Political responsibility and the European Union

Myrto Tsakatika

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2013
• Print ISBN: 9780719075155
• eBook ISBN: 9781847796769
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Media & Performing Arts
• Subtopic: Film History & Criticism

This book addresses the question of political legitimacy in the European Union from the much neglected angle of political responsibility. It develops an original communitarian approach to legitimacy based on Alasdair MacIntyre's ethics of virtues and practices, that can be contrasted with prevalent liberal-egalitarian and neo-republican approaches. Tsakatika argues that a 'responsibility deficit', quite distinct from the often discussed 'democratic deficit', can be diagnosed in the European Union. This is documented in chapters that provide in-depth analysis of accountability, transparency and the difficulties associated with identifying responsibility in European governance. Closing this gap requires going beyond institutional engineering. It calls for gradual convergence towards certain core social and political practices and for the flourishing of the virtues of political responsibility in Europe's nascent political community. Throughout the book, normative political theory is brought to bear on concrete dilemmas of institutional choice faced by the EU during the recent constitutional debates. Political responsibility and the European Union will be of interest to specialists and postgraduate students of political theory, constitutional law and European Union Studies.

1

European Union in perspective: the legacy of Jean Monnet

Introduction

This chapter will attempt to provide an account of why the EU system of governance presents such serious shortcomings in terms of political responsibility. It will start by going through the principal theories of European integration, in an effort to see what kinds of explanation could be derived from them with regard to the EU’s alleged failures of political responsibility. Neo-functionalist, liberal intergovernmentalist and new institutionalist approaches will be shown to yield different accounts.

By adopting a historical–sociological institutionalist framework, this chapter will go on to show, more specifically, why the problems of political responsibility in the EU emerged: it will look at the legacy of Jean Monnet, whose ideas and methods for European integration will be shown to have exerted a strong influence upon the building of Europe. The main question that will be addressed is whether there was something in Monnet’s system of thought and action that could have caused problems for the development of political responsibility in the EU, insofar as the rationale behind his approach was influential in the building of the Union.

Firstly, it will be shown that Monnet’s system of thought and action incorporated a target (the establishment of a novel system of governance), a strategy to arrive at this target (an incremental functionalist strategy) and a conception of legitimate governance (‘responsible technocratic’ governance). Secondly, the extent to which Monnet’s system of thought and action have been influential in the development of the EU will be pointed out. Finally, it will be argued that Monnet’s conception of legitimate governance was problematic and that the adoption of the rationale behind his plan is at the root of the failures of political responsibility that the Union faces at present. In particular, it will be argued that the problem with Monnet’s conception of legitimate governance lies in the empirical and normative assumptions behind it, as well as in the notion of political responsibility that it employed. Insofar as Monnet’s conception of legitimate governance was influential, its shortcomings can be shown to be reflected in the EU’s shortcomings of political responsibility.

Neo-functionalist, liberal intergovernmentalist and neo-institutionalist readings of European integration

The neo-functionalist reading of European integration, as formulated by Ernst Haas in the 1950s, predicted a gradual, incremental process, characterised by ‘spill over’. Incoherence and uneven development across the various sectors of interaction would only be temporary, as interdependence among sectors would lead to co-operation across the board with the purposeful interventions of key political and economic actors. Furthermore, the process was meant to be linear: no turning back could be envisaged once the multiplicity of national and supranational actors whose complex web of interaction was meant to give flesh and bones to the integration process had been mobilised and engaged in co-operation. Interdependence, the real driving force behind integration, would not be a reversible trend: it could best be described as a stream that grows inescapably into a massive river (Haas 1958; Lindberg 1963).

However, things did not turn out according to these early neo-functionalist predictions. The apparent lack of progress that characterised the process of European integration in the 1960s and 1970s seemed to discredit neo-functionalism and discourage neo-functionalists (Rosamond 2000: 85–8). Neo-functionalist work throughout this period was on the defensive, with many theorists modifying, correcting and refining their models of analysis, trying to explain why the initial predictions had not been met and moderating their claims to automatism (Schmitter 1996). More recent reformulations of neo-functionalism focused on developments in integration in the legal sphere (Burley and Mattli 1993), or on the changing economic structures that have enabled supranational actors to forge ahead with European integration in the 1980s (Sandholtz and Zysman 1989). Furthermore, some consider theories of ‘multi-level governance’ and policy networks analysis to be neo-functionalism’s ‘theoretical cousins’ (Pollack 1996: 429). These approaches claim to discern the emergence of a European polity with strong supranational institutions, which interact with transnational networks of public- and private-sector groups within domestic political arenas and which are gradually overwhelming and disempowering national governments (Peterson 1995; Marks et al. 1996).

The 1990s saw the emergence of the ‘liberal intergovernmentalist’ approach to European integration, put forward by Andrew Moravcsik (1991, 1993, 1995, 1998). According to Moravcsik, there is nothing gradual or automatic about European integration: it is clear that decisions are made by Member State Chiefs of Government (CoG), whose preferences are articulated through struggles in their domestic political arenas and which bargain with each other over the terms of co-operation at the European level (Moravcsik 1993). The process of integration reflects the will of national leaders (Moravcsik 1998: 4). European supranational institutions such as the Commission, the European Parliament (EP) and the European Court of Justice have only the power that has been delegated to them by the Member States (Moravcsik 1995) and are in any case kept ‘on a short leash’ (Pollack 1996: 429). Not only has there been no irrevocable sovereignty loss of the nation states to supranational European institutions, but co-operation at the European level has strengthened the nation states, or rather, it has strengthened nation state governments in their domestic politics vis à vis the societies over which they govern. Moravcsik has described European integration as a process of ‘fits and stops’, where the main events were ‘grand bargains’ between the nation states, followed by periods of ‘consolidation’, in the context of which national governments delegated the planning, organisation and realisation of what had been agreed to supranational actors, albeit keeping them under control (Moravcsik 1993: 473).

Naturally, the liberal intergovernmentalist story has not been without its critics. In a 1995 Journal of Common Market Studies article entitled ‘Institutional Interaction and European Integration: Towards an Everyday Critique of Liberal Intergovernmentalism’, Daniel Wincott argued that Moravcsik’s analysis underplayed the autonomous power of the Union’s supranational institutions. Grand bargains may well have been possible only because in the periods of ‘consolidation’ it was the supranational institutions that prepared the ground, devised policy innovations and informally channelled the agenda in certain directions (Wincott 1995: 602–6). In the same article, Wincott posed the institutionalist question: if institutions matter, why can national institutions have an impact on European policy outcomes while the institutions of the European Community cannot? (Wincott 1995: 602).

There is not one single institutionalist story to be told about the EU, but many. Rational choice institutionalist analyses of European integration emphasise the role of institutions as constraints to the strategic behaviour of rational actors, whose preferences are formed exogenously (that is, independently) of institutions. Their understanding of European integration is one in which not only states but also supranational actors interact strategically and where member states adopt (European) institutions which consequently constrain and direct their behaviour (Pollack 2001: 222). Rational-choice institutionalists have concentrated on analysing the influence of Europe’s supranational actors with respect to the operation and outcomes of European institutional processes in order to see whether and to what extent they do indeed have autonomous influence, using formal models (Garrett 1992, 1995; Garrett et al. 1998; Tsebelis 1994; Pollack 1997; Tsebelis and Garrett 1997; Kreppel 1999; for a comprehensive review see Dowding 2000). They use principal-agent analysis in order to explain the autonomous power of supranational institutions, where the actors involved are understood to be exploiting the imperfect division of powers in the EU in order to increase their influence (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 13). Any set of institutional arrangements, including the present ones, can be conceptualised as a reflection of the relative influence of strategically oriented national and supranational European actors at a given moment in time. The preferences, loyalties, or identities of national or supranational actors continue to be formed independently of the institutional set-up of the EU.

On the other hand, sociological institutionalists (‘reflectivists’ or ‘constructivists’) understand EU institutional arrangements as the framework in the context of which preferences, behaviours and identities are shaped. The implication here is that preferences, behaviours and identities of both national and supranational actors have already been and could in the future be transformed as the process of institutional evolution continues its course (Sandholtz 1993; Wind 1997; Christiansen et al. 1999). We could envisage a European future in which national preferences converge, where new, common behavioural and social norms are constructed and where a European identity emerges. We could, however, just as well imagine a European future that is less ‘European’ – where national identities are reinforced, norms and behaviours diverge further, supranational institutions become empty shells and the term Europe signifies nothing more than the name of a continent.

Paul Pierson’s historical institutionalist analysis is worth mentioning as an example of an institutionalist analysis of the EU which not only tries to take a middle ground among rational choice and sociological institutionalist approaches but also tries to provide a synthesis of neo-institutionalism with other theories of European integration. For historical institutionalists, institutional evolution cannot be placed under tight control as it is not an ‘efficient historical process’. In other words, institutions do not turn out as intended by those who set them up but take on a life of their own. Thus, institutions are no longer subject to the control of those who set them up. On the contrary, those who did set them up find that their choices are constrained by these same institutions. ‘History creates context, which shapes choice’ (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 16). In the case of European integration, institutional and policy reforms that were indeed intended by national governments can be seen to end up transforming the preferences of the same, initially dominant, national actors in unintended, unanticipated, or even undesired ways, over time.

Pierson claimed that neo-functionalist explanations overstate the autonomous power of supranational actors; national governments, acting together in Council, remain the strongest actors in the European picture (Pierson 1996: 125–6). He conceded, in other words, that the liberal intergovernmentalist starting point is correct: states do indeed initially make agreements through bargaining, but after the initial bargain has been struck and after delegation of authority to supranational institutions has taken place, the autonomy of national governments to bargain will be more limited the next time around and will diminish each time a bargain is negotiated.

According to Pierson, significant gaps emerge between the institutional and policy preferences of national governments and the actual functioning of the institutions for a variety of reasons: because the supranational European institutions (European Commission, European Court of Justice and EP) are, at least partially, autonomous and try to enhance their autonomous power; because national decision-makers have short-term time horizons which are given by the next domestic general elections and may not pay much attention to long-term consequences of decisions concerning institutional and policy choices; because even if decision-makers do focus on long-term effects, there are likely to be unintended consequences in a complex system such as the EU, which are likely to take the forms of ‘overload’ or ‘spill-over’; and finally, because the preferences of national governments as such change over time.

Once gaps emerge and national governments lose control, it is often not possible to reverse the process. The reasons mentioned by Pierson are: the resistance of supranational actors which may take advantage of gaps to strengthen their positions, institutional and legal barriers to reform, and sunk costs that make policy reversal unattractive. Governments get ‘locked in’ to policy options that they would not initiate if they were to start afresh (Pierson 1996: 131–48).

Pierson’s analysis is not the only version of a historical institutionalist analysis of the EU to have been put forward: others have highlighted the role of culture and ideas within institutions such as the Commission (Armstrong and Bulmer 1997). Ideas can be said to be ‘built into’ institutional structures, which could favour certain policy choices and outcomes over others. By extension, the persistence of these ideas can systematically privilege some actors over others, thereby creating power asymmetries. An example cited by Armstrong and Bulmer was that, since European policy is market-oriented and since in the Commission there are separate consumer and producer Directorates-General (DGs) with shared competence over policy-making, the result may well be a persistent marginalisation of non-market interests (Armstrong and Bulmer 1997). Such versions of historical institutionalism can be said to be closer to sociological institutionalism, whereas Pierson’s can be said to be closer to rational-choice institutionalism, given that his actors are, in the end, rational actors and not passive bearers of ideological or cultural biases (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000: 17).

The emerging historical institutionalist story of European integration is dominated by the ‘stickiness’ of institutions, which tend to persist in time and to increasingly circumscribe the choices that actors can make both in strategic and in substantial terms (Hall and Taylor 1996). This presumably counts for national governmental actors as much as it does for European supranational actors. To point out that, in this context, ideas and culture matter and can be seen to be built into ‘sticky’ institutions, could be argued to complete and enrich the kind of historical institutionalist analysis of the EU that Pierson undertakes. Taking into account the particular ideas, norms and cultures that are built into Europe’s national and supranational institutions, there might be a better chance of identifying and explaining the strategic (or non-strategic) behaviour of the actors involved, in the context of specific episodes in the history of the EU, as well as the overall, long-term process of integration from a historical institutionalist perspective.

Despite the deep differences among the various institutionalist approaches to the EU, it can be argued that they all share some characteristics.

First, they all agree that institutions matter, and that, therefore, the study of the EU should focus on the study of the institutions involved in its governance (Checkel 1998).

Second, in principle, all institutions matter: institutionalist analyses claim not to be biased towards the supranational or the national institutions (as are, respectively, neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism) but to adopt an empirical approach in order to see which institutions do in fact matter and how (Wincott 1995: 602).

Third, institutionalist approaches are argued not to imply a telos for European integration, neither in the direction of supranational union nor in the direction of strengthened state dominance; rather, any prediction must be localised, contingent on the empirical study of institutions and always medium-term (Bulmer 1997: 6).

Fourth, where neo-functionalism and liberal intergovernmentalism have tended to see the relationship between domestic and supranational institutions in the EU in terms of a zero sum game, institutionalist analyses tend to examine the interplay and mutual influence between levels in the EU context (Jupile and Caporaso 1999).

Fifth, institutionalism has been argued to signal a turning away from ‘grand theory’ towards the study of the day-to-day politics of the European Union (Bulmer 1997:16).

Theories of European integration and political responsibility in the EU

From the traditional neo-functionalist perspective, the EU could not be said to present any serious problems of political responsibility. Political responsibility, along with most other political questions, would be postponed to a distant future in which Europe would have evolved into a polity and where political decisions of a constitutive nature would have to be made. It would be pointless, in other words, to ask European politicians to behave responsibly and be aware of their obligation to assume responsibility or to demand fully operational practices of accountability in an emerging entity that was to be in a process of constant piecemeal evolution and whose agents would be members of various national and transnational elites, the role of which could not be characterised as strictly ‘political’.

More recent neo-functionalists would argue that the EU is a sui generis polity, that we cannot view it in the same light as a state or an inter-governmental organisation and that we need to judge it as it is, looking at its novelty and unique advantages as well as what we understand to be its disadvantages. Such judgements may result in our thinking that we need to reconsider the way in which we conceptualize political responsibility or accountability in the EU context in a way that is different from the state-centric view we normally adopt when we think about such matters (Banchoff and Smith 1999: 7). In short, for neo-functionalists, old and new, the EU is not up against any problems related to political responsibility because political responsibility as we know it is not a principle that, at least for the time being, or in more general terms, is or should be applied to it.

A liberal intergovernmentalist would identify concrete problems of political responsibility in the EU. They would accept that while political responsibility for decisions taken at the European level lies at the national level in full, national governments can often escape parliamentary accountability and scrutiny, given that domestic oppositions are disadvantaged in terms of the information they can obtain about what their respective governments do in ‘Brussels’ and given that these governments are able to blame ‘Brussels’ for their own decisions. It would seem that the EU’s responsibility deficit, as identified from a liberal intergovernmentalist point of view, appears as a national problem which can only find national solutions. The shortcomings of political responsibility in Europe are a problem for national publics and national groups, which see their control over their respective governments concerning European issues (and also by extension national issues) as continuously diminishing. Political responsibility could be strengthened at the national level: more openness, more political debate and more accountability for national governments with regard to European issues could improve the situation in terms of political responsibility in the EU as a whole.

However, this is not a line of argument that can be taken very far. European-level co-operation has meant a strengthening of CoG positions in two ways: a better environment for bargaining with one another and an improved position in the context of their domestic social and political arenas. Among the reasons that national governments have for agreeing to co-operate with one another, a significant one is that their position of power is improved vis à vis their citizens; thus their hand is freer at decision-making, both domestically and at the European level, since they can escape from having to account for their actions. If this is an integral part of why national governments agree to co-operate at the European level, increased accountability at home would mean less or no integration for Europe. It seems, therefore, that liberal intergovernmentalism entails a trade-off between political responsibility and European integration: we can either have responsible national governments or irresponsible European governance.

Rational-choice institutionalist accounts would lead us to a similar picture with regard to political responsibility in the EU. For liberal inter-governmentalists, where responsibility lies and the lines of accountability in the EU are clear: all responsibility lies with national governments; the problem is that national governments can escape national scrutiny because their domestic publics do not have access to information about EU decision-making. This capacity to disown responsibility is an important motive for national governments to co-operate at EU level. Rational-choice institutionalists not only acknowledge that the locus of political responsibility and the lines of accountability in the EU are blurred but also show that, in many cases, supranational actors are irresponsible vis à vis their (presumably irresponsible in their turn) national principals.

According, then, to the liberal-intergovernmentalist and rational-choice institutionalist accounts, the EU does present shortcomings in terms of political responsibility, which are mainly to do with the difficulty national principals have of keeping their supranational agents under control. While this perspective can help to trace the origins of the problem of political responsibility, it is not sufficient as it addresses only one part of the problem, which has to do with certain aspects of accountability.

A histor...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication
• Preface
• Abbreviations and acronyms
• Introduction
• 1 European Union in perspective: the legacy of Jean Monnet
• 2 Political responsibility and legitimate governance
• 3 Accountability
• 4 Identifiability
• 5 Openness
• 6 Conclusions
• References
• Index