Anarchy in Athens

An ethnography of militancy, emotions and violence

Nicholas Apoifis

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2016
• ISBN:
  9781526108036
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Cultural & Social Anthropology
• Index: Social Sciences

The battles between Athenian anarchists and the Greek state have received a high degree of media attention recently. But away from the intensity of street protests militants implement anarchist practices whose outcomes are far less visible. They feed the hungry and poor, protect migrants from fascist beatings and try to carve out an autonomous political, social and cultural space. Activists within the movement share politics centred on hostility to the capitalist state and all forms of domination, hierarchy and discrimination. Based on extensive ethnographic fieldwork among Athenian anarchists and anti-authoritarians, Anarchy in Athens unravels the internal complexities within this milieu and provides a better understanding of the forces that give the space its shape.

1

Hellenic turmoil

Greece is in the midst of a profound economic, social and political crisis. Hardly Greece’s issue alone, it is a crisis shaped by a prevailing neo-liberal economic doctrine in Europe and elsewhere. Here, the ‘logic’ of markets and associated policies like austerity, privatisation and deregulation, are imposed on societies as life-saving cures for contemporary economic woes. Leaving aside for other scholars the problematic relationship between these ‘cures’ and the disease itself (see Amin, 2013; Shannon, 2014), it is nonetheless worth sketching the origins of this crisis as they specifically relate to Greece. This construct forms a backdrop to my discussion of the Athenian anarchist and anti-authoritarian movement.

In 2001, Greece entered the eurozone, but on the basis of economic modelling and data that were deliberately misleading (BBC News, 2004). Entry into one of the world’s richest clubs opened up tremendous new economic possibilities for Greece, though ones that would in the longer term come at a high cost. In particular, membership of the European Union along with the new currency enabled the Greek state, Greek capitalists and Greek consumers to borrow at very low interest rates relative to rates prior to joining the European Union. For a time, this fuelled a credit-driven economic boom. Times were good as flourishing consumer spending augmented tourism and shipping – the traditional mainstays of the Greek economy. But the economic boom concealed the deeper reality that both public and private debts were soaring to levels that would be impossible to service should there be an economic downturn (Choupis, 2011). Unfortunately, for Greece, such a downturn began in 2006, accelerated in 2007 and reached a crescendo in 2008–09, as the international banking system teetered on the verge of total collapse. The consequences for Greece were swift and devastating. In the midst of a sharply contracting economy, tourism slowed to a trickle of its former self, shipping plummeted, consumer spending slowed dramatically and the proverbial debt chickens came home to roost (Behrakis and Maltezou, 2012). The crisis arrived in earnest in 2009, when the newly elected PASOK announced the government’s fiscal balance was not in deficit by 4.1 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP) as proclaimed by the previous New Democracy government, but was instead a staggering 12.7 per cent of GDP and growing (Smith, 2009). Equally concerning, Greece’s public debt to GDP ratio was 114 per cent (Reuters, 2010).

As a result of the global economic crisis, international lending dried up, or at least became much more difficult to secure for a state with an indebted economy such as Greece. Where the Greek government was once able to pay back loans by ‘rolling them over’ (in effect, issuing new bonds to repay maturing ones), this became increasingly difficult in a context of soaring interest rates on bonds that were of a questionable quality. Neither able to use monetary policy to stimulate the economy (because interest rates are set at a European level), nor regain competitiveness through a depreciating currency, the Greek economy continued to contract while its debts mounted. Equally, the government was limited in its fiscal stimulus measures, having already reached an ultra-stimulus zone and now being unable to fund adequately such stimulus (Choupis, 2011). International bond markets froze Greece out, which required an injection of capital in order to avoid a sovereign default on debt repayments. This may have resulted in a Greek withdrawal from the eurozone and a return to the drachma, with very uncertain consequences for Greece, Europe and the World.

As austerity sucked demand out of the local economy, Greek economic statistics appeared weaker than originally anticipated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (International Monetary Fund, 2010). Hence, these institutions demanded even harsher austerity measures. In early May 2010, a troika consisting of the European Central Bank, the IMF and the European Commission granted the National Bank of Greece a three-year, €110 billion loan (Traynor, 2010). Attached to this loan were onerous obligations, including significant austerity measures aimed at cutting the government’s expenditure, increasing revenues and restoring fiscal balance. Amongst other measures, these involved a 15 per cent cut to public-sector wages,¹ the closure of nearly 2,000 schools, the movement of the retirement age from 61 to 65 years and the privatisation of a host of government assets. Added to these were increased income tax and a hike in the regressive consumption tax known as the VAT (value added tax). In essence, this punished the average Greek for their government’s ineptitudes, while rewarding gamblers (like banks and investment firms) for their morally hazardous investment in Greek bonds, an investment now protected by the troika’s bailout. The effects were devastating for most working- and middle-class Greeks. At the beginning of 2011, around the time I was first in Athens, the national rate of unemployment was 15.8%, which included 43.1% unemployment for those aged from 15 to 24 years (Sedghi, 2011). By July 2013, 27.6% of the population was unemployed, while youth unemployment had risen to 55.1%. In early 2015, opportunities had only marginally improved with unemployment at 25.7%, with 50.1% unemployment for the 15–24 age cohort (ieconomics, 2015). In circumstances of rapidly dwindling welfare services, this often meant homelessness, malnourishment and destitution for those thrown out of employment, or else it meant relying on the generosity of family and friends.

Massive protests throughout Greece exploded in response to economic decline and fiscal austerity. Protesters demanding a more equitable loan arrangement frequently brought Athens to a standstill (Reuters, 2010). Others called for more radical solutions, bringing them head-to-head with Athens’ police. This had been anticipated most vividly in December 2008 when riots and protests erupted throughout Greece after a policeman murdered a teenager in Exarcheia (I explore this in Chapter 5). The city was shut down as tens of thousands of disenfranchised people charged into the streets. The anger was palpable as protesters vented their emotions, with anarchists and anti-authoritarians out in force. Buildings were occupied, while others were torched, covered in graffiti or simply smashed up (Schwarz et al., 2010a). Amidst the repeated mass protests that followed, the government appealed for patience, insisting that the situation was soon to improve.

There was, however, no improvement. By the end of June 2011, daily protests swarmed the streets of Athens and other large Greek cities. A general election was finally held in May 2012, allowing the Greek electorate to participate in the political process and cast judgement on the policies of the day. All of my interviewees refused to participate in the election, as to do so would confer tacit legitimacy on the process of parliamentary democracy. For Greeks who did vote, the election was billed as a vote on the austerity measures (Malkoutzis, 2012). Pro-austerity parties only managed 30–35 per cent of the votes, which appeared to signal a resounding rejection of the austerity programme. None of the parties were able to form a coalition to govern, however, so another election was called for the following month (Smith, 2012a). This time the pro-austerity vote increased to around 45–47 per cent of votes (Owen, 2012). On 20 June 2012, pro-austerity parties and bitter political rivals New Democracy and PASOK (plus the smaller Democratic Left party) came together to form a coalition. With over half the population against the austerity measures, the streets again swelled with resistance and protest as the government extended the budget tightening.

All this bespoke a serious questioning of the current economic and political system by significant numbers of Greeks. As the fabled neo-liberal prosperity or even economic recovery failed to materialise there have been dramatic shifts in the political landscape.

From a parliamentary perspective, the January 2015 election of the left-wing SYRIZA marked a paradigm shift in Greek politics. In December 2014, after three failed attempts to elect a president, the Hellenic Parliament was dissolved and elections set for 25 January 2015. Built on the back of success in the 2014 European parliamentary elections, and a clear agenda to renegotiate the terms of the austerity programme, the 2015 election saw SYRIZA receive 36.3 per cent of the vote and 149 of the 300 seats in the Hellenic Parliament (the largest party gets an additional 50 seats to help them form a government). Falling two seats short of an outright majority, SYRIZA formed a coalition with right-wing nationalists Ανεξάρτητοι Έλληνες (ANEL or Independent Greeks), with SYRIZA’s Αλέξης Τσίπρας (Alexis Tsipras) installed as prime minister of Greece. By forming a government, SYRIZA ended 41 years of alternating and uninterrupted ND and PASOK rule. In the snap election of 20 September 2015, SYRIZA consolidated their dominance, albeit with a slightly reduced margin of 35.5 per cent of the vote and 145 seats.

While SYRIZA’s 2015 election result reflects a political shift, there is also more radical potential in the air – be it fascist, communist or anarchist – which is but the latest instalment in a long history of political upheaval in Greece. In the last 120 years, Greeks have been ruled by military juntas, monarchies, dictatorships and a Nazi occupation. In this context, the phase of parliamentary democracy since 1974 seems an exception rather than the rule, and a fragile one at that. It is little wonder then that for Athenian anarchists and anti-authoritarians revolution, or the creation of an autonomous neighbourhood, city or even region, is not beyond the realm of possibility. The imagining of radical political alternatives, however, is not the exclusive preserve of anarchists, anti-authoritarians and leftists more broadly. The Far Right has also energetically responded to, and been a key beneficiary of, the contemporary Greek crisis.

Golden Dawn

Forty years since the fall of the military junta, Greek fascism is on the rise again (Bistis, 2013). Its contemporary face is the cadres leading Golden Dawn and their black-shirted members out in the streets of mostly urban Greek centres. In 2009, Golden Dawn gained only 0.29 per cent of the vote in the national elections. This equated to roughly 20,000 votes. By 2012, this party of the Far Right had increased its vote to around 7 per cent, or 400,000 votes (Dalakoglou, 2013), and by 2013 Golden Dawn was Greece’s third largest party with 18 seats in the 300-member parliament (Smith, 2013d). Led by a Holocaust denier, the party’s symbolism is awash with Nazi imagery, vocalised in vehemently anti-migrant, anti-Semitic and anti-Muslim rhetoric (Dalakoglou, 2013; Margaronis, 2013; Occupied London, 2014). In 2013, during a ‘Greeks only’ food distribution to struggling Athenians, it was reported that party members blasted the Nazi-German anthem on loud speakers (Smith, 2013c). Despite the arrest of its leadership and many of its governing Members of Parliament under criminal-gang legislation in late 2013 (the constitution forbids the banning of a party for their political stance), the January 2015 election saw Golden Dawn maintaining the position of Greece’s third largest party, with 17 seats in parliament. This result was marginally improved in the September 2015 election, with the gain of an extra seat. While its parliamentary presence is temporarily arrested, out in the streets and in the offices of the Greek police and military, its racist, homophobic and sectarian politics are thriving. It is here, away from parliament’s doors, where anarchists and anti-authoritarians come into regular contact with proponents of this far-right ideology.

Before musician and anti-fascist Παύλος Φύσσας (Pavlos Fyssas or Killah P) was stabbed by a Golden Dawn member in 2013, which led to a public furore and ultimately the banning of the organisation, the party and its members took full advantage of the legitimacy that came from parliamentary representation. Racist attitudes and actions had credence now that they were represented so openly in the Hellenic Parliament. Coupling this newfound validity was a rabidly complicit police force. In the May 2012 elections, around half the police officers in the country voted for Golden Dawn (To Βημα, 2013). Furthermore, it was reported that the chief of the Hellenic police, Νίκος Παπαγιαννόπουλος (Nikos Papagiannopoulos), told his officers to make the lives of immigrants ‘unbearable’ (Smith, 2013e). It is not surprising, then, that in this climate the radical Right felt they could run free. Their attacks on immigrants have been relentless. A daily stream of violence, stabbings and attempted murders were reported alongside the vandalism of migrant centres, synagogues and mosques (Dalakoglou, 2013). Members of the coastguard unit have been accused of beating and stripping migrants and dumping them at sea in Turkish territorial waters, or mock waterboarding them as a form of torture (Smith, 2013e). Communists were not immune either, with Golden Dawn members viciously beating KKE members who were leafleting in Athens (Smith, 2013c). Particular hostility is reserved for anarchists and anti-authoritarians, with regular, violent attacks on activists, social centres, protests, squats and outdoor assemblies (Occupied London, 2014).

During a number of these attacks against migrants, it has been claimed that police stood by idly, as was the case during the stabbing murder of the musician Fyssas (Smith, 2013a). My respondents told of countless incidences in which fascists and neo-Nazis were protected by the riot police. One incident had Golden Dawn members climbing into the back of a riot police van where they had stored their weapons. Others saw riot police watching as neo-Nazis violently attacked an anarchist squat. I too saw a police line protecting and supporting fascist antagonists. In this light, the words of former Greek President Κάρολος Παπούλιας (Karolos Papoulias) that it is the Greek population’s duty ‘not to allow any space whatsoever to fascism, not even an inch’, appear rather hollow (Smith, 2013d). In the streets, where police complicity is consistently evident, it is left to anarchists and anti-authoritarians, as well as anti-fascists more generally, to challenge authoritarian and racist activity.

One of the more recent responses has anarchists, anti-authoritarians and anti-fascists riding on motorcycles in the search for fascist pogroms, who are themselves looking for migrants to assault (Occupied London, 2014). Often outnumbering fascist militants, the radical leftists engage in violent tactics to confront these forces. Other responses involve anarchists and anti-authoritarians setting fire to the offices of Golden Dawn, and more recently and drastically, the assassination of two Golden Dawn members outside the party’s offices in the northern Athenian neighbourhood of Νέο Ηράκλειο (Neo Iraklio) (Legge, 2013; Occupied London, 2014). Inasmuch as it is still unclear who committed these murders, their timing so close to the murder of Fyssas suggests that it was in retaliation.

All these events may be a precursor to a more bloody confrontation. Activists within the Far Right are fostering condition...