The advocacy trap

Transnational activism and state power in China

Stephen Noakes

• Publisher: Manchester University Press
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9781526119476
• eBook ISBN: 9781526119490
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book asks what happens to transnational civil society actors as a result of their engagement with China, recognising its status and influence as a rising world power. Taking an interactive and processed-based approach, it aims to explain the multiple, divergent pathways or functional forms of advocacy campaigns in China.

1

Mechanisms of persuasion: when and how are advocacy campaigns effective?

At their most elemental, transnational networks are norm-based. Shared values or principles are the glue that holds them together (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: 3). As Peter Katzenstein explains, ‘norms operate like rules that define the identity of an actor, thus having “constitutive effects” that specify what actions will cause relevant others to recognize a particular identity’ (Katzenstein, 1996: 5). Issue-based campaigns may serve as mechanisms of persuasion, but it is collective commitment to an idea that makes them what they are, providing the grounding for campaigns to be sustainable and effective (Gamson, 1991: 28).

Owing to the fundamentally principled nature of advocacy networks, attempts to understand their role and impact in world politics have unfailingly invoked constructivist theory. For those wishing to explain how norms originate and spread – to account for the existence of TANs – this makes a great deal of sense. What else besides common values compels strangers from different backgrounds and points of origin to mobilize on behalf of others? Constructivism gets us to the bottom of why people care about those whom they have never met far better than any of its rivals. Even the most rationalist treatments of transnational civil society emphasize the currency of their moral message as the utility TANs most want to maximize. The theoretical discussion that takes place in this chapter begins from this assumption, and regards the explanation of activism that unfolds throughout the remainder of this book as ‘constructivist’ in so far as it is concerned with understanding how and when norms matter, and more importantly whose norms exercise causal influence in the conduct and results of transnational advocacy.

Yet scholarly inquiries into the behaviour and effectiveness of TANs under an exclusively constructivist banner poses inherent challenges too. For one thing, constructivism as an approach to questions in international politics covers a huge amount of ground, and scholarly opinion varies on how and how much structural variables matter in the dissemination of norms and states’ compliance with them (Adler, 1997; Price and Reus-Smit, 1998). Moreover, the common framing of the question of how TANs influence states sets up the former as the primary causal agent and protagonist in our story, while the latter is relegated to the status of passive resistor without a significant role in the crafting or execution of advocacy campaigns. Indeed, approaches emphasizing the constituent role of other actors in the advocacy process, especially states, have taken a perennial backseat, leaving the question of whose norms are most influential unasked and unanswered.

To correct for this problem and take a full account of the broad range of factors affecting TAN campaigns in China, this chapter adopts a wide-angle lens, culling factors pertinent to the results and processes of issue advocacy from among three paradigmatic families – state preference-oriented, social preference-oriented, and norms-based. Readers having an international relations background will recognize these as realism, liberalism, and constructivism respectively, albeit stylized forms of each that draw from and make connections with comparative politics, reflecting the multidisciplinary approach of the book as a whole. The first half of the chapter is devoted to an exploration of each one, and articulates from the perspective of each a generalized hypothesis about when and why TAN campaigns are likely to be influential. For instance, the state-preference oriented paradigm understands the effectiveness of TAN campaigns primarily as a function of state capacity – or the ability to convert preferences to authoritative actions – while the social-preference oriented hypothesis views the results of activism as mediated heavily by institutional types and configurations. By contrast, the third, norms-based paradigm posits that TAN effectiveness (or the lack of it) stems from shifting identities brought on by socialization to the mores and practices of a larger whole, or a sense of belonging to a community defined by common adherence to certain values. My discussion of each of these paradigms in turn is accompanied by remarks on how each might be expected to play out in the Chinese context, given what we know about its level of capacity, its authoritarian structure, and its posture in relation to norms of the international community.

The second half of the chapter distils from each of the three paradigms clusters of causal factors from across the fields of political science, international relations, and sociology. This is done in order to reflect the fact that each paradigm is itself a synthesized approach containing many distinct but related variables at play in the unfolding of transnational advocacy campaigns in China. One of the challenges of weaving together an explanatory framework from different intellectual traditions is that it invites disagreement about which paradigm or category of causal factors a given variable properly belongs to, and the relative importance of different variables or categories in the final analysis. My position here stems from a belief that all of the causal factors explicated throughout this chapter are potentially relevant (at least in principle), and that the need for a fully specified causal model trumps strict adherence to disciplinary boundaries. Much is done for convenience in my sorting and categorization of variables from across a breadth of salient literatures. For example, my discussion of realist/state-centred factors includes not only characteristics of the target state environment related to capacity – such as its degree of centralization, openness to new actors, the absence or availability of domestic allies and supporters, and the target state’s ability to repress or accommodate collective mobilization – but also international-level considerations such as the linkage of a TAN to powerful foreign governments – financially, rhetorically, or otherwise – and support for a TAN within interstate organizations and treaties. Similarly, my discussion of liberal/society-centred causal factors takes account not only of institutional type, which introduces a range of enabling or constraining conditions for TANs and to some degree intersects with target state capacities, but also characteristics of the transnational political environment and the internal attributes of TANs themselves. So conceived, the liberal/society-centred category of explanation fuses elements of the political opportunity structures and resource mobilization theories of social movement behaviour. The final category of explanations derives from identity-based theories of collective mobilization and considers the role of ideational or cultural factors in TAN effectiveness. Such factors include the characteristics of issues themselves, such as their relative malleability or nebulousness, the ability of some issues to resonate within a given cultural context while others do not (also known as the ‘cultural match’ hypothesis), and the ease with which an issue can be grafted onto an existing norm or moral standard with some pre-established level of support. To reiterate, it is expected that each of the factors explored in this chapter are relevant for understanding TAN campaigns in China, though they probably do not matter equally in all cases or all of the time. The main question is therefore whether some are more consistently important than others across different campaigns in China, and the effects they exert on how different campaigns unfold.

Thinking about TAN effectiveness: three hypotheses

The realist/state-centred hypothesis

State power has seldom been taken as seriously as is warranted in discussions about transnational civil society. This is largely because of the view of some observers that the gains of transnational actors have come at the expense of states and state-based approaches. Many see the rise of transnational civil society as a direct result of the declining significance of states in a global age (Strange, 1996). This sentiment applied to states in general, which seemed less and less consequential after the Cold War, and increasingly shared the international stage with multinational corporations and other types of non-state actors. Consequently, successful interventions by transnational forces into domestic politics have most often been posed as a rebuttal to the state-centric realist and, to a lesser degree, state-oriented institutionalist approaches in international relations (Katzenstein et al., 1998; Keohane, 1989; Waltz, 1979).

If, on this understanding, state retrenchment explains the rise of transnational activism, then relative capabilities are central to problematizing its domestic impacts. The leverage exerted by transnational civil society over states is indeed a marvel considering the material advantages the latter have at their disposal and their ability to deploy these in the form of coercive force. By definition, TANs are disinclined towards the use of hard power tactics, and even the most resourceful should, in theory, be no match for state power when it is defined in these terms. Indeed, from a realist or state-centred perspective, the material advantages of states should mean that activist campaigns are successful when and where states want them to be. The reason some states might be more open to TANs is because it is in the interests of such states to be open to them. Beyond the question of whether it is in the interest of a state to acquiesce to or appease activists, there is an equally important issue of state capacity. Is the target state sufficiently strong to resist the entreaties of activists? Does it possess the means to convert its preferences, whatever these might be, to authoritative actions (or, in some instances, inaction).

Preferences form the core of the realist/statist explanation, but capacity is needed to back these interests up, and obviously, not all states are equal on this account. Some are more capable than others of directing influences from within and without and converting their preferences to authoritative actions. In general, the stronger the state, the more autonomous and insular it is, and the more it is able to execute its preferences relatively free from external interference. Weak states, on the other hand, are usually more permeable but not necessarily more likely to yield the kinds of results activists hope for. As Jeffrey Haynes explains, ‘easy access for external actors does not necessarily translate into significant leverage on state policies. This is because while [foreign activists] may readily penetrate countries with fragile political institutions, they may find that when they gain access there is little institutionally to work with and hence help achieve their goals’ (Haynes, 2005: 97).

Now more open than ever before to external actors but with seemingly limitless capacity to repress civil society actors, China represents perhaps the hardest of all possible tests for foreign activists. According to figures tabled at the 2011 session of the National People’s Congress, China spends 624.4 billion RMB (about 95 billion USD) annually on domestic security and surveillance, even more than it allocates for military expenditures. A major portion of these funds is devoted to developing some of the world’s most advanced internet filtering technology, according to Reporters Sans Frontières (2006). The capabilities of the central government have scarcely ever been in dispute. Many argue that the decentralization of political authority in the post-Mao era has strengthened, not weakened, the local state and improved governance capacity at the sub-provincial level (Huang, 1996; Tsai, 2007). Even in situations where the impulse for repression is not high, Chinese authorities show remarkable skill in co-opting social forces and redeploying them in the state’s service, a strategy that has served the CCP well in its endeavour to strengthen its capacity to govern (Dickson, 2000–2001; Wright, 2010).

The liberal/society-oriented hypothesis

A second explanation for effective advocacy grants primacy to the constraining effects of social preferences on state decision-making. Unlike the realist perspective, which emphasizes the relative capabilities of state and social forces, this approach stresses how competition among subnational actors mitigates the formation and execution of national preferences (Moravcsik, 1997). Institutional types, not merely their strength, are the salient factor affecting campaign outcomes within this framework, since different institutional types present differing incentives for elites, individuals, or groups to engage in rent-seeking, and provide important clues about whose preferences get voiced, when, and why.

In general, the more representative and contestable those institutions are, the stronger the possibilities for advocates to penetrate and influence the target state. Where they succeed in doing so, it is because states are compelled by social interests exercised through enabling structural and legal channels to adopt new policy positions. In principle, such institutions as legislatures can serve this function, as can the empowerment of grassroots organizations through legal frameworks that enable civil society or encourage local policy experimentation, for example through a measure of decentralization or administrative autonomy. The tricky part is that the presence or absence of enabling institutional features or arrangements does not always overlap perfectly with regime type (Boix and Svolik, 2013; Gandhi, 2008; Wright, 2010). This is a point worth remembering when exploring what activists can expect to encounter in the Chinese context, a subject to which I will return momentarily. For the moment, however, there are some general patterns in the way in which distinct regime types shape TAN campaigns and their outcomes.

By and large, democratic states make for easier targets of advocacy campaigns. This should not be surprising – democracies are supposed to be more open and accessible, providing citizens with genuine opportunities to form opinions and participate in political decision-making by means of routinized institutional points of entry (Dahl, 1972; Diamond, 1999; Schmitter and Karl, 1996). Strong democracies are fully capable of deflecting those attempts at advocacy they perceive as being at odds with their own interests, but the presence of an institutional and legal framework that makes participation possible and protects civil society groups against overt state supervision and control makes these regimes more permeable than those lacking this feature. Non-democracies typically display the inverse characteristic, operating with a greater degree of autonomy from social actors. As a result, authoritarian regimes are relatively insular and invulnerable, capable of isolating themselves from external influences, both foreign and domestic. Self-segregation from popular mobilization is a common feature of virtually all non-democracies, regardless of their institutional or regional sub-type. However, non-democracies do vary in their degree of closure, just as democracies do in their openness. In the most extreme cases autocrats exercise such complete control and authority over society and are so little concerned with popular opinion that they treat the public, in Max Weber’s famous words, as ‘any ordinary object of possession’ (Weber, 1947: 347).

As the most frequently occurring and widely dispersed of all authoritarianisms, communist regimes historically comprise a notable sub-variant of this category. Leninist party-states in almost every corner of the world combined a total absence of rival political parties with extreme forms of state-mandated mobilization to stoke revolutionary fervour and enforce ideological conformity. Their goal was not merely to control social organizations, but to eliminate their autonomy altogether by remaking society in the state’s image. By reconstituting all of society as an instrument of state policy, proletarian dictatorships were able to maintain the highest levels of control over their citizens. Further, the export of Lenin’s particular emphasis on the imperialistic nature of capitalism promoted a deep hostility and mistrust towards foreign powers and led to the adoption of self-reliance in many socialist countries, effectively shutting them off from threats of encroach...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Series Information
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Series editors’ foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction: The superpower’s dilemma: to appease, repress, or transform transnational advocacy networks?
• 1 Mechanisms of persuasion: when and how are advocacy campaigns effective?
• 2 The power of state preferences: the ‘natural cases’ of the campaigns for Falun Gong and IPR protection
• 3 Reading the ‘lay of the land’: intercessory advocacy and causal process in the HIV/AIDS treatment and death penalty abolitionist campaigns
• 4 State-directed advocacy: the ‘drift’ phenomenon in the ‘free Tibet’ and global warming campaigns
• 5 Strategic considerations, tough choices: how state preferences influence campaign forms
• Conclusion: State power as reality
• References
• Index