot 1889: 30). He thus played an important role in the âprocess of psychologizationâ whereby what began as the concept of a somatic disorder developed into the concept of a neurological and, finally, a psychological condition (Micale, in Micale and Lerner 2001: 123).
But it is Charcotâs student Pierre Janet who today is credited with discovering a key feature of psychological trauma: dissociation (Van der Kolk, Weisaeth and Van der Hart 1996: 53). In his 1889 dissertation, Lâautomatisme psychologique (1889), Janet developed an elaborate model of the psyche, a few years ahead of the model developed by his fellow student at the SalpĂȘtriĂšre in 1888, Sigmund Freud. Based on clinical observations of somnambulism, amnesia, âdĂ©doublement de la personnalitĂ©â (âsplitâ or âdual personalityâ) and other seemingly hysteria-related phenomena, he identified the mechanism of dissociation as the process by which the mind âsplits offâ an event that is so violent or shocking that it cannot be integrated (âsynthesizedâ) into consciousness. Though psychiatrists such as Moreau de Tours (1865) had already theorized notions of dissociation, Janet produced its first elaborate model. The dissociated information, he maintained, takes on a âparasiticâ life of its own and recurs as autonomous âfixed ideasâ, uncontrolled by the cognitive mind. His discovery was groundbreaking: in present-day psychotraumatology, dissociation is widely regarded as âthe core pathogenic process that gives rise to posttraumatic stressâ (Van der Kolk, Weisaeth and Van der Hart 1996: 53).
However, the significance of Janetâs contribution was long forgotten. One of several reasons for this âamnesiaâ (Herman 1992: 7) was the advent of psychoanalysis. In their early Studies on Hysteria (1895), Freud and Josef Breuer initially adopted Janetâs concept of dissociation. In âThe Aetiology of Hysteriaâ (1896), Freud even posited a bold theory that suggested the widespread existence of sexual abuse. Against Charcotâs hereditary framework, he elevated trauma to a primary aetiology of hysteria, arguing that traumatic neuroses originate in sexual assault in childhood (Freud 1953â74, vol. 3: 191ff.). But the following year, the psychoanalyst dismissed his âseduction theoryâ, positing instead that neuroses originate in a dynamic of drives present at infancy. Today, Freud is often discredited for abandoning the notion of real trauma as a pathological determinant and subsuming it into a model of intrapsychic conflicts. Yet psychotraumatologists such as Gottfried Fischer and Peter Riedesser, who advocate for a ârelational model of traumaâ that allows for objective as well as subjective causal factors, nonetheless rely heavily on the influential model of trauma that Freud developed in later years (Fischer and Riedesser 2009).
In the years following the First World War, Freud returned to the subject of trauma once more, as the Great War left in its wake an epidemic of soldiers who presented with nonorganic nervous disorders. Neurophysicians increasingly recognized that so-called âshell-shockedâ soldiers suffered not from the concussive effects of exploding shells, but from extreme fear. In his aetiology of âwar neurosesâ in Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920), Freud described this traumatic impact as a breach of the psycheâs âprotective shieldâ (Freud 1953â74, vol. 18: 29). Because of the eventâs overwhelming force, Freud maintains, patients cannot integrate the experience into their psychic âeconomyâ. They are condemned to re-living the event in âdreams which, with a view to the psychical binding of traumatic impressions, obey the compulsion to repeatâ (33). Freudâs model of a breach in the protective barrier provided the starting point for the American psychoanalyst Abram Kardinerâs systematic account of war neurosis (Kardiner 1941), which in turn became a source for the symptomatology of PTSD in current psychiatric nosology. Freudâs concept of repetition compulsion has been absorbed into a cluster of PTSD-symptoms termed âintrusionsâ. The notion of a âtalking cureâ that âbindsâ (Freud) or ânarrativizesâ (Janet) the overwhelmingly terrifying experience laid the groundwork for present-day trauma therapy, which emphasizes the importance of integrating the dissociated memory into âa personal narrativeâ (Van der Kolk, Van der Hart and Marmar 1996: 309). And it formed the basis for the interrelation of trauma and narrative as explored in literary trauma studies (discussed further below).
Trauma: a product of modernity
Even this brief and selective survey of the first key steps in the development of trauma shows that this conceptâs history is highly complex and discontinuous. Herman aptly characterized the history of trauma as fraught with âepisodic amnesia:â âit has been periodically forgotten and must be periodically reclaimedâ (Herman 1992: 7). She also pointed out that in order to understand these fluctuations between progress and regress, critics must take into account the political contexts within which theorizations of trauma have occurred (Herman 1992, 2014). Indeed, histories of trauma succeeding Hermanâs have traced not only the political context but the many other discourses that have influenced the trauma concept. Interdisciplinary volumes from Micale and Lernerâs to J. Roger Kurtzâs Trauma and Literature (2018) have highlighted how the advent of the trauma diagnosis in the later 1800s was conditioned by major social, economic and political shifts, of which advanced industrialization, urbanization, technologization and modern warfare formed but one part. Other changes include the establishment of capitalist systems and the emergence of European nation states and welfare states, which in turn generated unprecedented innovations, such as health insurance and legal protections for a restive working class.
We might call these contextual approaches to the history of trauma âdiscourse-analyticalâ. This term seems particularly appropriate since the founder of discourse analysis, the historian Michel Foucault, proffered one of the earliest of such approaches. To date, genealogies of trauma have largely ignored the fact that Foucault concluded his 1973/74 lectures on Psychiatric Power with a brief but significant reference to what he deliberately termed the âdevelopmentâ of trauma. Charcot, Foucault maintained, âdeveloped the concept of traumaâ because he needed an âassignable causeâ, an âeventâ for hysteria: a manifest aetiology that would help build a rigorous pathological framework, which in turn would strengthen his anticlerical politics and consolidate psychiatryâs hold over a growing number of patients (Foucault 2006: 317). Pointing to other emerging power configurations, Foucault connected the advent of the railway spine diagnosis with the rising labour movementâs claims to welfare protections for the working class. For Foucault, trauma is essentially the product of a power struggle, that is, an âeventâ in a ...