Understanding Contemporary Strategy

David J. Lonsdale, Thomas M. Kane

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781138059474
• eBook ISBN: 9781351671453
• Edition: 2
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This textbook provides a comprehensive introduction to modern strategy, covering the context, theory, and practice of military strategy in all its different forms.

Covering all the main issues in the field, the book explores the major themes through a combination of classical and modern strategic theory, history, and current practice. It is split into three main sections:

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• The first provides the context for contemporary strategy and includes discussions of the human, technological, intelligence, ethical, and grand strategic dimensions.

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• The second part explores the theory and practice of strategy in different geographical domains, including land, sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

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• The final part engages with three of the most challenging forms of strategy in the contemporary era: nuclear weapons, terrorism, and insurgency.

This second edition brings the book up to date by including discussions of the rise and fall of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS); the emergence of robotics and artificial intelligence; major events in space and cyberspace; and the growing profile of nuclear weapons. Each chapter presents the reader with a succinct summary of the topic, provides a challenging analysis of current issues, and finishes with key points, questions for discussion, and further reading.

This book will be essential reading for upper-level students of strategic studies, war studies, military history, and international security.

PART I
Context

1
Strategy

Reader’s guide

The use of military power in politics (offence, defence, deterrence, coercion, and miscellaneous); defining strategy; the levels of strategy; the challenges of strategy (disharmony in the levels, the troubled relationship between war and politics, the enemy, the nature of war, the multidimensional nature of strategy, the polymorphous character of war, and friction); dealing with the challenges of strategy (theory and history, ample and quality forces, appropriate strategic culture, military genius, and effective command process).

Introduction

The conduct of war, regardless of time or place, cannot be meaningfully understood without reference to strategy. This book is divided into chapters that deal with strategy in many contexts. The essence of strategy, however, remains constant regardless of the situation. Strategy, which can best be described as the process that converts military power into policy effect, provides purpose and meaning for military activities. This opening chapter seeks to provide an understanding of strategy and the different levels at which it operates. Said understanding will not only define the core features of strategy but also identify those aspects of strategy that create substantial challenges for the practitioner. In particular, the discussion will focus on the troubled relationship between war and politics; the multidimensional nature of strategy; the polymorphous character of war; the nature of war; and friction. The chapter will then discuss how these difficulties can be overcome. However, before the chapter delves into the complexities of strategy, it will consider the place of military power in the world of politics and will in particular discuss the varied uses to which it can be put.

Box 1.1 Strategy defined

Strategy is the process that converts military power into policy effect.

The use of military power

Although military power often appears ill-suited to the nuanced world of politics, war is a political act and at times a necessary one. In conceptual terms, military power can take a number of forms: defence, offence, deterrence, coercion, and miscellaneous. Taken together, these categories represent the many uses to which military force can be put. Although military power is often perceived as a fairly blunt instrument of policy, it is a remarkably flexible tool in the right hands, and especially in relation to its psychological effects, it can be fairly subtle. This chapter will now briefly outline each of these different uses.

Defence is the most basic and important function of military power. Providing physical security for the nation-state is an essential enabler for the proper functioning of society. Indeed, without effective defence, societies and/or states can simply disappear off the map. For example, South Vietnam and Carthage are but two examples of states that no longer exist due to a failure in the defensive function of their military forces. Even if a state survives foreign attack and invasion, the effects of aggression can still be devastating. Millions of Jews in Europe who were outside the borders of Nazi Germany were slaughtered in Nazi concentration camps partly because the military forces of their respective states could not withstand German forces of conquest. Although the notion of security has expanded (to include such dimensions as economic and environmental security), providing basic physical security for its citizens and resources still remains the primary function of the state. Despite the importance of the defensive mission, there are no guarantees that it can be fulfilled in every circumstance. It may be, as was the case for Poland in 1939, that invading forces prove too strong and overwhelm defensive measures taken.

Despite the best efforts of sections of the international community (as expressed through international organisations and international law) to rein in military power, it continues to perform an offensive role. Both sub-state actors (terrorists and insurgents) and nation-states still regard the aggressive use of military power as legitimate and productive in pursuit of their policy objectives. Russian actions in Ukraine, the campaigns of al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq all serve to illustrate this point. Whether or not these particular adventures are regarded as successful is something of a moot point. From the perspective of a strategic analyst, what matters is that certain actors choose offensive military power as an appropriate means to achieve their objectives. Indeed, there are some policy objectives that are only attainable by aggressive military action, at least in a reasonable time-frame. Although the removal of the Taliban (from power in Afghanistan) and Saddam Hussein’s regime could conceivably have been achieved via diplomatic and economic pressure (although this is debatable), military power achieved these goals in relatively short order. However, as these and many other examples illustrate, the offensive use of force is fraught with difficulties and dangers. ‘Use with care’ is a label ideally suited for the offensive use of force.

The offensive use of force is not restricted to large invasions. Raids are a form of offensive action that have far more limited goals, perhaps focused on the destruction of a distinct target or the capture and/or killing of an individual. Examples of successful raids include the Israeli strikes on nuclear reactors in Iraq (1981) and Syria (2007) and the US raid to capture/kill Osama Bin Laden (2011). As will be explained in Chapter 11, the most recent raid against a potentially hostile nuclear programme (the Iranian uranium enrichment site at Natanz in 2010) was conducted via cyberattack (Stuxnet). This was, at least in part, because the Iranians, conscious of the 1981 and 2007 attacks, built the facility underground precisely to secure it against air attack.

In contrast to physically taking or defending something, deterrence and coercion function via the psychological effect of military power. Whereas deterrence has the negative objective of persuading an enemy not to take a certain course of action, coercion seeks to compel an enemy to act in a certain manner. It is tempting to suggest that deterrence differs from coercion in that the former relies solely on the threat of force, not its actual use. Whereas, coercion often requires a demonstration of force (the infliction of some pain) to have an effect. Although there is some validity in this perspective, it is not entirely true. Deterrence can occur once fighting has actually started. In such circumstances, so-called intra-war deterrence may rely on actions taken to increase the potency of threats. Nonetheless, it is generally true that deterrence is seen to have failed if force is actually used. It is also true that coercion can, and often does, function purely on the threat of force to compel. The mere deployment of forces in theatre may sometimes be enough to encourage a change in behaviour.

In conceptual terms, deterrence can operate via two distinct, but certainly not mutually exclusive, methods: punishment and denial. The former relies on the threat of the infliction of unacceptable costs on an enemy. By contrast, denial seeks to deter an enemy by denying them the ability to achieve their objectives. Deterrence grew to prominence during the Cold War, as it appeared to be the most apt defence posture for nuclear weapons. However, deterrence is by no means a product of the twentieth century, nor has it lost its relevance since the end of the superpower standoff. It remains an important element in defence policy and can be general or immediate (tailored) in character.¹

Coercion, as Thomas Schelling so aptly describes, is based on ‘the power to hurt’.² If it works well, coercion is an efficient use of force that has the possibility of no actual fighting occurring. Thus, policy objectives may be met simply by a vocal threat or the deployment of forces. As Byman and Waxman note, there is a significant difference in taking something and persuading someone to give it.³ In terms of costs to oneself, the latter is normally preferable. Although violence may not be needed, cumulative punishment may be required until the enemy changes their behaviour, as in the 1999 Kosovo campaign.

Although potentially efficient forms of strategy, both coercion and deterrence suffer from similar problems and limitations. Most importantly, they cede a certain amount of control to the enemy. Ultimately, it is the enemy that decides if they will accede to one’s demands or not. Their pain threshold may be extremely high, or they may not fully believe the threats they face. Both forms of strategy also rely on a reasonable understanding of the enemy. What do they value? How can I hurt them sufficiently? Can I hurt them? How much pain can they withstand? How does their decision-making process work? These are all extremely valuable questions one must pose when constructing a strategy of deterrence or coercion. To provide satisfactory answers to these questions, the intelligence task is substantial and complicated by analytical challenges. For example, accurate analysis of enemy intentions and will is undermined by various cognitive impediments. These include confirmation bias, groupthink, and mirror imaging. Before the attack on Pearl Harbor, key decision makers in the United States saw no advantage for Japan in an attack on Hawaii. As a result, US policy towards Japan, which included economic coercion, underestimated Japanese objectives and will. There is also the danger that a particular enemy may be beyond deterrence and coercion; their will and objectives may be near total in nature. Like all other aspects of strategy, there are no guarantees when using these forms of action.

Despite its rather blunt image, military power has great flexibility as an instrument of strategy. Those roles not mentioned so far can be corralled under the heading of miscellaneous. Under this category are too many uses to discuss them all in detail, but the most significant ones are defence diplomacy, constabulary, disaster relief, and peacekeeping. Defence diplomacy uses military force to grease the wheels of peaceful diplomatic relationships. Port visits by naval vessels and military parades for visiting dignitaries are some of the most obvious examples of this type of activity. The constabulary function covers counternarcotic operations as well as the enforcement of trade embargoes. Disaster relief is rather self-evident, but no less important for that. Due to their range of capabilities and culture of service, military forces are often the first on the scene of a major disaster. Finally, as the post–Second World War era reveals, various international and regional organisations have used neutral military forces in attempts to stabilise and monitor tense security environments, thereby enabling lasting political solutions to be explored.

Defining strategy

It has been established that military power has a substantial and reasonably flexible role in politics. But how does one translate military power into policy effect? The answer is strategy, but the term ‘strategy’ needs to be defined carefully. The theoretical literature provides many definitions of strategy. Clausewitz prefers a rather straightforward combat-orientated approach: ‘strategy [is] the use of engagements for the object of war’.⁴ Liddell Hart appears to have a slightly more nuanced understanding of the role that military power can play in the pursuit of policy: ‘strategy is the art of distributing and applying military means to fulfill the ends of policy’.⁵ Liddell Hart’s definition appears somewhat broader than that of Clausewitz, in that it can incorporate acts such as coercion, peacekeeping, and constabulary operations. The French theorist Andre Beaufre draws attention to the competitive nature of strategy: ‘strategy is… the art of the dialectic of force or, more precisely, the art of the dialectic of two opposing wills using force to resolve their dispute’.⁶ Finally, Colin Gray describes strategy as ‘the bridge that relates military power to political purpose; it is neither military power per se nor political purpose’.⁷ Drawing on all of these definitions for inspiration, to reiterate, this work defines strategy as the process that converts military power into policy effect.

It is useful to linger for a moment on the concept of process. Strategy is concerned with the dynamic relationships among ends, ways, and means, whereby ends refers to the policy objectives sought and ways refers to the strategic application of military means in the pursuit of those ends. In this sense, we see that although strategy deals with physical military assets, it is itself immaterial. Like love, strategy does not possess tangible, material form. It is not an entity. However, also like love, the effects of strategy can be seen and experienced and can have revolutionary consequences. Strategy is formed in the mind of the strategist and/or in the discussions that occur between the political and military leadership. Strategy is really concerned with controlling the process of converting military means into positive policy outcomes. Later in this chapter, we will return to the idea of controlling the process of strategy.

Box 1.2 The levels of strategy

• Policy – sets the objective to be achieved.
• Grand strategy – coordination of all a nation’s assets to pursue policy objective. Military strategy – use of military power in support of grand strategy.
• Operational – links tactical actions to military strategy (conceptually and geographically).
• Tactical – details relating to combat (deployment and engagement).

For conceptual reasons, and to rationalise the delegation of command, the process of strategy is organised into different levels. Atop the taxonomy of strategy is policy: the objective to be pursued. As Clausewitz reminds us, policy objectives can be extremely varied: ‘Policy… is simply the trustee for all these interests against other states.… we can only treat policy as representative of all interests of the community’.⁸ Whatever the policy objective in question, it must guide all the actions of the strategist. Since war is merely political intercourse conducted through the threat or use of violent force, military power should never become divorced from the policy that it serves. However, establishing a viable relationship between policy and the military instrument is challenging. Sometimes the conversion of military power to policy effect is direct, as would be the case when the po...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• List of text boxes
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• PART I Context
• PART II The geographic domains
• PART III Contemporary strategic challenges
• Conclusion: patterns in grand strategy today
• Index