The European Union in the Asia-Pacific

Rethinking Europe's strategies and policies

Weiqing Song, Jianwei Wang, Weiqing Song, Jianwei Wang

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2019
• Print ISBN: 9781526131850
• eBook ISBN: 9781526131874
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has defined the Asia Pacific as one of its key strategic targets on its ambitious road towards a global power. Over the past decades, big changes have taken place on both sides and the wider world. It's high time to evaluate the EU's performance in its Asian policy. In fact, the EU is at crossroads with its Asia Pacific policy. On several aspects, the EU is compelled to redefine its interests and roles, and rethink its strategies and policies towards the dynamic and ever important Asia Pacific region. This volume addresses this theme, by elaborating the general context, major issues and countries in the EU's Asia Pacific policy. It covers issue areas of traditional security, economy and trade, public diplomacy, and human security and focuses on the EU's relations with China, Japan, the ASEAN countries, and Australasia.

Part I
General strategic context

1
The European Union in the Asia-Pacific: strategic reflections

Michael Reiterer

Introduction

Although the EU maintains four (China, Japan, Republic of Korea, India) out of its ten strategic partnerships with Asian partners (Reiterer, 2013a) and is contemplating adding a fifth (with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, ASEAN), doubts are harboured in Asia whether the EU can be a genuine strategic partner. Perceptions may not match: the EU has over the years developed policy papers dealing with Asia in general (Europe and Asia: A Strategic Framework for Enhanced Partnerships (European Commission, 2001)) or with sub-regions, for example Guidelines on the EU's Foreign and Security Policy in East Asia (Council of the EU, 2012), the 2015 Communication The EU and ASEAN: A Partnership with a Strategic Purpose (European Commission 2015), or with specific countries like the 2016 China Strategy (European Commission, 2016a) while on the Asian side only China has so far published two policy papers on the EU in 2003 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2003) and in 2014 (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of PRC, 2014).

The perceived missing link in the Europe–US–Asia triangle led in 1996 to the creation of the Asia–Europe Meeting (Reiterer, 2002) on the joint initiative of France and Singapore. Following the year-long blockade over the political situation in Burma/Myanmar after the military junta took over, the EU intensified its dialogue and cooperation with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), signed the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in 2012, and intensified its engagement in the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in order to demonstrate its comprehensive interest in Asia. “Comprehensive” means, firstly, in the sense of the EU's comprehensive approach to foreign policy and, secondly, underlines the political and security dimension (Reiterer, 2014a) in addition to the well-known economic and trade dimension. In terms of security Asian partners still demand more “proof” of the EU's engagement as they perceive the EU primarily as an economic force to reckon with but less of a political and security player: thus, perceptions do not match.

On the basis of the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force in 2009, the EU is in a position to become a more active foreign policy player. Additional tools, like the High Representative for Security and Defence Policy / Vice President of the European Commission (HRVP) and the European External Action Service (EEAS), the diplomatic service of the EU, were added and the principles of the EU's foreign policy defined in the Treaty. However, at the time history was not waiting for the EU to set up the new framework with ease – soon the neighbouring area was in flames (Arab Spring), Russia invaded and annexed the Crimean Peninsula, terrorism globalised further and found in the so-called Islamic State a new incarnation. Terrorism firmly arrived at the heart of Europe, refugees and immigrants swept over Europe's border straining the principles of European integration like solidarity and all that on top of the financial and debt crisis since 2008.

In parallel we witness a power shift from West to East, economically and politically (Reiterer, 2015a). Asia became the economic engine largely built on China's economic growth which in turn led to a shift in the political and power relationships in the region as well as globally. The latter aspect led the Obama Administration to underscore its Pacific vocation in “pivoting” to Asia, not least to counterbalance China's political rise and endeavour to regain its position as a regional power (Reiterer, 2013a). Thus, the “return of geopolitics” (Mead, 2014) and the danger of the Thucydides trap (Allison, 2015) entered the political discourse.

Taking the 2003 European Security Strategy (Council of the European Union, 2003), as the point of departure, the EU has embarked since 2014 on an overhaul of its foreign policy. Mandated by the European Council (2015), the HRVP has developed a new “Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy” (EUGS) (European Union, 2016) in order to position the Union as a global player, taking into account on the one hand the new level of ambition for its foreign policy and on the other hand the changes in international politics which have occurred since 2003. In 2003 A Secure Europe in a Better World indicated a world of optimism – after the fall of the Berlin Wall and other fences, but also after 9/11 and the first Iraqi War. The “end of history”, the peace dividend characterised then the political discourse. In contrast, today's world is more contested, complex and connected, requiring a new approach and making use of the toolbox of the Treaty of Lisbon.

Within a decade the strategic environment of the EU has changed; the election of the novice politician Donald Trump in the United States became another watershed requiring further adaptations and a hitherto unknown striving for more autonomy in EU foreign relations.¹ After the “end of history” illusion in the 1990s, security takes centre stage again, however, without the traditional separation of domestic and international aspects. Today's challenges need a response that combines aspects of internal and external policies; foreign policy and security start at home but are entangled with international developments. Centre stage also means that citizens are directly concerned and expect protection and solutions by their governments and the EU.

Recognising these changes, the EUGS responds: “The European Union will promote peace and guarantee the security of its citizens and territory … Internal and external security are ever more intertwined” (European Union, 2016: 14). The European Commission translated this proposition into an Implementation Plan on Security and Defence (European Commission, 2015) which led to Council Conclusions in 2017 on Security and Defence in the Context of the EU Global Strategy (European Council, 2017). It had also rekindled the discussion about a European army by Commission President Juncker in 2015² or a “defence capacity” by the HRVP Mogherini;³ EU foreign and defence ministers in November 2016 did not decide in favour of an army as the HRVP clearly stated but agreed to push ahead with co-operation on security and defence matters. In order to be successful this task needs to be a comprehensive approach to security and to crisis management through a “whole-of-EU approach” (Faria, 2014).

Published only a few days after the Brexit decision, the EUGS develops a collective sense of direction for the EU: it needs to appear united on the world stage to keep its citizens safe, preserve its interests and uphold its values. To this end, the EU needs to become a strong(er) power in order to become a security provider.

The EUGS sets out the EU's core interests, priorities and principles for engaging in the world. Built on an analysis by EEAS (European Eexternal Action Service, 2015; also Missiroli, 2015) of the changes since 2003, the EUGS aims to clarify the EU's values and the ensuing goals, and spells out what it wants to achieve (priorities) while respecting and realising its core interests. Core interests are security and prosperity of the EU and its citizens living in a democratic system which in turn has a rules-based system as its environment. The EU's priorities are its security, societal resilience inside the Union and in particular in its southern and eastern region, an integrated approach to conflicts and crises, helping to set up co-operative regional orders while contributing to sustainable global governance.

Strategic autonomy in relation to security, although it had already been discussed for a long time, gets new traction, leading to a discussion on how best to strengthen the European structures and make them resilient and complementary to the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) in the overall context of the trans-Atlantic partnership. All this should lead to a more credible, more responsive and better co-ordinated Union. In view of the election victory of Donald Trump and his professed intention to engage allies and partners more, financially and materially, in security and defence while sowing doubt on continued US engagement, this option turns into a necessity.

In order to translate this “shared vision” as mentioned in the EUGS subtitle into action (Reiterer, 2017a), follow-up processes have been initiated immediately in close co-operation with member states, the European Commission and European Parliament. Therefore the EU Foreign Minister concluded only four months after the adoption of the EUGS on 17 October 2016 that the EU expects the implementation to focus on the following priority areas during the next two years:

• resilience building and integrated approach to conflicts and crises
• security and defence
• strengthening the nexus between internal and external policies
• updating existing or preparing new regional and thematic strategies
• stepping up public diplomacy efforts

Therefore, the EUGS sets out global ambitions, core interests and principles for engagement in different geographic regions, in a principled manner thereby leaving the necessary room for individualisation through regional or horizontal strategies.

Furthermore, the EU's approach to foreign and security policy needs to change from ad-hoc reaction to strategic planning, from words to deeds, from putting out fires to securing the environment (Reite...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-title page
• Title page
• Copyright page
• Contents
• Tables
• Figures
• Contributors
• Preface
• Abbreviations
• Introduction: The European Union’s Asia-Pacific strategies and policies at the crossroads
• Part I: General strategic context
• Part II: Major issues and themes
• Part III: Selected countries and groups
• Index