Propaganda and counter-terrorism

Strategies for global change

Emma Briant

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2015
• ISBN:
  9781847799623
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Terrorisme

A unique account of British and United States government's attempts to adapt their propaganda strategies to global terrorist threats in a post-9/11 media environment

1

Introduction

Following the September 11th 2001 terrorist attacks, the so-called ‘psychological terrain’ was seen as the crucial counter-terrorism ‘battleground’ where compliance might be created or conflict influenced in Afghanistan and Iraq. Much has been written about the ‘hearts and minds’ campaigns of the governments of the United States and United Kingdom. Yet this book will illuminate an unseen story, that of the planning behind the propaganda, from the mouths of the key planners themselves. It traces their efforts to adapt propaganda systems that were seen as ‘outdated’ within a rapidly changing global media environment that defied geographical boundaries and muddied traditional ‘targeting’. The book will argue that these counter-terrorism adaptations resulted in initiatives that gave propaganda wider reach and challenged existing structures, ‘rules’ and practices. Change was not an uncomplicated process, however, and this book examines Anglo-American adaptation and explains how, why, and to what extent the countries were ‘successful’ in adapting. Documenting changing ideas about propaganda in both countries during this transitional period, the book will point to the active mediation of propaganda strategies into the culture and practices of government departments and military organisations.

Where the operation and systems of propaganda are often discussed as if they were a systematic or unproblematic ‘machine’, this book demonstrates that the systems of this machine do not always function as governments hope and, like any large bureaucracy, they can struggle to adapt. They are of course formed of people, and propaganda planning can become a site of active struggle, dependent on evolving informal structures founded in relationships and culture. The Anglo-American relationship emerged in this struggle as one element that could sometimes be engaged in the process of propaganda adaptation and exchange. Ultimately the book will show how a structural development of the propaganda apparatus and gradual culture change, particularly in the US, brought a (more permissive) re-definition of ‘legitimate’ propaganda function, developments that were seen as necessary to shift out old ideas and solidify the changes necessary for operational effectiveness.

The rest of this introduction will provide an entry point into the specialist area covered by the book including debates about security and ethics. It will begin with a short history of propaganda theories, including important definitions and concepts from academic perspectives as well as those dominant in contemporary defence policy. This section will be followed by a brief history of Anglo-American relations and propaganda use to provide valuable context to the contemporary relationship. This will lead into a discussion of how ‘security’ and ‘threats’ were defined and constructed for the ‘War on Terror’. There will finally be a brief note on method.

Theoretical and ethical debates on propaganda

Although this research focuses on the use of propaganda by two particular modern liberal democracies, the use and indeed the study of propaganda is ancient and global. From the early democracies of ancient Greece until the early twentieth century the term most commonly used to refer to what we now think of as propaganda was ‘rhetoric’. Its morality was debated from the first. Although he was generally unhappy about rhetoric’s use, Plato regarded the motives of the propagandist to be of great importance. In Phaedrus he argues that rhetoric should not be used unless the rhetorician has good motives and a solid knowledge of the ‘truth’. Aristotle appeared to judge the act of using rhetoric by the ends to which it is directed, its context and methods, with much being acceptable if done with good intentions (Aristotle, 1984; Triadafilopoulos, 1999). Machiavelli famously claimed in The Prince that ends justify means and that deception was acceptable as a means for retaining power, and his description of the Prince reflects an understanding of the need for a leader to occasionally appear to be what he is not (1961: 55–56).

Ethical debates regarding ‘truths’, ‘ends’ and ‘motives’ have continued to be central to the study of rhetoric and propaganda. The prescience of the study of political tools like rhetoric and propaganda has become increasingly apparent into modernity and it is important to understand where the ‘rules’ governing persuasion stem from, since they are integral to societal values and a debate rooted in the very origins of Western democratic culture. Representative democracy raises particular issues regarding the relation between public opinion and policy, and it may be that propaganda is simply irreconcilable with democratic values. Responding to the British government’s lies during the First World War, Lord Ponsonby declared propaganda ‘The defilement of the human soul’ and ‘worse than the destruction of the human body’ (1928, quoted in Taylor, 2003: 1). Robert Goodin echoes this, saying propaganda is ‘the evil core of power’ (1980: 23), which by ‘deceptively subverting’ the recipients’ ‘powers of reasoning’ becomes more objectionable even than force (1980: 21–22). If a person is suffering oppression, coercion or terror they are aware of this and may be able to take steps to reassert their will. However, the art of propaganda does not allow for this possibility. It attempts to gain willing compliance often unconsciously.

Throughout the early twentieth century, public opinion was seen as essentially unpredictable and susceptible to the influence of external propaganda and marginal interests. Harold Lasswell (1934), for example, saw public opinion as irrational, inconsistent and in need of leadership. Likewise, Walter Lippmann argued that public opinion is not sovereign, nor should it be, for this would create tyranny or failure of government. For him the public are ‘outsiders’ who should fulfil the role for which they have been prepared and not try and delve into politics when they lack expertise (1954: 51–53). Should we reject such elitism, the model of rational ignorance tells us that, as the public are unable to know everything, they must to some extent trust in information presented to them (Goodin, 1980: 38). A negative conception of public opinion would hold that it cannot be the basis of stable, responsible government. Since democratic government cannot operate outside the pressure of the electorate and public opinion must be seen to be expressed in policy, by such reasoning attempts to adjust opinion to correspond to government policy lose their perception of illegitimacy. This was significant in Edward Bernays’ early ‘public relations’ work, inspired by Lippmann, which used the psychology behind persuasion both to engineer consent to govern and fight wars through propaganda, and to aid consumerism (2004).

As the mass media flourished in the post-war period, propaganda was increasingly viewed as a key characteristic of modern democracy. There developed a highly influential school of thought drawing insight from behavioural psychology and applying this to propaganda. Lasswell, Doob and others saw propaganda largely as a tool that could be manipulated in order to produce desired responses in the audience (Robins, Webster and Pickering, 1987: 3). The study of propaganda revolved around ‘audience effects’, including experimental studies which have since been denounced (Ellul, 1973: Ch. 4, App. 1). Such theories saw the audience as passively absorbing information, as if injected by a hypodermic syringe. Theorists have since rejected such notions in favour of more sophisticated understandings that account for the wider context through which information is organised, filtered and interpreted. While many still looked at the mechanical aspects of propaganda, thought gradually moved towards the consideration of power and social relations reacting against the less optimistic ideas of public opinion. The mass persuasion and propaganda of Goebbels for Hitler also drove post-war fears of the implications should government fall into the wrong hands. The political and social elements of the use of propaganda came into focus, as well as more sophisticated psychological approaches. Discussion stemmed from the emerging work of the Chicago School, which saw public opinion as essentially rational and requiring a public sphere characterised by lively debate (drawing on Enlightenment ideas such as those of J.S. Mill) (Robins, Webster and Pickering, 1987: 16). If we are to believe that public opinion is rational (or at least no less so than elite opinion) and the only basis for responsible and legitimate government, then propaganda can surely never be justified? Habermas, for example, was critical of propaganda, which he feared was leading to the destruction of the public sphere, the means whereby public opinion is formed (Webster, 1995: 101–134). This book will return to this debate in Chapter 4.

In the US, while fears about propaganda remained, it was seen as a priority to ensure engagement in influencing global perceptions and debate, and permissions as well as restrictions were established during the Cold War period (see below). While the term ‘propaganda’ was commonly associated with dictatorships and totalitarian regimes (conceived as ‘what the enemy said’), its methods were increasingly recognised as a standard tool of democratic government. Qualter, for example, saw propaganda as acceptable as long as there was the ‘greatest possible degree of free competition between propagandists’ (1962: 148). Fraser stressed that ‘propaganda as such is morally neutral’, and it is the surrounding circumstances or the methods applied that are evil or good (Ellul, 1973: 242). He emphasised that although these methods can be abused, this should not be extended to an ultimate judgement of the use of propaganda (Fraser 1957: 12). Merton (1995) also made a distinction between propaganda that provides facts and that which denies such information, rooting his arguments on morality around this distinction. Even Ellul, despite his highly critical stance towards propaganda (he articulates concern over pollution of our shared knowledge-base, saying that propaganda corrupts those who use it), concedes that it is an inevitable part of any democracy (1973: 242–243; see also Burnell and Reeve, 1984).

Some contend that it is the growth of democracy and mass communication that has confirmed the place of propaganda in politics. Democratic governments must live with a political reality that their citizens have some level of political awareness and come up with a strategy to deal with this. According to Ellul, ‘propaganda is needed in the exercise of power for the simple reason that the masses have come to participate in political affairs’ (1973: 121). The emphasis has gradually changed from the techniques and practices themselves and refocused on those employing them, and social theorists have attempted to scrape away the rhetoric and illuminate and challenge the roles propagandists play within wider social power relations. A great debt is owed here to Gramsci’s work on cultural hegemony, as he developed Marx’s concept of the ‘superstructure’ in his Prison Notebooks. Hegemony, for Gramsci, emerged through various competing ideologies, some of which are theories created by academics or political activists, others of which are more ‘organic’, emerging within the common people’s lived experience and articulated through religion, education, family and the media. These were ‘functionaries’ of a structure, yet ‘mediated’ by their relation to the rest of society (Gramsci, 1971: 12). Gramsci saw some scope for resistance and ‘will’ in these ‘organic intellectuals’ (1971: 129), but this exists alongside their tendency to shape perceptions of institutions and wider society towards the dominant culture. Essentially, for Gramsci, this tension was necessary for the coordination of ‘the dominant group’ with ‘the general interests of the subordinate groups’ so that the state could modify any ‘unstable equilibria’ of interests (1971: 182). This underpinned the illusion that dominant interests were also those of society, and government was ‘based on the consent of the majority’ as it is expressed through the media (Gramsci, 1971: 80).

Gramsci thus articulated a theory of how the dominant group are able to manufacture consent and consensus in society, while allowing conflicts to be resolved or absorbed. Much of his theory is helpful in considering the way that democracies work today and how the dominance of neoliberal ideologies is maintained through propaganda, both within the state and in its relation to civil society and the public. For Gramsci, more traditional intellectuals and the ‘party’ reproduced the dominant order most closely; having survived a transition in the mode of production, they falsely retained beliefs that their thought somehow transcended social class and had ‘independence’ (1971: 129). Gramsci described how intellectuals can ‘exercise such a power of attraction that [they subjugate] intellectuals of the other social groups; they thereby create a system of solidarity’, engineering consensus through psychological and social bonds (1971: 182). McLellan argues this can form an all-pervasive notion of ‘common sense’ (something we will see illustrated in later accounts in this book); he points to how, devoid of ‘feudal’ engagement with a peasantry, America’s ruling class were still able to exercise a strong hegemony of capitalist values (1998: 203).

Contemporary arguments often still incorporate an ends–means analysis; for instance, Philip Taylor argued that what was needed was ‘to redirect any moral judgement away from the propaganda process itself and more to the intentions and goals of those employing propaganda’ (2003: 8). Generally, if a strategy successfully achieves a desirable goal the methods employed are quickly overlooked; it is usually when the plan backfires that criticism flows – if, of course, this becomes public knowledge. But too much focus on ‘ends’ may be dangerous. Ellul points out that the ‘truth’ about actors and outcomes as we understand them is elucidated through history, and that history is made by the powerful and successful. He highlights a conflict between the principles of democracy and the need for and processes of propaganda (Ellul, 1973: 232– 238). Taylor stressed the importance of remaining within the boundaries of certain ‘democratic’ principles, which he argued evolved during the events of the twentieth century. This led him, after 9/11, to argue for an enhanced US propaganda effort during peacetime to attempt to counter rumour, hostility and misunderstanding in the international arena (Taylo...