The social construction of Swedish neutrality

Challenges to Swedish identity and sovereignty

Christine Agius

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780719071539
• eBook ISBN: 9781784990022
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Since the end of the Cold War and the 'War on Terror', neutrality is considered to be obsolete. This book traces the conceptualisation of neutrality, with a specific focus on Swedish neutrality, examining the link between identity and neutrality.

1
Writing neutrality: from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War

But what is neutrality? I don’t understand it. It means nothing. (Gustavus Adolphus to George Frederick, Elector of Brandenburg, cited in Politis, 1935: 13)

NEUTRALITY STANDS AS one of the most under-represented concepts in international political relations. Despite containing a deeper lineage than concepts such as ‘sovereignty’ or the ‘state’, neutrality has largely been conceptualised as a problematic adjunct to more serious academic questions, such as war and power. As such, neutrality has a limited presence in IR literature. And although neutrality is given attention in historical, legal and religious texts, the story of neutrality is a largely negative one. The general perception of neutral states is that they are weak and insignificant, and neutrality is depicted as the policy of isolationism and self-interest, an unrealistic posture, lacking in morality and integrity.

By exploring the history, interpretations and meanings accorded to neutrality, found in references as early as Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War, one finds that the validity of neutrality has been consistently challenged. Neutrality does not sit comfortably between war and peace. It is commonly regarded as a state of limbo (Politis, 1935: 3), a policy of indecision. Much of the contextualisation of neutrality has not permitted the possibility of examining and developing various underlying themes implicit in the concept, due to its inconsistent and negative legacy.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the way in which neutrality has been conceptualised throughout key points in history, and how the meanings and associations connected to neutrality have become established. Beginning with the Melian Dialogue, it explores how neutrality was pitched against the realities of power and empire. Just war theory and legal philosophy also found neutrality problematic, solidifying the problems of morals and action. The rise of the Westphalian state and the development of international law provided some space for neutrality in the context of sovereignty, but neutrality faced harsh tests during conflicts of the twentieth century. This chapter also examines how mainstream IR theory neglected the concept of neutrality during this period. This prepares the ground for Chapter 2, which then rethinks this depiction of neutrality, and opens up the question of neutrality in the present age, with particular reference to increased interdependence and the changing nature of sovereignty.

Setting the precedent: the Peloponnesian War and the question of neutrality

Thucydides’ account of the Peloponnesian War provides one of the earliest written records of neutrality. The Melian Dialogue of 416 BC recounts the events surrounding the neutral status of Melos, which was politically and legally linked to Sparta, but wished to remain neutral during the hostilities between Sparta and Athens. The Athenians refuse to submit to the Melian plea for neutrality because to do so would be a sign of weakness: ‘the fact that you are islanders and weaker than others rendering it all the more important that you should not succeed in baffling the masters of the sea’. (Thucydides, 1951: 332) The Athenians, concerned with power and empire, provide the justification that ‘the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must’. (Thucydides, 1951: 331) The Melian Dialogue provides important insights into how neutrality was conceptualised in terms of power politics. Independence can only be guaranteed through strength, and those who are weak cannot afford to make claims to be impartial. However, the Athenians do not leave it at that, and in their parting words chastise the Melians for choosing the path of neutrality rather than seeking security through alliance. For the Athenians, the Melians are short-sighted in their desire to be neutral – for the Athenians, the promise of neutrality is an ‘extravagant’ and foolish pursuit: ‘Hope, danger’s comforter, may be indulged in by those who have abundant resources, if not without loss at all events without ruin; but its nature is to be extravagant, and those who go so far as to put their all upon the venture see it in its true colours only when they are ruined.’ (Thucydides, 1951: 333) And that they do, as their refusal to submit to the Athenians results in the Melos massacre.

At this particular point in history, there was no room for the uninvolved. Ancient Greece was a cultural–religious association or entity, not a legal–political one. It contained a geographical area and cultural unity, but did not exist as a single political state; rather it was constructed from city-states. The polis (the city-state political communities) did not have equal rights and obligations. Hence there was no concept of equal sovereignty among units (Jackson, 1997: 37).¹ There were allies or enemies, and neutrality was not readily permissible, even though it had a presence in ancient times (Raymond 1997: 138). Although ‘abstention’ was common in Greek warfare, accounts of such were made in passing and more attention was paid to the occasional cases of ‘unexpected neutrality’ (Bauslaugh, 1991: xxi). The concept and practice of neutrality lacked a vocabulary: no word for ‘neutrality’ existed during antiquity.² Instead, terms such as intermediaries, friends, tranquillity or abstention were employed to denote non-participation in war, and words such as truces, peace, and friendship were used in the same manner for maritime relations (Politis, 1935: 4). Thucydides employed different descriptions, such as ‘those standing aloof from both sides’ or ‘those who were allies of neither side’. Herodotus combined the two in his phrase ‘standing aloof in the middle’. (Bauslaugh, 1991: xx) Furthermore, diplomacy between city-states at this time was more complex than a demarcation of ‘friends’ or ‘enemies’. Modern terms, such as ‘truce’, ‘treaty’ or similar legal phrasings, were not signifiers of a particular description that we understand today (Bauslaugh, 1991: 4–7).

Realists claim Thucydides as their founding father and in this regard perhaps the most important lesson of the Melian Dialogue is that the stance of the Athenians prescribes to a natural rule, a timeless wisdom, that the powerful will subdue the weak: ‘it is not as if we were the first to make this law, or to act upon it when made; we found it existing before us, and shall leave it to exist for ever after us; all we do is to make use of it, knowing that you and everybody else, having the same power as we have, would do the same as we do.’ (Thucydides, 1951: 334) It is this lesson which has not only shaped realist discourse but has also constructed the parameters of definition and association when it comes to the question of neutrality. The Athenians are able to discipline the Melians not simply for their choice in rejecting alliance, but because their stance contradicted the ‘timeless wisdom’ of strong over weak. Modern interpretations of neutrality, as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, return to this formulation, noticeably in the way neutrality is dealt with as the policy of small and weak states which obstructs the necessities of war.

There appears to be a large gap in the literature on neutrality since the Melian Dialogue. During the Middle Ages, religious and imperial unity meant there was little room for neutrality (Politis, 1935: 11). The Crusades (1085–1270) were a moral commitment; to pursue the right not to participate in such wars, especially on a legal footing, was an act of castration from the order itself. To be neutral was to reject the establishment (Rubin, 1988: 14). The connection between religion and neutrality as a negative relationship is a common theme. Dante’s Inferno depicts neutrals as ‘wretched spirits … Whose lives knew neither praise nor infamy … who against God rebelled not, nor to Him were faithful, but to self alone were true’. (Aligheri, 1996: 22) Among Christian nations, an injustice against one was considered an injustice against all. Efforts to unite Christendom against the enemies of God made neutrality impossible, particularly since the papal bull of 1500, which ordered peace and unity among Christians under threat of excommunication (Jessup and Deák, 1935: 7).

Likewise, in feudal times, ‘private wars’ were linked to feudal obligations, and rulers could not remain neutral. Again there was scant distinction between public and private feuds, making the practice of neutrality difficult (Brown, 1997: 67–9; Jessup and Deák, 1935: 5–6). Reprisals, according to Rubin (1988: 16) were ‘available to equals on the feudal scale at all levels’. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, neutrality was decided on an ad hoc basis, resulting in bilateral treaties, such as the 1408 French royal decree where the King of France declared neutrality in the struggle between the Popes of Rome and Avignon (Karsh, 1988: 14). Dynastic bonds also linked together Europe’s monarchy, providing little option to be neutral (Malmborg, 2001: 24). Machiavelli (1995: 71–2) was also unsympathetic to the proclamations of neutrality, believing that those who followed this path would essentially be ruined by it: ‘It is always the case that the one who is not your friend will request your neutrality, and the one that is your friend will request your armed support. Princes who are irresolute usually follow the way of neutrality in order to escape immediate danger, and usually they come to grief.’ In legal philosophy, natural law was the order of the day, and for Dominican professor Francisco de Vitoria, the question of neutrality bore little weight where Christian unity was concerned (Politis, 1935: 6).

This legacy does not reveal a great deal about neutrality per se. Rather, neutrality is depicted as a challenge to other concepts, such as power between weak and strong states, questions of religious loyalty and the demarcation between enemy and ally. There was nothing noble to be found in being neutral. Neutrality was seen as trickery and indecision. More importantly, it was regarded with suspicion because it signalled a refusal to defend certain values that held the unit or community together. Abstaining from choosing between friend and foe, refusing to fight religious wars, the neutral was cast as the self-interested outsider. Connected to such powerful themes, there was no solid defence or basis for such a stance; passivity was not an acceptable option (Politis, 1935: 6–7). Neutrality was mainly viewed as unwise statecraft and a failure to participate in honourable duty.

As such, no firm rules existed about the role and place of neutrality. In the fifteenth century, maritime trade expanded and became more competitive. As attempts were made to claim sovereignty over the seas, neutral trade became a legal issue embroiled in ‘the difficulties resulting from an anarchic situation’. (Jessup and Deák, 1935: 11) The Court of Maritime Trade of Barcelona initiated the first legal codification of neutral rights. The Consolato del Mare (1494), influenced by customary law, became the common law of the Mediterranean, and set out the first restrictions on neutral trade and property rights. The rule of the Consolato spared neutral ships and goods from capture: neutral goods seized aboard an enemy ship had to be returned, and all enemy goods aboard neutral ships could be seized by the belligerents (Politis, 1935: 13; Ross, 1989: 4). Rulings on neutrality were not made in the spirit of neutral rights but more as a regulatory device to ensure the continuation of trading patterns. The growth of international trade was the catalyst for the development of international law, which was to significantly affect neutrality (Henkin et al., 1987: xxxv). The following section explores the influence of the ‘just war’ doctrine and how it affected certain notions about neutral rights and obligations.

Legal philosophy, just war, and the rise of the state

During the sixteenth century, the shift to a system of separate, sovereign states was under way with the decline of the Papacy and the medieval unity of Christendom. The Reformation weakened the power of the Church and by the seventeenth century, commerce and trade began to bypass religious domination. Such changes prompted important shifts in legal philosophy, which began to address matters of international relations, and brought the question of the neutral state into a different context.

Central to the doctrine of just war is whether war can be waged in the first place (jus ad bellum) and the conduct of that war (jus in bello). International law attempted to formulate rulings regarding war, but legal philosophy found it difficult to reconcile the just war thesis with neutrality. If an ‘injustice can morally require a military response’, then neutrality was illegal. However, having a legal basis for war also meant that neutrality was acceptable: ‘Those who lack the standing, the just cause, object or intention have no moral or legal basis for participating in the armed struggle. Neutrality for them would not be a right but an obligation.’ (Rubin, 1988: 14) It is with Grotius that the question of sovereignty over the seas arose, which was to have an important impact upon neutral trade and rights. Grotius supported the 1609 principle of the freedom of the seas (Mare Librum), because of Dutch interests as a rising maritime and colonial power against England, Spain and Portugal (Henkin et al., 1987: xxxvii).

Grotius made small reference to neutrality in one chapter of his three-volume work De Jure Belli ac Pacis (The Law of War and Peace, 1625). Grotius established two principles guiding the conduct of neutral countries. The first stipulated that the neutral (or the medii – those between war and peace) must not assist an ‘unjust’ cause, nor harm a ‘just’ one (Ørvik, 1953: 11). The second principle focused on the question of determining the justness of the cause – if the neutral could not decide, each party must be treated equally.³ These principles were included in the first formal codification of jus ad bellum and became established in 1653, when first cited by a French Prize Court (Ross, 1989: 4). At this time, there was no protection against belligerent violation of neutral territory, which would later become a key aspect of modern neutrality. Grotius still privileged a just war over the right to exercise neutrality (Walzer, 1992: 246). Grotius held that there was no reason for war to end; only to be controlled (Grotius, 1957: 21; Holmes, 1989: 153). Since the development of neutral rights and responsibilities emerged at a time when ‘the solidifying norms of territorial sovereignty were applied more easily to land than to the high seas’, the state of maritime law relating to neutral rights was not readily accepted by some belligerents (Bukovansky, 1997: 220).

With the Treaty of Westphalia (1648), the political and geographical map of Europe altered, and power shifted from the Church to the state. The emergence of the state altered the legal characteristics of entities or ‘juristic persons’ who were the subjects (Holmes, 1989: 152). During this time, legal philosophy was shifting from the natural law foundation to positive law, which emerged with the rise of the state. This had important implications for the status of neutrality. In a state of nature (the Hobbesian interpretation of the state of war), morals did not dictate how states behaved toward each other. From this premise, states could not judge each other morally (Holmes, 1989: 157). Therefore much of the moral undertone attached to the question of neutrality lost its force.

Eighteenth-century positivists, such as Emmerich de Vattel, focused on the question of the neutral state’s impartiality. Before Vattel, some of the groundwork had already been laid by other positivist writers such as Samuel Pufendorf, who agreed with the just war thesis but warned of the dangers of permitting neutral states to decide if a cause was just or not. Cornelius von Bynkershoek, in Quaestiones Juris Publici (1737), claimed that since neutrals were non hostis (‘of neither party’) in war, they must therefore be impartial and could refuse the passage of troops to any belligerent waging war for an unjust cause (Ross, 1989: 5). Although neutrality was beginning to receive serious attention in legal philosophy, the rights of belligerents still bore stronger weight compared to the rights of neutrals, and if a war was considered just, then neutral rights became questionable or redundant (as argued by jurists Lormier and Westlake, and Wolff). Bynkershoek appealed for restraint by belligerents regarding the violation of neutral territory, but this was not impenetrable ‘in the heat of action’ (dum fervet opus) (Politis, 1935: 22 and 37; Walzer, 1992: 236).

In the climate of sovereign states, neutrals began to take a less passive view of their role and rights. Just at it was a state’s right to wage war in order to protect its national interests and security, so too was it considered the right of a state to abstain from war if that suited its national interest and security. What little rights neutrals had, however, were still regularly violated, leading to the creation of armed neutrality leagues such as those of Sweden and Denmark in 1691, in order to protect neutral commerce.⁴ The First League of Armed Neutrality formed in 1780 in response to British intervention in neutral shipping during the US War of Independence. Initially limited to Denmark, Sweden and Russia (later joined by the Netherlands, Portugal, Prussia, Austria and the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies), the First League protected neutral commerce and had the effect of localising war (Ross, 1989: 6). By the time of the Napoleonic Wars, the opportunity for unprecedented warfare grew. It was difficult for states to practise neutrality at this time since central Europe was divided into weak states. There was little uniformity and neutrality was practised in an ad hoc manner (Lyon, 1963: 17; Ørvik, 1953: 16–17 and 25). In 1800, the Second League of Armed Neutrality formed, paving the path for the extension of neutral rights and obligations in the nineteenth century and forming the precedent for armed neutrality in the twentieth century (Karsh, 1988: 16–17; Ross, 1989: 6–7).

In the post-Napoleonic period, the international system was a more congenial environment for neutrals – no bloc structure had emerged and wars were limited. This ‘golden age’ of diplomacy and international law characterised Europe from 1815 until 1914 (Morgenthau, 1958: 191). The moderately stable balance of power in the nineteenth century produced a new development for neutrality. In order to localise conflict and limit the ‘theatres of war’, some states and provinces were neutralised. The great powers at the Congress of Vienna (1815) acknowledged the right of a state to practise neutrality as a strategic policy which signalled ‘a recognition that a neutral status during a war was legally justifiable, as was belligerency’. (Karsh, 1988: 18; Ørvik, 1953: 32) Further rules developed that worked in the interests of the neutral state, such as the Declaration of Paris (1856) which protected neutral trade (a concern of the Leagues of Armed Neutrality) and served as a precursor to the developments outlined in the following section.

The Hague Conventions, the First World War, and neutrality

The Hague Conventions (1899 and 1907), which regulated aspects of land and naval warfare, are commonly regarded as the first embodiment of neutral rights and duties under positivist international law. They stipulated that neutrals had to defend their territory from violation (stressing armed neutrality); neutrals could not supply belligerents with war material, loans or aid; and impartiality had to be practis...

Table of contents

• Front Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Abbreviations and acronyms
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1 Writing neutrality: from the Peloponnesian War to the Cold War
• 2 Neutrality ‘is what states make of it’: rethinking neutrality through constructivism
• 3 Neutrality as a Social Democratic project: tracing the origins of Swedish neutrality, 1814–1945
• 4 Sweden’s post-war neutrality doctrine: active internationalism and ‘credible neutrality’
• 5 The crisis in Swedish Social Democracy: paving the path for a new identity
• 6 A new Swedish identity? Bildt, Europe and neutrality in the post-Cold War era
• 7 Into Europe with the SAP: Sweden as an EU member state
• 8 The ‘war on terror’ and globalisation: implications for neutrality and sovereignty
• Conclusion: The failure of neutrality?
• Bibliography
• Index