1 The Myth of the Fall and its Impact
Pullman, Lewis and Others
A very warm welcome to the first lecture in this series and this book. Itâs rather longer than almost all the other lectures because, unlike the others apart from the lecture at the centre of the book on âfallen womenâ, it ranges quite widely across texts many of which I think youâll know. The other lectures are almost all focused on single texts which are widely studied and enjoyed.
My starting point here is the biblical story of the Fall and its impact and cultural significance. I approach it in terms of myth as a way of discussing it in the context of a rich sampling of literary texts and in the light of psychoanalytic ideas. And Iâll add that the final lecture on Miltonâs treatment of the Fall in his great Paradise Lost means that the beginning, middle and end of this book make up one of the threads that connect these lectures in ways that I hope you find productive in your reading-lives.
**
Myths serve to relieve anxiety. They start from a difficult question or problem and guess backwards with a narrative that ends with âexplainingâ or âansweringâ what was otherwise inexplicable, relieving the anxiety caused by the original problem. The myth of the Fall, and the subsequent loss of Eden, has such a tentacular reach and power to suggest that the anxieties to which it ministers are the most urgent and elementary of all. There are some pressingly specific anxious questions that the myth âanswersâ, like why are womenâs child-labours so painful, why do men âruleâ over women, why do we wear clothes and feel shame about our private parts â oh, and why do we have to die? But there are more generalised but just as pressing anxieties at stake. Why am I not happy? Why do I not get what I want? Why does what I want, when I get it, not make me happy? Why is desire bound to fail to reach its object? Why have I lost what I had? And what am I being punished in this way for? Why canât I stay with mummy, at her breast, in her bed?
Why are you not happy? You were, but Eve (and then Adam) contrived to make sure youâd never be, any more, properly. The anxiety of unhappiness is narrated as a myth which relieves the burden: a myth in which there is an othering of good and bad, Eden and Fall. Gerard Manley Hopkins calls it, and his sweetly poisonous poem, âSpring and Fallâ and in it he addresses a child who is weeping over leaves falling in Autumn. He tells her that the âspringsâ for all sorrows are identical and reside in the âblight man was born forâ, the Fall that is death, her own death for which she unknowingly weeps. The blight man was born for. Why are you going to die? You werenât, once. Iâm reminded of the moment Alice returns to her world from Wonderland and her sister is brushing dead leaves off her face: her journey started at the height of summer so, in a subtly muted way, the year has fallen and died, intimating a kind of death for Alice herself. But that makes sense because, for Carroll, Alice growing into a mature woman (in what he pointedly calls the after-time) is a kind of death, certainly for him and even for her.
The root anxiety which the Fall myth most elementally answers to is our collective need to believe in guilt itself â it being preferable (to paraphrase Elaine Pagels) to feel guilty than helpless, better than subsisting in a void of meaninglessness. To believe in guilt is to believe that things were better once, that we were happy once but that something happened which is my fault or someone elseâs fault, or everyoneâs, and that things now, like gardens, arenât what they used to be, before we grew up, before language, before daddy. The myth of the Fall is everyday pathology. This is what the post-Freudian psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan realised in his ideas about the infant having to negotiate a series of wounding separations after losing the primal and nurturing illusion that its world consists exclusively of one unified entity, infant-plus-mummy. Separation from the breast, from the bed, the recognition that mummy has needs focused elsewhere, notably on daddy â these are the psychic losses of the childâs garden, of Eden. Garden is mother. What Freud and Lacan had to say about the infantâs negotiation of mother-loss and its subsequent insertion in forms of exile and deferred desire is, in this sense, just the story of Adam and Eve losing their garden told in a grown-up way or, an example at random, the story of David Copperfield now barred by the padlocked gate and the high fence from the garden where âfruit clusters on the trees, riper and richer than fruit has ever been since, in any other garden, and where my mother gathers some in a basketâ (Chapter 2). We are exiles from that garden/mother.
Hamlet knows this as painfully as anyone when he describes his post-Edenic and fallen world, where his mother has in effect exiled him from her love by marrying a hated brute, as âan unweeded garden / That grows to seed; things rank (= disgusting) and gross in nature / Possess it merelyâ (= completely: his hated uncleâs grossly complete possession of his mother). He now feels that his own flesh, as well as what was the beautiful garden of a world, is âsulliedâ (= fouled; Act 1, Sc. 2. Reading supplied from second quarto). Before this evidence of his motherâs sexual appetite Hamlet fed off (as all children do) an idealised family romance where he, mother and (first) father were the Edenically unsullied unit. Old Hamlet (as ghost), describing the official account of his murder in the Edenic garden (âsleeping in my orchardâ) as the work of a âserpentâ, pointedly colludes in this fantasy-romance when claiming that his love for Gertrude was of a chaste and simple purity: âwhat a falling-off was thereâ is his phrase for Gertrude then choosing Claudius (Act 1, Sc. 5).
When Alice falls into Wonderland she wants to and canât get into the most beautiful garden â sheâs either too big or too small â and when she does eventually get there itâs a nightmare world of cardboard cut-outs with a pseudo-mother wanting to decapitate her (and everyone else). The opening fall down the rabbit-hole itself is a death-fall (into the underworld) and birth-fall (down the birth-canal) combined, as well as a flying-penetration-orgasm-fall, and therefore none of these; the same may be said of the other child-fantasy or adult-nightmare scenes (according to how theyâre read), like Alice in the White Rabbitâs house, which is at once the child small enough to play in the dollâs house, the terror of claustrophobia, the foetus constricted in the womb, the vagina about to be penetrated by Bill the lizard (whose pencil Alice famously deprives him of in the trial scene). The garden which Alice longs to enter functions equivalently, attracting multiple connotations which, somehow, float into each other, neutralising their forces. Itâs Eden as mother, Alice wanting to go home, Carroll wanting his mother and to be her mother, the womb, the place where weâre always too big or too small to enter (or re-enter), the ârealâ Eden weâre all locked out of, the ârealâ world Alice wants to grow into, the Deanery garden in which, from his rooms, Carroll can get glimpses of Alice at play.
Too big or too small: the wonderful 17th-century priest-poet George Herbert, wanting to be an orange-tree in his poem âEmploymentâ, reflects bleakly that he can never reach God to offer back his fruit: âBut we are still too young or old; / The man is gone / Before we can our wares unfold: / So we freeze on / Until the grave increase our coldâ. Why do I not get what I want? Why does what I want (like Aliceâs garden), when I get it, turn out so wrong? Desire never reaches its goal, as Lacan also said about language. Meaning like desire is always deferred. In effect the garden disappears as soon as Alice enters it, in the way that all objects of desire turn out to be not the ones we thought we wanted. That itself is not the least of the falls intimated in these stories, the garden that collapses into playing-card world.
Our attempts to love are acts of recovery from these wounding psychic separations. Thatâs why itâs impossible to read Cathy and Heathcliffâs love as anything other than as constituted in and structured by separations and loss â for, in effect, they are each otherâs lost mother. (More on this great novel in the third lecture.) The novel insists that loss is the principal fact of our psychic lives, and Emily Dickinson notices this more than once in her poems, one of them even suggesting that her first moment of consciousness was of being bereft, having lost something â but not knowing what.
The need to believe in guilt is also the need to believe in significant events, significantly connected, to believe in narratives. The pre-Fall Eden, like the infantâs earliest bonded bliss with the mother, by definition cannot be narrated. Adam and Eve are happy, for ever. That is not narrative. Narratives are by definition fallen as they end in closure, which is death. The Fall narrative is narrative at its most elemental or pure â perhaps the only narrative we have to tell. Eden/happy/forever; temptation; fall; punishment/exile/death. The need for narrative may in turn be related to the most primitive moment of the infant at the breast. Hunger > satisfaction > sleep. This meta-narrative is as close to the Edenic non-narrative as we can get. Related perhaps also is an equally urgent need, that of the infantâs later need for the bed-time story. Tell me a narrative > the narrative is told > sleep. Hunger for food and hunger for story > satisfaction > sleep is also the narrative of desire: desire > sex > orgasm. And if pre-Fall Eden is hunger > satisfaction > sleep in an endless cycle in what has been called time as mythos, the Fall is hunger > satisfaction > death where food is sex and death is punishment, in what is called time as chronos, time as linear.
And if there is this psychic connection between need for food and need for story, in that for the infant they both lead to the desired sleep, that might suggest why, in Philip Pullmanâs dazzling His Dark Materials trilogy, Mary Malone is told to play Satan, to awaken the budding sexuality of Lyra and Willâs desire for each other, and she does so by telling them a story of her own first sexualised love, with its own context of significantly charged eating. She feeds them her story and they fall. And it was good.
The need for narrative may account for the fact that we prefer, and tend to know much better, the story of Adam and Eveâs creation in Genesis 2 and 3 rather than the one in Genesis 1. In terms of sexual politics the difference is vital. In Genesis 1 âGod created man in his own image ⌠male and female created he themâ, in effect simultaneously and equal. In Genesis 2 and 3, Adam is created first and superior and Eve is only secondarily created from Adamâs rib as âan help meetâ for Adam as âit is not goodâ for Adam to be alone. But Genesis 1, God the workman working then resting, is only a linear narrative in the sense that he stops working and we prefer the narrative action of the Fall in Genesis 2 and 3 â which incidentally was written much earlier than Genesis 1 (and their writers were different). The former earlier narrative (the Fall) was apparently written to warn the Jews not to be too complacent; the latter later narrative was written to console them in their captivity.
Northrop Frye notes that the story of the Fall seems originally to have been one of many âsardonicâ folktales explaining how mankind was cheated out of immortality by malign deities. He also points to a strange moment at Genesis 3.22 in which God âseems to be telling other Gods that man is now âas one of usâ and in a position to threaten their power unless they do something about it at onceâ (Frye 1982: 109). But the early Christian church fathers would have had no time for such sceptical reflections on the origin of their founding myth. Itâs those church fathers whose readings of Genesis 2 and 3 set the pattern for all the later repressive and misogynistic doctrines that have so disfigured Western culture and which Milton and Pullman rebel against â and, I would add, Blake. (Mind you, the early fathers disagreed about the reason why Eve and Adam fell: was it because they were children, because they were gluttonous, because they were lustful?)
The Judeo-Christian tradition is unashamedly misogynistic. Orthodox Jewish men still thank their God for not being created women. Clement of Alexandria said that every woman should blush at the thought that she was a woman. For Thomas Aquinas women are defective. In Leviticus a woman who gives birth to a son is considered unclean for 40 days; in the case of a daughterâs birth the unclean period is 80 days. Earliest human cultures had believed that creation was the work of earth-goddesses and that everything in life was sacred because of its place in that matriarchal wholeness. This world-view was replaced by the Hebrew invention of a single male God; myths across many cultures have stories telling how matriarchal systems were destroyed by a new order led by a dominant male God. The radical change in world-view has been put down to a biological shift from the right side of the brain (imagination, wholeness) to the left side (order, reason, logic).
The move to patriarchal power needed justification in the form of reading Genesis 2 and 3 in a way that emphasised the primacy of Eveâs fault and the justness of the most aggressive of the three punishments, hers. Sheâs punished with the pains of childbirth and, in a much discussed passage, with a future in which âyour desire will be for your husband, and he will rule over youâ. This was and is taken to mean that womenâs desire is not hers to dispose on herself but a desire only real in the sense that itâs subject and subservient to male desire.
Chaucerâs âKnightâs Taleâ has a moment thatâs very pertinent here, especially as his women are generally more sensible and practical than his men. Iâm not sure if its unpleasantness has been recognised very widely. This is when Emily, who wants to remain a virgin for her entire life rather than be anyoneâs mistress or wife, but now faced with two men who confidently expect her hand, asks the goddess Diana to turn their hearts away from her so that the fire of their violent loves will âbe queynteâ (quenched) and her âmaydenhedeâ be preserved. And Dianaâs response? The two fires on her altar behave in a very âqueynteâ (curious) way. One of them âqueynteâ (quenched) and then âquikedâ (started up) again while immediately the other âwas queynte and all agon; / And as it queynte, it made a whistelingeâ followed by the running of many drops apparently of blood.
The terrified Emily has no idea what this means. It means that one suitor will be defeated but survive (âquikedâ), and one bloodily wonât, but those five intrusively obvious repetitions of âqueynteâ (curious; quenched) canât but be read as an ironic reply to her wish to stay a maiden all her life (and why shouldnât she?) with the love of both men âqueynteâ (quenched) â but also as very aggressively punning on a third sense, which Chaucer uses elsewhere, âqueynteâ as female genitals (âgrabbed her by the queynteâ in âThe Millerâs Taleâ â this worried me very much when I was a fifteen-year-old at school â and as later in Marvellâs âyour quaint honourâ in his âCoy Mistressâ poem which Iâm sure many of you know). So Dianaâs reply to Emilyâs wish to conserve her maidenhead is, in effect: sorry, no â men are going to take your virginity, whether you like it or not. And the ...