Lipari
Lipari. To Sicilianise Compton Mackenzieās Highlands, āinadequate indeed would be the guidebook or travellerās tale that did not accord to Lipari a place of honour in the very forefront of Italian scenery and romanceā.1 Benito Mussolini and his Chief of Police, Arturo Bocchini, professed similarly grandiose sentiments to dismiss denunciations of confino, Fascismās extrajudiciary practice of internal exile. In fact, Bocchini went so far as to argue that bucolic settings were necessary to confinement because their very beauty served to āsfatare la leggenda tanto cara ai fuoriusciti italiani e alla stampa estera ostile al Regime, circa il presunto inumano trattamento ai confinati politiciā.2 ([D]āebunk the legend so dear to exiled Italians and to the foreign press hostile to the Regime, that the political exiles are supposedly ill-treated.) They countered political outrage with feigned naivetĆ©: how could such Mediterranean wonders be sites of human despair? Rather than address the material conditions of sequestration, these apologists engaged in an axiological short con that rhetorically conflated the islandās stirring landscape with the detention experiences of its prisoners.3
For those stripped of their civil liberties and confined to a liminal legal state in a secluded colony, the stark contrast between the beauty of the setting and the brutality of the conditions permitted no such delusive conflation. The juxtaposition between weal and woe is a constant in narratives that relate the confino experience. For example, Ettore Franceschini, one of Lipariās first detainees, has a double take reaction:
Franceschiniās rapturous impression of Lipari soon ruptures as the imaginary paradiso succumbs to the reality of the inferno. The shattered illusions he describes are recurring motifs in the memoirs of these political prisoners.
The Regime sought to stifle such laments by classifying the colonies as essentially extraterritorial areas, shadow zones beyond the jurisdiction of national and international laws and to negate complaints by propagating its own idyllic narrative of island paradise. An improbable event, however, brought Lipari and confino to the attention of the world: Carlo Rosselli, Emilio Lussu, and Francesco Fausto Nittiās audacious escape from the colony, on 27 July 1929.5 Thanks to the fugitivesā stirring accounts of both the oppressive conditions and their intrepid flight, the foreign press dubbed Lipari the āDevilās Islandā or āMussoliniās Siberiaā.6 Stoking the outrage, Nittiās American publisher, the future Mr Amelia Earhart, George Putnam, claimed to have received, on Fascist letterhead no less, death threats should he proceed with the bookās release. Even though it was a promotional ruse, this publicity stunt reinforced Anglo-Americansā negative perceptions of both Mussolini and confino.7 Ultimately, such unwelcome scrutiny of the governmentās detention practices contributed to the Ministry of the Interiorās decision to shutter the political colony after six years of operation.8 Closure was not immediate: bureaucratic morass and administrative exigencies sustained the site until 10 January 1933. During its period of activity, however, the Lipari colony held over 1,400 political prisoners: approximately 9 per cent of the national total. Its organisational and financial logistics made it the most complex colony of the confino system. Although each internal exile experience was unique, Lipariās comparatively well-documented history elucidates the implementation and conditions of this extrajudiciary punishment as it was conceived and enacted.
The lay of the island
When the Interior Ministry began to sentence political undesirables, confinati politici, to Lipari in December 1926, the Regime was reintroducing a tradition dating back millennia to when Republican Rome had neatly coupled pleasure and penitence by utilising the isle as both a therapeutic retreat and an exile site. Largest of the Aeolian Islands both as land mass (37.29 km2) and population (14,276),9 Lipariās proximity to the Sicilian shores (some 30 km north) ensured both separation from and accessibility to terra firma: an isolation that facilitated the Ministryās ability to control access to the colony.
Throughout its history of continual invasions and rampant piracy, Lipari subsisted on agriculture, fishing, and pumice mining. Annexation by the Kingdom of Italy limited rather than expanded any efforts to diversify the local economy because the nascent national government designated the island as a detention site for criminals. The relegation to colonial penitentiary resulted from the promulgation of the 1863 Pica law, which imposed domicilio coatto, a policy of forced residence, on those deemed undesirable by the State.10 For the inhabitants, the presence of coatti was onerous both physically and financially. Moreover, as the scope of security legislation became increasingly aggressive in its clampdown on dissidents, the number of those interned swelled. By the turn of the century, the inefficacy and brutality of the practice led critics to launch a campaign to end it.11 The political activist Ettore Croce wrote two books criticising domicilio coatto while serving his sentence on Lipari.12 Inspired by Croceās exposĆ©, the writer Irma Melany Scodnik followed up with her own denunciation of detention on the Aeolian Islands.13 Eight years later, the living conditions for coatti had not improved as evinced by Zina Centa Tartariniās account published in the Corriere della Seraās monthly La Lettura in 1908.14
Although the colony officially closed in 1916, Lipari continued to serve as an internment site for political dissidents during the Great War. Following the Paris Peace Conference, however, the opportunity to refashion the island into a tourist destination seemed both desirable and possible. City councillor Francesco De Mauro emphasised this point on 11 October 1920:
Tourism was an untapped revenue stream of which the island was in dire need. The Great War had strapped the municipalityās finances. Its nearly exclusive reliance on pumice as a funding source led to fiscal insolvency when budgetary expenses almost quadrupled while tax revenues decreased by over 70 per cent ā from pre-war levels of ā¤300,000 to post-war levels of ā¤80,000.16 Thus De Mauroās proposal was as much an economic development effort to diversify the tax base as it was a civic impetus to improve the living conditions on Lipari. Moreover, the de facto collapse of the Latin Monetary Union exacerbated the economic crisis, which in turn fostered civil discontent.17 Rather than address the needs and demands of the populace, the political response was an unwavering commitment to sustaining the status quo by stymying efforts to effect change. New administrative reforms, such as transferring control from local officials to a podestĆ , an external appointment in lieu of an elected mayor, effectively suppressed grassroots initiatives.18 In the spring of 1926, instead of the construction projects De Mauro had envisioned, the new administration began to expand the castleās barracks and its environs (in the space that the Archaeological Museum occupies today) for discouragingly familiar purposes well before the enactment of the so-called Leggi eccezionali del fascismo. In July, a citizensā committee sought to prevent the rehabilitation of the colony. It launched a campaign, which included soliciting the support of public figures.19 Amongst these was consummate self-aggrandiser Gabriele DāAnnunzio, who sent a telegram expressing a singular solidarity with the population: āSiate sicuro che sosterrò col più alto fervore lāaspirazione della più bella fra le isole eolie dove io vorrei essere felicemente relegato per polire con la pomice cutulliana [sic] il mio ultimo libroā.20 (Be assured that I support with the greatest fervour the aspiration of the most beautiful of the Aeoliean islands where I would happily like to be confined to polish my latest book with Catullian pumice.) Such ambivalent empathy failed to dissuade the authorities. Tensions continued to escalate culminating in a violent anti-colony protest that caused significant property damage. In response to the civil unrest, the Commissioner of Public Security, Attilio Stagni, called for military reinforcements from Messina on 29 August 1926. Stagni had Francesco De Mauro as well as other civic leaders and protestors arrested, but Lipariās resistance perhaps did have some effect: rather than intern criminals, the island became a political colony.21 The Prefect of Messina spun this strategic modification by reassuring the population that ācoloro che arriveranno non sono criminali comuni nĆ© persone pericolose, ma sono persone rispettabilissime: professori, avvocati, professionisti, che anzi daranno lustro a...