Security in Northern Europe

Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue

John Andreas Olsen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9780367109769
• eBook ISBN: 9781000011920
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

NATO's Northern members are increasingly concerned about Russia's military activities. This Whitehall Paper contains perspectives from prominent authors across the region, showing how member states are responding, individually and collectively, to Moscow's resurgence. Overall, it identifies the common but differentiated responsibility that member states have for security in the Alliance's northern regions.

IX. Canada and Security in Northern Europe

DAVID PERRY

Canada’s post-war international policy has been deeply shaped by atlanticism – a multi-faceted connection to NATO. The Alliance has, of course, afforded Canada core protections and these considerations have driven much of Canada’s connection with NATO. However, Canada’s fondness for the Alliance goes beyond purely defensive concerns; other elements have sustained Canadian support for NATO even when hard-security concerns have waned and Canada’s views have diverged from those of its allies. Key among these softer ties, the Alliance also represents a ‘community of shared values’ created by transatlantic familial relations, cultural ties and trade with Europe – especially with the UK and France, Canada’s two foundational linguistic communities.¹

Beyond this, NATO has offered Canada ‘a seat at the most important allied table in the world’² and a strong voice in the world’s foremost multilateral defence forum. In doing so, NATO has provided Canada with a European counterweight to US security interests, somewhat moderating the US’s otherwise dominant voice in Canadian defence and security discussions.³ Thus, while hard-security concerns drove Canada’s involvement in the creation of and continued participation in NATO during the Cold War, these other benefits helped sustain Canada’s strong support for the Alliance even after the Soviet threat disappeared. This dual focus on hard security and softer benefits serves as an important context to understand how Canada’s relationship with the Alliance has evolved over time, even as core security considerations have waned. It explains how Canada has remained an enthusiastic contributor to reassurance and deterrence initiatives in Europe since 2014, despite views about Russia that diverge from some allies.

From the North Atlantic Treaty to Crimea

NATO considerations drove much Canadian post-war defence planning, starting with a rearmament programme after a significant post-war demobilisation. Although the build-up began in response to the Korean War, once troops were deployed to that theatre efforts were re-oriented around defending NATO Europe.⁴ Beginning in 1951, the Canadian Army deployed 6,000 troops to Germany; the Royal Canadian Air Force (RCAF) sent twelve squadrons and 300 aircraft; while the Royal Canadian Navy (RCN) eventually contributed a fleet of 50 vessels, including submarines and an aircraft carrier, to the defence of the North Atlantic.⁵

Although Canadian peacekeeping efforts often receive greater place of pride in Canada’s public consciousness, the preponderance of Canadian military activity during the Cold War centred on NATO duties.⁶ For much of the 1950s and 1960s, Canada had 12,000 troops stationed in Europe – commitments so extensive that by the early 1970s some argued Canadian defence policy amounted to little more than the sum total of Canada’s NATO commitments.⁷ Concern about the disproportionate focus on Alliance concerns drove then Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau’s first government to re-evaluate Canadian NATO policy, reducing the army’s contribution to 2,800 troops and the RCAF’s to three squadrons, for a total of 5,000 troops.⁸ Yet, despite initial antipathy towards the Alliance, Trudeau created a Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade, based in Canada but intended for deployment to NATO’s northern flank in Norway, in a move designed to offset the impact of the reduction in Canadian troops permanently stationed in Europe. Further, when he reviewed Canadian defence policy in 1974-75 he recommitted to the Alliance, initiating a programme of military investment to allow Canada to honour its NATO obligations. This recommitment was partly driven by a desire to establish stronger economic ties with Western Europe, exemplified by the purchase of Leopard tanks from West Germany in part for access to trade, highlighting the importance of non-security ties in Canada’s links with NATO Europe.⁹

The end of the Cold War coincided with Canada’s embrace of fiscal discipline and decreases in defence budgets made a significant contribution to government-wide spending reductions that started in 1989. Over the following decade cuts were apportioned across the Canadian military, reducing troop strength, curtailing procurement, and closing bases, including Canada’s European installations in 1992. In the wake of these closures, with the Alliance’s traditional collective defence role waning and NATO’s focus shifting towards a crisis-management role in the Balkans, some understandably expressed concerns that Canada’s support for NATO would wither.¹⁰ Between 1989 and 1999, the share of Canada’s GDP devoted to defence dropped from 2 per cent in 1990 to 1.2 per cent by 2000, a level at which it remained until 2006.¹¹ The size of the armed forces decreased considerably over this period.

Along with smaller overall budgets, the portion of the Canadian defence budget devoted to equipment investment and research and development fell below 15 per cent after 1996 and has remained below this level. This was a consequence of anaemic capital investment; for example, from the end of the Cold War through the mid-2000s, only the army’s Light Armoured Vehicle fleet and the RCN’s submarines were replaced (the latter with second-hand boats). The military initiated major life extensions and mid-life upgrades, rather than replacement projects, for RCAF aircraft and RCN frigates; consequently, by the mid-2000s Canada’s equipment base was rapidly rusting out.¹²

Starting in 2007, following the publication by both of Canada’s main political parties of successive defence policies predicated on military investment, the share of Canada’s GDP devoted to defence increased for a fewyears.Theseadditionalfundssupportedanexpansionofthemilitaryand a number of major equipment purchases. Much of this effort was directed towards properly equipping Canada’s Afghan operations as the army replaced its combat vehicles and acquired counterinsurgency-specific equipment, and the RCAF obtained new transport fleets to support the war effort. Closer to home, a defence policy focused on enhancing Canadian sovereign presence at home resulted in projects to provide the RCN with its first purpose-built Arctic vessels in 50 years and a refuelling station in the eastern Arctic.

After 2010, however, the share of GDP devoted to defence again started to decline and the rate of new procurement slowed once the government enacted deficit-reduction measures. During this period of divestment, the Canadian military withdrew its participation in NATO’s AWACS programme, the Alliance Ground Surveillance system. In the context of major budget pressures, the decision resulted from Canadian frustration with the Alliance’s inability to have common-funded programmes such as AWACS support in out-of-area operations in Afghanistan and Libya.¹³

Despite reduced investment and changed strategic circumstances,the fear that Canada would reduce its engagement in NATO after the Cold War proved unfounded. A desire to support the Alliance in its new crisis-management role, rather than any particular concern for Balkan security, drove a Canadian contribution of thousands of troops over several years, reaching a peak of 4,000 personnel.¹⁴ Thus, Canada remained a ‘committed, capable and dedicated ally,’¹⁵ willing to shoulder a proportional role in NATO crisis response. This was also true in Afghanistan where, in addition to supporting the US, Canada’s largest foreign deployment since the Korean War was also a pledge of ‘solidarity within the alliance’.¹⁶ Subsequent participation in operations in Libya, where Canada contributed the leadership element, refuelling, and fighter and surveillance aircraft, as well as a frigate, also reaffirmed the importance of NATO to Canada’s foreign policy.

As these historical examples indicate, when strategic threat to NATO collective defence existed,Canada contributed directly to European security. When this threat waned, it did little to reduce Canada’s commitment to the Alliance; it just changed the focus of that support to participation in crisis-management operations. This waning threat coincided with a sharp reduction in Canadian defence spending and investment, so Canadian governments preferred that their contribution to the Alliance be measured by actions, not dollars. This mindset still holds, as Canadian officials continue to note that Canada has participated in every NATO ‘mission, operation, and activity’ since its foundation.¹⁷

From Crimea to the Present

The focus of Canada’s relationship with NATO changed once again after Russia’s 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent campaign in Eastern Ukraine. While an enthusiastic supporter of NATO crisis-response measures, Canada had no troop presence in Europe, so re-engagement in Alliance collective defence has driven a considerable change in Canadian force posture, with Canada participating in a series of continuous expeditionary operations to deploy troops to Europe to provide a sustained presence on the continent.

In response to the Russian action in Crimea, Canada immediately moved to impose sanctions against Russian officials and curtail diplomatic engagement, end military cooperation and recall Canada’s ambassador from Moscow. Simultaneously, then Prime Minister Stephen Harper was the first G7 leader to visit the new Ukrainian government in Kiev. Then, starting in April 2014, Canada launched Operation Reassurance, which has seen thousands of troops rotate through European deployments.¹⁸ At the same time, Canada has embarked on a series of measures to show support for the government of Ukraine, including military training in western Ukraine, and considers these measures as part of its wider support for NATO.¹⁹

In April 2014, Canada deployed an air task force to Romania to conduct air policing, and the same month a Canadian frigate, HMCS Regina, was re-tasked to participate in NATO reassurance measures. Additional fighter aircraft were deployed to Lithuania to conduct Baltic air policing at the end of 2014. In June 2017, Canada deployed aircraft to Iceland to conduct a NATO surveillance and intercept mission, and in September of the same year deployed another fighter contingent to Romania to conduct an air-policing mission. At sea, HMCS Regina has been replaced by a series of Canadian frigates, largely deployed under one of NATO’s Standing Maritime Groups. This has effectively kept a Canadian frigate continuously deployed as part of NATO reassurance measures since spring 2014. Finally, since May 2014 the Canadian Army has rotated numerous units, up to company size, through training exercises in Poland, Latvia, Germany, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, Hungary and Bulgaria.²⁰

These reassurance mea...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• About the Editor
• About the Authors
• Preface
• Foreword
• Introduction: Security in Northern Europe
• I. The High North: A Call for a Competitive Strategy
• II. The Baltic Region
• III. The Nordic Region
• IV. The UK and the Northern Group: A Necessary Partnership
• V. Defence and Security in Northern Europe: A German Perspective
• VI. Netherlands Defence and Security Policy: Coping with the 'New Normal'?
• VII. Poland: NATO's Front Line State
• VIII. Defence and Security in Northern Europe: A Washington View
• IX. Canada and Security in Northern Europe
• X. NATO and the Challenge in the North Atlantic and the Arctic
• Conclusion: Deterrence, Defence and Dialogue