Iran and Palestine

Past, Present, Future

Seyed Ali Alavi, Seyed Alavi

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367228316
• eBook ISBN: 9781000022919
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Relations internationales

Examining the nature of relations between Iran and Palestine, this book investigates the relationship between state and authorities in the Middle East.

Analysing the connections of the Iranian revolutionary movements, both the Left and the Islamic camps' perspectives are scrutinized. To provide a historical background to the post-revolutionary period, the genealogy of pro-Palestinian sentiments before 1979 are traced additionally.

Demonstrating the pro-Palestinian stance of post-revolutionary Iran, the study focuses on the causes of roots of the ideological outlook and the interest of the state. Despite a growing body of literature on the Iranian Revolution and its impacts on the region, Iran's connection with Palestine have been overlooked. This new volume fills the gap in the literature and enables readers to unpack the history of the two states.

This unique and comprehensive coverage of Iran and Palestine's relationship is a key resource for scholars and students interested in international relations, politics, Islamic and Middle East studies.

1
IRAN’S PRE-REVOLUTIONARY OPPOSITION AND THE PALESTINE CAUSE

At this stage it is essential to provide context for how Iranian opposition groups in the pre-revolutionary era engaged with the Palestinian cause. This chapter does not provide an exhaustive overview of secondary literature examining the role of left-wing forces in Iran from the early 1960s up to the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iranor of their differences and strategies in toppling the Shah’s regime. Instead, this chapter focuses on the attitudes of Iranian dissidents towards Palestine up until the 1979 Islamic revolution. As this chapter comprises the first narrative of the historical development of relations between Iranian opposition groups and the Palestinian cause, it may appear more descriptive than analytical. However, my discovery, selection, translation and evaluation of dispersed sources, as well as the presentation of this data within a relevant framework alongside a comprehensive assessment, in itself presents a major analytical challenge to understand the Iranian-Palestinian dialectic.

The chapter is divided into two sections. The first section looks into historical relations between left-wing Iranian guerrilla forces – such as the People’s Mojahedin of Iran [Mojahedin e Khalq] (MKO), the Iranian People’s Faday’an and the Palestine Group, as well as organised student opposition to the Shah, such as the Confederation of Iranian Students National Union (CISNU) – and Palestine. The second section analyses the attitude of some of the most prominent revolutionary and distinguished Muslim figures, such as Ayatollah Kashani, Navab Safavi, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, Ayatollah Mahmoud Taleqani, Mustafa Chamran, Ali Shariati, Ayatollah Mortaza Mottahari and others, towards the Palestinian question. In order to better understand the origin of relations between pre-revolutionary Iranians and the Palestinian cause, it is necessary to gain an understanding of these figures’ political ideas and activities. I conclude the chapter with an assessment of this history and emphasise that Iran’s pre-revolutionary oppositions’ sociopolitical tendencies – which included stances of anti-imperialism, anti-monarchy, anti-Zionism and, with regard to Islamic figures, pro-Muslim preferences – guided their attitudes towards the Palestinian cause. In this account, I assess that material factors played a secondary role in determining the relationship between these groups and the Palestinian cause.

The Iranian pre-revolutionary “left-wing” guerrilla movements and Palestine (1963–1979)

After the overthrow of Iran’s democratically elected Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq in the 1953 coup and the reinstatement of the Shah’s absolute monarchy, not least due to American and British intelligence support, Iranian dissidents began to face suppression and systematic coercion. Due to coercion and political closeness, the period between 1953 and 1963 can be characterised as an era in which opposition groups such as the Tudeh party and the Mossadeqist National Front pursued less confrontational policies against the dictatorship of the Shah.¹ Some historians and academics agree that the 1963 popular uprising under the leadership of Ayatollah Khomeini was a turning point, becoming a catalyst for emerging “left-wing” guerrilla movements in Iran. From Abrahamian’s point of view, the roots of the guerrilla movements date back to the summer of 1963, when the Shah’s regime fiercely dealt with peaceful protests organised by the opposition.² The brutal suppression during 1963 coincided with increasing activities by revolutionary and guerrilla movements in Third World countries, notably in Algeria, Cuba, Vietnam and Palestine. Influenced and inspired by guerrilla movements in other Third World countries, it was natural that younger members of traditional oppositional organisations such as the Tudeh and the National Front came to the conclusion that peaceful actions against the Shah’s regime was a dead end and that guerrilla conflict represented a better alternative. Of the emerging guerrilla groups, Abrahamian categorises them into two groups as being more active and organised: the Sazman-i Cherik-ha-yi Feda-i Khalq-i Iran (Guerrilla Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People), known as the Marxist Faday’an; and the Sazman-i Mujahidin-i Khalq-i Iran (Organisation of the Freedom Fighters of the Iranian People), generally referred to as the Islamic Mojahedin.³

Post-1963, younger members of the Tudeh party and the Marxist contingent of the National Front were left frustrated by the perceived failure of the Tudeh party to confront the Pahlavi regime. Many were inspired by anti-imperialist movements across the Third World and – critical of pro-Soviet Tudeh policies – began to organise independent groups. The Fadayi, according to Abrahamian, adopted its name in 1971, and came into existence through the merging of three politically active groups. The first group was founded during1963–1964 by Ali Akbar Safai Farahani, Mohammad Ashtiyani, Abbas Sourki and Bezhan Jazani, all of them active members of the Tudeh Party’s Youth Organisation.⁴ The second group was led by Masoud Ahmadzadeh, who bore religious and pro-Marxist sociopolitical tendencies. The third group was led by Ashraf Dehqani.⁵ Safa-i Farahani wrote a handbook titled Ancheh Yek Inqelabi Bayad Bedanad (What a Revolutionary Must Know),⁶ in which he drew up the ideological composition of the Faday’an. In his handbook, Safa-i Farahani castigated the Shah’s regime for being dependent on “global imperialism”, criticising the Pahlavi regime’s pro-American foreign policy and particularly its “collaboration” with Israel against Arab neighbours such as Egypt, which was causing other political conflicts in South Yemen, Iraq and Syria. His handbook highlighted the importance of supporting international anti-imperialist movements as a vital part of the Faday’an’s ideological struggle against the Shah’s pro-Western regime.⁷

According to Sepehr Zabih, the Faday’an was ideologically influenced by Marxism-Leninism and pursued it as their official ideology. In particular, Latin American revolutionary writings became attractive to the Faday’an, and its members were inspired heavily by the Cuban Revolution and “anti-Imperialism guerrilla movements” throughout the Third World.⁸ The Cuban Revolution, the Tupamaros in Uruguay, and the growth of guerrilla warfare in Palestine and Vietnam greatly influenced their leadership.⁹ In 1967, a few years after the foundation of Jazani’s group, most of its leadership were arrested by SAVAK (Sāzemān-e Ettelā’āt va Amniyat-e Keshvar, literally Organization of National Intelligence and Security of the Nation). Two prominent members, Safa-i Farahani and Ashtiyani, escaped to Lebanon, joining their Palestinian counterparts in Fatah and receiving guerrilla training for two years. Upon their return to Iran in 1969, they continued their struggle alongside their fellow guerrillas.¹⁰ Safa-i Farahani and Ashtiyani managed to cross the border into Iraq by using forged documents. Although SAVAK deported two Iraqi Marxist dissidents to Baghdad as a goodwill gesture,¹¹ the Iranian foreign office failed to persuade its Iraqi counterparts to extradite the Faday’an.

Safa-i Farahani and Ashtiyani requested permission from the Iraqi authorities to cross the border in order to join up with their fellow freedom fighters in Palestine. After spending a month in Iraqi jails, they were allowed to cross into Syria. Initially interrogated in Damascus, they were subsequently allowed to cross the border into Jordan so long as they managed to convince the Syrians that they would fight alongside Palestinian guerrillas. After meeting and engaging in an ideological discourse with Fatah delegates on the Jordanian border, they were accepted and sent to Palestinian camps in Jordan. Safa-i Farahani received the nickname Abu-Abbas from his Palestinian comrades and became one of the commanders of the Palestinian camp, while Ashtiyani was appointed as the keyholder of the camp’s warehouse. Both received support and training until they decided to return to Iran in winter 1969 in an effort to continue their anti-imperialist struggle at home.¹² Upon their return, the military training of these two proved invaluable in improving the guerrilla warfare capabilities of the Faday’an. Meanwhile, a group of their fellow fighters gathered in northern Iran preparing for an armed struggle against the monarchy. This culminated in an open battle on the 8th of February 1971, known as the Siyahkal insurgency, under the command of Safa-i Farahani. Most of the Faday’an fighters were either killed in the Siyahkal battle or arrested and subsequently executed.¹³

According to Abrahamian, Safa-i Farahani was captured and tortured to death. He died after refusing to reveal information about other members of the Faday’an.¹⁴ After the failed Siyahkal insurgency, the Pahlavi state mounted a massive propaganda war against the guerrillas, accusing them of being “tools of the PLO”, Baghdad and Arab imperialism.¹⁵

The connection between the Faday’an guerrillas and Palestinian fighters was not monopolised by the Faday’an’s leadership, however. Iraj Sepehri, a sympathiser and later low-ranking member of the Faday’an, travelled across the Iran-Iraq border alone in order to join up with Ahmad Jibril’s Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine–General Command in autumn 1971. In a memoir written by Sepehri, published by the Faday’an in 1977, he described his fascination and attraction to the Palestinian cause, arguing that the Palestinians were in fact fighting the same enemy as he was: “global Zionism” and international imperialism. He strongly believed that there was a close link between the Shah’s regime and the state of Israel’s oppression of the people of Palestine. According to the memoir, Sepehri fought alongside the Palestinians during a number of guerrilla insurgencies in the Golan Heights, alongside Ahmad Jibril’s group in 1972. During his time in the Golan, Sepehri used the name Mohammad Abdul-Qader and was later nicknamed Abu-Saeed Irani by his Palestinian comrades.¹⁶

Abrahamian clarifies that, althoug...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Dedication Page
• CONTENTS
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Iran’s pre-revolutionary opposition and the Palestine cause
• 2 Iran’s relations with Palestine during the first decade of the Islamic revolution
• 3 Iran’s relations with Palestinian Islamic Jihad
• 4 Relations between Iran and Hamas (1987–2011): strategic partnership, shared values and ideological differences
• 5 Iran and Palestinian Islamic movements in the post–Arab Spring era
• 6 Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index