Japan's new security partnerships

Beyond the security alliance

Wilhelm Vosse, Paul Midford, Wilhelm Vosse, Paul Midford

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9781526123121
• eBook ISBN: 9781526123145
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Comparative Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book provides the first comprehensive analysis of Japan's new security partnerships with Australia, India, countries and multilateral security fora in East Asia, as well as with the EU and some of its member states.

Part I

Japan–Australia security partnership

1

The Australian perspective on the security partnership with Japan

Thomas S. Wilkins

Introduction

During the Cold War period Japan and Australia were sometimes referred to as the northern and southern ‘anchors’ of the American alliance system in the Asia-Pacific. These two important ‘spokes’ in the so-called American ‘hub-and-spoke’ regional alliance system therefore found themselves in a condition of indirect alignment – or, to use Victor Cha’s term, ‘quasi-alliance’ (Cha, 1999). This implies that while the two countries participated in no direct defence relationship, by dint of their separate military alliance treaties they were on a parallel security course throughout this period, united in common resistance to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. Theoretically, this description could still be applied to the current Australia–Japan relationship, and indeed, it has been labelled as such by some official Japanese sources (though in this case I suspect they mean ‘almost-an-alliance’ rather than a parallel relationship with a third party (Garnaut, 2014)). But this does not capture much more than a reductionist notion of how the bilateral relationship fits into the broader US alliance presence in Asia, and ignores the far-reaching developments occurring between the two states as they work to build a true bilateral strategic partnership.

The pace and extent of Australia’s broad security cooperation with Japan is somewhat remarkable when one recalls the suspicion and bitter enmity towards Japan held by Australians in the wake of World War II. However, the combination of the US Cold War alliance system and the re-emergence of an important trading, then political/diplomatic, relationship, from the 1957 Commerce Agreement (Parliament of Australia, 2000) through the 1976 NARA (Nippon–Australia Relations Act) treaty, has assisted in building a strong track record of interaction between the countries (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 1976; Rix, 1999). Then, the post-Cold War and post-9/11 period saw cooperation between the countries in areas such as peacekeeping and counterterrorism reach new heights. Over the past two decades, Australia has added a robust security dimension to its relationship with Japan, with the result that ‘Japan–Australia security ties are now stronger than ever’ (Satake, 2015). The construction of a positive and now multifaceted relationship with Tokyo represents a foreign policy triumph for Australia, perhaps only rivalled by its linkages to the US or the UK.

The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, in accordance with the theme of this volume, it will examine the overall relationship between Canberra and Tokyo from a distinctly Australian perspective. Second, it will disaggregate Australia–Japan bilateral relations from the simplistic ‘allies of the US’ context (‘quasi-alliance’) to demonstrate how the two countries have developed a hugely strengthened bilateral security relationship to a significant degree independently of the US context (if not of US influence). Their so-called ‘strategic partnership’ is a new form of security alignment that does not neatly fit the traditional alliance pradigm (Wilkins, 2011). Third, it will consider the wider contexts within which the bilateral strategic partnership exists, firstly by restoring its place in the overall American-led San Francisco (alliance) system, including trilateral cooperation, and secondly by considering an alternative non-US context in which the two powers align more closely with other regional states in some form of coalition. The approach of this chapter is thematic; it ranges across a number of key questions and issues that frame the improved state of Australian ties with Japan in recent years. The chapter does not dwell extensively upon outlining the historical background or bureaucratic structure of the strategic partnership, which the author and others have documented extensively elsewhere (e.g. Walton, 2007).

A new ‘special’ strategic partnership

In 2014, in one of two joint annual leadership summits that have become a feature of Australia–Japan ties, Prime Ministers Shinzō Abe and Tony Abbott announced that a ‘new special relationship had been born’ (Placek, 2014). The term ‘special relationship’ has usually been reserved only for the closest of ‘allies’ – such as the UK and the US, or the US and Israel – which imbues such proclamations with a serious degree of political capital. Though the term ‘ally’ has been used by politicians, analysts and commentators rather unguardedly, it is important to note that despite all of the unprecedented developments in the political, diplomatic, security/defence and economic spheres, no direct mutual defence pact (alliance) exists or is likely to appear in the near future between Canberra and Tokyo (Wilkins, 2015). As we will see, on the Australian side this has been an issue of contentious debate over the past few years.

Nevertheless, since the official founding of the strategic partnership in 2005, Australia has invested major diplomatic effort into following through on its declared policy to build a deeper and more comprehensive bilateral relationship with Tokyo. Standout developments include the groundbreaking Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation (JDSC) in 2007 that committed the parties to enhanced collaboration on a range of traditional and non-traditional ­security issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). The subsequent ACSA (Acquisition and Cross-Serving) and ISA (Information Sharing) agreements lent substance to this declaration to operationalise joint activities (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2010; 2012). The Agreement on Defence Cooperation (Department of Defence Australia, 2014) – including the sharing of military technology – was likewise put into operation by the creation of a (unique) Japan–Australia Defence Cooperation Office at the Ministry of Defence (MOD), ‘to keep up with the unprecedented pace of activity in Japan’ (Lang, 2015: 6). Lastly, not to neglect the economic pillar, which appears to be fundamental to such strategic partnerships, Canberra signed the long-awaited free trade agreement (FTA) (called the Japan–Australia Economic Partnership Agreement (JAEPA)) in 2014, seeking to enhance mutual trading benefits (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2014). These and a number of more minor related initiatives (looked at later in the chapter) have demonstrated Australian commitment to its strategic partnership with Japan as a major diplomatic objective. These headlining developments are set against a steady accretion of institutional interconnections throughout all levels of the hierarchy (for example two-plus-two Foreign and Defence Minister’s Meetings, now entering their seventh iteration) across a broadening range of joint ‘issue areas’ (Wilkins, 2010).

Strategic interests

Australia has consistently stressed both its common (strategic) interests and its shared values with Japan as drivers for closer ties. The fifth two-plus-two meeting agreed to ‘elevate the strategic partnership between Australia and Japan to a new special relationship based on common values and interests including democracy, human rights, the rule of law, open markets and free trade’ (Minister for Foreign Affairs, 2014). Indeed, the interests/values declaration has now become de rigueur for (Western) states justifying their security cooperation, especially within the US alliance framework. Often, ‘interests’ are subsumed or conflated with ‘values’ in political rhetoric, or otherwise stated nebulously – for example, Abe has noted joint ‘strategic interests in peace, stability and prosperity’ (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). Actual specifics on strategic/security cooperation are diffused throughout statements/documents and must be parsed together here to form a coherent and composite analysis.

In terms of common interests with Japan, the emphasis here is on coordinating their mutual position as status quo powers in an international system experiencing (disruptive) change. On a global level, Australia seeks to work closely with Japan in major diplomatic forums such as the G20 and the UN, where it has been an assiduous supporter of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council for Tokyo. Accordingly, ‘Australia and Japan consulted closely during Australia’s term as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 2013–14’ (Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, 2016b). Australia and Japan have also jointly led efforts towards disarmament through this channel, such as the Evans–Kawaguchi UN Commission and the Non-Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative; (Evans and Kawaguchi, 2009). Australia has also participated in several peacekeeping missions alongside Japan, for example in Cambodia, East Timor and currently South Sudan (UNMISS).

Australia’s ‘internationalist’ strain of foreign policy places priority on maintaining a stable and rules-based security order. This is especially evident at the regional level, where both countries have depended upon and benefitted from the American hegemonic presence in the Asia-Pacific. Neither wishes to see rising powers such as China revise the regional order, which has worked so well for them in both security and economic terms since the 1950s. In addition to this underlying balance of power approach to order is their shared enthusiasm for multilateral approaches to regional security. Collaboration in appropriate regional forums such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum (ARF), for example, is a key aspect of the bilateral relationship. Both countries were instrumental in the establishment of APEC and the ARF, and Canberra has received unswerving support from Japan in its efforts to ‘integrate’ into the Asian region. In return, Australia has been a strong supporter of Japan’s reforms aimed towards a ‘proactive contribution to international peace’. Foreign Minister Julie Bishop claimed that ‘Australia fully supports reforms that increase Japan’s role in our shared interests in regional and international peace and security’ (Bishop, 2015). An enhanced international role for Japan, including the ability to contribute to ‘collective self-defence’, is seen by Australia as a welcome and beneficial move towards ‘normalisation’. Moreover, by bolstering Japan’s diplomatic space, it ‘reassures’ a Japan that might feel increasingly isolated and threatened in what it identifies as ‘an increasingly severe security environment’ – assailed from all sides by territorial disputes and incursions by its neighbours (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2016). Thus, according to Yusuke Ishihara, ‘In Australia’s view, this reassurance function helps prevent an extensive Sino-Japanese rivalry from emerging and disrupting the regional order’ (Ishihara, 2013: 92).

As well as their joint investment in building a stable regional security architecture, Australia has specifically worked in accord with Japan to fend off disruptions to regional norms, such as Chinese challenges to freedom of navigation in the South China Sea and the attempt to extend an Air Defence Identification Zone (ADIZ) ove...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half-Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of tables
• Notes on contributors
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• Part I: Japan–Australia security partnership
• Part II: Japan–India security partnership
• Part III: Japan–Southeast Asia security partnership
• Part IV: Japan–Europe security partnership
• Conclusion
• Appendix
• Index