Legislative Decline in the 21st Century

A Comparative Perspective

Irina Khmelko, Rick Stapenhurst, Michael L. Mezey

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000766509
• Subtopic: American Government
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Irina Khmelko, Frederick Stapenhurst, and Michael L. Mezey have assembled an authoritative guide to the declining institutional capacities of legislatures around the world.

Case studies represent a diverse sample of countries, ranging from newer democracies emerging from the post-communist world to more established but at times fragile democracies in Asia. Although largely focused on newer democratic systems, readers will be able to identify key factors that explain the general global trend toward the empowerment of executives at the expense of national legislatures. The cases, although different from one another, identify several factors that have explained the erosion of legislative power, including historical legacies, institutional design, economic factors, external factors, political polarization, personalization of politics, and the rise of populism. Original data and the presentation of testable theoretical propositions about the growing imbalance between executives and national legislatures moves the field in a promising new direction.

Legislative Decline in the 21st Century will be of interest to students and scholars of Legislative Studies and Comparative Politics. Lessons drawn from these case studies will allow policy makers to explore new solutions that can lead to the improved quality of democracy in countries around the world.

1
Comparing Legislatures in Moldova and Macedonia

William Crowther

Introduction

Moldova and North Macedonia, while differing in many respects, share several critical characteristics that have impeded democratic development in general and engendered an environment in which their legislatures have not evolved into robust institutional supports for democratic governance. North Macedonia may now be moving in a more positive direction as a consequence of its 2017 “colorful revolution” and installation of a reformist government under Prime Minister Zoran Zaev, but there is little evidence that either the North Macedonia or the Moldovan legislatures thus far could hold their respective executive branches in check. While they have played important roles at different points in the evolution of their respective political systems, neither the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia nor the Moldovan Parliament have emerged as stable central forums for representation and policy-making. Scholars have posited many answers as to why some legislative bodies live up to the expectations placed on them, and others fail to do so. These range from political culture hypotheses, to constitutional design, and purely institutional arguments. While the institutional design is essential, extra-intuitional factors can, in some cases, overcome even thoroughly planned constitutional designs.¹ I will focus on a limited number of political and societal factors external to governmental intuitions themselves and common to both countries that contributed to the weakening of their legislatures. These include a lack of democratic political heritage, flawed or incomplete post-communist transitions, marginalization from the European Union (EU) integration process, and high levels of corruption. The collective impact of these factors has been sufficiently detrimental to legislative performance to overwhelm the importance of institutional arrangements per se.

Legislative Marginalization in Moldova and North Macedonia

Weak legislatures in the face of strong executives and extra-governmental forces have been a marked characteristic in both Moldova and North Macedonia since independence. As the postcommunist systems matured from “transition” to stable hybrid democratic regimes, this condition appears to have become a structural attribute of their politics. Freedom House, as of 2018, regards both countries as “partly free.”² Over the past decade, Freedom House ratings for overall democracy, national democratic governance, and corruption have remained stagnant or declined somewhat, indicating that both stabilized in their current patterns since the late 1990s.

The Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project’s somewhat more elaborate methodology based on aggregating expert opinion on different dimensions of democratic practice indicate similar flaws in democratic practice in both countries.³

Parallel elements stand out regarding the causes of weak legislative performance in each of these cases. In both Moldova and North Macedonia, V-Dem’s analysis shows low levels of control over the executive and high levels of legislative corruption.

These traits appear to be related. In neither country does expert opinion suggest that members of parliament (MPs) can act as an effective brake on the executive. This is in part a consequence of weak oversight powers, but also the failure of other institutions, such as the judiciary. While formal mechanisms for legislative control of the executive, parliamentary questions, inquiry commissions, public discussion, and debate are in place, they fail to function in practice. Similarly, both countries’ legislatures have committee systems, which should provide forums for policy discussion and legislative initiative. Legislative control is in the hands of the government, transforming the legislatures in “voting machines.”⁴

Corruption has a corrosive impact on MPs. In both North Macedonia and Moldova, corruption is rampant and legislators, no less than other political actors, are participants in extensive clientelist networks that center on party leaders. Surveys indicate that legislatures are among the least trusted political institutions, although attitudes have improved in North Macedonia since the 2017 change in government.⁵ In Moldova, parliament is seen as the most corrupt of government institutions’⁶ control.⁷ In North Macedonia, corruption among legislators is also problematic. Finally, the lack of intra-party democracy also inhibits legislative efficacy. While parties function within a formally democratic environment, they lack democratic practices internally.⁸ Unlike the case in more well-functioning democracies, legislators do not regularly act as the representatives of their constituents. Instead, they are highly dependent on and responsive to the influential party leaders who dominate the two political systems. Legislative candidates are placed on electoral lists and removed from them at the whim of top party leaders. On entering the legislature, they are obligated to party leaders who effectively control the legislative agenda. In North Macedonia, oversight is fatally undermined by the power of party leaders, the lack of independence among MPs, and a deeply ingrained culture of governmental supremacy.⁹ Similarly, in Moldova, two years after its “pro-democratic” AEI came to power in 2009, a report by the Expert-Grup, a prominent Moldovan non-governmental organization (NGO), concluded that “power mostly lies not with public institutions, but with obscure special interests which have undermined and abused these institutions.”¹⁰

Table 1.1 Macedonia: Freedom House Nations in Transit Component Scores^*

	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018
National Democratic Gov.	4.0	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.75	5.00	4.75
Electoral Process	3.0	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.75	4.00	4.00
Civil Society	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.25	3.50	3.25	3.25	3.25
Independent Media	4.25	3.45	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.75	5.00	5.00	5.25	5.25	5.00
Local Democratic Gov.	4.0	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00
Judicial Framework and Indp.	3.75	3.75	3.75	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.75
Corruption	5.0	4.75	4.75	4.50	4.25	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.00	4.25	4.25	4.50	4.75	4.75
Democracy Score	3.89	3.82	3.82	3.86	3.86	3.79	3.82	3.89	3.93	4.00	4.07	4.29	4.33	4.36

* A score of 1 equals most...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: Vulnerable Legislatures in the Era of Strong Executives
• 1 Comparing Legislatures in Moldova and Macedonia
• 2 The Rise of Powerful Executives: Comparing the Ukrainian and Russian Legislatures
• 3 A New Parliament in the Economic Crisis: Slovenia’s National Assembly, 2008–2016
• 4 Poland: The Road to Authoritarianism is Paved by Gradual Majoritarian Shifts
• 5 The Grand National Assembly of Turkey: A Decline in Legislative Capacity
• 6 The Decline of the Lok Sabha in India: The Impact of Party Polarization, Rise of the Media, and the BJP’s Dominance on Parliamentary Efficacy
• 7 The Legislature as a Tool, Executives’ Power Grab, and Civilian Authoritarianism: The Bangladesh Case
• 8 Changes in Executive-Legislative Relationship: A Comparative Analysis of Turkey and Central European Countries
• 9 Democracy, Legislatures, and Business Conditions in Post-Authoritarian African Regimes
• 10 Legislative-Executive Relations in Post-Junta Myanmar
• 11 Mexico: The Rise of Presidential Populism and the Decline of Congress
• 12 The Decline of the Hungarian Legislature Since 2010
• 13 The Upsurge of Right-Wing Populism in Germany
• Conclusion: A Theory of Global Legislative Decline?
• Index