The European Union and culture

Between economic regulation and European cultural policy

Annabelle Littoz-Monnet

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780719074356
• eBook ISBN: 9781847796646
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The European Union and culture explains why and how the European Union has started to intervene in the cultural policy sector – understood here as the public policies aimed at supporting and regulating the arts and cultural industries. It is the first comprehensive and theoretically informed account of the Communitarisation process of the cultural policy sector. Before 1992, no legal basis for EU intervention in the field of culture appeared in the Treaties. Member states were, in any case, reluctant to share their competences in a policy sector considered to be an area of national sovereignty. In such circumstances, how was the Communitarisation of the policy sector ever possible? Who were the policy actors that played a role in this process? What were their motives? And why were certain actors more influential than others? This book will be of great use to all researchers and students of European integration and European public policy.

1
Cultural policy as a contested area

The trajectory of Communitarisation, the process by which European level policies are developed and the sector’s governance (at least in terms of policy-making) takes place in Brussels, varies significantly across policy sectors. Most EU policies found a basis in the Treaty of Rome. Yet some policy sectors were Communitarised in the absence of a Treaty basis for Community intervention. Community policies were created in the telecommunications and environment fields, for instance, although the original Treaty made no mention of a Community role in these sectors. In the same way, no formal competence on cultural policy appeared in the original Treaty¹ – the first legal basis for a very narrowly defined EU competence on culture appeared with the Maastricht Treaty reform in 1992. Yet the Communitarisation of domestic policies in the cultural sector has occurred. European institutions have extensively intervened in the realm of audio-visual, book, copyright and cultural heritage matters, to name only those sectors where EU intervention has been the most substantial. As early as the 1970s, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) issued various rulings related to audio-visual, copyright, works of art, national treasures or book trade issues. ECJ cases examined the compatibility between the regulatory aspects of member states’ cultural policies and EU competition rules and also, perhaps even more crucially, gave a legal basis for the European Community (EC) to intervene in the cultural sector. At the same time, the European Parliament (EP) issued resolutions drawing attention to the need for EU-level cultural policies and the European Commission published its first policy proposals for EU intervention in the field. Concrete policy developments soon followed. The ‘Television Without Frontiers’ Directive (89/552/EEC), which established the principle of free flow for television programmes within the EU, as well as minimal harmonised rules for television programmes, was issued in 1989. In the field of intellectual property, five directives were adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, which harmonise copyright legislation within the EU. Besides the regulatory aspects of EU intervention, various support mechanisms intended to promote the European audio-visual industry, encourage artistic creation, foster exchanges and cooperation between artists from different EU states, and ensure the preservation of European heritage were also initiated. Symbolic initiatives, such as the ‘European City of Culture’ event, the European Year of Cinema, and the setting up of European awards for artists, to mention only a few, were initiated in the 1980s. These developments are wide-ranging.

This is particularly striking since the cultural sector is an especially critical case of integration. As mentioned, there was no Treaty basis for Community intervention in the field before 1992. Even since then, Community intervention is meant to comply with a strictly defined principle of subsidiarity, which states that the Community should take action only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the member states. Culture has indeed traditionally been considered the domain of national sovereignty and member states are particularly disinclined to transfer their competence in this area. Along with the sheer fact that culture has been perceived as the domain of national competence, stark differences in member states’ own conceptions of cultural policy abound (Sallois et al. 1993; Zetterholm 1994). Culture is an area where diversities between member states are particularly obvious – not only are peoples’ cultures, in an anthropological sense, very different, but institutional forms of managing this area are also specific to each country – and anchored in national cultural styles. In the UK, cultural concerns were brought together under the responsibility of the Secretary of State for National Heritage in 1991, whereas in France a state minister has been in charge of cultural affairs since 1959 (Sallois et al. 1993). The British Secretary of State for Culture, Media and Sport is not only responsible for museums, libraries, music and film, but also for the press, historic buildings, tourism and sport. These differences among EU countries raise very basic questions concerning the nature of the cultural policy that the EU is entitled to implement.

Cultural policy is indeed a rather ‘unsettled universe’ that encompasses such varied issues as patronage, national heritage, artists’ rights and intellectual property, the cultural industries, public education, pornography and censorship, entertainment markets, and cultural tourism. What pertains to the field of ‘cultural policy’ often reflects political choices made by national – or supranational, as will be seen here – governments. To take only one example, copyright issues are dealt with by the national ministries of culture in Spain, France, Norway, Italy, the Czech Republic, Poland, Portugal, Denmark, Finland and Greece. In other countries, a governmental department deals specifically with intellectual property issues; this is the case in the UK (the ‘Patents Office’, which has a copyright subdivision), in Hungary and in the Netherlands for instance. Finally, intellectual property is under the remit of the ministry of justice in Sweden and in Germany, the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment in Ireland, and the Ministry of Economy in Luxembourg.

Yet despite the ‘difficult’ nature of cultural policy as a field of integration, the governance of the policy sector has increasingly shifted towards the European level. Perhaps even more surprisingly yet, EU-level intervention in the cultural sector has essentially initiated the liberalisation of cultural industries’ markets. Even when legislative solutions were agreed upon by member states, the latter essentially furthered the economic liberalisation of the cultural sector and imposed only minimal common standards. EU support programmes have only had a limited impact upon the art sector in Europe. Such an outcome goes against the widely spread belief that European cultural policy² was a ‘French creation’, which reflected French policy preferences (Littoz-Monnet 2003).³ Given the highly publicised nature of France’s endeavours in promoting the ‘cultural exception’ theme in international arenas, the common assumption is indeed that if one regulatory model was to be adopted at the EU level in the cultural sector, it would be the French one. This book highlights, instead, that not only were France’s initiatives often a reaction to supranational developments that were already under way but also that once the process of EU policy formation was entrenched, France was not successful in ‘locking in’ its own policy model during EU policy negotiations.

The book seeks to explain this ‘unexpected’ policy outcome. Several alternative policy options were indeed available in the cultural field. In addition to the question of the appropriate level of governance for cultural matters, there was a debate over the objectives that EU cultural policy was meant to be fulfilling. Should a negative or a positive type of integration be promoted? Should EU policy-makers in fact apply economic principles to the cultural sector, in order to promote the liberalisation of cultural markets, or instead develop dirigiste⁴ policies acknowledging the ‘specificity’ of the cultural field? Finding out why certain policies were opted for – in the event a market liberalisation strategy of the sector – in a policy sector where the choice of policy options is a ‘non-obvious’ enterprise, given the unsettled nature of the policy area, will shed light on essential aspects of the inherent dynamics of the EU decision-making and policy-making process.

Cultural policy: whose responsibility? Which objectives? Explaining integration dynamics and policy outcomes

In the book, the term ‘Europeanisation’ is used when referring to the penetration of the European dimension in national arenas of politics and policy (Börzel 1999), while the term ‘Communitarisation’ refers to the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance.⁵ Attending to cultural policy makes it clear that both of these stages (Europeanisation/Communitarisation), in the process of ‘governance shift’ from the national to the supranational level, need to be considered. The argument goes thus. From the 1970s onwards, the ECJ and the Directorate General (DG) Competition, making use of their judicial and regulatory powers, initiated a negative type of integration, which essentially consists of eliminating trade barriers, while positive integration aims to harmonise national legislation and set up common forms of administration. Negative integration seems indeed to be particularly effective in areas where economic integration can be advanced by applying fairly explicit prohibitions in the treaties against national policies constituting barriers to the free mobility of goods, services, capital and persons or distortions of free competition (Scharpf 2000: 15). In this mode of governance (the ‘hierarchical decision’ mode), competencies were centralised at the European level and exercised by supranational actors without the participation of member governments. These functions are performed by the ECJ as well as the European Commission when it is acting as a guardian of the Treaty in infringement procedures against national governments (Scharpf 2000: 14). The process of negative integration, which did not involve the creation of a distinct supranational policy in the cultural sector, nevertheless had a strong impact on domestic policies. The policy sector was ‘Europeanised’ in the sense that the European dimension penetrated national arenas of politics, and member governments had to adapt their legislative and policy traditions to EU-level developments.

From this first ‘Europeanisation phase’, which occurred in the audio-visual, book and copyright policy sectors in the 1970s and 1980s, ensued a process leading to the formation of distinct policies and structures of governance at the EU level (‘Communitarisation’). This Communitarisation phase resulted, essentially, from an attempt of dirigiste states to lock in their favoured policy models at the EU level. In reaction to the wave of negative integration promoted by the Court and the Commission from the 1970s onwards, those member states whose legislative and policy traditions were at odds with the liberalisation strategies developed by supranational structures attempted to develop their own initiatives. In particular, France, where a dirigiste policy model was in place in the cultural sector, attempted to lock in its favoured policy model at the EU level. Dirigiste states hoped that by pulling the decision-making process towards a ‘joint decision’ mode (Scharpf 2000: 18), in which aspects of intergovernmental negotiations and supranational centralisation are combined, they would be better able to further their policy preferences at the EU level. In the face of EU institutions’ de facto intervention in the cultural sector, reorienting the policy debate at the EU level seemed to be the best available strategy.

Thus, two coalitions of actors were in the ‘game’, trying to gain – or preserve – control over policy. In this conflict, the portrayal of the policy problems at stake was a key weapon. The dirigiste or cultural coalition,⁶ led by France and the cultural lobby, attempted to define culture as an area where ‘special laws’ should be applied. In the dirigistes’ view, a so-called cultural specificity justifies the exemption of the cultural sector from market mechanisms. The ‘liberals’, led by the UK and DG Competition within the Commission, defended an economic definition of the cultural sector, which justified, on the contrary, the application of EU competition law. In fact, allied to tensions between levels of governance were tensions between conflicting ways of addressing the policy problems at stake. Framing policy problems in one specific way was a means, for policy actors, to gain control over policy. Thus, the policy-making process was characterised by the continuous adjustment between two coalitions of actors and their competing fashions of framing the policy problems. Yet, EU-level policy outcomes have not just been a balanced compromise between the preferences of the dirigistes and the liberals.

Essentially, the French attempt to ‘rescue’ cultural policy at the EU level failed. The dirigistes could not, once the locus of governance had shifted towards the European level, change the way policy problems were tackled. Why was that? The book’s explanation goes thus. Because cultural policies were initially Communitarised as a result of the de facto intervention of EU institutions, which were applying economic principles to cultural matters by making use of their judicial and regulatory powers, dirigiste states’ room for manoeuvre was restrained at the stage of policy negotiations. EU institutions were indeed successful in making the nature of the status quo (the situation without any EU-level common solution agreed upon by member states) less desirable for dirigiste member states. Even without formally accepting the delegation of their competence in specific cultural policy sectors, member states were subject to the enforcement of EU competition rules by the ECJ and DG Competition within the Commission. Technological developments were also putting pressure on domestic legislative and regulatory arrangements. Thus, when member states negotiated over possible common solutions within the Council of Ministers – the only way through which the dirigistes could have tried to impose a market-correcting mechanism in order to counter the propensity of the ECJ and the Commission to apply economic principles without the participation of member governments – dirigiste states were in a weak position. They were indeed unlikely to oppose even non-satisfactory EU-level solutions agreed upon by a majority of member governments, since the default situation was not favourable to their preferences either.

The dynamics of policy formation (the selection of policy options at the EU level), once the dynamics of Communitarisation have already taken place, are therefore directly connected to the factors that provoke Communitarisation itself. By looking at these two phenomena together, one can grasp a better understanding of both EU integration and EU ‘policy outcomes’. Dividing the study of ‘the nature of the beast’ and that of ‘integration’ is counterproductive if one accepts that the two variables under examination are closely connected – and even more, interdependent.

Understanding how this ‘unlikely’ process of Communitarisation has occurred, and why, despite the widespread assumption that EU cultural policy was ‘exported’ by the French, another regulatory model was in fact adopted at the EU level, is highly relevant to explaining European integration dynamics, formal and informal processes of decision-making in the EU and broader debates on evolving forms of governance in the context of economic and technological globalisation.

Theorising policy-building at the EU level

Departing from the conventional theoretical debate

The process of European integration has been the object of continuing controversies between ‘intergovernmental’ and ‘supranational’ or ‘neo-functionalist’ perspectives. The latest version of the intergovernmental explanation of the EU is provided by Moravcsik (1993, 1999), who assumes that states are rational actors who play ‘two-level games’ (Putnam 1988). Intergovernmentalist theories of European integration argue that major choices in favour of Europe reflect the preferences of member states, which aim to further their economic interests (see also Garett 1992; Hoffman 1966). The outcomes of negotiations are seen as the result of the bargaining power of the states. Functionalist approaches see European integration as the product of growing international interdependence. Haas (1964) emphasises the importance in the integration process of supranational institutions and their propensity to maximise their powers. He recognises the continuing importance of national political elites, but explains that in response to new policies at the EU level, shifts in the expectations and activities of individuals are expected to emerge via ‘political spill-over’. Shifts in loyalty increase the dynamic towards the development of a new political community. Haas also recognises the importance of ‘functional spill-over’, a process by which cooperation in one sector engenders cooperation in another, previously unrelated, sector. Standholtz and Stone Sweet (1997, 1998), in their ‘supranational governance’ model, also explain that integration is driven by private transnational actors who perceive an interest in the implementation of European rules. Thus, scholars have been successful in demonstrating that non-member state actors have been able to exercise considerable influence in the determination of policy outcomes at both the sub-national and supranational levels. However, neither intergovernmentalism nor theories drawn from neo-functionalist insights have convincingly proven their ability to deal with multi-level interactions. Puchala (1999) argues that competing approaches explain different phenomena that have been occurring in the experience of the EU. And that distinguishing what institutionalism/neofunctionalism and intergovernmentalism respectively explain, and what they ‘respectively do not explain’ (1999: 330) is crucial to our understanding of European integration.

The case of cultural policy lends credence to his statement. Intergovernmentalist theories cannot account for the way in which supranational institutions developed autonomous agendas or for the role played by private actors in by-passing member governments in order to further their preferences. As for functionalist theories, while they provide useful insights into the mechanisms which promote the Communitarisation of public policies, they do not analyse the way in which member states seek to maximise their perceived interests by developing goal-oriented strategies; nor do they provide a theoretical framework that could explain the conditions under which national policy actors are successful or not in imposing their policy preferences at the EU level. The supranational governance framework does recognise that member states react to supranational entrepreneurship stra...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• 1 Cultural policy as a contested area
• 2 Cultural policy at the heart of tensions between conflicting models of policy intervention
• 3 Cultural policy at the heart of tensions between governance levels
• 4 The Communitarisation of broadcasting regulation: the ‘Television without Frontiers’ Directive
• 5 The Europeanisation of the regulation of book markets: fixed price systems for books in the EU
• 6 The Communitarisation of copyright policies
• 7 Conclusion
• Appendices
• Bibliography
• Index