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Psychoanalytic theory
Introduction
Psychoanalysis plumbs the depths of how we imagine ourselves, how we establish worldviews and values, and how we relate out of these.1 According to Anthony Elliott, psychoanalysis âpowerfully accounts for the ⊠essential and primary foundations of all human social activityâ,2 namely representation, fantasy, identification and pleasure. It âhighlights the fantasmatic dimension of cultural practices, social institutions, political normsâ.3 For this reason, Elliott is correct in his contention that one must consider the place of the psyche in our understanding of human subjectivity if one is to bring about social and political transformation.
For Elliott, the social world will never be the same again after reading Lacan because âhis theories capture something of the strangeness that pervades the mundane and familiar in daily lifeâ.4 Lacanian and post-Lacanian analyses have helped evaluate the self and society, connecting the self to political domination and exploitation. They have also focused on rethinking and deconstructing the possibilities for political emancipation and autonomy. The approaches of the Lacanian and Frankfurt Schools âhighlight that modern social processes interconnect in complex and contradictory ways with unconscious experience and therefore with the selfâ.5 Unconscious processes affect social relationships, contemporary culture and all attempts at conceptualisation.
In light of the above, it would be hard to argue that Lacanian psychoanalysis has little to say about socio-ideological fantasy, the denial which it involves, and the conflict it gives rise to, a contention that is strengthened by Lacanâs remark that psychoanalysis ârests on a fundamental conflict, on an initial, radical dramaâ6 at the psychic level.
Lacanian psychoanalysis7
For Lacan, conflict and domination are not marginal deviations from normality but part and parcel of societyâs basic structure. There is no pre-established harmony. He understands the self, as constructed in the West, to be âan ideological construction which makes our whole civilization in a meaningful sense mentally illâ.8 The point of psychoanalysis for Lacan, however, is not primarily an explanatory one: it is change. Evidence the following:
Analysis is not a matter of discovering in a particular case the differential feature of the theory, and in doing so believe that one is explaining why your daughter is silent â for the point at issue is to get her to speak, and this effect proceeds from a type of intervention that has nothing to do with a differential feature.
Analysis consists precisely in getting her to speak.9
Add to this his development of the Imaginary, the Symbolic and the Real orders,10 accounting for the fragmented ego and the centrality of aggressivity to this,11 the constitution of the split subject caught up in the exigencies of the Other (otherwise the Lacanian unconscious, which is structured like language),12 and rivalry over jouissance even when this involves suffering,13 and it becomes clear what it is that makes Lacanian analysis particularly relevant to a study of conflict and its resolution.
The Imaginary order is the realm of opposition, domination, oppression, alienation, images, mirrors, paranoia, perception, identifications with others, and identity. Paraphrasing Lacan, Fink characterises the Imaginary order as âthe world of rivalry and warâ.14 He notes that â[i]t is in a fundamental rivalry ⊠that the constitution of the human world as such takes place.â15 Lacan believed that the basic natural state for mankind was that of aggression. Aggression is already present in the pre-verbal child born out of the narcissistic relation with the image and is linked to the structures of objectification that âcharacterize the formation of the egoâ.16
The Symbolic overwrites the Imaginary, subordinating Imaginary relations involving rivalry and aggressivity to symbolic relations that are âdominated by concerns with ideals, authority figures, the law, performance, achievement, guilt, and so onâ.17 The Symbolic order situates the individual in culture, the world of metaphor and metonymy. A personâs thoughts are made within culture. Thus: âThe subject does not speak, he âis spokenâ by the symbolic structure.â18 The Symbolic thus inhabits the individual and dominates him or her, imposing its law on the desiring subject, both curtailing desire and propelling its motion. So, Turkle can write that for Lacan â[t]he individual and the social order are inextricably boundâ.19
The Real is trauma, violence, a moment of excruciating pain, pure antagonism. People construct ârealityâ out of the Real in part to protect themselves against its pure antagonism. They recreate âa harmony with the realâ.20 Lying outside the world of the signifier, the Real âgoverns our activities more than any otherâ.21 We repeat it without recognising it: âthe real is that which comes back to the same place â to the place where the subject in so far as he thinks, where the res cogitans, does not meet itâ.22 Nevertheless, one can say something about the Real from the way the unconscious speaks where there is pain, revealing truth, which Lacan views as a function of the unconscious. In ĆœiĆŸekâs words, truth âbelongs to the order of contingency: we vegetate in our everyday life, deep into the universal lie that structures it, when, all of a sudden, some totally contingent encounter â a casual remark by a friend, an incident we witness â evokes the memory of untold repressed trauma and shatters our self-delusionâ.23 This is what tells us what is really going on, what people really desire.
The Imaginary order
The ego
For Lacan the point of departure for human subjectivity occurs at the pre-verbal âmirror stageâ. Looking into a mirror the child is captivated or âcapturedâ by its image, seeing the image as reality and concluding âI am thatâ and âThat is meâ. In effect, the subject collapses into its object, failing to distinguish itself from the Other. It is thus in the Other that the subject first lives and registers himself or herself. The individual is alienated from himself or herself because of his or her desire for the image. It is a relation of opposition because what is established is established on the basis of what is not, i.e. an Other. Thus, Imaginary relations always involve intimidation, aggression, aggressive competitiveness, superiority, jealousy, or resentment. Lacan says that with the âcaptation of the subjectâ24 in the mirror we have a formula for âthe madness that deafens the world with its sound and furyâ.25
The mirror stage is rooted in the âfragmented bodyâ (âcorps morcelĂ©â) fantasy. According to this fantasy, the individual has a sense of bodily disarray that feeds the desire for a secure, stagnant, frozen âIâ. The ego is condemned to perpetual torment, caught as it is between a push towards integration and wholeness as imaged in the mirror and the disintegration of the âcorps morcelĂ©â, which is a reminder to the individual of its lack and incompleteness.
As a result of the mirror stage, all Imaginary relations are fixated on an idealisation and an illusion, and otherness in the form of oppositions persists throughout adult life. Others always appear to have the totality and stability that the individual desires. Pulled between the desire for autonomy or identity and the identification with a rival, the ego is in a constant paranoid relation with the Other. The egoâs desire to be the Other by dissolving its otherness in this gradually becomes a desire to control the Other through which it sees itself because any change in the Other would threaten its view of itself. This is the source of human conflict. Conflict for Lacan is not the innocuous, anodyne competition or disagreement that exists between individuals or groups. It is a matter of domination and oppression â forms of violence that may or may not have a physical expression. Lacan notes that the effects of aggressive intention are âmore far-reaching than any act of brutalityâ.26 This understanding of conflict makes Lacanian analysis relevant to situations of communal conflict where the threat of violence can paralyse a community.27
According to Lacan, the ego has a paranoiac structure and is buttressed by denial. Violence, for Lacan, is the result of âparanoid justifications of our own insecurity, which we project as aggressivity emanating from the others we controlâ.28 Feelings of persecution lead to anxiety and this in turn leads the ego to express itself through negative projections onto others, throwing its own disorder and bad feelings onto them and fearing their return in the form of paranoia. When someone says âThey are out to get meâ what they are actually saying is âI am out to get themâ. The term âprojectionâ has many usages in psychoanalysis but it always appears as a defence.29 It is best understood for the purposes of the present study as the unconscious process whereby the indivi...