Interrogation, intelligence and security

Controversial British Techniques

Samantha Newbery

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9780719091483
• eBook ISBN: 9780719098345
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Interrogation, Intelligence and Security examines the origins and effects of a group of interrogation techniques known as the 'five techniques'. Through its in-depth analysis the book reveals how British forces came to use these controversial methods. Focusing on the British colony of Aden (1963–67), the height of 'the troubles' in Northern Ireland (1971), and the conflict in Iraq (2003), the book explores the use of hooding to restrict vision, white noise, stress positions, limited sleep and a limited diet. There are clear parallels between these three case studies and the use of controversial interrogation techniques today. Readers will be able to make informed judgements about whether, on the basis of the results of these cases, interrogation techniques that might be described as torture can be justified. This book will be of particular interest to security professionals, academics and members of the public interested in the torture debate, intelligence, the military, counter-insurgency, counter-terrorism, foreign policy and law enforcement.

1

The ‘five techniques’ of interrogation and the Aden Emergency, 1963–67

The use of the ‘five techniques’ to aid interrogation during the years of the Aden Emergency is the subject of this and the following chapter. Aden is the first use of the ‘five techniques’ to be analysed in depth because it was the first that received sustained retrospective attention from the government. As a result of this, written records were created that allow sufficiently complete answers to the key questions of what happened, why, and with what results, to be composed. The division between Chapters 1 and 2 is chronological: the first addresses the run-up to and details of the interrogation operation, while the second examines the results and reactions. In order to explain how the ‘five techniques’ came to be used in Aden, this chapter examines the history and development of the techniques. Detailing who used the techniques, against whom and where, further helps explain the aims behind their use. This will be combined with an examination of the decision-making processes and the level and type of authorisation this operation received to allow the questions of what happened with respect to the ‘five techniques’ in Aden and why to be answered.

The chapter begins with a brief history of Britain’s presence in what became the colony of Aden. Britain was eventually forced to withdraw by the nationalist insurgency it faced there, granting Aden State, and the Federation of South Arabia to which it belonged, independence in 1967. Debates about to what extent, if at all, Britain might have brought about a different outcome continue. While the historian R. J. Gavin argues that even before the Emergency began Britain had little to no chance of maintaining a presence in Aden, the counter-insurgency scholar Thomas Mockaitis argues that the British were unable to maintain a presence there because of their own action and inaction.¹ Strong claims that there were weaknesses in the British approach to the Emergency can be made. Poor co-ordination of its intelligence activities has been highlighted, as has the encouragement the 1966 announcement that Britain would withdraw from the Federation of South Arabia and abandon the military base there gave to the nationalist insurgents.² As will be seen, interrogation became a crucial source of intelligence at a time when other sources were scarce. Identification of the positive and negative contributions that interrogation and the allegations of mistreatment associated with it made to British efforts during the Aden Emergency adds to the debate about the extent to which Britain was responsible for the Emergency’s outcome.

Declaration of a State of Emergency

Aden State was a colony 73 square miles in size – only one-third of the size of the Isle of Man in the Irish Sea – with a population of approximately 220,000, more than two and a half times that of the Isle of Man.³ On 16 January 1963 Aden joined the Federation of South Arabia.⁴ When the Federation was created in 1959 a number of states chose to remain un-federated, and remained part of the East and West Aden Protectorates, though by the end of 1964 all bar one of the states belonging to the latter had already joined, or were soon to join, the Federation.⁵ These territories outside of Aden State, known as ‘the hinterland’, remained dominated by tribes and tribal politics, and the Federation never developed a cohesive political identity.⁶ Aden Colony became Aden State when it joined the Federation. However, Britain retained sovereignty.⁷ Federal rulers were obliged to accept advice from the UK on how to govern the Federation.⁸ The British High Commissioner took advice from Adeni Ministers but was solely responsible ‘for [Aden’s] external affairs, defence, internal security, police and the Aden Public Service’.⁹ Being responsible for internal security, successive High Commissioners played an influential role in the Aden Emergency.

There were two reasons why Aden was a valuable possession. Firstly, its port was the busiest in the Commonwealth and ‘the premier [oil] bunkering port in the world’.¹⁰ Secondly, it was home to a large military base and the headquarters of the military’s Middle East (MIDEAST) Command. It was from this base that activities to protect the Federation and un-federated states were carried out and support given to forces operating in the Gulf.¹¹ The military base was seen as key to protecting Kuwait, which a treaty obliged them to protect. Kuwait had 20 per cent of the world’s known oil reserves.¹² Britain controlled half of these reserves, rendering any disruption to British access to this oil harmful to the economy.¹³ The Commander-in-Chief, MIDEAST Command, emphasised in May 1964 that ‘[t]he fulfilment of my tasks in Kuwait, the Persian Gulf, and in East and Southern Africa depend upon the free and unfettered use of our facilities in Aden’.¹⁴ A stable Aden was key to the continued functioning of the British base there. Much of the accommodation for UK service personnel was spread throughout Aden and therefore could not be given full protection.¹⁵ The base installations were also scattered around Aden and could not be protected without considerable manpower, and the base depended on the local area for provision of water, electricity and sewerage.¹⁶ Britain therefore had an interest in maintaining a presence in Aden and keeping it stable.

Figure 1.1 Aden relative to the Federation and Protectorate of South Arabia

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:FederationOfSouthArabiaMap.webp, accessed 27 May 2014

A State of Emergency was declared by Sir Kennedy Trevaskis, the Aden High Commissioner, on 10 December 1963. The immediate cause was the throwing of a grenade at a group of dignitaries, including Trevaskis himself, at Khormaksar civil airport earlier that day. Amongst the fifty-three people injured were the High Commissioner and his wife, both of whom were shielded from further injury by Herra Banti, an Indian woman, and the Deputy High Commissioner George Henderson, both of whom were killed.¹⁷ Two Federal Ministers were also injured.¹⁸

Trevaskis told Secretary of State for the Colonies Duncan Sandys that he intended to act firmly in response.¹⁹ The Colonial Office offered its support but was sceptical about the need to declare a State of Emergency as suggested by the High Commissioner.²⁰ Aden had experienced political violence since 1958.²¹ In the months before the grenade incident Yemeni authorities had claimed that the Federation was part of Yemen, leading to a steady decline in the security situation.²² The People’s Socialist Party (PSP) had also become a cause for concern, as intelligence indicated that they were preparing to use terrorism and sabotage in their quest to overthrow the government of Aden.²³ This culminated in the declaration of a State of Emergency throughout the Federation on 10 December 1963.²⁴ In the following few days, twenty-nine PSP leaders were detained, while the Federation passed a law controlling the immigration of aliens and began deporting Yemenis.²⁵ Members of the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), which was supported by the UK’s Labour Party, were also detained, taking the total number of detainees in Aden State to fifty-five by 18 December.²⁶ Detention continued to be used until the Emergency came to an end in November 1967. Reasons for the use of detention will be discussed in more depth in the following chapter.

It was ascertained that the grenade incident was ‘part of a deliberate plan for the subversion of the Federation’.²⁷ The most prominent group amongst those posing a threat to security during the Emergency was the National Liberation Front (NLF). Formed in 1963, its weapon of choice was hand grenades.²⁸ It also favoured explosives with time pencils, automatic weapons and mines, all of which were easy to smuggle into Aden because of its porous borders.²⁹ Although the NLF could be described as an insurgent group later in the Emergency, at least,³⁰ the authorities chose to describe it as terrorist so as not to recognise its grievances.³¹ Its revolutionary aims included removing the British base.³² The NLF caused considerable problems in the relatively small state of Aden.

The other influential nationalist group active in Aden at this time was the Front for the Liberation of Occupied South Yemen (FLOSY), created in 1966.³³ It was controlled by Egypt, which had lost its hold on the NLF.³⁴ One of its aims was to compel Her Majesty’s Government (HMG) to recognise that FLOSY was the ‘single Arab entity with which they can negotiate’.³⁵ It was ultimately unsuccessful in this aim, as it was the NLF the British were eventually forced to negotiate with over their exit from Aden.³⁶ Through the NLF, and later FLOSY, Egypt made the continued British presence in Aden increasingly difficult. It was Egypt’s stated intention ‘to overthrow the Federal Government and to secure the removal of the British Base in Aden’, and the Aden authorities learnt that Egypt was trying to organise terrorism and sabotage within the Federation.³⁷ In March 1965 the Aden Local Intelligence Committee (LIC), which was similar to London’s Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), reported there was no longer any doubt ‘of the Egyptian direction of the N.L.F. campaign’.³⁸ It had provided training to the NLF in Yemen and perhaps also in Cairo.³⁹ This training included instructtion on how to resist interrogation’.⁴⁰ It was within this context that the ‘five techniques’ of interrogation were used.

The ‘five techniques’ in Aden

The history and development of the ‘five techniques’

How the ‘five techniques’ of standing against a wall in a stress position...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures and tables
• Acknowledgements
• List of abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 The ve techniques of interrogation and the Aden Emergency, 1963–67
• 2 Aden: Results and reactions
• 3 The troubles, policy-making and interrogation, 1969–71
• 4 The government’s response: Banning the ‘five techniques’
• 5 The ve techniques, intelligence and security in Northern Ireland
• 6 Basra, Iraq, September 2003
• 7 The impact of the reoccurrence of the ‘five techniques’
• Conclusion
• Bibliography
• Index