âIf we can reveal that practices and beliefs have a history, then maybe we can destabilize their apparent immutabilityâ
Bosworth, 2001: 439
Introduction: contemporary juvenile justice debates in Europe and the importance of historical perspectives
Since the 1990s many European countries have introduced reforms to their juvenile justice legislation (Junger-Tas and Decker, 2006; Muncie and Goldson, 2006 DĂŒnkel et al., 2010; Decker and Marteache, 2017). These changes imply, to a certain extent, a departure from âclassicalâ juvenile justice principles that were established at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. Such reforms are often presented as repressive and are linked to a âtoughening upâ of attitudes and demands for more robust (punitive) responses to juvenile crime and youth delinquency (Goldson, 2002; Hendrick, 2006; Muncie, 2008; Bailleau and Cartuyvels, 2010; Dumortier et al., 2012). To counter such punitive tendencies, the increased need for (the real implementation of) international childrenâs rights standards has been advanced by several scholars (Muncie, 2008; Snacken and Dumortier, 2012; Goldson and Muncie, 2015) and, according to some, by taking account of such standards the excesses of punitiveness have been resisted in identifiable European juvenile justice systems (DĂŒnkel, 2016). Central to such rights approaches stands the concept of broad social justice for all children, the need to divert as many children and young people as possible from juvenile justice systems and, at the extremes, to limit any deprivation of liberty to an intervention of last resort and for the shortest time possible (United Nations Committee on the Rights of the Child, 2007; Goldson and Muncie, 2015).
However, by focusing solely on contemporary reforms and debates, their historical antecedents, problems and âsolutionsâ are lost in the mists of time. In other words, by not taking history into account, contemporary debates are at risk of continuously recycling common beliefs pertaining to juvenile justice rather than producing knowledge. It is to uncover contemporary myths and beliefs about juvenile justice that a longer-term, historical European perspective is needed.
Although it is inherently hazardous to attempt to outline general trends, reforms and evolutions across national frontiers â because every jurisdiction/country is confronted with its own particular conditions and comparative analysis is necessarily complex (Nelken, 2009) â a wider âEuropean perspectiveâ can help us to deepen our understanding of the foundation of Childrenâs Courts in different European countries. Of course, Europe is a large entity comprising 28 member states in the European Union and 47 member states in the Council of Europe. It is not, therefore, possible in a single chapter to provide a comprehensive historical account, and in this contribution the emphasis is on the origins of the childrenâs court in Belgium. Belgium is a particularly important jurisdiction given that within international-comparative research it is often referred to as a pioneer in European juvenile justice and, to this day, it is still commonly presented as being representative of the âwelfare modelâ (Junger-Tas and Decker, 2006; Bateman, 2012; Tonry and Chambers, 2012, 877; Dumortier, Christiaens and Nuytiens, 2017).
Notwithstanding its significance in Europe and beyond, however, it is also clear that the course and form that juvenile justice reform took in Belgium is not completely isolated. On the contrary, several countries in Europe and beyond witnessed the rise of specialised Childrenâs Courts at the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries (TrĂ©panier and Rousseaux, 2018). Even though national differences were clearly present, therefore â not least due to legal and political differences between common and civil law countries â certain core principles appear to be shared in the historical conceptualisation of the ânewâ Childrenâs Courts, including: (i) an ambiguous mission of âsavingâ children while also holding them to account, (ii) jurisdictional specificity (an exclusive focus on children and the exclusion of adults), (iii) the composition of the courts with specialised judges and âintimateâ (child-centred) processes, procedures and settings, and (iv) the inclusion of new collaborators working with the judge including probation officers, private (often religious) institutions and personnel and âscientific expertsâ (including doctors and psychiatrists).
To understand the common elements that characterise much juvenile justice reform, we will start with a first section on the rise of the childrenâs court in Europe in a context of major social, economic and political transformations. Our second section will then focus more sharply on the Belgian model through a diversity of sources including parliamentary sources (particularly pertaining to the Child Protection Act 1912) and judicial statistics and archives (especially relating to the Belgian Child Protection system from 1912â1965). In our conclusion and discussion we will, on the basis of this historical mapping, critically contextualise some contemporary debates that centre juvenile courts, juvenile justice and childrenâs rights in Europe.
The emergence and development of Childrenâs Courts in Europe: social, economic and political transformations
To comprehend the emergence and development of Childrenâs Courts we need to take account of the challenges European societies were facing at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. In this first section, therefore, we consider two important transformations that occurred at that time that, in turn, gave rise to two major questions (one social/structural and the other individual/moral).
The tensions between social justice and social defence
At the end of the nineteenthâbeginning of the twentieth century, both Europe and the USA were confronted with the âsocial questionâ. Ongoing processes of industrialisation and urbanisation during the nineteenth century, together with ultra-liberal politics and the absence of centralised social welfare systems, created an oppressed and highly impoverished working class who lived in miserable conditions (âle prolĂ©tariatâ). As a consequence, many European countries witnessed the rise of âsocialistâ, âcommunistâ or âlabourâ (political) movements that, together with the emerging and growing trade unions, aimed to defend the interests of the working classes; most notably, the struggle for the (universal) right to vote (Chlepner, 1972; Berger, 2006). Furthermore, sections of traditionally more conservative political parties and movements, together with the Church, also became inspired by principles of âsocial justiceâ. In the Anglo-Saxon world, for example, a new theology of Social Christianity developed throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth centuries (Phillips, 1996) and, in the Catholic belt of Europe, the philosophical revival of Thomas Aquinas at the end of nineteenth century, also helped to legitimise the principles of âsocial justiceâ (Kenny, 1980; van Kersbergen, 1995).
At the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries, however, the implementation of âsocial justiceâ was still at an embryonic stage. With regard to children and young people, key manifestations included the abolition of child labour and the obligatory education of children in many European countries (Rahikaenen, 2004). Although such steps can be taken to represent progress, they made minimal impact upon dominant modes of capitalist social ordering. The socialist and communist ideals of working towards a classless society and transforming the relations of production, distribution and exchange into âcommonâ entities were not shared by these early variants of âsocial justiceâ (Chlepner, 1972). On the contrary, such âsocial justiceâ was contingent and conditional and it was the bourgeoisie who maintained close control of the philanthropic âpatronageâ for the poor by deciding who might be helped (the deserving poor) and who might not (the undeserving poor). Indeed, such ostensible expressions of âsocial justiceâ (understood principally by reference to moral discourses) dovetailed neatly into the overarching imperative of âsocial defenceâ or social control, a much âtougherâ response to the âsocial questionâ and one that was principally driven by the maintenance of the status quo.
Indeed, as a reaction to the âsocial questionâ that was framed by class struggle (âla lutte des classesâ), âla bourgeoisieâ undertook pseudo-scientific investigations of the working classesâ living conditions (âles enquĂȘtes socialesâ) within which the âlabouring classesâ (or âperishing classesâ) and the âdangerous classesâ were bracketed as âsavagesâ to be feared, controlled and, if need be, repressed (Christiaens, 1999a). Further, backed up by the âscientific discoveriesâ of early criminologists such as Lombroso (1895, 1899), Lacassagne (1913) and Ferri (1905), it was assumed that criminal acts were not the product of free choice and rational calculation (classical school) but that the root causes of crime were to be found in factors outside the control of the offender (biological or sociological positivist schools). As a consequence, the âbankruptcyâ of classical criminal law was announced by several leading scholars of the time (Cantor, 1936).
Instead of the metaphysical, philosophical and âunscientificâ concepts of âfree willâ and âguiltâ drawn from the Era of Enlightenment, advocates of âsocial defenceâ â such as the Belgian Prins (1899, 1910), the Dutchman Van Hamel (1895) and the Italian Ferri (1905) â claimed that notions of âdeterminismâ and âdangerousnessâ should guide the stateâs interventions and that more fluid measures of âsocial defenceâ were needed to complement, if not replace, classical punishment, particularly in the cases of children, young people and the mentally ill. Such (indeterminate) measures were characterised by their aims of preventing crime, of transforming adaptable and compliant âcriminalsâ into law-abiding citizens or, in the case of their âincorrigibleâ counterparts, of neutralising them. According to Cantor (1935: 347), continental European countries and scholars were increasingly occupied with the âtheorisationâ and elaboration of new codes of social defence (in their attempts to reconcile positivism with classicism), whereas the Anglo-Saxon world, âin the absence of a clear penal theoryâ, was increasingly experimenting and developing â âfrom the bottom upâ â new approaches in daily practice. What is absolutely clear for continental European countries is that the second half of the nineteenth century was characterised by an intensification of experiments and new measures to deal with delinquent children and young people, beggars and vagabonds (Dupont-Bouchat and Pierre, 2001).
Children of the âlower depthsâ
In attempts to bolster âsocial defencesâ and better protect society against criminality, the children of the âlower depthsâ (âles bas fondsâ) received special attention. On one hand, the traditions of biological positivism presented children as more âsavageâ than adults, less psychologically developed, more prone to genetic determinism and, particularly during puberty and âadolescenceâ, more susceptible to hormonal changes and consequent instability (Lombroso, 1899). On the other hand, sociological positivists, such as Ferri (1905), Lacassagne (1913) and Tarde (1890), claimed that children, and specifically working-class children, faced particular risks and were routinely exposed to bad examples amidst their miserable living conditions. Tarde (1890), for example, argued that children learn by way of imitation and growing up in neighbourhoods and families in which âimmoral practicesâ abounded (such as alcoholism, prostitution, violence, gambling, laziness) imposed negative effects. Equally, Adolphe Prins (1910) approached working-class children as both unfortunate victims of their own genetic inheritance, parental neglect and/or poor living conditions, and as prospective dangerous criminals. Accordingly, although children of âles bas fondsâ might be excused punishment as guilty criminals (because they are unfortunate victims with no free will) they definitely had to be prevented from following a deterministic path towards adult criminality (because that would render them dangerous). In other words, working-class children were often conceptualised as miserable (âmisĂ©rableâ) and âdangerousâ at one and the same time.
From the perspective of securing âsocial defenceâ and preventing (adult) crime, therefore, âlower classâ children emerged as both a problem and, simultaneously, a key to the solution. If they could be âcorrectedâ in good time their path towards adult crime might be averted. This too comprised the juncture where âsocial justiceâ and âsocial defenceâ converged. Developments such as compulsory schooling and a broad public-health/hygiene policy (including nutrition, physical education of children, preventing and treating venereal diseases that were widespread) overlapped and intersected with initiatives to address juvenile delinquency by way of more preventive and early intervention approaches engineered, not only by the Childrenâs Courts, but also by a growing body of probation officers, foster carers and/or (private) institutions. Meanwhile, for more serious juvenile offenders, re-education took place in closed (often state-run) institutions.
Another important measure of social defence vis-Ă -vis working-class children (and their families) â highly promoted during the second half of the nineteenth century â was the (further) development of parens patriae. This doctrine, originally developed in common law countries (Bac, 1998), authorised local authorities to take responsibility for neglected, maltreated or abused children and it promoted and influenced the European-continental and civil law variant of âla dĂ©chĂ©ance paternelleâ (or âontzetting/ontheffing uit de ouderlijke machtâ). By the beginning of the twentieth century many European countries introduced the possibility of withdrawing âunfortunateâ children from their âunworthy parentsâ (âles parents indignesâ) and placing them in institutions or alternative families with foster carers. The principle of the âbest interest of the childâ became, also in civil law, a legally accepted concept and the gateway for state intervention in what was previously perceived as an âuntouchableâ domain in civil law countries until long into the nineteenth century: the âsacredâ family with the father as pater familias (Dupont-Bouchat, 1983; Christiaens, 1994; Van Praet, 2017). Moreover, the principle of equity, instead of due process, lay at the basis o...