Northern Ireland after the troubles

A society in transition

Colin Coulter, Michael Murray, Colin Coulter, Michael Murray

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780719074417
• eBook ISBN: 9781847794888
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Media & Performing Arts
• Subtopic: Radio

This book seeks to provide a comprehensive and critical overview of a society in the process of transition between war and peace.

1
Introduction

Colin Coulter and Michael Murray

While the recent turbulent political history of Northern Ireland has produced countless moments that will be difficult to forget, most of those that remain longest in the memory do so for the most harrowing of reasons. The particular day in question here, however, marks a stunning exception to that miserable general rule. Even the invariably doleful Northern Irish weather appeared to have read the script. At midday on 31 August 1994, as the region basked in glorious sunshine, the Provisional IRA declared that from midnight it would embark upon a ‘complete cessation of military operations’. Within six weeks, this seemingly historic move would be echoed in a cease-fire called by the principal paramilitary organisations on the loyalist side. The biggest-selling local newspaper sought to capture the sense of relief and perhaps even euphoria that many – though not, of course, all – felt that sumptuous late summer day when republicans committed themselves to laying down their arms. In its evening edition the banner headline of the Belfast Telegraph declared simply and boldly, ‘It’s over!’

It was always entirely predictable of course that the rhetorical optimism that greeted the republican cease-fire – in some quarters, at least – would transpire to be rather ill judged. The era of the troubles had produced a few false dawns, and hard experience had counselled that there would be many twists in the plot before the conflict could genuinely be said to be over. It was widely expected, therefore, that the path to political reconciliation would be a long and arduous one. There were few who would have anticipated, however, that the peace process would be beset by quite so many reversals. As the crises have accumulated the optimism once harboured by many ordinary people in the region has been largely displaced by disillusionment at – and even uninterest in – the prospect of real political progress. While the unlikely and possibly historic developments that unfolded in the spring and early summer of 2007 would seem to herald a genuinely progressive turn in the political life of the six counties, it is entirely likely that there will be further twists to come in this complex narrative. More than a dozen years on from those heady days signalled by the original paramilitary cease-fires, it still remains less than entirely clear what precisely will be the fate of Northern Ireland after the troubles.

The Good Friday Agreement

The era of the peace process has witnessed an at times bewildering sequence of political initiatives. The most significant political development of the period has of course been the agreement that eventually emerged from the tortuous negotiations that began in the autumn of 1997 in the wake of the decision of republicans to reinstall their ceasefire. On Good Friday 10 April 1998 the various parties to the talks announced that, against all odds, they had finally come to an agreement on the political future of Northern Ireland. Not for the first time, and certainly not for the last, it appeared for a while that the political fortunes of the region might just have taken a turn for the better.

The document that emerged from the multi-party negotiations at Stormont inevitably was detailed, multi-faceted and wide-ranging. The Belfast Agreement seeks to address and resolve a series of relationships – those between people living either side of the Irish border and either side of the Irish sea – that are understood to be at the heart of the ‘Northern Ireland problem’. The principal concern of the document is inevitably, however, to mend the often troubled relations between unionists and nationalists living in the region. In essence, the deal struck at Stormont represents an attempt to reach an honourable compromise between the ambitions and identities that often appear to divide the ‘two communities’ in Northern Ireland. The text of the document seeks to allay the enduring fears of the unionist community that they might be forced or duped into a united Ireland. It is stated quite categorically that ‘Northern Ireland in its entirety remains part of the United Kingdom’.¹ Furthermore, the text affirms that any change to the constitutional status of the region can happen only with the concurrent electoral consent of people living in both jurisdictions on the island. While the agreement clearly seeks to accord with unionists’ ambition to remain citizens of the United Kingdom, it also sets out to accommodate nationalists’ aspiration that they might in the future become citizens of a united Ireland. The text clearly acknowledges as legitimate both the political objectives and the cultural practices that are associated with the tradition of Irish nationalism. In addition, it is stated that if in the future a majority of people living either side of the border give their simultaneous support to the unification of Ireland, it would be a ‘binding obligation’ upon both the British and Irish governments to ensure that this came to pass.

While the Belfast Agreement clearly envisages that nationalists will remain de facto British citizens for some time to come, it also seeks to assure that they will do so on rather more favourable terms than has often been the case in the past. The historical experience of the minority community in the region has been marred by discrimination and disenfranchisement. The text agreed in the multi-party talks marks an attempt to resolve these historical grievances through the implementation of a sweeping programme of political and institutional reform. The 108 seat Assembly devised under the deal is obliged to operate in a manner that empowers both communities more or less equally. Those matters that come before the legislature that are deemed to be ‘key’ can be endorsed only on a cross-community basis. Furthermore, the two most senior positions in the proposed Executive – the First and Deputy First Ministers – have to attract the support of both nationalist and unionist Members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs). The remainder of those holding Ministerial posts are to be assigned on the basis of party strengths and according to the d’Hondt system, which in effect means that the positions of executive power are in the hands of equal numbers of nationalist and unionist politicians.

The consociational mode of government envisaged by those who framed the Belfast Agreement proves to be emblematic of a broader concern to build an equitable and inclusive social order in Northern Ireland. In effect, the agreement reached at Stormont represents a new deal for nationalists living in the region. One of the most alienating aspects of the nationalist experience in Northern Ireland was dealing with a police force that was drawn almost exclusively from the unionist community and that often conducted itself in a discriminatory and draconian manner. The Belfast Agreement seeks to redress the grievances of nationalists by promising a ‘new beginning to policing’ in the region. The text of the deal provides for the creation of an independent commission charged with beginning the arduous task of creating a police force that both reflects the composition and enjoys the trust of Northern Irish society as a whole. The commitment to a programme of reform is expressed further in the provisions for a review of the criminal justice system and for the establishment of a Human Rights Commission as well as an Equality Commission. Finally, the terms of the agreement seek to underline the need for greater respect for cultural and linguistic diversity. While Ulster-Scots is mentioned in passing, it is of some significance perhaps that it is the Irish language that is discussed at greater length as a cultural practice that deserves attention and funding.

Moving on?

In the early days after the deal was struck, it seemed that the Belfast Agreement might just be that hitherto elusive settlement that might mark a new and more progressive phase in the political life of Northern Ireland. The document that had emerged from months of painstaking negotiation was both comprehensive and clever – a little too clever, some critics would say, but more of that later. The accord enjoyed the backing of the British, Irish and US administrations as well as of all the mainstream local parties, with the ominous exception of the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). More important, perhaps, the agreement had gained favour among the ranks of those paramilitary groupings on both sides of the divide whose opposition would have made it untenable. While the deal negotiated at Stormont had the blessing of most of the political classes, its broader popular appeal would be tested in the dual referenda scheduled for 22 May 1998. In the Irish Republic the Belfast Agreement had evidently struck a chord, with 95 per cent of the votes cast being in favour. On the other side of the border, predictably, the outcome of the ballot was rather less clear-cut. In the Northern Irish poll some 71 per cent of the electorate that exercised their right to vote said ‘yes’ to the Belfast Agreement. In most electoral circumstances, of course, such a proportion would be considered a ringing endorsement. A closer examination of voting patterns, however, revealed a marked and potentially dangerous trend. While the overwhelming majority of the nationalist community had cast their votes in favour of the proposed deal, only a very slim majority of unionists had also voted ‘yes’.² What were the reasons for the very different responses that the agreement elicited within the ‘two communities’?

In a sense, it was always fairly inevitable that most nationalists would find the Belfast Agreement to their liking. The influence of certain nationalist thinkers was, after all, clearly apparent in the terms of the deal.³ The notion of the three strands of relationships, the emphasis upon power sharing and the conviction that the problems of Northern Ireland could be resolved only through political arrangements that both acknowledge and, more importantly, transcend that particular territorial space, all bear the hallmark of the SDLP. The popularity of the Belfast Agreement among constitutional nationalists was always, therefore, more or less guaranteed. In principle, however, the response of republicans to the deal should perhaps have been rather different.

Over the preceding three decades the republican movement had waged a brutal military campaign designed to take Northern Ireland out of the Union. The Belfast Agreement, however, quite clearly recognises and guarantees the constitutional status of the region as part of the United Kingdom. While a minority expressed their opposition to the deal, the republican movement en masse chose to endorse it. In so doing, republicans would seem to have violated the most central and cherished ideal of their political tradition.⁴ Quite conscious perhaps of the betrayal entailed in accepting the Belfast Agreement, the upper echelons of Sinn Féin have sought to shift attention away from the constitutional provisions of the accord. The leadership of Sinn Féin has sought consistently to cast the agreement as a process rather than an outcome. It is argued that the new political arrangements – and in particular the North/South bodies established under the deal – have a latent ‘dynamic’ that will gradually and inevitably nudge the six counties into a united Ireland.⁵ While this ‘inevitability thesis’ is on balance a matter of pure political fantasy, that has not prevented it from becoming a comforting mantra regularly rehearsed by the Sinn Féin leadership.

The second, and rather more convincing, strategy that republicans have adopted to obscure their blatant betrayal of their own ideals is to focus upon the benefits that will arise from the programme of reform sketched out in the Belfast Agreement.⁶ The Sinn Féin leadership has sought to underline those elements of the deal that appear to promise nationalists fairness and equality within Northern Ireland.⁷ While this strategic shift of focus from the ‘national question’ to the ‘democratic question’ raises questions about the legitimacy and utility of the IRA campaign over the previous three decades, the emphasis that republicans have placed upon a reform agenda that seems to offer genuine cultural and material parity would appear to have struck a chord within an increasingly pragmatic but confident nationalist community.⁸

In principle, there were elements of the Belfast Agreement that had the potential to appeal greatly to most of the unionist community.⁹ After all, the signatories to the accord had agreed that the constitutional status of Northern Ireland was to be respected and could not change without the voluntary consent of the majority of people living there. In effect, therefore, the deal hammered out at Stormont explicitly endorsed the principal ideal and ambition of the unionist tradition. While the constitutional guarantees enshrined within the Belfast Agreement were attractive to a great many unionists, their appeal was somewhat diminished by two further considerations. Firstly, the fairly generalised sense of mistrust that defines and deforms their political imagination ensured that unionists were unwilling to take at their word a whole range of other political actors and in particular the British state.¹⁰ Quite simply, the unionist community was from the outset never entirely convinced that the constitutional guarantees within the Belfast Agreement were in fact worth the paper they were written on. Secondly, those aspects of the deal that were attractive to unionists were from the beginning finely balanced against other elements that they found deeply troubling. While the unionist community hoped that the Belfast Agreement might be a final settlement, they also feared that it would in fact prove to be a process that would undermine their interests and perhaps ultimately sweep them into a united Ireland.¹¹

Hence, when unionists went to the polls in May 1998, they were torn between an ambition to strike a deal that would finally signal an end to the troubles and an anxiety to avoid being duped into arrangements that would ultimately undermine their position. The ambivalence and tension that defined the response of the unionist community to the new political circumstances were all too apparent in the way they cast their votes. While more unionists voted for the Belfast Agreement than against, this was the product more of rational calculation than principled or emotional attachment to the deal itself.¹² There were clearly many within the unionist community who had severe misgivings about the agreement but who took a leap of faith in the hope that a ‘yes’ vote might finally bring peace and stability to the region. The precise balance of forces within unionism in the future would hinge largely upon how this particular group of pragmatists who supported the deal in principle would respond to the specific manner in which it was implemented in practice – whether they felt that it was fair, whether they considered that promises had been honoured, whether measures that might have appeared just about tolerable in prospect turned out to be entirel...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Tables
• Figures
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgement
• 1 Introduction Colin Coulter and Michael Murray
• Part I Political developments and divisions
• Part II Social identities
• Part III Cultural practices
• Index